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Research Article

Using Safety Margins for a German Seismic PRA

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Abstract

The German regulatory guide demands the performance of a probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) for all nuclear power plants (NPPs) at licensed events. In 2005, a new methodology guideline (Methodenband) for PSA was released to provide the analyst with a set of suitable tools and procedures. In the case of earthquake, a multilevel verification procedure is suggested. The used depends on the seismic risk at the site of the plant. For sites with high seismic risk, only a reduced analysis is proposed. This paper describes the evaluation of the components and systems for plants at sites with high seismic risk according to the guideline. The seismic PRA results in an estimation of core damage frequency (CDF). The described approach can also be adapted for the usage in a reduced PSA. Westinghouse has wide experience in performing seismic PRA for NPPs. It uses the documented set of seismic design analyses dating from the 1970s as a basis for a seismic PRA, which means that usually no costly analyses are performed.

1. Verification Procedure of the German Methodology

In the case of earthquakes, a multilevel verification procedure is suggested (Methodenband) [1] which requires a probabilistic analysis only for

intensity $I_{DBE(MSK)} > 6$ on the site (DBE: Design Basis Earthquake comparable with the European macroseismic scale (EMS)). For reduced analysis is possible by demonstrating sufficient safety margin at an intensity of $I = I_{DBE} + 1$. For earthquake intensities I_{DBE} above 7 a detailed analysis of buildings, structures, mechanical, and electrical components is mandatory.

2. Seismic Hazard Analysis

The basis for a seismic PRA is a probabilistic seismic hazard analysis (PSHA) of earthquakes to exceed a certain intensity as shown in Figure 1. In this analysis, earthquakes will be used as initial values for the initiating event in the PRA. Buildings, structures, and components to estimate core damage frequencies (CDF) and large accident sequences (LAS).




Figure 1: Hazard curve of seismic risk at plant

While the annual probability of exceedance is given as a function of the seismic intensity, the peak ground acceleration of the design basis earthquake is used as basis for the analysis of buildings and components. Therefore, a mapping associating peak ground acceleration with seismic intensity is established. Figure 2 shows pairs of variates for some German sites. This guideline suggests also a doubling of the peak ground acceleration for higher intensities, known as Cancani correlation, with respect to the design basis earthquake. This approximation can be improved by the usage of site specific response spectra for earthquakes and for different intensities, respectively. Site specific response spectra are available for many sites in Germany. Calculation of site specific response spectra provides values as a function of the earthquake intensity. Typically, comparison of site specific response spectra with standard spectra applied for earthquake calculations during the construction phase can provide quite large safety margins in some cases.




Figure 2: Classification of earthquake intensities according to Cancani. Site specific spectra provide a high level of safety improvements.

3. Identifying the Plant Specific Scope of the Analysis

To perform a seismic PRA, it has to be identified which plant systems are directly affected by seismic events, and which design-basis accidents are initiated by buildings, structures, and components have to be identified with respect to seismic accidents. Furthermore, it has to be identified which are the seismic events and the corresponding safety systems needed to cope with the design-basis accidents. Typical design-basis accidents are a collapse of the reactor building, breakdown of the piping as well as a structural failure or loss of the integrity of the reactor building. Design-basis accidents include loss of offsite power, loss of main heat sink (LOSH), loss of main feedwater (LOFW), and an interaction with flooding of safety related systems (LOCAs).

For the identified structures and components a screening procedure reduce the amount of detailed investigation based on the calculation curves.

4. Assumptions to Simplify the Analysis

To reduce the scope of the analysis some conservative assumptions which the analysis is done, a loss of offsite power is directly assumed main feed water, so that the amount of structures and components those structures and components whose seismic-induced failure can affect all parts of the plant which are not designed to withstand the seismic loads. Relatively robust against seismic loads, the failure of single pipes can be added to the beyond design-basis accidents which lead directly to operator procedures which require human actions outside the control rooms may not be accessible after an earthquake. An exception to the removal from the fuel storage pool under the condition that its integrity is maintained.

5. Screening

All components needed to cope with design-basis accidents as mentioned in a seismic evaluation. Additionally, all relevant passive components (including their corresponding hangers and supports) have to be added. To determine the values for seismic rugged components from the literature, for example, are used. The usage of the generic values for typical plant components is used.

6. Plant Walkdowns

Plant walkdowns are an essential part of the seismic PRA to verify the assumptions as mentioned in the previous chapter and also to support the estimation of stress analyses. Further goals of plant walkdowns are the identification of seismic loads and the identification of components where only a few related components or structures have to be identified which can lead to seismic failure, for example, through collision or falling.

Prior to the walkdowns, a detailed planning with identification of the tasks to be done, including the preparation of record sheets with components to be checked. Walkdowns are performed by seismic qualification and system experts. A detailed recording of the plant walkdowns is mandatory. The documents include the summary of the record and the preparation of a photo documentation.

