

Three ways of worrying about 'causation'

Spurrett, David and Ross, Don (2004) Three ways of worrying about 'causation'.

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Abstract

Our point of departure is Russell's (1913) argument for the 'complete extrusion' of the word 'cause' from the philosophical vocabulary. We argue that at least three different types of philosophical project concerning 'cause' should be carefully distinguished, and that failures to distinguish them lie at the root of some apparently recalcitrant problems. We call them the 'cognitive', the 'scientific' and the 'metaphysical'.

Keywords: Causation, information, anticipation, metaphysics of causation

Subjects: General Issues: Causation

ID Code: 1685

Deposited By: Spurrett, David Jon

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