

Empirical Success or Explanatory Success: What does Current Scientific Realism Need to Explain?

Doppelt, Gerald (2003) Empirical Success or Explanatory Success: What does Current Scientific Realism Need to Explain?. In Doppelt, Gerald, Eds. [2004] Philosophy of Science Assoc. 19th Biennial Meeting - PSA2004: Contributed Papers (Austin, TX; 2004): PSA 2004 Contributed Papers, Austin, Texas.

Full text available as:

Microsoft Word - Requires a viewer, such as Microsoft Word Viewer

Abstract

Against the well-known objection that in the history of science there are many theories that are successful but false, Psillos offers a three-pronged defense of scientific realism as the best explanation for the success of science. Focusing on these, I criticize Psillos' defense, arguing that each prong is weakened when we recognize that according to realist rebuttals of the underdetermination argument and versions of empiricism, realists are committed to accounting for the explanatory success of theories, not their mere empirical adequacy or instrumental reliability. I conclude by indicating how 'explanationist' realism might be recast to accommodate my arguments.

Anti-Realist

Keywords: Scientific Realism

Philosophy of Science

Subjects: General Issues: Philosophers of Science

General Issues: Realism/Anti-realism

Conferences and

[2004] Philosophy of Science Assoc. 19th Biennial Meeting - PSA2004: Contributed

Volumes: Papers (Austin, TX; 2004): PSA 2004 Contributed Papers

ID Code: 1992

Deposited By: Doppelt, Gerald

Deposited On: 12 October 2004

Send feedback to: philsci-archive@library.pitt.edu