

On the Oblivious Transfer Capacity of Generalized Erasure Channels against Malicious Adversaries

Rafael Dowsley¹ and Anderson C. A. Nascimento²

¹ Institute of Theoretical Informatics
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
rafael.dowsley@kit.edu

² Institute of Technology
University of Washington Tacoma
andclay@uw.edu.

October 10, 2014

Abstract

Noisy channels are a powerful resource for cryptography as they can be used to obtain information-theoretically secure key agreement, commitment and oblivious transfer protocols, among others. Oblivious transfer (OT) is a fundamental primitive since it is complete for secure multi-party computation, and the OT capacity characterizes how efficiently a channel can be used for obtaining string oblivious transfer. Ahlswede and Csiszár (*ISIT'07*) presented upper and lower bounds on the OT capacity of generalized erasure channels (GEC) against passive adversaries. In the case of GEC with erasure probability at least $1/2$, the upper and lower bounds match and therefore the OT capacity was determined. It was later proved by Pinto et al. (*IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 57(8)*) that in this case there is also a protocol against malicious adversaries achieving the same lower bound, and hence the OT capacity is identical for passive and malicious adversaries. In the case of GEC with erasure probability smaller than $1/2$, the known lower bound against passive adversaries that was established by Ahlswede and Csiszár does not match their upper bound and it was unknown whether this OT rate could be achieved against malicious adversaries as well. In this work we show that there is a protocol against malicious adversaries achieving the same OT rate that was obtained against passive adversaries.

In order to obtain our results we introduce a novel use of interactive hashing that is suitable for dealing with the case of low erasure probability ($p^* < 1/2$).

Keywords: Oblivious transfer, generalized erasure channel, oblivious transfer capacity, malicious adversaries, information-theoretic security.

1 Introduction

The usefulness of noisy channels for cryptographic purposes was first realized by Wyner [38], who proposed a secret key agreement protocol based on noisy channels. Later on it was showed by Crépeau and Kilian that such channels can also be used to obtain information-theoretically secure implementations of cryptographic primitives such as oblivious transfer and commitment protocols [12, 11].

Oblivious transfer (OT) is one of the fundamental cryptographic primitives since it is complete for two-party and multi-party computation [23, 27, 15], i.e., given an implementation of OT it is possible to securely evaluate any polynomial time computable function without any additional assumptions. In the early years of research on OT, different variants of OT were proposed [37, 33], but it was later showed that they are equivalent [10]. Thereafter the community has focused mainly on the one-out-of-two string oblivious transfer variant, which is the one considered in this work. It is a primitive involving two parts, Alice and Bob. Alice inputs two strings $S_0, S_1 \in \{0, 1\}^k$ and Bob inputs a choice bit c . Bob receives as output S_c . The security of the OT protocol guarantees that (a dishonest) Alice cannot learn c , while (a dishonest) Bob cannot learn both strings. The results of Crépeau and Kilian [12, 11] regarding OT based on noisy channels were later improved in [28, 36, 13, 29].

OT Capacity After the initial success in obtaining OT protocols from noisy channels, researchers started to investigate the question of which channels can be used to implement OT and how efficiently this can be done. Nascimento and Winter [29] proposed the notion of OT capacity, which is the optimal rate at which noisy channels can employed to realize OT, and also determined which noise resources have strictly positive OT capacity. Imai et al. [25] obtained the OT capacity of erasures channels against passive adversaries (i.e., adversaries which always follow the protocol) and a lower bound on its OT capacity against malicious adversaries (which can arbitrarily deviate from the protocol). Ahlswede and Csiszár [1, 2] showed new bounds for the OT capacity of erasure channels.

Generalized Erasure Channel A generalized erasure channel (GEC) is a combination of a discrete memoryless channel and an erasure channel. The output of each transmission is an erasure with probability $p^* > 0$, independently from the input symbol. GECs represent a very special case for the study of OT based on noisy channels. In fact, the known techniques to implement OT from noisy channels first use the noisy channel to emulate a GEC (in case that it is not already one) and then use the (emulated) GEC in the rest of the protocol. Thus, clarifying the OT capacity of the generalized erasure channels is a central question.

Ahlswede and Csiszár [1, 2] investigated the OT capacity of GECs against passive adversaries. For a GEC with $p^* \geq 1/2$, they determined the OT capacity. For a GEC with $p^* < 1/2$, they obtained upper and lower bounds for the OT capacity. Of course, the upper bounds also hold for the case of malicious adversaries. Pinto et al. [32] proved that for a GEC with $p^* \geq 1/2$, the OT rate achieved by Ahlswede and Csiszár's protocol against passive adversaries can also be achieved against malicious adversaries, and so the OT capacity is

the same. The techniques used in [32] clearly do not apply in the case $p^* < 1/2$ as they explicitly use the fact that the majority of the symbols received by Alice are erasures.

Our contribution In this work we prove that for a GEC with $p^* < 1/2$, the same OT rate achieved by Ahlswede and Csiszár’s protocol [1, 2] in the case of passive adversaries can also be achieved in the case of malicious adversaries, thus establishing a lower bound on the OT capacity of these GECs against malicious participants that is equal to one obtained against passive ones. We introduce a novel use of the interactive hashing techniques used by Crépeau and Savvides in [14].

