

Removing Erasures with Explainable Hash Proof Systems

Michel Abdalla, Fabrice Benhamouda, and David Pointcheval

ENS, Paris, France *
firstname.lastname@ens.fr
www.di.ens.fr/~{abdalla, fbenhamo, pointche}

October 7, 2014

Abstract. An important problem in secure multi-party computation is the design of protocols that can tolerate adversaries that are capable of corrupting parties dynamically and learning their internal states. In this paper, we make significant progress in this area in the context of password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) and oblivious transfer (OT) protocols. More precisely, we first revisit the notion of projective hash proofs and introduce a new feature that allows us to *explain* any message sent by the simulator in case of corruption, hence the notion of *Explainable Projective Hashing*. Next, we demonstrate that this new tool generically leads to efficient PAKE and OT protocols that are secure against semi-adaptive adversaries without erasures in the Universal Composability (UC) framework. We then show how to make these protocols secure even against adaptive adversaries, using *non-committing encryption*, in a much more efficient way than generic conversions from semi-adaptive to adaptive security. Finally, we provide concrete instantiations of explainable projective hash functions that lead to the most efficient PAKE and OT protocols known so far, with UC-security against adaptive adversaries, with or without erasures, in the single global CRS setting.

As an important side contribution, we also propose a new commitment scheme based on DDH, which leads to the construction of the first one-round PAKE adaptively secure under plain DDH without pairing, assuming reliable erasures, and also improves previous constructions of OT and two- or three-round PAKE schemes.

Keywords. Oblivious Transfer, Password Authenticated Key Exchange, Erasures, Universal Composability, Adaptive Adversaries.

* DI/ENS, CNRS UMR 8548, and INRIA

1 Introduction

1.1 Motivation

One of the most difficult problems in secure multi-party computation is the design of protocols that can tolerate adaptive adversaries. These are adversaries which can corrupt parties dynamically and learn their internal states. As stated in the seminal work of Canetti *et al.* [CFGN96], this problem is even more difficult when uncorrupted parties may deviate from the protocol by keeping record of past configurations, instead of erasing them, or just because erasures are not reliable. To deal with this problem, they introduced the concept of non-committing encryption (NCE) and showed how to use it to build general multi-party computation protocols that remained secure even in the presence of such adversaries. Unfortunately, the gain in security came at the cost of a significant loss in efficiency. Though these results were later improved (e.g. [Bea97b, DN00]), NCE still requires an important amount of communication and achieving efficient constructions with adaptive security without assuming reliable erasures remains a difficult task.

To address the efficiency issue with previous solutions, Garay, Wichs, and Zhou [GWZ09] (GWZ) introduced two new notions. The first one was the notion of semi-adaptive security in which an adversary is not allowed to corrupt a party if all the parties are honest at the beginning of the protocol. The main advantage of the new notion is that it is only slightly more difficult to achieve than static security but significantly easier than fully-adaptive security. The second new notion was the concept *somewhat non-committing encryption*. Unlike standard NCE schemes, somewhat non-committing encryption only allows the sender of a ciphertext to open it in a limited number of ways, according to an equivocalty parameter ℓ .

In addition to being able to build very efficient somewhat non-committing encryption schemes for small values of ℓ , Garay *et al.* [GWZ09] also showed how to build a generic compiler with the help of such schemes that converts any semi-adaptively secure cryptographic scheme into a fully-adaptively secure one. Since the equivocalty parameter ℓ needed by their compiler is proportional to the input and output domains of the functionality being achieved, they were able to obtain very efficient constructions for functionalities with small domains, such as 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfers (OT). In particular, their results do not require reliable erasures and hold in the universal composability (UC) framework [Can01, Can00].

Building on the results of Garay *et al.* [GWZ09], Canetti *et al.* [CDVW12] showed how to use 1-out-of-2 OT protocols to build reasonably efficient password-based authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocols in the UC framework against adaptive corruptions without erasures. The number of OT instances used in their protocol is proportional to the number of bits of the password.

Even though both works provide efficient constructions of UC-secure OT and PAKE schemes with adaptive security without erasures, the efficiency gap between these protocols and those which assume reliable erasures (e.g., [CKWZ13, ABB⁺13]) remains significant. In this work, we aim to reduce this gap.

1.2 Our Approach

In order to build more efficient OT and PAKE schemes with adaptive security without erasures, we start from the constructions of Abdalla *et al.* [ABB⁺13], which were the most efficient OT and PAKE constructions in the UC model with adaptive corruptions, with a single global CRS¹, and

¹ Here, global CRS just means multiple parties can share the same CRS, as in [CKWZ13]. Our notion of global CRS is different from that in [CDPW07]

assuming reliable erasures. We then improve them to make them secure against *semi-adaptive* adversaries, without erasures. Finally, we show how to enhance these protocols with *non-committing encryption* (NCE) in order to achieve adaptive security without erasures, without hurting too much their efficiency. All our constructions assume the existence of a single global CRS (notice that even with static corruptions, OT and PAKE in the UC model do not exist in the plain model without CRS [CHK⁺05]).

Hash Proof Systems. At the heart of the OT and PAKE constructions in [ABB⁺13] is the following idea: one party commits to his index (for OT) or his password (for PAKE), and the other party derives from this commitment some hash value which the first party can compute if his commitment was valid and contained some given value (a valid password or a given index), or appears random otherwise. This hash value is then used to mask the values to be transferred for OT or is used to derive the session key for PAKE.

More precisely, this hash value is computed through a hash proof system or smooth projective hash functions (SPHF) [CS02]. An SPHF is defined for a language $\mathcal{L} \subseteq \mathcal{X}$. In our case, this language is the language of valid commitments of some value. The first property of an SPHF is that, for a word C in \mathcal{L} , the hash value can be computed using either a *secret* hashing key \mathbf{hk} (generated by the first party) or a *public* projected key \mathbf{hp} (derived from \mathbf{hk} and given to the second party) together a witness w to the fact that C is indeed in \mathcal{L} . However, for a word C not in \mathcal{L} , the hash value computed with \mathbf{hk} is perfectly random, even knowing \mathbf{hp} . The latter property is the so-called *smoothness* property.

Explainable Hash Proof Systems. To make the protocol secure against semi-adaptive adversaries, we face two main problems. The first is the fact the commitment scheme has at the very least to be UC-secure against semi-adaptive adversaries, without relying on erasures. While this is not the case of the original commitment scheme in [ABB⁺13], we show that a slight variant of it is.

The second problem is the main challenge: in case of corruption of an honest player after this player sent some projection key \mathbf{hp} , we need to be able to exhibit an hashing key \mathbf{hk} compatible with the view of the adversary. This view may contain some hash value of some commitment under \mathbf{hk} . For that purpose, we introduce the notion of explainable hash proof systems (EPHFs) which basically are SPHFs with a trapdoor enabling to generate a projection key \mathbf{hp} , and later exhibit a hashing key \mathbf{hk} for any hash value.

We propose two constructions of EPHFs. The first one works with any SPHF, as long as there exists a trapdoor which enables to generate, for any hashing key \mathbf{hk} , a random hashing key \mathbf{hk}' associated to the same projection key as \mathbf{hp} . This property is achieved by most known SPHF. Then to generate a hashing key \mathbf{hk}' corresponding to a given projection key \mathbf{hp} (associated to some known \mathbf{hk}) and a given hash value H , we can draw \mathbf{hk}' as above until it corresponds to the hash value H . Unfortunately, this can only be done if the set of possible hash values is small. One way to ensure this is not to use directly the hash value but only ν -bits from it. In that case, the reduction requires $O(2^\nu)$ drawing of \mathbf{hk}' .

