

Thinking About the Ultimate Argument for Realism

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to rebut two major criticisms of the No-Miracles Argument for Realism. The first comes from Musgrave (1988). The second comes from Colin Howson (2000). Interestingly enough, these criticisms are the mirror image of each other. Yet, they both point to the conclusion that NMA is fallacious. Musgrave's misgiving against NMA is that if it is seen as an inference to the best explanation, it is deductively fallacious. Being a deductivist, he tries to correct it by turning it into a valid deductive argument. Howson's misgiving against NMA is that if it is seen as an inference to the best explanation, it is inductively fallacious. Being a subjective Bayesian, he tries to correct it by turning it into a sound subjective Bayesian argument. I will argue that both criticisms are unwarranted.

Keywords: scientific realism, deductivism, Bayesianism, the base-rate fallacy, inference to the best explanatoion

Subjects: [General Issues: Realism/Anti-realism](#)

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