7. Calculation of Safety Factors and Fragility Curves

Westinghouse uses safety margins in the existing stress calculation curves as a function of the peak ground acceleration as described. The safety factors for components can be calculated by

$$F_{\text{Failure}}(A, Q) = \Phi \left[\frac{\ln(A/\bar{A}) + \frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{Q}{\bar{Q}} \right)^2}{\sigma} \right]$$

F_{Failure} describes the probability of failure during an earthquake of level Q . Φ and Φ^{-1} are the distribution function of the standardized function. β_U and β_R describe the uncertainty and the scattering of the factor \bar{F}_{SR} is a product of all individual safety factors \bar{F}_i described ground acceleration with the failure probability of 50% (Median):

$$\bar{A} = A_{DBE} \cdot \bar{F}_{SR} = A_{DBI}$$

A_{DBE} is given by the acceleration of the plant design basis earthquake the strength factor with 1.5, the factor for hardening of concrete absorption with 1.4, the factor for broadening of the response spectrum intensity with depth of the building in ground with 1.1. These factors are approximately larger than 3. Figure 3 shows the corresponding fragility




Figure 3: Example of a fragility curve for a building component.

The fragility curve, shown in Figure 3 for three different confidence levels as a function of the horizontal peak ground acceleration. To calculate damage frequencies the median curve with a confidence level of 50% is used. According to existing documents of the seismic design analyses, the construction

Examples for safety factors of a component, here a pipe, are the floor response spectra with 1.1 and 1.6, the factor for the attenuation of intensity with distance with 1.3, the three hinge factor with 1.2, the factor for damping of the floor response spectra with 1.2. These factors are approximately larger than 7 for the example of a pipe. The corresponding




Figure 4: Example of a fragility curve for a component.

Because of the high resistivity of a pipe against seismic loads only a confidence level of 95% is visible, whereas the median fragility curve coincides with the 5% confidence level.

The procedure for using safety margins to calculate safety factors is described in the following guideline.

8. Modeling and Quantification

In the last step of the full analysis within the scope of a seismic damage frequencies are calculated for individual intensity intervals. The relevant intensity area reaches from a reasonable minimum intensity anticipated for earthquakes with lower intensities to a maximum value

earthquake becomes negligible. According to the German method (see Section 2) for plants with intensity 6 or less for the design t was used in the example shown in Figure 5.




Figure 5: Core damage frequencies for different intensity intervals. The corresponding annual probability of exceeding design-basis accidents are shown. Values on the

In order to estimate core damage frequencies, the existing Level individual intensity interval. As frequency for the initiating event (offsite power), the annual probability of earthquakes to exceed t used. The seismic-related failures and unavailabilities of building fragility curves, are superposed with the corresponding stochastic

For beyond design-basis accidents which cannot be coped with frequencies correspond directly to the annual probability of earthquakes of the seismic-induced failure of buildings, structures, and core accidents. For design-basis accidents the core damage frequencies the assumed probability that such an accident is caused by an related failure probabilities of the relevant buildings, structures accident. As described before, loss of offsite power is assumed already

Figure 5 shows an example of calculated core damage frequencies: German nuclear power plant. With increasing intensity, the initial In the last intensity interval, the remaining probability of earthquake damage frequencies. At low earthquake intensities the anticipated stochastic unavailabilities of components dominates the result. approximately 40% to the overall result. Seismic-related unavailability assumption that no earthquakes with intensities below 6 are to result is dominated by the seismic-induced failure of buildings accidents. This region contributes with approximately 60% to the site specific response spectra, as described in Section 2, lead to a also to a reduction of the contribution of the high-intensity region from the failure of buildings and structures. The failure of components

9. Reduced Analysis

As described before, a reduced analysis is possible for plants at site lower than 7. The procedure for this purpose is a considerably reduced. The verification of resistivity against seismic loads from an earthquake intensity of the design basis earthquake is done by fragility components, which contribute by experience in a decisive way to buildings, structures and components, which have a dominant previous PRAs, generic values for seismic-rugged components, and resistivity against seismic loads as well as the existing seismic analysis from later updates, if done, can be used.

10. Summary and Experiences

Westinghouse used the procedure described by the new German seismic PRA for a German BWR. Also a corresponding seismic PRA

Due to the high core damage frequencies at low earthquake intensity, offsite power in association with the stochastic unavailabilities of systems is needed. The seismic-related unavailabilities of components are the most important part. Normally, all documents needed for the analysis phase, so that no costly new calculations have to be performed. The construction company should be consulted. The described screening method requires a number of components to be analyzed and of fragility curves to be developed within two weeks. An important safety factor results from realistic site specific conservative response spectra used for the design phase. For a comparison of buildings and structures and approximately 30 fragility curves. The overall conclusion for the development of a German seismic PRA as described in the German methodology guideline is feasible and realistic.

Acknowledgments

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