This reduction gap means that ν has to be logarithmic in the security parameter. If we look carefully at current construction of SPHF over cyclic groups, we remark that the hashing key is a vector of scalars, while the hash value is a group element. Therefore, in any case, it seems intuitively impossible to recover a hashing key from a hash value, without performing some kind

of discrete logarithm on the hash value². The best we can hope, intuitively, is therefore to be able to drop back the cost from $O(2^\nu)$ to $O(2^{\nu/2})$, by enabling us to use a baby-step giant-step algorithm, or Pollard’s kangaroo method [MT09]. A straightforward application of this idea to an SPHF would require to perform this method to directly recover the discrete logarithm of the hash value, which is impossible. Our second construction basically consists in making this idea work.

From Semi-Adaptive Adversaries to Adaptive Adversaries. Once obtained OT and PAKE protocols secure against semi-adaptive adversaries using EPHFs, we still need to transform them into protocols secure against adaptive adversaries.

First, for PAKE, the GWZ transformation cannot directly be used because channels are not authenticated, and some ideas of Canetti *et al.* in [BCL⁺05] need to be combined to deal with this issue. Even then, the GWZ improvement of using somewhat NCE cannot be applied directly either because the outputs of PAKE are session keys, and therefore there is an exponential number of them, which means the equivocality parameter and the communication complexity of the resulting protocol would be exponential in the security parameter. So all bits need to be sent through NCE channels. While the resulting protocol would only be 3-round, its communication complexity would be impractical: even with the most efficient NCE schemes known so far [CDMW09], each bit in the original protocol needs to be replaced by about 320 group elements. That is why, we propose a new generic transformation from semi-adaptive PAKE to adaptive PAKE, only requiring to send $\mathfrak{K} + 8\nu_m$ bits via NCE (where \mathfrak{K} is the security parameter, and ν_m is the password length).

Second, for OT, while the GWZ transformation is very practical for bit OT (i.e., OT for messages of one bit), for long messages, it cannot be used, for a reason similar to the one for PAKE. Garay *et al.* [GWZ09] proposed a solution consisting in running ν_m -bit string OT and using zero-knowledge proofs to make sure the same index is used in all protocols. In this paper, we show how to directly construct ν_m -bit string OT from our specific semi-adaptive protocol at a lower cost, by avoiding zero-knowledge proofs and reducing the number of bits sent via NCE channels.

Relying only on DDH. As an important side contribution, we propose a new commitment scheme which can be used in a protocol. This commitment scheme is more efficient than the one of Abdalla *et al.* [ABB⁺13] and works under plain DDH, hence avoids the need of pairings required in [ABB⁺13]. We remark that this new commitment scheme significantly improves previous OT and PAKE in the UC model with adaptive adversaries, assuming reliable erasures. It also yields to the *first one-round PAKE scheme under plain DDH*, using [ABB⁺13].

For our protocols to be secure, the commitment scheme we use has to verify strong properties, which makes their design quite challenging. On the one hand, we need to be able to extract the inputs of the parties, hence, in particular to extract the commitments produced by an adversary. On the other hand, we also need to be able to simulate a party without knowing its input, in particular his commitments; but still to be able to open later these commitments to the correct input, in case of corruption. In other words, the commitment has to be both equivocal and extractable. But that is not sufficient. To be compatible with SPHF, it indeed requires an additional twist: the language \mathcal{L} of commitments of a given value need to be non-trivial. More precisely, it should not be possible for a (polynomial-time) adversary to generate a commitment

² We could imagine to use group elements for the hashing key, but that would require to use bilinear pairings, and the hash value would be in the target group \mathbb{G}_T of the pairing $e : \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G} \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$. So we still would need to be able to convert a group element from the target group \mathbb{G}_T to the original group \mathbb{G} .

which may be open in multiple ways (even if a polynomial-time adversary may not be able to find it), or in other words, a commitment generated by a polynomial-time adversary has to be perfectly binding. This last property is called robustness. Roughly speaking, a commitment verifying all these properties is said to be SPHF-friendly.

Efficient constructions of equivocable and extractable commitments fall in two categories: the one following the ideas of Canetti and Fischlin [CF01] (including [ACP09, ABB⁺13]), and the ones using non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs as decommitment information as the Fischlin-Libert-Manulis schemes [FLM11]. The latter ones are not robust and cannot be used for our purpose. The first basically consists, when the committed value is just one bit b , to commit in an equivocable way to b , and provide two ciphertexts C_0 and C_1 , where C_b contains the decommitment information for b and C_{1-b} is random. Extracting such a commitment can be done by decrypting C_0 and C_1 and finds which of them contain a valid decommitment information, while simulating such a commitment just consists of encryptions of valid decommitment information in C_0 and C_1 (for 0 and 1, respectively).

The difficulty is to find an equivocable commitment and an encryption scheme compatible with an SPHF, which basically means they have to be structure-preserving. In [ACP09], the Pedersen [Ped91] commitment scheme is used. But then the decommitment information has to be done bit by bit as it is a scalar, which is very inefficient³. To solve this issue, in [ABB⁺13], one of the Haralambiev structure-preserving commitment [Har11] is used, at the expense of relying on SXDH and pairings. Unfortunately, there does not seem to exist structure-preserving commitment under plain DDH. That is why, we had to develop a new way of constructing SPHF-friendly commitment schemes.

1.3 Organization of the Paper

After recalling some definitions in Section 2, we introduce our new notion of explainable hash proof systems (EPHFs) in Section 3 and present our two constructions. This is our first main contribution. Then, we show how to use EPHFs and SPHF-friendly commitments to construct PAKE and OT UC-secure against semi-adaptive adversaries, in Section 4. Next, we introduce our new SPHF-friendly commitment scheme under plain DDH, which is our second main contribution and also provides substantial improvements for OT and PAKE schemes in the UC model, assuming reliable erasures. Finally, in Section 6, we show how to efficiently enhance our OT and PAKE semi-adaptive protocols with *non-committing encryption* (NCE) in order to achieve adaptive security. In particular, we propose several adaptive versions of our semi-adaptive OT and PAKE protocols, yielding different trade-offs in terms of communication complexity and number of rounds. In each case, at least one of our new protocols outperforms existing ones. A detailed related work coverage can be found in Appendix A.

To better focus on the core ideas, classical definition and notations are recalled in Appendix B, and we put all the proofs of our semi-adaptively and adaptively secure protocols in Appendix C and Appendix E (respectively). Proofs together with some technical parts of our new SPHF-friendly commitment are in Appendix D.

³ In addition, the SPHF we can build is a weak form of SPHF, and cannot be used in one-round PAKE protocol for example.

2 Definitions

2.1 Notations

As usual, all the players and the algorithms will be possibly probabilistic and stateful. Namely, adversaries can keep a state \mathbf{st} during the different phases, and we denote $\stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow}$ the outcome of a probabilistic algorithm or the sampling from a uniform distribution. For example, $\mathcal{A}(x; r)$ will denote the execution of \mathcal{A} with input x and random tape r . For the sake of clarity, sometimes, the latter random tape will be dropped, with the notation $\mathcal{A}(x)$.

2.2 Smooth Projective Hash Functions

Projective hashing was first introduced by Cramer and Shoup [CS02]. Here we use the formalization of SPHF from [BBC⁺13b]: Let \mathcal{X} be the domain of the hash functions and let \mathcal{L} be a certain subset of this domain (a language). A key property is that, for a word C in \mathcal{L} , the hash value can be computed by using either a *secret* hashing key \mathbf{hk} or a *public* projection key \mathbf{hp} but with a witness w of the fact that C is indeed in \mathcal{L} :

- $\text{HashKG}(\mathcal{L})$ generates a hashing key \mathbf{hk} for the language \mathcal{L} ;
- $\text{ProjKG}(\mathbf{hk}, \mathcal{L}, C)$ derives the projection key \mathbf{hp} , possibly depending on the word C ;
- $\text{Hash}(\mathbf{hk}, \mathcal{L}, C)$ outputs the hash value from the hashing key, for any word $C \in \mathcal{X}$;
- $\text{ProjHash}(\mathbf{hp}, \mathcal{L}, C, w)$ outputs the hash value from the projection key \mathbf{hp} , and the witness w , for a word $C \in \mathcal{L}$.