2 Preliminaries

2.1 Notation

Domains of random variables and other sets will be denoted by calligraphic letters, the cardinality of a set \mathcal{X} by $|\mathcal{X}|$, random variables by upper case letters, and realizations of the random variables by lower case letters. For a random variable X over \mathcal{X} , $P_X : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow [0, 1]$ with $\sum_{x \in \mathcal{X}} P_X(x) = 1$ denotes its probability distribution. For a joint probability distribution $P_{XY} : \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y} \rightarrow [0, 1]$, $P_X(x) := \sum_{y \in \mathcal{Y}} P_{XY}(x, y)$ denotes the marginal probability distribution and $P_{X|Y}(x|y) := \frac{P_{XY}(x, y)}{P_Y(y)}$ the conditional probability distribution if $P_Y(y) \neq 0$. $X \in_R \mathcal{X}$ denotes a random variable uniformly distributed over \mathcal{X} and U_r a vector uniformly chosen from $\{0, 1\}^r$. $[n]$ denotes the set $\{1, \dots, n\}$ and $\binom{[n]}{\ell}$ the set of all subsets $\mathcal{S} \subseteq [n]$, where $|\mathcal{S}| = \ell$. For $X^n = (X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n)$ and $\mathcal{S} \subseteq [n]$, $X^{\mathcal{S}}$ is the restriction of X^n to the positions in the subset \mathcal{S} . Similarly for a set \mathcal{R} , $\mathcal{R}^{\mathcal{S}}$ is the subset of \mathcal{R} consisting of the elements determined by \mathcal{S} . If a and b are two bit strings of the same dimension, $a \oplus b$ denotes their bitwise XOR. The logarithms used in this paper are in base 2. The entropy of X is denoted by $H(X)$ and the mutual information between X and Y by $I(X; Y)$.

2.2 Entropy and Extractors

The main entropy measure used in this work is the min-entropy since its conditional version captures the notion of unpredictability of a random variable, i.e., the private randomness that can be extracted from variable X given the correlated random variable Y possessed by an adversary. For a finite alphabet \mathcal{X} , the min-entropy of a random variable $X \in \mathcal{X}$ is defined as

$$H_\infty(X) = \min_x \log(1/P_X(x)).$$

Its conditional version, for a finite alphabet \mathcal{Y} and a random variable $Y \in \mathcal{Y}$, is defined as

$$H_\infty(X|Y) = \min_y H_\infty(X|Y = y).$$

For two probability distributions P_X and P_Y over the same domain \mathcal{V} , the statistical distance between them is

$$\text{SD}(P_X, P_Y) := \frac{1}{2} \sum_{v \in \mathcal{V}} |P_X(v) - P_Y(v)|.$$

In order to extract secure one-time pads from random variables we use strong extractors [30, 21, 20].

Definition 1 (Strong Extractors). *A probabilistic polynomial time function $\text{Ext} : \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^r \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^\ell$ using r bits of randomness is a (n, m, ℓ, ϵ) -strong extractor if for all probability distributions P_X with $\mathcal{X} = \{0, 1\}^n$ and such that $H_\infty(X) \geq m$, we have that $\text{SD}(P_{\text{Ext}(X;U_r),U_r}, P_{U_\ell,U_r}) \leq \epsilon$.*

In particular we will use Universal Hash Functions [7] as strong extractors since they can extract the optimal number of nearly random bits [34] according to the Leftover-Hash Lemma (similarly the Privacy-Amplification Lemma) [26, 24, 5, 4].

Definition 2 (Universal Hash Function). *A class \mathcal{G} of functions $g : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$ is 2-universal if, for any distinct $x_1, x_2 \in \mathcal{X}$, the probability that $g(x_1) = g(x_2)$ is at most $|\mathcal{Y}|^{-1}$ when g is chosen uniformly at random from \mathcal{G} .*

Lemma 1. *Let \mathcal{G} be a 2-universal class of functions $g : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^\ell$. Then for G chosen uniformly at random from \mathcal{G} we have that*

$$\text{SD}(P_{G(X),G}, P_{U_\ell,G}) \leq \frac{1}{2} \sqrt{2^{-H_\infty(X)} 2^\ell}.$$

In particular, it is a (n, m, ℓ, ϵ) -strong extractor when $\ell \leq m - 2 \log(\epsilon^{-1}) + 2$.

2.3 Interactive Hashing and Encoding of Subsets

The oblivious transfer protocol introduced in this paper uses interactive hashing as an important building block. Interactive hashing is a cryptographic primitive between two players, the sender (Bob) and the receiver (Alice) which was initially introduced in the context of computationally secure cryptography [31] but was later on generalized for the context of information-theoretical cryptography. It is particularly useful in the design of unconditionally secure oblivious transfer protocols [6, 18, 19, 14, 32, 22]. In this primitive Bob inputs a string $W \in \{0, 1\}^m$ and both Alice and Bob receive as output two strings $W_0, W_1 \in \{0, 1\}^m$ such that $W_0 \neq W_1$. The first requirement is that one of the two output strings, W_d , should be equal to W . The second requirement is that one of the strings should be effectively beyond the control of (a malicious) Bob. On the other hand, the third requirement states that (a malicious) Alice should not be able to learn d (as long as W_0 and W_1 are a priori equally likely to be the input).

Definition 3 (Security of Interactive Hashing [18, 19]). *An interactive hashing protocol is secure for Bob if for every unbounded strategy of Alice (A'), and every W , if W_0, W_1 are the outputs of the protocol between an honest Bob (B) with input W and A' , then*

$$\{\text{View}_{A'}^{\langle A', B \rangle}(W) | W = W_0\} = \{\text{View}_{A'}^{\langle A', B \rangle}(W) | W = W_1\},$$

where $\text{View}_{A'}^{\langle A', B \rangle}(W)$ is Alice's view of the protocol when Bob's input is W . An interactive hashing protocol is (s, ρ) -secure for Alice if for every $S \subseteq \{0, 1\}^m$ of size at most 2^s and every unbounded strategy of Bob (B'), if W_0, W_1 are the outputs of the protocol, then

$$\Pr[W_0, W_1 \in S] < \rho,$$

where the probability is taken over the coin tosses of Alice and Bob. An interactive hashing protocol is (s, ρ) -secure if it is secure for Bob and (s, ρ) -secure for Alice.

If the distribution of the string $W_{\bar{d}}$ over the randomness of the two parties is η -close to uniform on all strings not equal to W_d , then the protocol is called η -uniform interactive hashing.

