



# Forcing in Strategic Belief Models

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Forcing is a methodology for building models of Set Theory satisfying certain properties. Since its inception by Paul Cohen, in the early 1960s, it has been applied to several areas in Mathematical Logic, becoming a powerful tool in the analysis of axiomatic systems. In this paper we extend the applicability of forcing to game-theoretic strategic belief models. In particular, we propose a very general notion of solutions for such games by enlarging Brandenburger's  $\$RmAR\$$  condition via extension through generic types.

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