The set of hash values is called the *range* of the SPHF and is denoted Π .

On the one hand, the *correctness* of the SPHF assures that if $C \in \mathcal{L}$ with w a witness of this fact, then $\text{Hash}(\mathbf{hk}, \mathcal{L}, C) = \text{ProjHash}(\mathbf{hp}, \mathcal{L}, C, w)$. On the other hand, the security is defined through the *smoothness*, which guarantees that, if $C \notin \mathcal{L}$, $\text{Hash}(\mathbf{hk}, \mathcal{L}, C)$ is *statistically* indistinguishable from a random element, even knowing \mathbf{hp} .

As in [BBC⁺13b], we focus on SPHFs for languages of commitments, whose corresponding plaintexts verify some relations, and even more specifically here equal to some value \mathbf{aux} . The languages are denoted $\mathcal{L}_{\text{full-aux}}$, where $\text{full-aux} = (\mathbf{crs}, \mathbf{aux})$, and \mathbf{crs} is the common reference string of the commitment. For some applications, such as PAKE, \mathbf{hk} and \mathbf{hp} have to be independent of \mathbf{aux} , since \mathbf{aux} is a secret (the password in case of PAKE). For the sake of simplicity, since we can efficiently achieve it, we restrict HashKG and ProjKG not to use the parameter \mathbf{aux} , but just \mathbf{crs} (instead of full-aux). But note that this is a stronger restriction than required for our purpose, since one can use \mathbf{aux} without leaking any information about it; and some of our applications such as OT do not require \mathbf{aux} to be private at all. But, this is not an issue, since none of our SPHFs uses \mathbf{aux} .

If HashKG and ProjKG do not depend on C and verify a slightly stronger smoothness property (called adaptive smoothness, which holds even if C is chosen after \mathbf{hp}), we say the SPHF is a KV-SPHF. Otherwise, it is said to be a GL-SPHF. See [BBC⁺13b] for details on GL-SPHF and KV-SPHF and language definitions.

2.3 SPHF-Friendly Commitment Schemes

In this section, we briefly sketch the definition of SPHF-friendly commitment schemes we will use in this paper (more details are given in Appendix B.3). This is a slightly stronger variant of the one in [ABB⁺13], since it requires an additional polynomial-time algorithm C.IsBinding .

But the construction in [ABB⁺13] still satisfies it. This is a commitment scheme that is both equivocal and extractable. It is defined by the following algorithms: $\text{C.Setup}(1^{\mathbb{R}})$ generates the global parameters, passed through the global CRS crs to all other algorithms, while $\text{C.SetupT}(1^{\mathbb{R}})$ is an alternative that additionally outputs a trapdoor τ ; $\text{C.Com}^{\ell}(\mathbf{M})$ outputs a pair (C, δ) , where C is the commitment of the message \mathbf{M} for the label ℓ , and δ is the corresponding opening data, used by $\text{C.Ver}^{\ell}(C, \mathbf{M}, \delta)$ to check the correct opening for C , \mathbf{M} and ℓ . It always outputs 0 (false) on $\mathbf{M} = \perp$. The trapdoor τ can be used by $\text{C.Sim}^{\ell}(\tau)$ to output a pair (C, eqk) , where C is a commitment and eqk an equivocation key that is later used by $\text{C.Open}^{\ell}(\text{eqk}, C, \mathbf{M})$ to open C on any message \mathbf{M} with an appropriate opening data δ . The trapdoor τ can also be used by $\text{C.Ext}^{\ell}(\tau, C)$ to output the committed message \mathbf{M} in C , or \perp if the commitment is invalid. Eventually, the trapdoor τ also allows $\text{C.IsBinding}^{\ell}(\tau, C, \mathbf{M})$ to check whether the commitment C is binding to the message \mathbf{M} or not: if there exists $\mathbf{M}' \neq \mathbf{M}$ and δ' , such that $\text{C.Ver}^{\ell}(C, \mathbf{M}', \delta') = 1$, then it outputs 0.

All these algorithms should satisfy some correctness properties: all honestly generated commitments open and verify correctly, can be extracted and are binding to the committed value, while the simulated commitments can be opened on any message.

Then, some security guarantees should be satisfied as well, when one denotes the generation of fake commitments $(C, \delta) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{C.SCom}^{\ell}(\tau, \mathbf{M})$, computed as $(C, \text{eqk}) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{C.Sim}^{\ell}(\tau)$ and then $\delta \leftarrow \text{C.Open}^{\ell}(\text{eqk}, C, \mathbf{M})$:

- *Setup Indistinguishability*: one cannot distinguish the CRS generated by C.Setup from the one generated by C.SetupT ;
- *Strong Simulation Indistinguishability*: one cannot distinguish a real commitment (which is generated by C.Com) from a fake commitment (generated by C.SCom), even with oracle access to the extraction oracle (C.Ext), the binding test oracle (C.IsBinding), and to fake commitments (using C.SCom);
- *Robustness*: one cannot produce a commitment and a label that extracts to \mathbf{M} (possibly $\mathbf{M} = \perp$) such that $\text{C.IsBinding}^{\ell}(\tau, C, \mathbf{M}) = 0$, even with oracle access to the extraction oracle (C.Ext), the binding test oracle (C.IsBinding), and to fake commitments (using C.SCom).

Note that, for excluding trivial attacks, on fake commitments, the extraction oracle outputs the C.SCom -input message and the binding test oracle accepts for the C.SCom -input message too. Finally, an SPHF-friendly commitment scheme has to admit an SPHF for the following language: $\mathcal{L}_{\text{full-aux}} = \{(\ell, C) \mid \exists \delta, \text{C.Ver}^{\ell}(C, \mathbf{M}, \delta) = 1\}$, where $\text{full-aux} = (\text{crs}, \text{aux})$ and $\mathbf{M} = \text{aux}$.

Basically, compared to the original definition in [ABB⁺13], the main difference is that it is possible to check in polynomial time (using C.IsBinding) whether a commitment is perfectly binding or not, i.e., does not belong to any $\mathcal{L}_{(\text{crs}, \mathbf{M}')}$ for $\mathbf{M}' \neq \mathbf{M}$, where \mathbf{M} is the value extracted from the commitment via C.Ext . In addition, in the games for the strong simulation indistinguishability and the robustness, the adversary has access to this oracle C.IsBinding .

Finally, for our PAKE protocols, as in [ABB⁺13], we need another property called strong pseudo-randomness. This property is a strong version of the pseudo-randomness property. However, while the latter is automatically verified by any SPHF-friendly commitment scheme, the former may not, because of an additional information provided to the adversary. But, it is verified by the SPHF-friendly commitment scheme in [ABB⁺13] and by our new commitment scheme introduced in Section 5, which is the most efficient known so far, based on the plain DDH.

2.4 SPHF-Friendly Commitment Schemes without Erasures

We will say that an SPHF-friendly commitment scheme is *without erasures* if this is an SPHF-friendly commitment scheme where δ (and thus the witness) just consists of the random coins used by the algorithm `C.Com`. Then, an SPHF-friendly commitment scheme without erasures yields directly a commitment scheme that achieves UC-security without erasures.

We remark that slight variants of the constructions in [ACP09, ABB⁺13] are actually *without erasures*, as long as it is possible to sample obliviously an element from a cyclic group. To make these schemes without erasures, it is indeed sufficient to change the commitment algorithm `C.Com` to generate random ciphertexts (with elements obliviously sampled from the corresponding cyclic groups) instead of ciphertexts of 0, for the unused ciphertexts (i.e., the ciphertexts b_{i, \overline{M}_i} , for [ABB⁺13], using the notations in that paper). This does not change anything else, since these ciphertexts are not used in the verification algorithm `C.Ver`.