Lemma 2 ([18, 19]). *Let t, m be positive integers such that $t \geq \log m + 2$. Then there exists a four-message (2^{-m}) -uniform $(t, 2^{-(m-t)+O(\log m)})$ -secure interactive hashing protocol.*

The interactive hashing scheme ensures that one of the outputs is almost uniformly random; however, in the oblivious transfer protocol, the two strings are not used directly, but as encodings of subsets. For the protocol to succeed, both output strings should be valid encodings of subsets. Cover showed [9] the existence of an efficiently computable one to one mapping $F : \binom{[n]}{\ell} \rightarrow \binom{[n]}{\ell}$ for every integer $\ell \leq n$ (thus making it possible to encode the set $\binom{[n]}{\ell}$ in binary strings of length $m = \lceil \log \binom{[n]}{\ell} \rceil$). But using such mapping in a straight way may result in only slightly more than half of the strings being valid encodings. Therefore we use the modified encoding of Savvides [35], in which each string $W \in \{0, 1\}^m$ encodes the same subset as $W \bmod \binom{[n]}{\ell}$, thus implying that all strings always encode valid subsets. In this encoding, each subset corresponds to either 1 or 2 strings in $\{0, 1\}^m$, so this scheme can at most double the fraction of the strings that maps to Bob's subset of interest.

3 Security Model

In this section we specify the model used for proving the security of the oblivious transfer protocol and also the resources available to the parties. In the one-out-of-two string oblivious transfer, Alice gives two strings $S_0, S_1 \in \{0, 1\}^k$ as input and Bob inputs a choice bit c . Bob receives S_c as output and remains ignorant about $S_{\bar{c}}$, while Alice should not learn Bob's choice bit. As showed by Beaver [3], there exists a very efficient reduction from randomized OT to OT, therefore in this paper we consider for simplicity OT with random inputs. We consider malicious adversaries that can act arbitrarily. The protocol participants are connected by both a noiseless channel and a generalized erasure channel. The security parameter n determines the number of times that the generalized erasure channel can be used.

Definition 4 (Generalized Erasure Channel [1, 2]). *A discrete memoryless channel $\{W : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}\}$ is called a generalized erasure channel (GEC) if the output alphabet \mathcal{Y} can be decomposed as $\mathcal{Y}_0 \cup \mathcal{Y}^*$ such that $W(y|x)$ does not depend on $x \in \mathcal{X}$, if $y \in \mathcal{Y}^*$. For a GEC, we denote $W_0(y|x) = \frac{1}{1-p^*}W(y|x)$, $x \in \mathcal{X}$, $y \in \mathcal{Y}_0$, where p^* is the sum of $W(y|x)$ for $y \in \mathcal{Y}^*$ (not depending on x).*

We use the OT security definition from Crépeau and Wullschleger [16] because it implies the sequential composability of the protocols that meet it. Their definition is described below. The statistical information of X and Y given Z is defined as

$$I_{Stat}(X; Y|Z) = \text{SD}(P_{XYZ}, P_Z P_{X|Z} P_{Y|Z}).$$

A \mathcal{F} -hybrid protocol consists of a pair of algorithms $\mathcal{P} = (A, B)$ that can interact and have access to some functionality \mathcal{F} . A pair of algorithms $\tilde{\mathcal{P}} = (\tilde{A}, \tilde{B})$ is admissible for protocol \mathcal{P} if at least one of the parties is honest, that is, if at least one of the equalities $\tilde{A} = A$ and $\tilde{B} = B$ holds. Let S denote (S_0, S_1) .

Theorem 1 ([16]). *A protocol \mathcal{P} securely realizes string OT (for k -bit strings) with an error of at most 6ϵ if for every admissible pair of algorithms $\tilde{\mathcal{P}} = (\tilde{A}, \tilde{B})$ for protocol \mathcal{P} and for all inputs (S, C) , $\tilde{\mathcal{P}}$ produces outputs (U, V) such that the following conditions are satisfied:*

- (Correctness) *If both parties are honest, then $U = \perp$ and $\Pr[V = S_C] \geq 1 - \epsilon$.*
- (Security for Alice) *If Alice is honest, then we have $U = \perp$ and there exists a random variable C' distributed according to $P_{C'|S, C, V}$, such that $I_{Stat}(S; C'|C) \leq \epsilon$ and $I_{Stat}(S; V|C, C', S_C) \leq \epsilon$.*
- (Security for Bob) *If Bob is honest, we have $V \in \{0, 1\}^k$ and $I_{Stat}(C; U|S) \leq \epsilon$.*

The protocol is secure if ϵ is negligible in the security parameter n .

If the protocol uses the generalized erasure channel n times, its oblivious transfer rate is given by $R_{OT} = \frac{k}{n}$. The oblivious transfer capacity [29] C_{OT} is the supremum of the achievable rates with secure protocols.

4 OT Capacity of GEC

For a generalized erasure channel $\{W : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}\}$, let $C(W_0)$ denote the Shannon capacity of the discrete memoryless channel $\{W_0 : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}_0\}$. For the case of generalized erasure channels with $p^* \geq \frac{1}{2}$, the oblivious transfer capacity was determined by Ahlswede and Csiszár [1, 2] against passive adversaries (i.e., adversaries that always follow the protocol) and Pinto et al. [32] against malicious adversaries.

Theorem 2 ([1, 32, 2]). *For a generalized erasure channel with $p^* \geq \frac{1}{2}$, the oblivious transfer capacity both in the case of passive adversaries as in the case of malicious adversaries is $C_{OT} = (1 - p^*)C(W_0)$.*

For the case of generalized erasure channels with $p^* < \frac{1}{2}$, a lower bound on the OT capacity against passive adversaries was obtained by Ahlswede and Csiszár [1, 2].

Theorem 3 ([1, 2]). *For a generalized erasure channel with $p^* < \frac{1}{2}$, a lower bound on the oblivious transfer capacity in the case of passive adversaries is $C_{OT} \geq p^*C(W_0)$.*

In the current work we prove that the same OT rate that was achieved against passive adversaries can also be achieved against malicious ones.

Theorem 4. *For a generalized erasure channel with $p^* < \frac{1}{2}$, a lower bound on the oblivious transfer capacity in the case of malicious adversaries is $C_{OT} \geq p^*C(W_0)$.*

We present next a protocol that achieves such OT rate and its security proof. This protocol belongs to the lineage of OT protocols initiated by Crépeau and Savvides [14, 35], which use interactive hashing as a central, efficient mechanism to ensure that (a malicious) Bob is following the protocol rules without revealing to Alice his choice bit. Due to the fact that in our case the non-erasure positions are the majority, our usage of the interactive hashing protocol is different from the previous protocols.

