

Phenomenological Obviousness and the New Science of Consciousness

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Abstract

Is phenomenal consciousness a problem for the brain sciences? An increasing number of researchers not only hold that it is, but that its very existence is a deep mystery. That this problematic phenomenon exists is generally taken for granted: It is asserted that phenomenal consciousness is just phenomenologically obvious. In contrast, I hold that there is no such phenomenon and, thus, that it does not pose a problem for the brain sciences. For this denial to be plausible, however, I need to show that phenomenal consciousness is not phenomenologically obvious. That is the goal of this article.

Subjects: Specific Sciences: Biology: Neuroscience Specific Sciences: Psychology/Psychiatry

Specific Sciences: Cognitive Science

Conferences and

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