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It is commonly recognized that compared with the self in modern western philosophy, the self in Confucianism is a role-carrying and interrelated individual, who acts in accordance with li. That is, the Confucian self is, first of all, a li-follower. Due to this feature of the Confucian self, some may argue that the Confucians require the individual to bring his personal and subjective desires into conformity with li, thereby ignoring the dignity of human subjectivity and autonomy. By arguing that the Confucian li is based on the understanding of the Way of Heaven and that the self has the potentiality to understand the Way of Heaven, I will show that the individual in Confucianism is not only a li-follower, but also a li-maker. Using Kant's phrase, the Confucian self is one who is "legislating for oneself." However, because of Kant's denial of human being's intellectual intuition, "legislating for oneself" is ultimately not realized in Kant's moral philosophy. By admitting that human heart-mind is an infinite heart-mind and that the self has the potentiality to understand the Way of Heaven, the Confucians render "legislating for oneself" a real possibility in Confucianism.

I. The Confucian Self as a Li-follower

The individual is always considered as a person-in-society in Confucianism, existing in a network of relations. Mencius pointed out five human relations (wulun): (1) father and son, (2) ruler and subordinate, (3) husband and wife, (4) brother and brother, and (5) friend and friend. It is well known now that the self in Confucianism is a role-carrying and interrelated individual. For example, according to Francis L. K. Hsu's formulation of psychological homeostasis, the Chinese consciousness of self is interactionist. [2] Tu Wei-ming also argues that "a characteristic Confucian selfhood entails the participation of the other and that the reason for this desirable and necessary symbiosis of selfhood and otherness is the Confucian conception of the self as a dynamic process of spiritual development." [3]

Unlike the purely rational, rights-claiming, autonomous individual of western liberal ethics, the self in Confucianism is a role-carrying and interrelated individual. In order to adjust these relationships, rules of conduct in the name of li are set up to make the relationships stable and the emphasis is placed on the

duty and obligation demanded of the parties concerned in each relationship, which are in turn based on the notion of the right ideal. If every person can abide by the rules of conduct (li) and carry out the obligations corresponding to his status, there will be peace in society. Confucius said, "When the father is father, the son is son, the elder brother is elder brother, the husband is husband, and the wife is wife, then the family is in proper order. When all families are in proper order, all will be right with the world." [4] This means that each name not only has a prescribed set of obligations, but also reflects a status. For example, that a son should be filial to his parent is not only an obligation; the son fulfils it not solely for the sake of the parent, but also because this is what he owes to his own moral integrity. By this act, he proves to himself, as well as to others, that his claims to true personhood are valid. [5]

The Confucians emphasize the importance of li because it is essential to living a distinctive human life. Living a distinctive human life means living in dignified harmony with others, and our distinctive human roles are defined by our relation to others. Moreover, these roles define the "person" himself or herself. The identity of each person is in his or her relations to other people, to social communities, and to his or her own moral cultivation by which the self is brought to maturity. This can be seen clearly from the Confucian emphasis on the importance of yi, the original meaning of which is one's dignity or demeanor.

The ancient Chinese character for yi contains yang, or "sheep" as a radical or classifier, and the first person personal pronoun wo (I, we, me, us) as its phonetic. Shuowen Jiezi explains that yi means one's dignity or demeanor. In the early philosophical literature, yi is consistently defined in terms of its homonym, YI, which is often translated as right, proper, appropriate or suitable. [6] David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames make a useful suggestion when they say that the homophonous and semantic relation between these two characters suggests that they can be traced back to one original root concept which, in the evolution and refinement of its meaning, gave rise to a distinction significant enough to warrant two different characters. At a very basic level, these two characters are congruent in their meaning of "appropriateness, rightness, propriety." They diverge, however, in that whereas yi denotes appropriateness to one's own person, YI refers to appropriateness to one's context. [7]