In the sequel, all SPHF-friendly commitment schemes are assumed to be *without erasures*. Variants of [ACP09, ABB⁺13] are possible instantiations, but also our quite efficient constructions presented in Section 5 and Appendix D.

3 Explainable Projective Hashing

In this section, we define the notion of explainable projective hash function (EPHF) and then give two generic constructions. The first construction works with any SPHF with a way to compute a random hashing key corresponding to the projection key of some given hashing key. The second one is about twice more efficient, but only works with SPHF constructed from the generic framework in [BBC⁺13b].

3.1 Definition

Let us first suppose there exists an algorithm `Setup` which takes as input the security parameter \mathfrak{K} and outputs a CRS `crs` together with a trapdoor τ . In our case `Setup` will be `C.SetupT`, and the trapdoor τ will be the commitment trapdoor, which may need to be slightly modified, as we will see in our constructions. This modification generally roughly consists in adding the discrete logarithms of all used elements and is possible with most concrete commitment schemes.

An *explainable projective hashing* (EPH) is an SPHF with the following additional property: it is possible to generate a random-looking projection key `hp`, and then receive some hash value H , some value `aux` and some word $C \notin \mathcal{L}_{\text{full-aux}}$, and eventually generate a valid hashing key `hk` which corresponds to `hp` and H , as long as we know τ . In other words, it is possible to generate `hp` and then “explain” any hash H for a word outside the language $\mathcal{L}_{\text{full-aux}}$, by giving the appropriate `hk`.

While dual projective hashing [Wee12] implies a weak version of smoothness, our notion of EPH implies the usual notion of smoothness, and is thus stronger than SPHF. Then, an EPHF can be either a GL-EPHF or a KV-EPHF, depending on whether the word C is known when `hp` is generated or not.

Formally, an EPHF is defined by the following algorithms:

- `Setup`($1^{\mathfrak{K}}$) takes as input the security parameter \mathfrak{K} and outputs the global parameters, passed through the global CRS `crs` or `full-aux` to all the other algorithms, plus a trapdoor τ ;
- `HashKG`, `ProjKG`, `Hash`, and `ProjHash` behave as for a classical SPHF;
- `SimKG`(`crs`, τ , C) outputs a projection key `hp` together with an explainability key `expk` (C is not given as input for KV-EPHF);

- $\text{Explain}(\text{hp}, \text{full-aux}, C, H, \text{expk})$ outputs an hashing key hk corresponding to hp , full-aux , C , and H .

It must verify the following properties, for any $(\text{crs}, \tau) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Setup}(1^{\mathfrak{R}})$:

- *Explainability Correctness.* For any aux , any $C \notin \mathcal{L}_{\text{full-aux}}$ and any hash value H , if $(\text{hp}, \text{expk}) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{SimKG}(\text{crs}, \tau, C)$ and $\text{hk} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Explain}(\text{hp}, \text{full-aux}, C, H, \text{expk})$, then $\text{hp} = \text{ProjKG}(\text{hk}, \text{crs}, C)$ and $H = \text{Hash}(\text{hk}, \text{full-aux}, C)$;
- *Indistinguishability.* As for smoothness, we consider two types of indistinguishability:
 - *GL-indistinguishability:* a GL-EPHF is ε -indistinguishable, if for any aux and any $C \notin \mathcal{L}_{\text{full-aux}}$, the two following distributions are ε -close:

$$\{(\text{hk}, \text{hp}) \mid H \xleftarrow{\$} \Pi; (\text{hp}, \text{expk}) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{SimKG}(\text{crs}, \tau, C); \text{hk} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Explain}(\text{hp}, \text{full-aux}, C, H, \text{expk})\} \\ \{(\text{hk}, \text{hp}) \mid \text{hk} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{HashKG}(\text{crs}); \text{hp} \leftarrow \text{ProjKG}(\text{hk}, \text{crs}, C)\}.$$

- *KV-indistinguishability:* a KV-EPHF is ε -indistinguishable, if for any aux and any function f from the set of projection keys to $\mathcal{X} \setminus \mathcal{L}_{\text{full-aux}}$, the two following distributions are ε -close:

$$\{(\text{hk}, \text{hp}) \mid H \xleftarrow{\$} \Pi; (\text{hp}, \text{expk}) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{SimKG}(\text{crs}, \tau, \perp); \text{hk} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Explain}(\text{hp}, \text{full-aux}, f(\text{hp}), H, \text{expk})\} \\ \{(\text{hk}, \text{hp}) \mid \text{hk} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{HashKG}(\text{crs}); \text{hp} \leftarrow \text{ProjKG}(\text{hk}, \text{crs}, \perp)\}.$$

3.2 First Construction

First Construction of GL-EPHF. Let us consider a GL-SPHF for which:

1. For any hashing key hk and associated projection key hp , it is possible to draw random hk' corresponding to hp , such that the hash value of a word $C \notin \mathcal{L}_{\text{full-aux}}$ under hk' is uniform. More precisely, we suppose there exists a randomized algorithm InvProjKG , which takes as input τ , a hashing key hk , crs , and possibly a word $C \notin \mathcal{L}_{\text{full-aux}}$, and outputs a random hashing key hk' , verifying $\text{ProjKG}(\text{hk}', \text{crs}, C) = \text{hp}$. For any $(\text{crs}, \tau) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Setup}(1^{\mathfrak{R}})$, for any aux , for any $C \notin \mathcal{L}_{\text{full-aux}}$, with overwhelming probability over $\text{hk} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{HashKG}(\text{crs})$, the two following distributions are supposed to be identical (or ε -close, with ε negligible in \mathfrak{R}):

$$\{H \mid \text{hk}' \xleftarrow{\$} \text{InvProjKG}(\tau, \text{hk}, \text{crs}, C); H \leftarrow \text{Hash}(\text{hk}', \text{full-aux}, C)\} \quad \{H \mid H \xleftarrow{\$} \Pi\}.$$

This property can be seen as a strong version of smoothness.

2. There exists a parameter ν polynomial in $\log \mathfrak{R}$ and a randomness extractor Extract with range $\{0, 1\}^\nu$, such that the two following distributions are ε -close (with ε negligible in \mathfrak{R}):

$$\{\text{Extract}(H) \mid H \xleftarrow{\$} \Pi\} \quad \{H \mid H \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^\nu\}.$$

Details on the randomness extractor can be found in Appendix B.2. But either a deterministic extractor exists for Π , which is possible for many cyclic groups [CFPZ09], or one uses a probabilistic extractor with an independent random string in the CRS.

Then, if the hash values H computed by Hash or ProjHash are replaced by $\text{Extract}(H)$, the resulting SPHF is a GL-EPHF. Indeed, if $\text{SimKG}(\text{crs}, \tau, C)$ just generates $\text{hk} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{HashKG}(\text{crs})$ and $\text{hp} \leftarrow \text{ProjKG}(\text{hk}, \text{crs}, C)$, and outputs hp and $\text{expk} = (\tau, \text{hk})$. Then, $\text{Explain}(\text{hp}, \text{full-aux}, C, H, \text{expk})$ just runs $\text{hk}' \xleftarrow{\$} \text{InvProjKG}(\tau, \text{hk}, \text{crs}, C)$ many times until it finds hk' such that $\text{Hash}(\text{hk}'$,

$\text{full-aux}, C) = H$. Thanks to the above properties, it should find a valid hk' after about 2^ν runs. Since ν is polynomial in $\log \mathfrak{K}$, the resulting algorithm **Explain** is polynomial in \mathfrak{K} .

Actually, ν will determine the tightness of the proof. In all comparisons in this article, we will use $\nu = 1$, which hinders performances of our scheme; but our schemes are still very efficient. In practice, to gain constant factors, it would be advisable to use a greater ν , and thus larger blocks. Finally, the range of the EPHF can be easily extended just by using multiple copies of the EPHF: for a range of ν' , hk becomes a tuple of $\lceil \nu'/\nu \rceil$ original hashing keys, the same for hp and H .