Protocol 1.

1. (Parameter Setting) Alice and Bob select a positive constant α such that $3\alpha < 1/2 - p^*$ and set $\beta = 1/2 - p^* - \alpha$. Note that $\beta > 2\alpha$.
2. (GEC Usage) Alice chooses x^n randomly according to the probability distribution that achieves the Shannon capacity of W_0 . She sends x^n to Bob using the GEC, who receives the string y^n .
3. (Good/Bad Sets) Bob divides the string y^n into a set \mathcal{G} of good positions (those with $y \in \mathcal{Y}_0$) and a set \mathcal{B} of bad positions (those corresponding to erasures). The protocol is aborted if $|\mathcal{G}| < (1 - p^* - \alpha)n$.
4. (Partitioning) Bob chooses uniformly randomly a bit c and a m -bit string w , where $m = \lceil \log \binom{n/2}{\beta n} \rceil$. He decodes w into a subset \mathcal{T} of cardinality βn out of $n/2$ (using the encoding scheme described in Section 2). Then he partitions the n positions into two sets of same cardinality. For \mathcal{R}_c he picks randomly, and without repetition, $n/2$ positions from \mathcal{G} . For $\mathcal{R}_{\bar{c}}$, he first picks the subset $\mathcal{R}_c^{\mathcal{T}}$ randomly from the remaining positions from \mathcal{G} and then fills the rest of $\mathcal{R}_{\bar{c}}$ randomly with the $n/2 - \beta n$ still unused positions. Bob sends the descriptions of \mathcal{R}_0 and \mathcal{R}_1 to Alice, who aborts if there is some repeated position.
5. (Interactive Hashing) Bob sends w to Alice using the interactive hashing protocol. Let w_0, w_1 be the output strings, $\mathcal{T}_0, \mathcal{T}_1$ the decoded subsets and d be such that $w_d = w$.
6. (Checking the Partitioning) Bob announces $a = d \oplus c$, $y^{\mathcal{R}_0^{\mathcal{T}_a}}$ and $y^{\mathcal{R}_1^{\mathcal{T}_a}}$. Alice verifies if $y^{\mathcal{R}_0^{\mathcal{T}_a}}$ and $y^{\mathcal{R}_1^{\mathcal{T}_a}}$ are 2ϵ -jointly typical with her input on these positions for the channel $\{W_0 : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}_0\}$ (see Appendix for the considered definitions of typicality); aborting if this is not the case.
7. (Strings Transmission) Let $\mathcal{Q}_0 = \mathcal{R}_0 \setminus \mathcal{T}_a$, $\mathcal{Q}_1 = \mathcal{R}_1 \setminus \mathcal{T}_a$ and $\mu = p^* + \alpha$. Alice randomly chooses 2-universal hash functions $g_0, g_1 : \mathcal{X}^{\mu n} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{\mu n \lceil H(X|Y \in \mathcal{Y}_0) + \epsilon \rceil}$ (with $\epsilon > 0$ such that the output length is integer) and computes $g_0(x^{\mathcal{Q}_0})$ and $g_1(x^{\mathcal{Q}_1})$. In addition she also randomly chooses 2-universal hash functions $h_0, h_1 : \mathcal{X}^{\mu n} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{\delta n}$, where $\delta = (\mu - 5\alpha)H(X) - \mu(H(X|Y \in \mathcal{Y}_0) + \epsilon) - \gamma$ and $\gamma > 0$ is such that the output length is integer. Alice sends Bob $g_0(x^{\mathcal{Q}_0})$, $g_1(x^{\mathcal{Q}_1})$ and the descriptions of g_0, g_1, h_0, h_1 . She outputs $S_0 = h_0(x^{\mathcal{Q}_0})$ and $S_1 = h_1(x^{\mathcal{Q}_1})$.
8. (Output) Bob computes all possible $\tilde{x}^{\mathcal{Q}_c}$ that are jointly typical with $y^{\mathcal{Q}_c}$ and satisfy $g_c(\tilde{x}^{\mathcal{Q}_c}) = g_c(x^{\mathcal{Q}_c})$. If there exists exactly one such $\tilde{x}^{\mathcal{Q}_c}$, then Bob outputs $S_c = h_c(\tilde{x}^{\mathcal{Q}_c})$; otherwise $S_c = 0^{\delta n}$.

Theorem 5. *This string oblivious transfer protocol is secure.*

Correctness If both Alice and Bob are honest, Bob will get the correct output value unless he aborts in the Good/Bad Sets step or if he does not recover exactly $\tilde{x}^{\mathcal{Q}_c} = x^{\mathcal{Q}_c}$ in the Output step. But the probability that Bob has to abort in the Good/Bad Sets step is a negligible function of the security parameter n due to the Chernoff bound [8]. Bob does not recover the correct $\tilde{x}^{\mathcal{Q}_c} = x^{\mathcal{Q}_c}$ if either $x^{\mathcal{Q}_c}$ is not jointly typical with $y^{\mathcal{Q}_c}$ or if there exists another $\bar{x}^{\mathcal{Q}_c}$ that has $g_c(\bar{x}^{\mathcal{Q}_c}) = g_c(x^{\mathcal{Q}_c})$ and is jointly typical with $y^{\mathcal{Q}_c}$. The former case only occurs with negligible probability due to the definition of joint typicality. For the latter case, an upper bound on the number of $\bar{x}^{\mathcal{Q}_c}$ that are jointly typical with $y^{\mathcal{Q}_c}$ is $2^{\mu n[H(X|Y \in \mathcal{Y}_0) + \epsilon']}$, for $0 < \epsilon' < \epsilon$ and n sufficiently large. Therefore according to the Leftover-Hash Lemma, for n sufficiently large, with overwhelming probability $g_c(\bar{x}^{\mathcal{Q}_c}) \neq g_c(x^{\mathcal{Q}_c})$ for all these other $\bar{x}^{\mathcal{Q}_c}$ that are jointly typical with $y^{\mathcal{Q}_c}$. As all events that can result in Bob not obtaining the correct output only occur with negligible probability in n , the protocol is correct.