Then what does it mean to say that there should be "appropriateness to one's own person" in Confucianism? In order to answer this question, it is helpful to look at the contents and the importance of yi. Yi (righteousness) is one of the most important concepts in ancient Chinese philosophy. It covers the manners of ruler and minister, superior and inferior, the distinction between father and son, high and low, the contact between intimate acquaintances and the distant, and the internal and the external. In short, "righteousness" implies whatever is done right. Anything right ought to be done right. Hence the saying: "Superior ri

ghteousness acts and makes pretensions.” [8] In Confucian ethics, taking into consideration the fact that “yi” has been used in many crucial constructions dealing with normative judgements, it seems that yi is a standard or principle by which to judge or evaluate moral actions and moral agents. As Chung-ying Cheng argues, yi is the very principle which should make a person’s conduct morally acceptable to others and which should justify the morality of human action. In other words, it may be suggested that yi is the fundamental principle of morality that confers qualities of right and wrong on human actions, producing a situation that intrinsically satisfies us as moral agents. [9]

In theory, the earliest expression of yi was very much an individual matter. The Mozi describes this situation very vividly (11:14):

In antiquity at the dawn of human existence when there was as yet no law or government, it is said that people had different yi. Thus, where there was one person, there was one yi, where there were two persons, there were two yi, and where there were ten persons, there were ten yi. In fact there were as many yi as there were people, and everyone approved of his yi and disagreed with everyone else’s. Thus arose disagreement among people.

From this beginning, and in the process of socialization, these individual expressions of moral action have been knitted into li. These li, appropriate social conducts preserved in the conventions of an articulated cultural tradition, are the repository of the yi that past generations have invested in the world. So in most cases, an action of yi is also an action in accordance with li. This means that according to Confucian ethics, one’s dignity (yi) comes from his actions in accordance with li.

In essence, then, li not only defines “moral” or proper human conduct; it also defines what it means to be a person (or human being), from a Confucian point of view. Therefore, actions of yi are actions appropriate to their social roles or their relations with others, which are usually prescribed in detail by li. Since the content of li is about the appropriate social conduct of certain roles in certain human relations, normally an action of yi is an action which is appropriate to one’s social roles or status. Thus, by performing actions in accordance with li, one comes to maturity by having yi. That is why Confucius said, “The superior man takes yi to be his essence, and acts in accordance with li; expresses himself with modesty, and realises himself by way of integrity.” (Analects, 15:17) Xunzi also argues that “when he (a junzi) has practised righteousness by means of [conforming to] ritual, he is righteous.” (Xunzi, Ch.27) In this sense, the Confucian emphasis on the importance of yi is in correspondence with the theory of “rectification of names.” For example, if a minister acts in a way appropriate to the status of a minister, he is a minister of yi; and if he does not act in a way inappropriate to the status of a minister, he is not a minister

of yi and should be blamed. In the book of Zuozhuan, after recording the deed of a Duke's brother, who acted in a way which is not appropriate to his status, it concludes: "By his many deeds of unrighteousness he will bring destruction on himself." [10]

Confucius's own accounts of yi are often related to the appropriate roles or status, too. It is recorded in Zuozhuan Chenggong Year 2 that the state of Qi invaded the state of Lu, and Duke Mu of Wei sent an army led by Sun Huanzi to help the Lu state. But the army was defeated on the way to Qi. It was Zhongshu Yuhe, commandant of Xinzhu, who came to the relief of Sun Huanzi and secured his escape. As a result, the people of Wei wanted to reward Yuhe with a city, but he refused to accept it. He asked instead that he "be allowed to have his suspended instruments of music disposed incompletely [like those of the prince of a State], and to appear at court with the saddle-girth and bridle-trappings of a prince;-- which was granted to him." When Confucius heard of this, he said, "Alas! It would have been better to give him many cities. It is only peculiar articles of use and names, which cannot be granted to other [than those whom they belong];--to them a ruler has particularly to attend. It is by [the right use of] names that he secures the confidence [of the people]; it is by that confidence that he preserves the articles [distinctive of ranks]; it is in those articles that the ceremonial distinctions of rank are hid; those ceremonial distinctions are essential to the practice of righteousness; it is righteousness which contributes to the advantage [of the State]; and it is that advantage that which secures the quiet of the people. Attention to these things is the condition of good government...'" [11] For Confucius, what is righteousness is often related to what is appropriate to one's social status and position. Success in government lies ultimately in the cultivation of the righteous heart-mind of the person. Therefore, the ancient sage kings made the rules of conduct in the name of li in order to limit people's actions within appropriate confines, helping their heart-minds to achieve righteousness, which in turn leads to a good and efficient government, and eventually brings peace to the whole world.

