

A note on the Doomsday Argument

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Abstract

I argue that the Doomsday argument fails because it fails to take into account the lesson of the Sleeping Beauty puzzle.

Keywords: Doomsday Argument, Sleeping Beauty, confirmation, self-location.

Subjects: General Issues: Confirmation/Induction

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