

Is the Conjunction Fallacy tied to Probabilistic Confirmation?

Schupbach, Jonah N. (2008) Is the Conjunction Fallacy tied to Probabilistic Confirmation?.

Full text available as:

PDF - Requires a viewer, such as Adobe Acrobat Reader or other PDF viewer.

Abstract

Crupi, Fitelson, and Tentori (CFT, forthcoming) offer three conditions that constitute an attempted confirmationtheoretic explanation of the conjunction fallacy. I present experimental results to show that CFT' s conditions are neither necessary nor sufficient for the fallacy. There exist cases that do not meet their three conditions in which subjects still tend to commit the fallacy. Also, there exist cases that meet all three of CFT' s conditions in which subjects do not tend to commit the fallacy. In light of these experiments, CFT' s account of the conjunction fallacy cannot be right as it stands.

Commentary on:	Vincenzo, Crupi and Branden, Fitelson and Katya, Tentori (2007) Probability, Confirmation, and the Conjunction Fallacy. In [2007] LSE-Pitt Conference: Confirmation, Induction and Science (London, 8 - 10 March, 2007).
EPrint Type:	Other
Keywords:	confirmation theory, Bayesianism, conjunction fallacy, human judgment, uncertainty, human reasoning
Subjects:	Specific Sciences: Probability/Statistics General Issues: Confirmation/Induction Specific Sciences: Psychology/Psychiatry Specific Sciences: Cognitive Science General Issues: Formal Learning Theory General Issues: Experimentation
ID Code:	3755
Deposited By:	Schupbach, Jonah N.
Deposited On:	23 December 2007

Commentary/Response Threads

- Error: Unknown Citation Style "eprint_thread_commentary"
 - Error: Unknown Citation Style "eprint_thread_commentary" [Currently Displayed]