Made by the ancient sage-kings, li is emphasised by the Confucians. Confucius and his disciples strongly stressed the functions of li and worked hard to develop its philosophical basis. In this sense, the self in Confucianism is a li-follower. As Xinzhong Yao argues, the Confucian self is essentially a concept of moral relationships, emphasizing that what comprises individual identity is constituted in a social context, and it should be revealed and examined in its public dimensions. Without others and without social relations, the self has no ground on which to be based, and self-cultivation cannot be possible. [12]

Owing to the above-mentioned characteristic of the Confucian self, some may argue that by emphasizing the primacy of the importance of social relationships and the harmony of the society, the Confucians require the individual to bring their personal and subjective desires into conformity with li, thereby ignoring the dignity of human subjectivity and autonomy. This argument would be reasonable if li was arbitrarily made and enforced by the sages.

In order to have a thorough understanding of the Confucian self, we need to first explore tiandao (the Way of Heaven), the foundation on which li is established, and second, the Confucian self, which has the capacity to obtain an understanding of the Way of Heaven. Those who have obtained an understanding of the Way of the Heaven will naturally think highly of li and become a li-maker for others as well as themselves.

Li and Tiandao

It is well known that in the teachings concerning the Confucian li, li is regarded as something that is not arbitrary. Confucius contends that li is in harmony with the universal order, that is, the tiandao, or the Way of Heaven. Only thus could it successfully execute its function as a means of social control. Since li is a product of the sages who knew the Way of Heaven, and everyone can become a sage if he/she chooses to, this implication is that the self in Confucianism is endowed with an infinite heart-mind, which, if fully developed, will enable one to coexist with the Heaven and Earth. Without this infinite heart-mind, it would be impossible for Mencius and Xunzi to claim that everyone can become a sage like Yao, Shun and Yu.

Heaven is the source of Confucian spirituality. As the Ultimate Reality, Heaven (tian) is the origin of all things in the world. Heaven creates everything, not in the way in which God created everything, but in the sense that it generates all things through its internal, rich abundance of life. In the Analects, Confucius said, "Does Heaven say anything? The four seasons run their course and all things are produced. Does heaven say anything?" (Analects, 17:19) When he reflects on the speechlessness of heaven and the simultaneous creative workings of heaven in the sun, the moon, and the four seasons, he points to a nature that is sacred, not because it is sanctified by a transcendental God but because it inspires in us a sense of order, harmony and purpose. So although Heaven does not speak to people in a literal sense, we can know its generative power and come to be aware of an objective order in the universe from the manifestations of Heaven's work. The way of Heaven embodies a cosmic pattern, a pattern of an organic whole in which everything is related to everything else. To be out of the relation is to be a non-entity.

Heaven is the source of all forms of life. All things generated from Heaven therefore maintain relation to Heaven while interrelating with one another. In this intelligible living macroorganism of the Universe (Heaven), everything has its precisely determined function in the cosmic dynamic process of creations (as are, in our modern terminology, particular cells in a living organism). Accordingly, one understands that life on Earth is organically connected with these heavenly (cosmic) processes, which cannot be ignored in the organization of human society. [13] Heaven is not only the source of all things but also the ground and justification for the continuous existence of all things. In short, Heaven is immanent in all things and constitutes the very nature of things. This is also true of human existence, so that the Way of humanity must follow the Way of Heaven.