Application to SPHF Built Using the Generic Framework of [BBC⁺13b]. Although the first property may seem really restrictive, most (if not all) current SPHFs verify it if τ is chosen correctly. In particular, SPHFs built using the generic framework of [BBC⁺13b] verify it, basically as long as τ contains the discrete logarithms of all elements.

First Construction for KV-EPHF. In the previous generic construction, we get a KV-EPHF, if the security property related to InvProjKG holds even if C can depend on hp . More precisely, we want the following property: For any $(\text{crs}, \tau) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Setup}(1^\mathfrak{K})$, for any aux , for any function f from the set of projection keys to $\mathcal{X} \setminus \mathcal{L}_{\text{full-aux}}$, with overwhelming probability over $\text{hk} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{HashKG}(\text{crs})$, with $\text{hp} \leftarrow \text{ProjHash}(\text{hk}, \text{crs}, \perp)$, the two following distributions are supposed to be identical (or ε -close, with ε negligible in \mathfrak{K}):

$$\{H \mid \text{hk}' \xleftarrow{\$} \text{InvProjKG}(\tau, \text{hk}, \text{crs}, \perp); H \leftarrow \text{Hash}(\text{hk}', \text{full-aux}, f(\text{hp}))\} \quad \{H \mid H \xleftarrow{\$} \Pi\}.$$

3.3 Second Construction

This second construction is more efficient but only works in the generic framework of [BBC⁺13b].

Recall of the Generic Framework. The generic framework encompasses most, if not all, known SPHFs over cyclic groups: an SPHF is defined by a matrix $\Gamma \in \mathbb{G}_1^{k \times n}$ (which depends on crs for KV-SPHF, and on crs and the word C for GL-SPHF), a function $\Theta : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathbb{G}^{1 \times n}$ (which depends on full-aux and in case of GL-SPHF, also possibly on an additional value ε which is a part of hp and hk ⁴), such that for any aux and any $C \in \mathcal{X}$, with high probability over ε (if ε is used):

$$C \in \mathcal{L}_{\text{full-aux}} \iff \exists \lambda \in \mathbb{Z}_p^k, \Theta(C) = \lambda \odot \Gamma,$$

where \oplus and \odot are the natural operations on the field \mathbb{Z}_p and the group \mathbb{G} (or even $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2$, and \mathbb{G}_T , with a pairing $e : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$ — details can be found in [BBC⁺13b]). In addition, we suppose λ can efficiently be computed from the witness of C in $\mathcal{L}_{\text{full-aux}}$.

The hashing key hk of the SPHF is a random vector $\alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_p^n$ (or $\text{hk} = (\alpha, \varepsilon)$ when ε is used), while the projection key hp is the vector $\Gamma \odot \alpha$ (or $\text{hp} = (\gamma, \varepsilon)$ when ε is used). And the hash value is $\text{Hash}(\text{hk}, \text{full-aux}, C) := \Theta(C) \odot \alpha$. When $C \in \mathcal{L}_{\text{full-aux}}$, it can also be computed from a witness w of C , by computing λ from w , and then setting $\text{ProjHash}(\text{hp}, \text{full-aux}, C, w) := \lambda \odot \gamma$. In the sequel, we ignore ε for the sake of simplicity.

⁴ This ε can be used to do efficient conjunctions of SPHF as in Section D.1. It is not present in the original framework, but can easily be added to it.

GL-EPHF. In this section, we describe our construction of a GL-EPHF, for any GL-SPHF constructed from the generic framework, as long as τ enables to compute the discrete logarithms of all elements of Γ .

The range of the SPHF is the set $\Pi = \{0, \dots, 2^\nu - 1\}$. Then, the hashing key is chosen as $\text{hk} := (\alpha, H_1, H) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^n \times \mathbb{G} \times \Pi$, while the projection key is $\text{hp} := (\gamma, H_1, H')$, with $\gamma := \Gamma \odot \alpha$, $H_0 := \Theta(C) \odot \alpha$ (i.e., H_0 is the original hash value of $\Theta(C)$ for the hashing key α), and $H' := H_0 \oplus H \odot H_1 = H_0 H_1^H$. The hash value is H . It can also be computed from λ by solving the following equation:

$$H' = (\lambda \odot \gamma) \oplus H \odot H_1.$$

In other words, $H \in \{0, \dots, 2^\nu - 1\}$ is the discrete logarithm of $H' \ominus (\lambda \odot \gamma)$ in base H_1 . This can be computed in $O(2^{\nu/2})$ group operations by **ProjHash**, using Pollard's kangaroo method in [MT09].

We now just need to prove that we have a way to explain any hash value H for any word $C \notin \mathcal{L}$. From τ , we can compute a basis $\beta_1, \dots, \beta_{k'}$ of the kernel of Γ ($\Gamma \odot \beta_i = \mathbf{1} \in \mathbb{G}^k$), since τ enables to compute the discrete logarithms of entries of Γ . Necessarily, as $C \notin \mathcal{L}$, there exists i such that $\Theta(C) \odot \beta_i \neq \mathbf{1} \in \mathbb{G}$, and we write $\beta = \beta_i$

SimKG chooses random $\alpha \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^n$ and $t \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$, sets $H_1 \leftarrow \Theta(C) \odot t\beta$ (which is a uniform random element in \mathbb{G}), and outputs $\text{hk} = (\alpha, H_1, 0)$ and $\text{expk} = (\alpha, \beta, t)$. Therefore, the corresponding projection key is $\text{hp} = (\gamma, H_1, H')$ with $H' = \Theta(C) \odot \alpha$. And **Explain** outputs $\text{hk} = (\alpha \ominus tH \odot \beta, H_1, H)$. This works because

$$H_0 \oplus H \odot H_1 = \Theta(C) \odot (\alpha \ominus tH \odot \beta) \oplus H \odot (\Theta(C) \odot t\beta) = \Theta(C) \odot \alpha = H'.$$

This construction is about twice more efficient than the previous one, since ν can be chosen twice larger, as **ProjHash** needs to run an algorithm of time complexity $O(2^{\nu/2})$ (in group operations) and **Explain** runs in constant time, while in the first construction, **Explain** has to run an algorithm of time complexity $O(2^\nu)$ (in group operations) and **ProjHash** runs in constant time.

4 Semi-Adaptive OT and PAKE without Erasures

In this section, we propose two new OT and PAKE protocols that are UC-secure against semi-adaptive adversaries, but without requiring reliable erasures. The security proofs can be found in Appendix C. Actually, these protocols are very similar to the UC-secure schemes in [ABB⁺13], except that the SPHF-friendly commitment scheme has to be *without erasures* and the SPHF has to be *explainable*. However, the proof is more complicated.

4.1 Semi-Adaptivity

The semi-adaptive setting has been introduced in [GWZ09], for two-party protocols when channels are authenticated: the adversary is not allowed to corrupt any player if the two players were honest at the beginning of the protocol. When channels are not authenticated, as for PAKE, we restrict the adversary not to corrupt a player P_i if an honest flow has been sent on its behalf, and it has been received by P_j , without being altered.

In addition to those restrictions on the adversary, there are also some restrictions on the simulator and the protocol. First, the simulator has to be *setup-preserving*, which means, in our case, that it first has to generate the CRS, before simulating the protocol execution. Second, the simulator has to be *input-preserving*, which means that if the adversary corrupts some user




Fig. 1. UC-Secure 1-out-of- k OT from an SPHF-Friendly Commitment for Semi-Adaptive Adversaries

and honestly runs the protocol for some input x , the simulator submits the same input to the functionality. Third, the protocol has to be *well-formed*, which means that the number of flows and the size of each flow is independent of the input and the random tapes of the users. All these restrictions are clearly verified by our simulators and protocols. Formal definitions can be found in [GWZ09].