Security for Bob In a generalized erasure channel, each input symbol x is erased with the same probability p^* . Hence Alice has no knowledge about the erasures and thus from Alice's point of view the sets $(\mathcal{R}_0, \mathcal{R}_1)$ are independent from the choice bit c . The only other point where the bit c is used is to compute $a = d \oplus c$ in the Checking the Partitioning step. The interactive hashing protocol is $\eta' < 2^{-m}$ uniform, which is negligible since $m = \lceil \log \binom{n/2}{\beta n} \rceil = O(n)$ by applying Stirling's approximation. Thus with overwhelming probability $w_{\bar{d}}$ is uniform in $\{0, 1\}^m \setminus w$, and so Alice's views are identical for $d = 0$ and $d = 1$. Hence she gains no information about d and therefore about c . Note that in the Output step Bob does not abort, so Alice cannot use reaction attacks. Therefore with overwhelming probability Alice's view of the protocol is independent from c .

Security for Alice The proof of security for Alice follows the lines of Savvides' proof [35, Section 5.1], but we use new variants of the supporting definitions and lemmas due to the fact that we use the interactive hashing protocol in a different way.

Definition 5. Let $u(\mathcal{R})$ be the number of positions contained in \mathcal{R} such that the corresponding output at this position was an erasure.

Definition 6. \mathcal{T} is called good for \mathcal{R} if $u(\mathcal{R}^{\mathcal{T}}) < \alpha n$, otherwise it is called bad for \mathcal{R} .

The proof is divided in two cases as follows: (i) both $u(\mathcal{R}_0), u(\mathcal{R}_1) \geq 2\alpha n$, (ii) either $u(\mathcal{R}_0)$ or $u(\mathcal{R}_1)$ is less than $2\alpha n$.

Case 1 For proving Alice's security in the first case we will need the following lemmas.

Lemma 3. Let \mathcal{R} be a set of cardinality $n/2$ such that $u(\mathcal{R}) \geq 2\alpha n$. The fraction f of subsets $\mathcal{T} \subset \mathcal{R}$ of cardinality βn that are good for \mathcal{R} satisfies $f < (1 - 2\alpha)^{\alpha n}$.

Proof. We prove that a subset \mathcal{T} chosen uniformly at random will be good for \mathcal{R} with probability smaller than $(1 - 2\alpha)^{\alpha n}$ using the probabilistic method. One way of choosing \mathcal{T} is by picking sequentially at random, and without replacement, βn positions out of the $n/2$ positions in \mathcal{R} . For $1 < i < \beta n$, the probability p_i that the i -th chosen position is a non-erasure given that the subset \mathcal{T} does not have enough erasure positions so far to be considered bad for \mathcal{R} (i.e., less than αn erasures) is upper bounded by

$$p_i < 1 - \frac{2\alpha n - \alpha n}{n/2} = 1 - 2\alpha$$

Since for a subset \mathcal{T} to be considered good for \mathcal{R} it needs to have at least $\beta n - \alpha n$ non-erasure positions, we have that

$$\Pr[\mathcal{T} \text{ is good for } \mathcal{R}] < (1 - 2\alpha)^{\beta n - \alpha n} < (1 - 2\alpha)^{\alpha n}.$$

□

Lemma 4. *Let $\mathcal{R}_0, \mathcal{R}_1$ be sets of cardinality $n/2$ such that $u(\mathcal{R}_0) \geq 2\alpha n$ and $u(\mathcal{R}_1) \geq 2\alpha n$. The fraction of strings w that decode to subsets \mathcal{T} that are good for either \mathcal{R}_0 or \mathcal{R}_1 is no larger than $4(1 - 2\alpha)^{\alpha n}$.*

Proof. It follows from the previous lemma and the union bound that the fraction f of subsets \mathcal{T} that are good for either \mathcal{R}_0 or \mathcal{R}_1 is smaller than $2(1 - 2\alpha)^{\alpha n}$. Then the lemma follows straightforwardly from the fact that in the encoding scheme there are either one or two strings mapping to each set. □

Since the fraction of the strings $w \in \{0, 1\}^m$ that are good for either \mathcal{R}_0 or \mathcal{R}_1 is no larger than $4(1 - 2\alpha)^{\alpha n}$, we can set the security parameter s of the interactive hashing protocol to $\log(4(1 - 2\alpha)^{\alpha n} 2^m) = m + \alpha n \log(1 - 2\alpha) + 2$ and thus have $\rho = 2^{-(m-s)+O(\log m)} = 2^{\alpha n \log(1-2\alpha)+O(\log n)}$. Hence, by the security of the interactive hashing protocol, the probability that both w_0 and w_1 are good for either \mathcal{R}_0 or \mathcal{R}_1 is a negligible function of n , and so with overwhelming probability one of the sets (w.l.o.g. \mathcal{R}_0) will have $u(\mathcal{R}_0^{\mathcal{T}_a}) \geq \alpha n$.

By lemma 5 (in the appendix), if two n long strings are not jointly typical at a uniformly randomly chosen linear fraction of positions, then these n long strings are not jointly typical. Hence Bob can only successfully pass the test performed by Alice in the Checking the Partitioning step (i.e., he can only find $y^{\mathcal{R}_0^{\mathcal{T}_a}}$ that is jointly typical with Alice's input) if he can correctly guess y 's values for the erasure positions that are jointly typical with Alice's input on these positions. For $\epsilon > 0$ and n sufficiently large, there are for these positions at most $2^{\alpha n[H(Y \in \mathcal{Y}_0|X)+\epsilon]}$ sequences of y 's values that are jointly typical with Alice's input, and there are at least $2^{\alpha n[H(Y \in \mathcal{Y}_0)-\epsilon]}$ typical sequences for the y 's values, thus Bob's success probability is less than $2^{\alpha n[H(Y \in \mathcal{Y}_0|X)-H(Y \in \mathcal{Y}_0)+2\epsilon]} = 2^{-\alpha n[C(W_0)-2\epsilon]}$, which is a negligible function of n . Since Bob can only cheat with negligible probability in the case that both $u(\mathcal{R}_0), u(\mathcal{R}_1) \geq 2\alpha n$, the protocol is secure for Alice in this case.