Heaven is the source of a meaningful life. But as Tu Weiming argues, although Heaven is omnipresent and may be omniscient, it is certainly not omnipotent—our understanding of the Mandate of Heaven requires that we fully appreciate the rightness and principle inherent in our heart-minds. [14] As Mencius put it, “Those who follow the way of Tian will be preserved, and those who act contrary to the way of Tian will perish.” (The Book of Mencius, 4A: 7) Xunzi also said, “The Way is the proper standard for past and present. He who departs from the Way and makes arbitrary choices on the basis of his own judgment does not understand wherein fortune and misfortune lie.” (Xunzi, Ch. 22)

It may be argued that Confucian doctrines are primarily based on observing and following the laws of Heaven and earth. The commentators of the Book of Changes believed that the ancient sages looked up to observe the pattern of Heaven, and looked down to examine the order of Earth, thereby gaining knowledge of the causes of affairs and understanding the cycle of life and death. [15] So li was made by the sage-kings to guide conduct, and people would order society and be in proper accord with the cosmos. As the Liji (Records of li) says, “It was by these rules that the ancient kings sought to represent the ways of Heaven and to regulate the feelings of men.” [16] The Analects also said, “Among the functions of propriety (li) the most valuable is that it established harmony. The excellence of the ways of ancient sage kings consists of this. It is the guiding principle of all things great and small.” [17] It can be seen from this that li is based on the understanding of the Way of Heaven.

Since the establishment of li is based on the Way of Heaven, does this mean, as Herbert Fingarette argues in his “The Problem of Self in the Analects,” that human beings “walking the dao” require the exorcism of their particular will and the yielding of their “self” to the dignity of the Way? [18] This explanation of the self seems to suggest that Confucianism constricts personal autonomy, which is necessary if they are to make life meaningful by their own efforts:

Man is not an ultimately autonomous being who has an inner and decisive power, i

ntrinsic to him, a power to select among real alternatives and thereby to shape life for himself. [19]

Using Fingarette's music metaphor, the human symphony is already scored and orchestrated, and becoming human is to play it in such a way that "the spirit of the original music is creatively displayed." [20] Although Fingarette does allow that the performer must interpret the score "in a creative, artistic, dynamic way," he distinguishes his meaning of creativity from that of the post-Romantic Western celebration of "the highly original composer, who creates not only new works within old forms but also creates new forms." [21] Fingarette uses the music metaphor to argue that the human being in Confucianism is only a performer, rather than a highly original composer. [22] But this is due to an inadequate understanding of Confucian self. In the following, I will use the music metaphor in a quite different way to see in what sense the Way of Heaven is objective, and how at the same time the self in Confucianism is highly autonomous, capable of producing works that are original as well as creative.

There is the objective universal dao just as there is an objective aspect of musical principles. In music, physical sounds which otherwise would be noise become music when they are shaped in accord with certain principles. For example, as early as in ancient Greece, Pythagoras found that in music, the pitch of tones depends on the length of the strings on musical instruments and that musical harmony is determined by definite mathematical proportions. Pythagoras discovered that the perfect consonances of the musical scale--the intervals of the fourth, the fifth, and the octave--can be exactly expressed as ratios between the numbers 1, 2, 3 and 4, which, added together, make the perfect number of 10. The ratio of the octave is 2:1; the ratio of the fifth is 3:2, and the ratio of the fourth is 4:3. This discovery was, no doubt, made by measuring, on a monochord with a movable bridge, the lengths of string required to yield the several notes forming the perfect intervals. [23] A similar argument about the objective principles of music was expressed differently in Yueji, a Chinese classic on music in the Book of Rites. According to Yueji, there are three kinds of expression of the voice, namely, mere sound, modulations or tones, and music. We are further told that animals know sounds but do not know tones, that ordinary people know tones but do not know music, and that it is only the superior person who is able to understand music itself. [24] This means that musical principles are objective but until they are found, learnt and mastered by the composer, it is impossible to compose beautiful music that can be enjoyed and appreciated by people. The original, creative work of composers cannot be ignored or denied because of the objectivity of the musical principles.

