

Probability, Rational Single-Case Decisions and the Monty Hall Problem

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Abstract

The application of probabilistic arguments to single cases and decision-making is a contentious philosophical problem arises in various contexts. This paper focuses on the validity of probabilistic arguments in the Monty Hall problem and a variation thereof. Two claims are made and defended. First, preferring a certain strategy to another in the Monty Hall Problem does not need any recourse to long-run success frequencies. Second, recent attempts to refute the standard solution of the Monty Hall Problem fail.

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