4.2 Oblivious Transfer

The ideal functionality of an Oblivious Transfer (OT) protocol is depicted in Fig. 8 on page 28. It is inspired from [CKWZ13]. In Fig. 1, we describe a 2-round 1-out-of- k OT for ν_m -bit messages, that is UC-secure against semi-adaptive adversaries. It can be built from any SPHF-friendly commitment scheme, admitting a GL-EPHF, with range $\mathcal{H} = \{0, 1\}^{\nu_m}$, for the language: $\mathcal{L}_{\text{full-aux}} = \{(\ell, C) \mid \exists \delta, \text{C.Ver}^\ell(C, \mathbf{M}, \delta) = 1, \text{ where full-aux} = (\text{crs}, \text{aux}) \text{ and } \mathbf{M} = \text{aux}\}$.

In case of corruption of the database (sender) after it has sent its flow, since we are in the semi-adaptive setting, the receiver was already corrupted and thus the index s was known to the simulator. The latter can thus generate “explainable” hp_t for all $t \neq s$, so that when the simulator later learns the messages m_t , it can explain hp_t with appropriate hk_t . Erasures are no longer required, contrarily to [ABB⁺13].

The restriction that \mathcal{H} has to be of the form $\{0, 1\}^{\nu_m}$ is implicit in [ABB⁺13]. Any SPHF can be transformed to an SPHF with range \mathcal{H} of the form $\{0, 1\}^{\nu_m}$, using a randomness extractor, as long as the initial range is large enough. However, this is not the case for EPHF, since the extractor may not be reversible. That is why we need to make this assumption on \mathcal{H} explicit.

4.3 Password-Authenticated Key Exchange

The ideal functionality of a Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) proposed in [CHK⁺05] is depicted in Fig. 9 on page 29, and more intuition is given in Appendix B.4. In Fig. 2, we describe a one-round PAKE that is UC-secure against semi-adaptive adversaries. It can be built from any SPHF-friendly commitment scheme, admitting a KV-EPHF with strong pseudo-randomness, with range $\mathcal{H} = \{0, 1\}^{\mathbb{R}}$.

Again, thanks to the explainability property, it is possible to generate the hashing key that explains the session key provided by the ideal functionality, when the second player gets corrupted: since a first player was already corrupted, the simulator has already extracted the tentative

CRS: $\text{crs} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{C.Setup}(1^{\text{R}})$. Only protocol execution by P_i is described. The one by P_j is symmetrical.

Protocol execution by P_i with π_i :

1. P_i generates $\text{hk}_i \xleftarrow{\$} \text{HashKG}(L)$, $\text{hp}_i \leftarrow \text{ProjKG}(\text{hk}_i, \text{crs}, \perp)$
2. P_i computes $(C_i, \delta_i) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{C.Com}^{\ell_i}(\pi_i)$ with $\ell_i = (\text{sid}, P_i, P_j, \text{hp}_i)$
3. P_i sends hp_i, C_i to P_j

Key computation: Upon receiving hp_j, C_j from P_j

1. P_i computes $H'_i \leftarrow \text{ProjHash}(\text{hp}_j, (\text{crs}, \pi_i), (\ell_i, C_i), \delta_i)$
and $H_j \leftarrow \text{Hash}(\text{hk}_i, (\text{crs}, \pi_i), (\ell_j, C_j))$ with $\ell_j = (\text{sid}, P_j, P_i, \text{hp}_j)$
2. P_i computes $\text{SK}_i \leftarrow H'_i \text{ xor } H_j$.

Fig. 2. One-Round UC-Secure PAKE from an SPHF-Friendly Commitment for Semi-Adaptive Adversaries

password. In case of good guess by the adversary, the simulator can choose the key, that is thus easy to explain. However, in case of a bad guess by the adversary, the session key is randomly chosen by the functionality. But the simulator knows that the commitment is not in the right language, and so the projection key can be made explainable.

5 New SPHF-Friendly Commitment Scheme

In this section, we present our new efficient SPHF-friendly commitment scheme under the plain DDH. Due to lack of space, we only give an overview of the scheme and a comparison with previous SPHF-friendly commitment schemes. Details are left to Appendix D.

5.1 Scheme

Basic Idea. The basic idea of our scheme is a generalization of the implicit idea behind the schemes in [CF01, CLOS02, ACP09, ABB⁺13]: to commit to some bit b , a user essentially generates some element P and two words C_0 and C_1 such that $C_b \in L_{P,b}$, where $L_{P,0}$ and $L_{P,1}$ are two languages⁵. To open the commitment, the user just gives the random coins used to generate C_b , which proves that $C_b \in L_{P,b}$.

The two words also have to be related, in such a way that an adversary cannot generate P and two words C_0 and C_1 such that $C_0 \in L_{P,0}$ and $C_1 \in L_{P,1}$. However, when in possession of a given trapdoor, we can compute such words, which enables us to generate simulated commitments which can later be opened to the bit of our choice. This property is crucial for robustness, since it ensures that a commitment produced by an adversary is necessarily perfectly binding.

In addition, using another trapdoor, it is possible to check whether $C_b \in L_{P,b}$ or not (without knowing the random coins used to generate C_b). This makes the commitment extractable.

For all the previous constructions, to ensure these properties, P was an equivocable commitment of the bit b to be committed, such as the Pedersen commitment [Ped91] in [ACP09] or the Haralambiev commitment [Har11] in [ABB⁺13], and $L_{P,0}$ and $L_{P,1}$ were the languages of ciphertexts (for an IND-CCA encryption scheme such as Cramer-Shoup [CS98]) of a valid opening of P for 0 and 1 respectively. The binding property of the commitment P was used to prove an adversary could not generate P together with two words $C_0 \in L_{P,0}$ and $C_1 \in L_{P,1}$.

Unfortunately, the most efficient instantiation to date of this idea, namely the commitment of Abdalla *et al.* [ABB⁺13], requires an asymmetric bilinear group $(\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, p, e)$, due to the use

⁵ These languages have nothing to do with the languages of SPHF, that is why the notation is different

of the Haralambiev commitment, and $8m$ elements in \mathbb{G}_1 (for the two Cramer-Shoup ciphertexts) and 1 element in \mathbb{G}_2 (for the Haralambiev commitment), for each bit.

Our New Scheme. Here, we improve on this construction in the following way: C_0 and C_1 are now similar to Cramer-Shoup ciphertexts but without the part depending on the plaintext. To ensure that no adversary can generate two words $C_0 \in L_{P,0}$ and $C_1 \in L_{P,1}$, we just ensure that the product of the first elements (denoted $u_{i,0}$ and $u_{i,1}$ for the i -th bit) of C_0 and C_1 be some fixed element T . An additional “randomization” using some elements denoted e_{i,M_i} is necessary to prevent the user from distinguishing simulated commitments from normal ones. The last parts of C_0 and C_1 are adapted consequently.

But even with this randomization, since we do not need the part of the Cramer-Shoup ciphertext with the plaintext element nor a Pedersen-like commitment, our scheme is much more efficient, as shown in Section 5.2.

More precisely, we define the commitment as follows:

- **C.SetupT**($1^{\mathbb{K}}$) generates a cyclic group \mathbb{G} of order p , together with three generators $g, h = g^x, \hat{h} = g^{\hat{x}}$, a tuple $(\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \alpha', \beta', \gamma') \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^6$, and H is a random collision-resistant hash function from some family \mathcal{H} . It then computes the tuple $(c = g^\alpha \hat{h}^\gamma, d = g^\beta h^\gamma, c' = g^{\alpha'} \hat{h}^{\gamma'}, d' = g^{\beta'} h^{\gamma'})$. It also generates a random scalar $t \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$ and sets $T = g^t$. The CRS crs is set as $(g, h, \hat{h}, H, c, d, c', d', T)$ and the trapdoor τ is the decryption key $(\alpha, \alpha', \beta, \beta', \gamma, \gamma')$ (a.k.a., extraction trapdoor) together with t (a.k.a., equivocation trapdoor) and (x, \hat{x}) (only used in the EPHF).