The same can be said of the relationship between the dao and those who follow the dao. The Way is already there before people obtain an understanding of it, just as the musical principles exist before composers compose their music. We cannot

t say that the composers' work is not original because of the objectivity of musical principles; we also cannot say that a person of de (that is, the person who follows and obtains dao) is only a "performer," rather than a "composer." According to Confucianism, the dao is an objective existence, but the dao does not become real until it is found by people in themselves. So Confucius said, "It is man that can make the Way great, and it is not the Way that can make man great." (Analects, 15:28) Just as musical principles cannot make a person a composer, so the existence of the Way cannot make a person a great man. The Way of a great person is compatible with such familiar acts as eating and drinking; it is not separate from daily affairs. It is no easy task, however, to eat and to be able to know the real taste of the food. There is no one who does not eat and drink, but there are few who can really know flavor. Although the Way is near at hand and exerts its functions in everyday life and daily affairs, most people are not able to notice and understand it.

Furthermore, based on the same musical principles, composers can compose beautiful music with very different characteristics. Similarly, based on the same dao, people of de have very different ways to display their understanding of dao. As Cheng Yi argues, "The different ways toward Dao are just like thousands of tracks and paths to the same capital. Yet he can enter if he has just found one way." [25] So the objectivity of the Confucian dao does not entail ignorance of personal autonomy and the individual differences among the persons who follow the dao.

Since the establishment of li is based on the understanding of the Way of Heaven, to be qualified as a li-maker, the self must have the potentiality to understand the Way of Heaven. So the question whether the Confucian self has the capacity to know the Way of Heaven naturally follows.

The Self and Tiandao

According to Confucian cosmology, man is a product and a form of the Way (dao), whose life manifestations are a conscious presentation of the creative energy and power of Heaven and as such, it is a microorganism within the macrocosm. For Confucians, as the most intelligent and sentient creatures of the Yin-Yang dialectic, it is the duty of humans to fully practice the Way of humanity in order to coexist with Heaven and Earth. It is up to humans to enlarge, belittle, manifest, or obscure it. But how can a person make the Way great?

Making the Way great means realizing the capacity or ability to do so. Men are able to find the Way in themselves because the self is endowed with the infinite heart-mind, [26] which, if fully developed, would enable one to be a co-ordinator of the world, a guardian of the natural and social processes, and a partner in t

he creative transformation of Heaven and Earth. According to Mencius, there is the presence of the dao of Heaven in everyone's heart-mind, which always reveals the correct guidance for action. Heart-mind is what comes into being in one's person, by which the self is brought or cultivated to maturity. Therefore if a man fully realizes his heart-mind, he will understand his nature; and if he knows his nature, he will know Heaven. Meanwhile, the proper way to serve Heaven is for a man to retain his good heart-mind and nurture his nature. [27] By this token, Mencius talks about nature by way of the heart-mind. Far from being a mere hypothesis, Heaven is thought to manifest itself in the functioning of the heart-mind, which, as the microcosm of Heaven, represents the Way of Heaven in the realm of immanence. So Mencius said, "All things are already complete in oneself. There is no greater joy than to examine oneself and be sincere (cheng)." (The Book of Mencius, 7A: 4)

Thus, Confucianism stresses the importance of sincerity (cheng) in self-examination. Being sincere is to have ultimate respectfulness for the oneness of one's being. Since human nature is imparted by Heaven and thus originally good, in order to find out whether we still preserve this good nature, we look within ourselves. But so often in our examination of ourselves, we make excuses for our failure to do what we should boldly accept as our responsibilities, and the result is self-deception. Thus self-examination is of no value if there is no sincerity as its basis. Anyone who possesses complete sincerity can transform oneself as well as others. As Mencius said:

Never has there been one who being possessed of complete sincerity [complete truthfulness to one's nature], did not move others. Never has there been one who, not being sincere, was able to move others. (The Book of Mencius, 4A: 13)

By being sincere and true to one's own nature, one is able to gain understanding of the Way of Heaven. As the Zhongyong states, "He who is sincere is one who hits upon what is right without effort and apprehends without thinking. He is naturally and easily in harmony with the Way. Such a man is a sage. He who tries to be sincere is one who chooses the good and holds fast to it." (Zhongyong, Ch. 20) That is, by being sincere, one obtains an understanding of dao, and when one obtains the understanding of the dao, one becomes a sage. So the claim was made that "the sage knows the Way of Heaven" (Guodian chumu zhujian, strip 26). This means the Confucian self is endowed with an infinite heart-mind, which, if fully developed, will enable one to understand the Way of Heaven and enable one to coexist with the Heaven and Earth. In short, such a person is a sage, a li-maker. This Confucian understanding of the self makes the "legislating for oneself" a real possibility. Some comparative perspective of Confucian and Kantian moral philosophy should shed further on this claim.

