

Can Rationalist Abductivism Solve the Problem of Induction?

Beebe, James (2008) Can Rationalist Abductivism Solve the Problem of Induction?.

Full text available as:

PDF - Requires a viewer, such as Adobe Acrobat Reader or other PDF viewer.

Abstract

According to Laurence BonJour, the problem of induction can be solved by recognizing the a priori necessity that inductive conclusions constitute the best explanations of inductive premises. I defend an interpretation of the key probability claims BonJour makes about inductive premises and show that they are not susceptible to many of the objections that have been lodged against them. I then argue that these purportedly necessary probability claims nevertheless remain deeply problematic and that, as a result, BonJour's proposal fails to provide a satisfactory resolution of the problem of induction.

Keywords: problem of induction, rationalism, abductivism

Subjects: General Issues: Confirmation/Induction

ID Code: 3961

Deposited By: <u>Beebe, James</u>
Deposited On: 28 March 2008

Send feedback to: philsci-archive@library.pitt.edu