

**Abstract**<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1848306>**References (36)****Paper statistics**

Abstract Views:	339
Downloads:	50
References:	36

[Download This Paper](#) | [Share](#) | [Email](#) | [Add to MyBriefcase](#) | [Purchase Bound Hard Copy](#)

## The Role of Local Politicians in Distributive Politics

[Michael Albertus](#)

University of Chicago - Department of Political Science

October 20, 2011

**Abstract:**

Empirical studies of clientelism typically use district-level data to analyze within-district voter targeting. Such analyses ignore how local politicians can impact the distribution of benefits, and can mistake core voter strategies for swing strategies and vice versa. This paper presents the first analysis of a distributive program – a Venezuelan land reform initiative known as Misión Zamora – at the individual level using data on revealed voter preferences and the receipt of particularistic benefits. Using data from a list of millions of voters that signed petitions to recall President Chávez, I match information on all recent land grant applicants to petition signers to measure the effect of political preferences on the likelihood of applying for land, receiving land, and being effectively rejected. I find evidence for both strategic core voter targeting and punishment of opposition voters, although both of these effects are modified by local political actors.

**Number of Pages in PDF File:** 50

**Keywords:** clientelism, vote buying, distributive politics, land reform, Venezuela

working papers series

Albertus, Michael, The Role of Local Politicians in Distributive Politics (October 20, 2011). Available at SSRN:  
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1848306> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1848306>

## Contact Information

**Michael Albertus (Contact Author)**

**University of Chicago - Department of Political Science** ( [email](#) )

Chicago, IL 60637

United States

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved. [FAQ](#) [Terms of Use](#) [Privacy Policy](#) [Copyright](#) [Contact Us](#)

This page was processed by apollo8 in 0.593 seconds