In Kantian philosophy, a distinction is drawn between a world of phenomena (thin

gs as they appear to us), and a world of noumena (an inaccessible world of things in themselves). There is a corresponding distinction between sensible intuition, which is aware of the independently existing phenomena that impinge upon the mind and intellectual intuition, which creates noumena as objects of intuition. Humans, according to Kant, are members of the phenomenal world by virtue of their senses, and of the noumenal world as a result of their intellect. But for Kant, only God is infinite existence and has the infinite mind. As God's creation, human beings are finite existence and their mind is finite. Human beings cannot know the intelligible world; they are only aware of it as "something more" that delimits the worlds of sense. As Kant argues, "If practical reason were also to import an object of the will--that is, a motive of action--from the intelligible world, it would overstep its limits and pretend to an acquaintance with something of which it has no knowledge. The concept of the intelligible world is thus only a point of view which reason finds itself constrained to adopt outside appearances in order to conceive itself as practical." [28] Intellectual intuition does not belong to human beings; it belongs solely to God. Thus, God might have intellectual intuition of things as they are in themselves, but we human beings are limited to sensible intuition of phenomena and have no knowledge of the intelligible world.

Mou Zongsan is insightful in commenting that denying intellectual intuition to human beings seems a crucial flaw in Kant's philosophy. For Kant's philosophy to be coherent, human intellectual intuition must be a real possibility. According to Kant's moral philosophy, to act morally is to behave in accordance with the categorical imperative, which is not simply the edict of a superior God. We have the capacity to act according to the categorical imperative through what Kant calls free will. Free will is the transcendent foundation of moral behavior and is itself absolutely and infinitely universal. It is absolutely autonomous; that is to say, it is not submitted to any law other than that which it gives itself. [29] In this sense, Kant says that rational beings have to see themselves as law-makers as well as law-followers: "Every rational being must so act as if he were through his maxims always a law-making member in the universal kingdom of ends." [30] This formulation recognizes the important aspect of choice or moral freedom by asserting that the will has to be seen as actually making the moral law which it follows. Thus Kant introduced the idea of "legislating for oneself." However, it is possible to argue that, contrary to Kant's reasoning, the concept of legislation requires superior power in the legislator, and that, because Kant denies intellectual intuition to human beings, autonomy of the will cannot be realized. As Mou Zongsan claims, for human beings to be moral beings in the Kantian sense, limited human beings must also have access to the infinite. If human minds are not infinite in this sense, then they cannot issue imperatives with no limitation, and the categorical imperative as the basis of morality is impossible. [31]

While Kant's supporters would no doubt wish to defend him against this criticism, it does suggest that, compared to Kant, Confucian moral philosophy has a better understanding of the moral subject. For it recognizes the heart-mind as infinite, and thus the self has the potentiality to know the Way of Heaven. It is commonly agreed that one of the most important insights of Confucianism is its affirmation of the moral subject. The Confucians teach that it is possible for everyone to develop his potentiality and to become a sage. The sage is one who has achieved the ultimate in the development of his human potential. And this achievement is within the reach of every human being. By being sincere, being true to one's own heart-mind, everyone is able to reach the same objective. It is through the infinite heart-mind that the subject can be in a position to be one with Heaven and Earth.

