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## Direct Proof of Security of Wegman-Carter Authentication with Partially Known Key

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**Abstract:** Information-theoretically secure (ITS) authentication is needed in Quantum Key Distribution (QKD). In this paper, we study security of an ITS authentication scheme proposed by Wegman&Carter, in the case of partially known authentication key. This scheme uses a new authentication key in each authentication attempt, to select a hash function from an Almost Strongly Universal<sub>2</sub> hash function family. The partial knowledge of the attacker is measured as the trace distance between the authentication key distribution and the uniform distribution; this is the usual measure in QKD. We provide direct proofs of security of the scheme, when using partially known key, first in the information-theoretic setting and then in terms of witness indistinguishability as used in the Universal Composability (UC) framework. We find that if the authentication procedure has a failure probability  $\epsilon$  and the authentication key has an  $\epsilon$  trace distance to the uniform, then under ITS, the adversary's success probability conditioned on an authentic message-tag pair is only bounded by  $\epsilon + |\mathcal{M}|\epsilon$ , where  $|\mathcal{M}|$  is the size of the set of tags. Furthermore, the trace distance between the authentication key distribution and the uniform increases to  $|\mathcal{M}|\epsilon$  after having seen an authentic message-tag pair. Despite this, we are able to prove directly that the authenticated channel is indistinguishable from an (ideal) authentic channel (the desired functionality), except with probability less than  $\epsilon + \epsilon$ . This proves that the scheme is  $(\epsilon + \epsilon)$ -UC-secure, without using the composability theorem.

**Category / Keywords:** secret-key cryptography / Authentication, Strongly Universal hash functions, Partially known key, Trace distance, Universal Composability, Quantum Key Distribution.

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