

Special Relativity, Coexistence and Temporal Parts: A Reply to Gilmore

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Abstract

In two earlier works (Balashov, 2000a and 2000b), I have argued that considerations based on special relativity and the notion of coexistence favor the perdurance view of persistence over its endurance rival. Cody Gilmore (2002) has subjected my argument to an insightful three-fold critique. In the first part of this paper I respond briefly to Gilmore's first two objections. I then grant his observation that anyone who can resist the first objection is liable to succumb to the third one. This, however, opens a way to other closely related relativistic arguments against endurantism that are immune to all three objections and, in addition, throw new light on a number of important issues in the ontology of persistence. I develop two such novel arguments in the second half of the paper.

Keywords: special relativity, coexistence, temporal parts, persistence, endurance, perdurance, three-

dimensionalism, four-dimensionalism, time, spacetime, Minkowski, Gilmore

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