

# Experimental Realism Defended: How Inference to the Most Likely Cause Might Be Sound

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## Abstract

On a purely epistemic understanding of experimental realism, manipulation affords a particularly robust kind of causal warrant, which is – like any other warrant – defeasible. I defend a version of Nancy Cartwright's inference to the most likely cause, and I conclude that this minimally epistemic version of experimental realism is a coherent, adequate and plausible epistemology for science.

**Keywords:** Causal Inference, Experimental Realism, Scientific epistemology

**Subjects:** [General Issues: Causation](#)  
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[General Issues: Realism/Anti-realism](#)

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