For **C.Setup**($1^{\mathbb{K}}$), the CRS is generated the same way, but forgetting the scalars, and thus without any trapdoor;

- **C.Com** $^\ell(\mathbf{M})$, for $\mathbf{M} = (M_i)_i \in \{0, 1\}^m$ and a label ℓ , works as follows: For $i = 1, \dots, m$, it chooses two random scalars $r_{i,M_i}, s_{i,M_i} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$ and set:

$$\begin{aligned} e_{i,M_i} &= g^{r_{i,M_i}} & u_{i,M_i} &= g^{s_{i,M_i}} & v_{i,M_i} &= \hat{h}^{r_{i,M_i}} h^{s_{i,M_i}} & w_{i,M_i} &= (c^{r_{i,M_i}} \cdot d^{s_{i,M_i}}) \cdot (c'^{r_{i,M_i}} d'^{s_{i,M_i}})^\xi \\ e_{i,\bar{M}_i} &\xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{G} & u_{i,\bar{M}_i} &= T/u_{i,M_i} & v_{i,\bar{M}_i} &\xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{G} & w_{i,\bar{M}_i} &\xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p, \end{aligned}$$

with $\xi = H(\ell, (e_{i,b}, u_{i,b}, v_{i,b})_{i,b})$. The commitment is $C = (e_{i,b}, u_{i,b}, v_{i,b}, w_{i,b})_{i,b} \in \mathbb{G}^{8m}$, while the opening information is the $2m$ -tuple $\delta = (r_{i,M_i}, s_{i,M_i})_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{2m}$.

- **C.Ver** $^\ell(C, \mathbf{M}, \delta)$ just checks all the above equalities (=);
- **C.Sim** $^\ell(\tau)$ takes as input the equivocation trapdoor, namely the scalar t , and outputs the tuple $C = (e_{i,b}, u_{i,b}, v_{i,b}, w_{i,b})_{i,b}$ and $\text{eqk} = ((r_{i,b})_i, (s_{i,b})_i)$, where, for $i = 1, \dots, m, r_{i,0}, r_{i,1}, s_{i,0} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p, s_{i,1} = t - s_{i,0}$:

$$\begin{aligned} e_{i,0} &= g^{r_{i,0}} & u_{i,0} &= g^{s_{i,0}} & v_{i,0} &= \hat{h}^{r_{i,0}} h^{s_{i,0}} & w_{i,0} &= (c^{r_{i,0}} \cdot d^{s_{i,0}}) \cdot (c'^{r_{i,0}} \cdot d'^{s_{i,0}})^\xi \\ e_{i,1} &= g^{r_{i,1}} & u_{i,1} &= g^{s_{i,1}} = T/u_{i,0,1} & v_{i,1} &= \hat{h}^{r_{i,0}} h^{s_{i,1}} & w_{i,1} &= (c^{r_{i,1}} \cdot d^{s_{i,1}}) \cdot (c'^{r_{i,1}} \cdot d'^{s_{i,1}})^\xi; \end{aligned}$$

- **C.Open** $^\ell(\text{eqk}, C, \mathbf{M})$ simply extracts the useful values from $\text{eqk} = \mathbf{s}$ to make the opening value $\delta = (r_{i,M_i}, s_{i,M_i})_i$ in order to open to $\mathbf{M} = (M_i)_i$.
- **C.Ext** $^\ell(\tau, C)$ outputs \perp if $u_{i,0} \cdot u_{i,1} \neq T$. It also outputs \perp if for some i , for both $b = 0$ and $b = 1$ or for none of them:

$$w_{i,b} = e_{i,b}^{\alpha+\xi\alpha'} \cdot u_{i,b}^{\beta+\xi\beta'} \cdot v_{i,b}^{\gamma+\xi\gamma'}.$$

Otherwise, for each i , there is exactly one bit b verifying the above equality; and it sets M_i to this bit b , and returns the resulting message $\mathbf{M} = (M_i)_i$.

- $\text{C.IsBinding}^\ell(\tau, C, \mathbf{M})$ outputs 1 if and only if⁶

$$\begin{cases} w_{i, \overline{M}_i} \neq e_{i, \overline{M}_i}^{\alpha + \xi \alpha'} \cdot u_{i, \overline{M}_i}^{\beta + \xi \beta'} \cdot v_{i, \overline{M}_i}^{\gamma + \xi \gamma'} & \text{for all } i = 1, \dots, m, \text{ if } \mathbf{M} \neq \perp \\ w_{i, b} \neq e_{i, b}^{\alpha + \xi \alpha'} \cdot u_{i, b}^{\beta + \xi \beta'} \cdot v_{i, b}^{\gamma + \xi \gamma'} & \text{for some } i, \text{ for } b = 0, 1, \text{ if } \mathbf{M} = \perp \end{cases}$$

For each i , $(e_{i,b}, u_{i,b}, v_{i,b}, w_{i,b})$ corresponds to the word C_b . The language L_b is just the set of such tuples as generated for $b = M_i$ in the commitment procedure, described above. The binding property comes from the fact that $u_{i,0} \cdot u_{i,1}$ has to be equal to T . By knowing t , the discrete logarithm of T in base g , it is therefore easy to generate an equivocal commitment.

It remains to show how to extract a commitment. For that, we can roughly show that with high probability, $(e_{i,b}, u_{i,b}, v_{i,b}, w_{i,b})$ is generated as in the commitment procedure, if and only if:

$$w_{i,b} = e_{i,b}^{\alpha + \xi \alpha'} \cdot u_{i,b}^{\beta + \xi \beta'} \cdot v_{i,b}^{\gamma + \xi \gamma'}.$$

This check is similar to the one used to check the validity of Cramer-Shoup ciphertexts.

Construction of SPHF for this scheme together with security proof (for strong simulation indistinguishability, robustness and strong pseudo-randomness) are given in Appendix D. SPHF design use classical methods from [BBC⁺13b]. However, security proofs use some new ideas.

For the reader acquainted with 2-universal hash proof systems [CS02], another way to look at this test (and at our commitment scheme in general) is the following: w_{i, M_i} is the hash value of the tuple $(g, e_{i, M_i}, u_{i, M_i}, v_{i, M_i})$ under a 2-universal SPHF with hashing key $(\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \alpha', \beta', \gamma')$ and projection key (c, d, c', d') . This hash value enables us to “prove” that $v_{i,b} = \hat{h}^{\log_g e_{i,b}} h^{\log_g u_{i,b}}$.

5.2 Complexity and Comparison

In our new scheme, we remark that $u_{i,1}$ can be computed from $u_{i,0}$ as $u_{i,1} = T/u_{i,0}$. So, in the sequel, we suppose that $u_{i,1}$ is not a part of the commitment, when we analyze our commitment complexity. However, for the sake of simplicity, we keep $u_{i,1}$ in the commitments in our proofs.

Table 1 compares our new schemes with existing non-interactive UC-secure commitments with a single global CRS. In most OT and PAKE schemes with erasures (or with static adversaries) of [ABB⁺13], what really counts is the size of the commitment (since only these values are sent) and the size of the projection key (either for a KV-SPHF for one-round PAKE, or GL-SPHF for all other schemes). In that context, our scheme is the most efficient SPHF-friendly scheme (even for KV-SPHF, since group elements in \mathbb{G}_2 are larger than elements in \mathbb{G}_1), and it provides the most efficient OT and PAKE scheme, so far (adaptively secure, assuming reliable erasures, under any assumption, with a single global CRS). In addition, it is secure under plain DDH, and it provides the first one-round PAKE (adaptively secure, assuming reliable erasures) under plain DDH, since the scheme of Abdalla, Chevalier, and Pointcheval [ACP09] does not support KV-SPHF (which is required for one-round PAKE construction [ABB⁺13]).