Confirmation of the heart-mind as infinite and acknowledgment of the self's capacity to understand the Way of Heaven is a special characteristic of Confucian moral philosophy. Because the self is endowed with the infinite heart-mind, humans have the potentiality to realize the state of tianrenheyi: the harmonious oneness of Heaven and humanity. In this perfect state, to follow the dao is do what one's heart-mind's desires. This is a state which Confucius reached when he was seventy years old: "At seventy I could follow my heart-mind's desire without transgressing the principle." (Analects, 2:4) This means that the self in Confucianism is not a passive being to be shaped and informed in accordance with some objective standard. On the contrary, the Confucian self is endowed with the infinite heart-mind capable of obtaining understanding of the Way of Heaven. Therefore, the "legislating for oneself" becomes a real possibility in Confucianism. The Confucian self is not only a li-follower, but also a li-maker. It is up to oneself to make life meaningful by one's own efforts. In the final analysis, it is improper to say that those who follow the Way of Heaven are those who bring their personal and subjective desires into conformity with the will of Heaven.

In conclusion, we may claim that the self in Confucian ethics is not an impartial individual who is independent from the details of personal life. Instead, he is one who lives in various concrete social relations. The Confucian self is not a concept of an independent entity. In the process of self-development, the key is to relating to one's social commitment, rather than isolating oneself from others and society. The society that Confucians aim to build is not one that is an aggregate of self-interested claimers, but one composed of virtuous individuals who live in harmonious relationships with other members of a community. The western atomistic perception of the self never comes to the mind of Confucians and the self is never understood as an independent being distinct from all others. In the eyes of Confucians, the liberal view of self is an impoverished one, since it is abstracted from the particularities of individual character, communal history, and social relations. As a result, liberal education is a process of

deprivation, not enrichment. [32] Confucius, if he were to live in our time, would agree with Sandel that the liberal view of freedom is “thin” and “devoid of inherent meaning.” [33] Confucius would also join MacIntyre in saying that the liberal self is disembodied from “narrative history,” lacking “character” and ‘social identity.’ [34]

On the other hand, conforming oneself to li and walking the dao does not entail the ignorance or suppression of one’s personal subjective desires because the self is endowed with the infinite heart-mind that has the potentiality to know the Way of Heaven. Because of this Confucian understanding of the self, the self is not only a li-follower, but also a li-maker. In this sense, “legislating for oneself” may be realized in Confucian terms. As a result, respecting one’s self is for one to become dynamically and creatively engaged in harmonizing one’s disposition. It is a course of directly and consciously manifesting and discovering one’s subject-nature and of making self-determined efforts to actualize one’s subject-nature. These two features together distinguish the self in Confucianism from the self in liberalism and also the self in Kantian philosophy.

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ENDNOTES

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[2] F. L. K. Hsu, “The Self in Cross-cultural Perspective,” in *Culture and Self: Asian and Western Perspectives*, edited by A. J. Marsella, G. DeVos and F.L.K. Hsu (New York: Tavistock Publication, 1985), pp. 24-55.

[3] Wei-ming Tu, “Selfhood and Otherness in Confucian Thought,” in *Culture and Self: Asian and Western Perspectives*, edited by A. J. Marsella, G. DeVos and F.L.

K. Hsu, p. 231.

[4] The Yi King, Legge, J. (trans.), in *The Sacred Books of the East*, vol. 16 (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1885), p. 240.

[5] A. W. Hummel, "The Art of Social Relation in China," *Philosophy East & West* 10(1960-61):14.

[6] For example, see *Liji* 35:24 and 14:31.

[7] For a detailed argument on the difference between the two characters, see D. L. Hall and R. T. Ames, "Getting it right: On saving Confucius from the Confucians," *Philosophy East & West* 34.1(1984):3-22.

[8] Han Fei Tzu, Book Six, Chapter xx, *Commentaries on Lao Tzu's Teachings* (Jie Lao), in W.K. Liao (trans.), *The Complete Works of Han Fei Tzu*, Vol. 1, London, Arthur Probsthain, 1939, p. 171.

[9] Cheng, Chung-ying, "On yi as a universal principle of specific application in Confucian morality," *Philosophy East & West* 22.3(1972):269-80.

[10] *Zuozhuan*, Yingong Year 1. Legge (trans.), *The Chun Tsew, With the Tso Chuen*, Book I, year I, in *The Chinese Classics* (Hong Kong University Press, 1960), vol. v, p. 5.

