

# The Tacking by Disjunction Paradox: Bayesianism versus Hypothetico-deductivism

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## Abstract

Hypothetico-deductivists have struggled to develop qualitative confirmation theories not raising the so-called tacking by disjunction paradox. In this paper, I analyze the difficulties yielded by the paradox and I argue that the hypothetico-deductivist solutions given by Gemes (1998) and Kuipers (2000) are questionable because they do not fit such analysis. I then show that the paradox yields no difficulty for the Bayesian who appeals to the Total Evidence Condition. I finally argue that the same strategy is unavailable to the hypothetico-deductivist.

**Keywords:** Confirmation paradox, tacking by disjunction, Bayesianism, Hypothetico-deductivism, total evidence, Gemes, Kuipers, Grimes

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