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Project Report

Deterministic Safety Technology for RBI

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Abstract

The present paper deals with the description of the technical activities carried out under EC Contract no. 30303, related to RBMK. The project activities include the development of computational tools suitable for the analysis of transients expected during a loss of coolant accident leading to the rupture of one pressure channel, with brittle failure of the pressure tube and of graphite bricks with reference scenario for the project. However, a series of expected activities of the individual codes or chains of code in simulating the envisaged activities performed at NIKIET in Moscow and at University of Pisa are described. The paper structures the executive summary that includes the following sections: (i) the roadmap, (ii) the adopted computational tools, (iii) key findings of the tube rupture (MPTR) issue and the individual channel monitoring (I

1. Introduction

The present paper deals with the description of the technical activities carried out under EC Contract no. 30303, related to RBMK [1]. The project activities include the development of computational tools suitable for the analysis of transients expected

accident leading to the rupture of one pressure channel, with fuel tube brittle failure of the pressure tube and of graphite bricks with reference scenario for the project. However, a series of expected of the individual codes or chains of code in simulating the envisage

The result of 30 man-years effort is summarized hereafter including the University of Pisa (UNIPI) in Pisa. A top-down approach is pursued in the following sections.

- (i) The safety needed for the RBMK NPP is described first: and the key findings from the execution of the project.
- (ii) The roadmap is discussed that gives an idea of the inter-complexity.
- (iii) The adopted computational tools are presented in the nodalization. In this section, the transient scenarios established chains are discussed.
- (iv) Key findings are presented per each logical block of activity.
- (v) Emphasis is given to the multiple pressure tube rupture monitoring (ICM) proposal.

2. RBMK Safety Needs, Status, and Key Conclusion :

RBMK safety technologists in Russia are well aware of safety needs and cooperation involving EC, US DOE, and IAEA in the last twenty years. This work summarized and was used to identify the priorities of the project. The safety technology was found as well as established and no remarkable process. However, related to the development and the improvements are described that brought to the characterization of priority areas to be concentrated. Examples of this, related to the KORSAR code development, pump performance as well as the need for a three-dimensional the

The main difference from the safety standpoint, primarily in the design of other water-cooled reactor lies in the allowance in the case of RBMK design basis conditions (design basis accident (DBA)), to break through the pressure boundary. In fact, the rupture of fuel channel caused contamination of parts of the confinement system, but no real hazard are not expected to overpass the thresholds applicable to other water-cooled reactors.

- (i) The potentially involved core inventory is less than 0.1% of the total core inventory.
- (ii) The radioactivity is expected to remain primarily in the containment system and basically no contamination for the environment.
- (iii) Notwithstanding the above, the expected breaking of fuel channels in events Leningrad NPP 1 and 3 (1975 and 1992) and Chernobyl (1986) or by the regulatory authorities) as a lack of capability of containment.
- (iv) The individual channel monitoring (ICM) proposal and the ICM proposal below, might substantially contribute in preventing the possible

The deterministic analyses performed within the project did not identify situations that can harm the public or the environment to an extent beyond the purpose of the project to evaluate the RBMK safety, however the results of the calculations). Nevertheless, computational tools are the outcome of the project conclusion and the ICM proposal has been formulated in the attempt

3. The Roadmap of the Project

The roadmap of the project has been finalized based on two main matrices, where the computational tools are related to the safety of NPP and the technological areas, Figure 1, (b) the flow diagram of accident scenarios goes through the technological subjects and enc




Figure 1: Connection between topological subjects and the conduct of the project by NIKIET.

Matrices of Activities

Two matrices have been developed for codes adopted by NIKIET subjects, relevant to the nuclear technology, were distinguished in

- (i) five barriers (5Bs) to the release of fission products to the environment: fuel cladding, pressure boundary, reactor cavity, ALS, and (various) reactor systems
- (ii) sixteen RBMK system (16S) hardware or material parameters: fuel assembly, coolant in power channel (high pressure) and in CP channel, absorber and displacer tube, graphite of power channels, circulation circuit, reactor cavity, accident localization system and accident management system
- (iii) seven nuclear technology (7T) sectors or computational models: thermalhydraulics in main circulation circuit (including fuel behavior), structural mechanics including fuel behavior, three-dimensional neutronics and fission product release and transport.

