

# Why Lewis', Shogenji's and Fitelson's notions of coherence cannot be accepted

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## Abstract

In this paper, I show that Lewis' definition of coherence and Fitelson's and Shogenji's measures of coherence are unacceptable because they entail the absurdity that any set of beliefs in general is coherent and not coherent at the same time. This devastating result is obtained if a simple and plausible principle of stability for coherence is accepted.

**Keywords:** Coherence, coherence measure, Bayesian coherence, Lewis, Fitelson, Shogenji

**Subjects:** [General Issues: Confirmation/Induction](#)

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