Case 2 We assume w.l.o.g. that \mathcal{R}_0 is the one with $u(\mathcal{R}_0) < 2\alpha n$. The Chernoff bound guarantees that $|\mathcal{B}| > (p^* - \alpha)n$ with overwhelming probability. If \mathcal{T}_a is bad for \mathcal{R}_1 , then, by the same reasons as above, we have

that Bob can only successfully pass the test performed by Alice in the Checking the Partitioning step (i.e., finding $y^{\mathcal{R}_1^a}$ that is jointly typical with Alice's input) with negligible probability. But if $u(\mathcal{R}_0) < 2\alpha n$, $u(\mathcal{R}_1^a) < \alpha n$ and $|\mathcal{B}| > (p^* - \alpha)n$, then $u(\mathcal{Q}_1) \geq (p^* - 4\alpha)n$. Then from Bob's point of view, at least $(p^* - 4\alpha)n = (\mu - 5\alpha)n$ of the positions in \mathcal{Q}_1 are erasures and Alice only sends him $\mu n[H(X|Y \in \mathcal{Y}_0) + \epsilon]$ bits of information about $x^{\mathcal{Q}_1}$. Hence $H_\infty(X^{\mathcal{Q}_1} | \text{View}_{\text{Bob}}) > n[(\mu - 5\alpha)H(X) - \mu H(X|Y \in \mathcal{Y}_0) - \mu\epsilon]$ and so the use of the 2-universal hash function h_1 for extracting $n[(\mu - 5\alpha)H(X) - \mu H(X|Y \in \mathcal{Y}_0) - \mu\epsilon - \gamma]$ bits is secure according to the Leftover-Hash Lemma. Therefore the protocol is secure for Alice in this case as well.

Maximizing the oblivious transfer rate For n sufficiently large, α , ϵ and γ can be made arbitrarily small without compromising the security, thus in the limit the strings' length can be up to $np^*[H(X) - H(X|Y \in \mathcal{Y}_0)]$. Since the probability distribution used for X is the one achieving the Shannon capacity of W_0 , this is equal to $np^*C(W_0)$, thus proving Theorem 4.

5 Conclusions

In this work it was proven that the known lower bound in case of passive adversaries for the oblivious transfer capacity of the generalized erasure channels with error probability $p^* < 1/2$ also holds in the case of malicious adversaries, which can deviate arbitrarily from the protocol. In order to prove this result, a novel usage of the interactive hashing technique suitable for channels with low erasure probability was established, which can be of interest in other scenarios. The question of determining the exact oblivious transfer capacity of the generalized erasure channels with low erasure probability remains open, even for passive adversaries, and would be an interesting direction for future research given the pivotal role of these channels in the known constructions of oblivious transfer from noisy channels. Another interesting line of research would be developing new methodologies for obtaining oblivious transfer from noisy channels which circumvent the need of emulating a generalized erasure channel as a first step.

References

- [1] R. Ahlswede and I Csiszár. On oblivious transfer capacity. In *Information Theory, 2007. ISIT 2007. IEEE International Symposium on*, pages 2061–2064, June 2007.
- [2] Rudolf Ahlswede and Imre Csiszár. On oblivious transfer capacity. In Harout Aydinian, Ferdinando Cicalese, and Christian Deppe, editors, *Information Theory, Combinatorics, and Search Theory*, volume 7777 of *Lecture Notes in Computer Science*, pages 145–166. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013.
- [3] Donald Beaver. Precomputing oblivious transfer. In Don Coppersmith, editor, *Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO'95*, volume 963 of *Lecture Notes*

- in *Computer Science*, pages 97–109, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 27–31, 1995. Springer, Berlin, Germany.
- [4] C.H. Bennett, G. Brassard, C. Crépeau, and U.M. Maurer. Generalized privacy amplification. *Information Theory, IEEE Transactions on*, 41(6):1915–1923, Nov 1995.
 - [5] Charles H. Bennett, Gilles Brassard, and Jean-Marc Robert. Privacy amplification by public discussion. *SIAM J. Comput.*, 17(2):210–229, April 1988.
 - [6] Christian Cachin, Claude Crépeau, and Julien Marcil. Oblivious transfer with a memory-bounded receiver. In *39th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science*, pages 493–502, Palo Alto, California, USA, November 8–11, 1998. IEEE Computer Society Press.
 - [7] J. Lawrence Carter and Mark N. Wegman. Universal classes of hash functions. *Journal of Computer and System Sciences*, 18(2):143 – 154, 1979.
 - [8] Herman Chernoff. A measure of asymptotic efficiency for tests of a hypothesis based on the sum of observations. *The Annals of Mathematical Statistics*, 23(4):493–507, 12 1952.
 - [9] T.M. Cover. Enumerative source encoding. *Information Theory, IEEE Transactions on*, 19(1):73–77, Jan 1973.
 - [10] Claude Crépeau. Equivalence between two flavours of oblivious transfers. In Carl Pomerance, editor, *Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO’87*, volume 293 of *Lecture Notes in Computer Science*, pages 350–354, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 16–20, 1987. Springer, Berlin, Germany.
 - [11] Claude Crépeau. Efficient cryptographic protocols based on noisy channels. In Walter Fumy, editor, *Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT’97*, volume 1233 of *Lecture Notes in Computer Science*, pages 306–317, Konstanz, Germany, May 11–15, 1997. Springer, Berlin, Germany.
 - [12] Claude Crépeau and Joe Kilian. Achieving oblivious transfer using weakened security assumptions (extended abstract). In *29th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science*, pages 42–52, White Plains, New York, October 24–26, 1988. IEEE Computer Society Press.
 - [13] Claude Crépeau, Kirill Morozov, and Stefan Wolf. Efficient unconditional oblivious transfer from almost any noisy channel. In Carlo Blundo and Stelvio Cimato, editors, *SCN 04: 4th International Conference on Security in Communication Networks*, volume 3352 of *Lecture Notes in Computer Science*, pages 47–59, Amalfi, Italy, September 8–10, 2004. Springer, Berlin, Germany.
 - [14] Claude Crépeau and George Savvides. Optimal reductions between oblivious transfers using interactive hashing. In Serge Vaudenay, editor, *Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2006*, volume 4004 of *Lecture Notes in Computer Science*, pages 201–221, St. Petersburg, Russia, May 28 – June 1, 2006. Springer, Berlin, Germany.

