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A Unified Framework for Small Secret Exponent Attack on RSA

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Abstract: We address a lattice based method on small secret exponent attack on RSA scheme. Boneh and Durfee reduced the attack into finding small roots of a bivariate modular equation: $x^{(N+1)+y} + 1 \equiv 0 \pmod{e}$, where N is an RSA moduli and e is the RSA public key. Boneh and Durfee proposed a lattice based algorithm for solving the problem. When the secret exponent d is less than $N^{0.292}$, their method breaks RSA scheme. Since the lattice used in the analysis is not full-rank, the analysis is not easy. Blömer and May gave an alternative algorithm. Although their bound $d \leq N^{0.290}$ is worse than Boneh--Durfee result, their method used a full rank lattice. However, the proof for their bound is still complicated. Herrmann and May gave an elementary proof for the Boneh--Durfee's bound: $d \leq N^{0.292}$. In this paper, we first give an elementary proof for achieving the bound of Blömer--May: $d \leq N^{0.290}$. Our proof employs unravelled linearization technique introduced by Herrmann and May and is rather simpler than Blömer--May's proof. Then, we provide a unified framework to construct a lattice that are used for solving the problem, which includes two previous method: Herrmann--May and Blömer--May methods as a special case. Furthermore, we prove that the bound of Boneh--Durfee: $d \leq N^{0.292}$ is still optimal in our unified framework.

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