

Russell, Causation, Determinism

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Abstract

Two arguments due to Russell are examined, and found to show that the notion of causation as full determination doesn't mesh easily with deterministic global physics and the distinction between effective and ineffective strategies. But a concept of local causation as involving a certain kind of counterfactual dependence is, I argue, compatible with Russell's conclusions. I defend it from a resurgent form of Russell's microphysical determinism argument by using some slightly contentious claims about the autonomy of the events posited by the special sciences.

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General Issues: Reductionism/Holism

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