Nine and eight codes, 9C and 8C, were selected by NIKIET and UNIK.

Diagram of Activities

The first level of the diagram (not given here) is constituted by the disciplines and the results of the project. The second level of the diagram is constituted by the disciplines and the results of the project. The third level of the diagram is constituted by the main outcomes from the project.

4. The Computational Tools and the Established Scenarios

The correspondence between the seven nuclear technology (7T) sectors and the computational models constituted the background for identifying the classes of accidents and the capabilities of the codes. The classes of accidents, the selected transient scenarios and the adopted codes are given in Table 1.

Table 1: Transient scenarios relevant to RBMK project and correspondence with adopted code

5. Key Findings within the Identified Safety Techno

Reference is made to the seven safety technological (7T) sectors a chain of codes to the identified accident scenarios. The capability cases.

Thermalhydraulics in Primary Cooling Circuit

Relap (primarily) and Korsar codes were found capable of simulat was found that prevents the application of those codes. Typical re summarized as follows.

- (i) Instabilities in parallel channels may originate critical h excursions during the operation of the emergency core cooling
- (ii) As a consequence of the group distribution header block tubes, flow reversal may be sufficient to cool the remaining c appears a function of the adopted calculation hypotheses inclu conditions.
- (iii) The comparison between system performance in Igna introduced in Ignalina NPP in the recent past create the co dynamic response.

The best estimate analysis of the RBMK primary circuit requires a t

Thermalhydraulics in Confinement

The passive function of mitigating the radioactivity release to hypothetical accident in RBMK is performed by a number of building localization system (ALS) constitute the important ones. Suitable design of reactor cavity and ALS.

Application of CFD

Two main applications were completed within the framework of t former focused on the modeling of a valve located in the inlet re steam superheating, due to pressure drop in the flow reversal v trigger event for the Chernobyl 4 accident. The latter application rods following the break of the pressure tube.

Structural Mechanics Including Fuel Behavior

Clad ballooning was found as the most important mechanism for from any channel. A damage map for fuel rods derived in the plan channel blockage was derived. In the case of flow blockage, signifi

The graphite rings and the bricks have been modeled by finite ele failure conditions. The important role of graphite rings has been t the radiation damage (fluence) upon the conditions for graphite bri




Figure 2: Evolution of the RBMK FC blockage

Three-Dimensional Neutron Kinetics

A pioneering effort has been made in relation to the application of the 3D representation of the RBMK core suitable “ λ -functions” to calculate the local system performance response following local perturbations like the control (and) protection of individual control rod, was demonstrated.

Generation of Cross-Sections

The Helios and the Unk codes were adopted to calculate the cross-sections respectively.

Fission Product Release and Transport

The technological area of fission product generation, release and transport to the surface does not present special features compared with the same

5.1. The MPTR Issue and the ICM Proposal

The MPTR Issue

A methodology was proposed for investigating the realism in modeling the neighboring pressure tubes, that is, addressing the MPTR issue. Significant

The study emphasized the importance of

- (i) modeling the RBMK core channels one-by-one (i.e., the effect of the blockage considering the geometric position within the array, the material properties, and the fluence,
- (ii) the stiffness of the tank that constitutes the ultimate confinement barrier again depending upon the position of the channel in the core.

As a key conclusion (the generic warning about the applicability of the above scenarios will be considered), it was found that only a limited number of scenarios are prone to cause the propagation of the fuel channel rupture.

Figure 3: Results from calculating mechanical stress distribution of an assigned pressure tube.




Figure 4: The ICM and the predicted working conditions

The ICM Proposal

The RBMK safety issue connected with the hydraulic blockage (i.e., deeply considered within the project. Notwithstanding the recent event, the rupture to a multiple pressure tube rupture is negligible, the break associated with stop of electricity production for cleaning and structural damage to personnel (unquantified), and (c) a “residual risk” for MPTR (subject for public acceptance and for regulatory bodies.

The individual channel monitoring (ICM) system has the capability to detect channel blockage. The system generates a devoted scram signal if the coolant temperature at FC inlet and outlet, respectively. The performed scram can be actuated early enough to prevent the PT rupture. See

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