[11] *Ibid*, Book VIII, Year 2, p. 344.

[12] Xinzhong Yao, "Self-construction and Identity," *Asian Philosophy* 6(1996):183.

[13] Marina Carnogurska, "Original Ontological Roots of Ancient Chinese Philosophy," *Asian Philosophy* 8(1998):209-10.

[14] Wei-ming Tu, "Embodying the Universe: A Note on Confucian Self-Realization," in *Self as person in Asian theory and practice*, edited by R. T. Ames, with W. Dissanayake and T. P. Kasulis (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), pp. 177-86.

[15] Wing-tsit Chan (ed. and trans.), *A Source Book of Chinese Philosophy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 265.

[16] VII.1, 4. Legge (trans.), in *The Sacred Books of China*, vol. 27, p. 367.

[17] *The Analects*, 1:12, in Chan, *A Source Book of Chinese Philosophy*, p. 21.

[18] H. Fingarette, "The Problem of Self in the Analects," *Philosophy East & W*

[19] H. Fingarette, *Confucius: The Secular as Sacred* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1972), p. 34.

[20] H. Fingarette, "The Music of Humanity in the Conversations of Confucius," *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 10(1983):346.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 345.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 346.

[23] It is said that the germ of Pythagoras' s mathematical philosophy was a discovery in the field of music. Further details can be found in J. Burnet, *Greek Philosophy, Part I* (London: Macmillian, 1914), p. 46.

[24] Yutang Lin, ed. and trans., *The Wisdom of Confucius* (New York: The Modern Library, 1994), pp. 252-5.

[25] Chan, *A Source Book of Chinese Philosophy*, p. 157.

[26] As Chung-ying Cheng has argued, the idea of the Confucian mind, or rather the idea of the Chinese mind, is different from what is conjured up in the Western Cartesian-oriented philosophical literature. For the Confucian mind is not simply cognitive and rational entity or a state of consciousness or awareness of the subjectivity. It is all the purposeful activities of feeling, valuation, will and conscientious efforts directed toward a goal or value. In fact, the very core of the cultivation of self, or of the virtue in the self, is a matter of efforts of the mind. Insofar as the mind has all the functions of will, feeling and effort, it is really the heart-mind, Cheng pointed out years ago. For a detailed discussion on xin (heart-mind) and xing in Confucianism, see Chung-ying Cheng, "A Theory of Confucian Selfhood: Self-Cultivation and Freedom of Will," in the *Collection of Papers*, edited by Rolf Eberfeld, Johann Kreuzer, John Minfield, Guenter Wohlfart (Muenchen: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1998), pp. 51-86.

[27] *The Book of Mencius*, 7A: 1. "He who exerts his mind to the utmost knows his nature. He who knows this nature knows Heaven. To preserve one' s mind and to nourish one' s nature is the way to serve Heaven."

[28] I. Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*, p. 118 (458). This quote is from H. J. Paton, ed., *The Moral Law* (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1948). Page number of the Prussian Academy edition in brackets.

[29] "Autonomy of the will is that property of will by which it gives a law to itself (irrespective of any property of the object of volition). This then is the principle of autonomy: never to choose otherwise than so that the maxims of one

e' s choice be also comprehended in the same volition as universal law.” See The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Ethics, translated by Otto Manthey-Zorn (New York: Appleton-Century, 1938), Section II, p. 59.

[30] Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, see Paton, p. 100 (438).




[31] Zongsan Mou, Fourteen Lectures on the Route Connecting Chinese and Western Philosophy (in Chinese, Shanghai : Guji Chubanshe, 1997).

[32] B. Almond, “Alasdair MacIntyre: the virtue of tradition,” the Journal of Applied Ethics 7(1990):99-103.

[33] M. J. Sandel, Liberals and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 175.

[34] See A. MacIntyre, After Virtue (London: Duckworth, 1981), Chap. 6. See also Seung-hwan Lee, “Liberal Rights or/and Confucian Virtues?” Philosophy East and West 46(1996):369-70.

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