# Counterexamples to a Likelihood Theory of Evidence

Forster, Malcolm R. (2006) Counterexamples to a Likelihood Theory of Evidence.

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## Abstract

The Likelihood Theory of Evidence (LTE) says, roughly, that all the information relevant to the bearing of data on hypotheses (or models) is contained in the likelihoods. There exist counterexamples in which one can tell which of two hypotheses is true from the full data, but not from the likelihoods alone. These examples suggest that some forms of scientific reasoning, such as the consilience of inductions (Whewell, 1858), cannot be represented within Bayesian and Likelihoodist philosophies of science.

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| **Keywords:** | The likelihood principle, the law of likelihood, evidence, Bayesianism, Likelihoodism, curve fitting, regression, asymmetry of cause and effect |
| **Subjects:** | General Issues: Confirmation/Induction<br>General Issues: Philosophers of Science |
| **ID Code:** | 2855 |
| **Deposited By:** | Forster, Malcolm R. |
| **Deposited On:** | 11 September 2006 |
| **Additional Information:** | The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com. |