

Embodied Delusions and Intentionality

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Abstract

Derek Bolton has claimed that extant philosophical theories of mind imply accounts of mental disorder, via their accounts of intentionality. The purpose of this paper is to extend Bolton's claims, by exploring what an embodied/situated theory of mind might imply about mental disorder. I argue that, unlike the more traditional views Bolton considers, embodied/situated accounts can (in principle) provide an observer-independent criterion for distinguishing mental health from disorder in cases of Capgras and Cotard delusions.

Keywords: phenomenology, intentionality, capgras delusions, cotard delusions, affective feelings, bodily feelings, feelings of familiarity

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