应用数学与基础数学

技术质量信息不对称下 Stackelberg 市场中的许可（英）

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摘要　　运用数学建模和博弈论分析方法, 研究同质 Stackelberg 市场中技术许可方对其专利技术质量拥有私人信息时的许可行为. 模型中, 许可方不再是独立的研发机构, 而是作为市场中的内部创新者参与生产和竞争. 在满足被许可方能接受许可的情况下, 使许可方利润最大化, 确定固定转让费、单位转让费以及混同合约与分离合约的最优选择. 为参与主体提供理论参考, 以提高技术许可效率.

Licensing in Stackelberg markets under asymmetric information of technology value

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Abstract

This paper proposed a model to analyze the licensing schemes when the patentee had private information about its technology value. In this model, the patentee was considered as an insider in Homogenous Stackelberg Market instead of an independent R&D institute. Based on this model, this paper presented the patentee's optimal licensing option for maximizing its profit under the condition that the licensee may accept the contract. In the same way, this paper analyzed the fixed fee, royalty and the profit of the patentee in the model, respectively. This paper aims at proposing an idea for the participants to advance the efficiency of licensing.

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