- [15] Claude Crépeau, Jeroen van de Graaf, and Alain Tapp. Committed oblivious transfer and private multi-party computation. In Don Coppersmith, editor, *Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO’95*, volume 963 of *Lecture Notes in Computer Science*, pages 110–123, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 27–31, 1995. Springer, Berlin, Germany.
- [16] Claude Crépeau and Jürg Wullschleger. Statistical security conditions for two-party secure function evaluation. In Reihaneh Safavi-Naini, editor, *Information Theoretic Security*, volume 5155 of *Lecture Notes in Computer Science*, pages 86–99. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2008.
- [17] Imre Csiszár and János Körner. *Information Theory: Coding Theorems for Discrete Memoryless Systems*. Academic Press, Inc., Orlando, FL, USA, 1982.
- [18] Yan Zong Ding, Danny Harnik, Alon Rosen, and Ronen Shaltiel. Constant-round oblivious transfer in the bounded storage model. In Moni Naor, editor, *TCC 2004: 1st Theory of Cryptography Conference*, volume 2951 of *Lecture Notes in Computer Science*, pages 446–472, Cambridge, MA, USA, February 19–21, 2004. Springer, Berlin, Germany.
- [19] Yan Zong Ding, Danny Harnik, Alon Rosen, and Ronen Shaltiel. Constant-round oblivious transfer in the bounded storage model. *Journal of Cryptology*, 20(2):165–202, April 2007.
- [20] Yevgeniy Dodis, Rafail Ostrovsky, Leonid Reyzin, and Adam Smith. Fuzzy extractors: How to generate strong keys from biometrics and other noisy data. *SIAM J. Comput.*, 38(1):97–139, March 2008.
- [21] Yevgeniy Dodis, Leonid Reyzin, and Adam Smith. Fuzzy extractors: How to generate strong keys from biometrics and other noisy data. In Christian Cachin and Jan Camenisch, editors, *Advances in Cryptology – EURO-CRYPT 2004*, volume 3027 of *Lecture Notes in Computer Science*, pages 523–540, Interlaken, Switzerland, May 2–6, 2004. Springer, Berlin, Germany.
- [22] Rafael Dowsley, Felipe Lacerda, and Anderson C.A. Nascimento. Oblivious transfer in the bounded storage model with errors. In *Information Theory, 2014 IEEE International Symposium on*, pages 1623–1627, June 2014.
- [23] Oded Goldreich, Silvio Micali, and Avi Wigderson. How to play any mental game or A completeness theorem for protocols with honest majority. In Alfred Aho, editor, *19th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing*, pages 218–229, New York City, New York, USA, May 25–27, 1987. ACM Press.
- [24] J. Håstad, R. Impagliazzo, L. Levin, and M. Luby. A pseudorandom generator from any one-way function. *SIAM Journal on Computing*, 28(4):1364–1396, 1999.
- [25] H. Imai, K. Morozov, and A.C.A. Nascimento. On the oblivious transfer capacity of the erasure channel. In *Information Theory, 2006 IEEE International Symposium on*, pages 1428–1431, July 2006.

- [26] Russell Impagliazzo, Leonid A. Levin, and Michael Luby. Pseudo-random generation from one-way functions (extended abstracts). In *21st Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing*, pages 12–24, Seattle, Washington, USA, May 15–17, 1989. ACM Press.
- [27] Joe Kilian. Founding cryptography on oblivious transfer. In *20th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing*, pages 20–31, Chicago, Illinois, USA, May 2–4, 1988. ACM Press.
- [28] Valeri Korjik and Kirill Morozov. Generalized oblivious transfer protocols based on noisy channels. In *Proceedings of the International Workshop on Information Assurance in Computer Networks: Methods, Models, and Architectures for Network Security*, MMM-ACNS '01, pages 219–229, London, UK, UK, 2001. Springer-Verlag.
- [29] A.C.A. Nascimento and A Winter. On the oblivious-transfer capacity of noisy resources. *Information Theory, IEEE Transactions on*, 54(6):2572–2581, June 2008.
- [30] Noam Nisan and David Zuckerman. Randomness is linear in space. *J. Comput. Syst. Sci.*, 52(1):43–52, February 1996.
- [31] Rafail Ostrovsky, Ramarathnam Venkatesan, and Moti Yung. Fair games against an all-powerful adversary. In Renato Capocelli, Alfredo De Santis, and Ugo Vaccaro, editors, *Sequences II*, pages 418–429. Springer New York, 1993.
- [32] A.C.B. Pinto, R. Dowsley, K. Morozov, and A.C.A. Nascimento. Achieving oblivious transfer capacity of generalized erasure channels in the malicious model. *Information Theory, IEEE Transactions on*, 57(8):5566–5571, Aug 2011.
- [33] Michael O. Rabin. How to exchange secrets by oblivious transfer. Technical Report Technical Memo TR-81, Aiken Computation Laboratory, Harvard University, 1981.
- [34] J. Radhakrishnan and A. Ta-Shma. Bounds for dispersers, extractors, and depth-two superconcentrators. *SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics*, 13(1):2–24, 2000.
- [35] George Savvides. *Interactive Hashing and Reductions Between Oblivious Transfer Variants*. PhD thesis, Montreal, Que., Canada, Canada, 2007. AAINR32237.
- [36] D. Stebila and S. Wolf. Efficient oblivious transfer from any non-trivial binary-symmetric channel. In *Information Theory, 2002. Proceedings. 2002 IEEE International Symposium on*, pages 293–, 2002.
- [37] Stephen Wiesner. Conjugate coding. *SIGACT News*, 15(1):78–88, January 1983.
- [38] A. D. Wyner. The wire-tap channel. *Bell System Technical Journal*, 54(8):1355–1387, 1975.

