

Author: [ADVANCED](#) | Volume Page

Keyword: |



[TOP](#) > [Available Issues](#) > [Table of Contents](#) > [Abstract](#)

ONLINE ISSN : 1349-6778

PRINT ISSN : 1349-6786

The Kyoto Economic Review

Vol. 77 (2008) , No. 2 pp.107-125



[\[PDF \(625K\)\]](#) [\[References\]](#)

Noncooperative Game in Cooperation Reformulation of Correlated Equilibria

[Norio Kôno](#)¹⁾

1) Professor Emeritus, Kyoto University

Abstract: In the usual Nash equilibrium of strategic noncooperative games, the mixed strategies of all the players are assumed to be stochastically independent. In order to relax this stochastic independence, two essentially different formulations are proposed. In this paper, by using random variables defined on an abstract and universal probability space, I introduce two equilibrium concepts, one is for the framework of a noncooperative game in which a third person, a mediator, influences each player's strategy independently or plays the role of a publicly observable random device. The other concept is for the framework of a noncooperative game in which the restriction of stochastic independence is removed, which could imply possible communications between players. Consequently, we have two different theorems that characterize all the strategies in the correlated equilibrium for each framework. These two theorems show that the two equilibrium concepts, which we shall call "exogenous correlated equilibrium" and "endogenous correlated equilibrium" are entirely different concepts. Finally, we provide some comments on previous related studies²⁾.

Keywords: [noncooperative game](#); [correlated equilibrium](#); [exogenous equilibrium](#); [endogenous equilibrium](#)



[\[PDF \(625K\)\]](#) [\[References\]](#)

To cite this article:

Norio Kôno; "Noncooperative Game in Cooperation", *The Kyoto Economic Review*,
Vol. **77**, pp.107-125 (2008) .

JOI JST.JSTAGE/ker/77.107

Copyright (c) 2009 by Graduate School of Economics, Kyoto University



[Japan Science and Technology Information Aggregator, Electronic](#)

