

The Doomsday Argument Without Knowledge of Birth Rank

Monton, Bradley (2001) The Doomsday Argument Without Knowledge of Birth Rank.

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Abstract

The Carter-Leslie Doomsday argument, as standardly presented, relies on the assumption that you have knowledge of your approximate birth rank. I demonstrate that the Doomsday argument can still be given in a situation where you have no knowledge of your birth rank. This allows one to reply to Bostrom's defense of the Doomsday argument against the refutation based on the idea that your existence makes it more likely that many observers exist.

Keywords: Doomsday argument, anthropic reasoning, observational selection effects, problem of old evidence

Subjects: [General Issues: Decision Theory](#)
[Specific Sciences: Probability/Statistics](#)

ID Code: 577

Deposited By: [Monton, Bradley](#)

Deposited On: 08 March 2002