

Modal Metaphysics and the Everett Interpretation

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Abstract

Recent work on probability in the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics yields a decision-theoretic derivation of David Lewis' Principal Principle, and hence a general metaphysical theory of probability; part 1 is a discussion of this remarkable result. I defend the claim that the 'subjective uncertainty' principle is required for the derivation to succeed, arguing that it amounts to a theoretical identification of chance. In part 2, I generalize this account, and suggest that the Everett interpretation, in combination with a plausible view of natural laws, has the potential to provide a reductive theory of metaphysical modality. I defend the resulting naturalistic modal realism, and outline some of its implications for other parts of metaphysics.

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