A Typical Sequences

The following definitions follow largely the book of Csiszár and Körner [17].

Definition 7. For a probability distribution P on \mathcal{X} and $\epsilon > 0$ the ϵ -typical sequences form the set

$$\mathcal{T}_{P,\epsilon}^n = \{x^n \in \mathcal{X}^n : \forall x \in \mathcal{X} |N(x|x^n) - nP(x)| \leq \epsilon n \text{ \& } P(x) = 0 \Rightarrow N(x|x^n) = 0\},$$

with the number $N(x|x^n)$ denoting the number of symbols x in the string x^n .

The *type* of x^n is the probability distribution $P_{x^n}(x) = \frac{1}{n}N(x|x^n)$. Then, $x^n \in \mathcal{T}_{P,\epsilon}^n \Rightarrow |P_{x^n}(x) - P(x)| \leq \epsilon, \forall x \in \mathcal{X}$.

Properties 1.

1. $P^{\otimes n}(\mathcal{T}_{P,\epsilon}^n) \geq 1 - 2|\mathcal{X}| \exp(-n\epsilon^2/2)$.
2. $|\mathcal{T}_{P,\epsilon}^n| \leq \exp(nH(P) + n\epsilon D)$.
3. $|\mathcal{T}_{P,\epsilon}^n| \geq (1 - 2|\mathcal{X}| \exp(-n\epsilon^2/2)) \exp(nH(P) - n\epsilon D)$,

with the constant $D = \sum_{x:P(x) \neq 0} -\log P(x)$. See [17] for more details.

Extending this concept to the conditional ϵ -typical sequences, we have:

Definition 8. Consider a channel $W : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$ and an input string $x \in \mathcal{X}^n$. For $\epsilon > 0$, the conditional ϵ -typical sequences form the set

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{T}_{W,\epsilon}^n(x^n) &= \{y^n : \forall x \in \mathcal{X}, y \in \mathcal{Y} |N(xy|x^n y^n) \\ &\quad - nW(y|x)P_{x^n}(x)| \leq \epsilon n \\ &\quad \& W(y|x) = 0 \Rightarrow N(xy|x^n y^n) = 0\} \\ &= \prod_x \mathcal{T}_{W_x, \epsilon P_{x^n}(x)^{-1}}^{\mathcal{I}_x}, \end{aligned}$$

where \mathcal{I}_x are the sets of positions in the string x^n where $x_k = x$.

Properties 2.

1. $W_{x^n}^n(\mathcal{T}_{W,\epsilon}^n) \geq 1 - 2|\mathcal{X}||\mathcal{Y}| \exp(-n\epsilon^2/2)$.
2. $|\mathcal{T}_{W,\epsilon}^n| \leq \exp(nH(W|P_{x^n}) + n\epsilon E)$.
3. $|\mathcal{T}_{W,\epsilon}^n| \geq (1 - 2|\mathcal{X}||\mathcal{Y}| \exp(-n\epsilon^2/2)) \cdot \exp(-nH(W|P_{x^n}) - n\epsilon E)$,

with the constant $E = \max_x \sum_{y:W(y) \neq 0} -\log W_x(y)$ and the conditional entropy $H(W|P) = \sum_x P(x)H(W_x)$. See [17] for more details.

It is a well know fact that if x^n and y^n are conditional ϵ -typical according the definition 8, then

$$|\mathcal{T}_{W,\epsilon}^n| \leq 2^{n(H(Y|X)+\epsilon)}.$$

We now prove the following lemma:

Lemma 5. *Let $W : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$ be a discrete memoryless channel and $x^n \in \mathcal{X}^n$, $y^n \in \mathcal{Y}^n$ be the input and output strings of this channel. Let \mathcal{A} be a random subset of $[n]$ such that $|\mathcal{A}| = \delta n$, $0 < \delta \leq 1$. Let $x^{\mathcal{A}}$ and $y^{\mathcal{A}}$ be the restrictions of x^n and y^n to the positions in the set \mathcal{A} . If x^n and y^n are conditional ϵ -typical, then $x^{\mathcal{A}}$ and $y^{\mathcal{A}}$ are conditional 2ϵ -typical for any $\epsilon > 0$ and n large enough.*

Proof. By hypothesis x^n and y^n are conditional ϵ -typical, so for every symbols x and y we have that

$$|N(xy|x^n y^n) - nP_{x^n}(x)W(y|x)| \leq \epsilon n,$$

for a large enough n .

Given the conditional ϵ -typical strings x^n and y^n , the probability of selecting one pair with the specific values x and y for the substrings $x^{\mathcal{A}}$ and $y^{\mathcal{A}}$ is $\frac{N(xy|x^n y^n)}{n}$. We have that

$$P_{x^n}(x)W(y|x) - \epsilon \leq \frac{N(xy|x^n y^n)}{n} \leq P_{x^n}(x)W(y|x) + \epsilon.$$

Therefore, by the Chernoff bound [8], for n large enough with overwhelming probability the number of pairs of x and y in the substrings $x^{\mathcal{A}}$ and $y^{\mathcal{A}}$, $N(xy|x^{\mathcal{A}} y^{\mathcal{A}})$, is limited by

$$\begin{aligned} \delta n (P_{x^n}(x)W(y|x) - \epsilon - \epsilon') &\leq N(xy|x^{\mathcal{A}} y^{\mathcal{A}}) \\ &\leq \delta n (P_{x^n}(x)W(y|x) + \epsilon + \epsilon'), \end{aligned}$$

for any $\epsilon' > 0$. Making $\epsilon' = \epsilon$ we have that the substrings $x^{\mathcal{A}}$ and $y^{\mathcal{A}}$ are conditional 2ϵ -typical. \square