

**Abstract**<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1913846>**References (55)**[Download This Paper](#) | [Share](#) | [Email](#) | [Add to MyBriefcase](#) | [Purchase Bound Hard Copy](#)

Cabinet Volatility Under Dictatorship and Democratic Transition

[Michael Albertus](#)

University of Chicago - Department of Political Science

October 5, 2012

Abstract:

How does volatility under dictatorship affect the likelihood of democratization? Most scholarship focuses on differences in levels of key factors hypothesized to impact the likelihood of transition. This study, by contrast, investigates how volatility in elite welfare affects transition. That a dictator must rely upon a support coalition composed of select elites to retain office suggests that volatility in elite power and status is an important determinant of their decision to support the regime or push for transition. This paper focuses on one particularly important elite coalition under autocracy, a dictator's cabinet. Using a global sample of autocratic regimes from 1950-2006, I find that cabinet volatility is positively associated with democratization. This finding holds across several different measures of cabinet volatility and instrumental variables estimation. The paper therefore provides an agent-based mechanism linking autocratic volatility to one prominent way autocracies fail and democracies are instituted.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 37

Keywords: Autocracy, volatility, regime transitions, democratization, autocratic cabinets

working papers series

Paper statistics

Abstract Views:	485
Downloads:	114
Download Rank:	136,693

References:	55
-------------	----

Suggested Citation

Albertus, Michael. Cabinet Volatility Under Dictatorship and Democratic Transition (October 5, 2012). Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1913846> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1913846>

Contact Information

Michael Albertus (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Department of Political Science ([email](#))

Chicago, IL 60637

United States