Here are some details on the comparison. For the Canetti-Fischlin commitment scheme [CF01], we use a Pedersen commitment as a chameleon hash and multi-Cramer-Shoup ciphertexts to

⁶ Since the requirement on C.IsBinding is just to accept honestly generated commitments but to reject a commitment with any message \mathbf{M} if the verification algorithm could accept another message \mathbf{M}' , several definitions could be acceptable. But the above one is enough for our purpose.

Table 1. Comparison with existing non-interactive UC-secure commitments with a single global CRS (m = bit-length of the committed value, κ = security parameter)

	SPHF Friendly	W/o Erasure	C size	δ size	hp size KV / GL	Assumption
[CF01]	no	yes	$9m \times \mathbb{G}$	$2m \times \mathbb{Z}_p$	–	Plain DDH
[ACP09]	yes	yes	$(m + 16m\kappa) \times \mathbb{G}$	$2m\kappa \times \mathbb{Z}_p$	– / $(3m + 2) \times \mathbb{G} + (\mathbb{Z}_p)^a$	Plain DDH
[FLM11], 1	no	no	$5 \times \mathbb{G}$	$16 \times \mathbb{G}$	–	DLin
[FLM11], 2	no	no	$37 \times \mathbb{G}$	$3 \times \mathbb{G}$	–	DLin
[ABB ⁺ 13]	yes	yes	$8m \times \mathbb{G}_1 + m \times \mathbb{G}_2$	$m \times \mathbb{Z}_p$	$2m \times \mathbb{G}_1 / \mathbb{G}_1 + (\mathbb{Z}_p)^a$	SXDH
this paper	yes	yes	$7m \times \mathbb{G}$	$2m \times \mathbb{Z}_p$	$4m \times \mathbb{G} / 2 \times \mathbb{G} + (\mathbb{Z}_p)^a$	Plain DDH

^a this \mathbb{Z}_p element may only be κ -bit long and is useless when $m = 1$.

commit to multiple bits in a non-malleable way (see [ABB⁺13] for a description of the multi-Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme). We do not know a SPHF on such commitment, since the opening information of a Pedersen commitment is a scalar. For the complexity of [ACP09], we consider a slight variant without one-time signature but using labels and multi-Cramer-Shoup ciphertexts, as in the scheme in [ABB⁺13]. The size of the projection key is computed using the most efficient methods in [ABB⁺13]. Commitments in [CF01, ACP09, ABB⁺13] were not described as without erasures, but slight variants of them are, as explained in Section 2.4. Finally, we always suppose there exists a family of efficient collision-resistant hash functions (for efficiency reason, since DDH implies the existence of such families).

6 Adaptive OT and PAKE

As explained in [GWZ09], one can transform any semi-adaptive protocols into adaptive ones by sending all the flows through secure channels. Such secure channels can be constructed using non-committing encryption (NCE) [CFGN96, DN00, Bea97a, CDMW09]. However, even the most efficient instantiation of NCE [CDMW09] requires $8\nu_{\text{NCE}}\kappa$ group elements to send ν_{NCE} bits securely, with ElGamal encryption scheme as (trapdoor) simulatable encryption scheme. If ν_{NCE} is $\Omega(\kappa)$, this can be reduced to about $320\nu_{\text{NCE}}$ group elements.

In this section, we propose several adaptive versions of our semi-adaptive OT and PAKE protocols. Some are optimized for the number of rounds, while others are optimized for the communication complexity. In each case, at least one of our new protocols performs better than existing protocols. But, before that, we quickly recall the definition of a NCE scheme.

6.1 Non-Committing Encryption Scheme

A ν_{NCE} -bit non-committing encryption scheme is defined by six algorithms:

- $\text{NCE.Setup}(1^\kappa)$ generates the parameters NCE.param for the scheme, which taken as argument of the other algorithms (often implicitly);
- $\text{NCE.KG}(\text{NCE.param})$ generates an encryption key ek together with a decryption key dk ;
- $\text{NCE.Enc}(\text{ek}, R)$ encrypts the plaintext $R \in \{0, 1\}^{\nu_{\text{NCE}}}$ into the ciphertext χ ;
- $\text{NCE.Dec}(\text{dk}, \chi)$ decrypts the ciphertext χ , and output the corresponding plaintext R ;
- $\text{NCE.Sim}(\text{NCE.param})$ generates an encryption key ek , a ciphertext χ together with an equivocation key eqk_{NCE} ;
- $\text{NCE.Open}(\text{eqk}_{\text{NCE}}, \text{ek}, \chi, R)$ generates random coins r_{KG} for NCE.KG and r_{Enc} for NCE.Enc corresponding to R .

It has to verify the following properties:

- *Correctness.* For any parameter $\text{NCE.param} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{NCE.Setup}(1^{\mathfrak{R}})$, any honestly generated key pair $(\text{ek}, \text{dk}) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{NCE.KG}(\text{NCE.param})$, and any plaintext $R \in \{0, 1\}^{\nu_{\text{NCE}}}$, we have $\text{NCE.Dec}(\text{dk}, \text{NCE.Enc}(\text{ek}, R)) = R$ with overwhelming probability;
- *Simulation indistinguishability.* One cannot distinguish real keys (ek, dk) and ciphertexts χ (using NCE.KG and NCE.Enc) from simulated ones (using NCE.Sim and NCE.Open) even with access to the associated random coins. A scheme is said (t, ε) -simulation-indistinguishable if $\text{Adv}^{\text{nc-sim-ind}}(t) \leq \varepsilon$ (see the experiments $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{nc-sim-ind-}b}(\mathfrak{R})$ in Figure 3).

```

 $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{nc-sim-ind-}b}(\mathfrak{R})$ 
NCE.param  $\xleftarrow{\$}$  NCE.Setup( $1^{\mathfrak{R}}$ )
( $R, \text{st}$ )  $\xleftarrow{\$}$   $\mathcal{A}$ (NCE.param)
if  $b = 0$  then
   $r_{\text{KG}}, r_{\text{Enc}}$   $\xleftarrow{\$}$ 
   $(\text{ek}, \text{dk}) \leftarrow \text{NCE.KG}(\text{NCE.param}; r_{\text{KG}})$ 
   $\chi \leftarrow \text{NCE.Enc}(\text{ek}, R; r_{\text{Enc}})$ 
else
   $(\text{ek}, \chi, \text{eqk}_{\text{NCE}}) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{NCE.Sim}(\text{NCE.param})$ 
   $(r_{\text{KG}}, r_{\text{Enc}}) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{NCE.Open}(\text{eqk}_{\text{NCE}}, \text{ek}, \chi, R)$ 
return  $\mathcal{A}(\text{st}, \text{ek}, \text{dk}, \chi, r_{\text{KG}}, r_{\text{Enc}})$ 

```

Fig. 3. Simulation Indistinguishability

This definition is a straightforward extension of the definition in [CDMW09] to multiple bits messages. As in [CDMW09], the definition directly implies that the scheme is semantically secure.

A ν_{NCE} -bit non-committing encryption scheme can be constructed using any single-bit non-committing encryption scheme (such as the one in [CDMW09]) ν_{NCE} times.

6.2 Oblivious Transfer

First Scheme. A first efficient way to construct a bit (i.e., $\nu_m = 1$) 1-out-of-2 OT secure against adaptive adversary consists in applying the generic transformation of Garay *et al.* [GWZ09] to our semi-adaptive OT.

This transformation uses the notion of ℓ -somewhat non-committing encryption scheme. This scheme enables to send securely long messages, but which restricts the non-committing property to the following: it is only possible to produce random coins corresponding to ℓ different messages. Then, to get an adaptive OT from a semi-adaptive OT, it is sufficient to execute the protocol in a 8 -somewhat non-committing channel. Indeed, the simulator can send via this channel 8 versions of the transcript of the protocol: depending on which user gets corrupted first and on which were their inputs and outputs. There are two choices of inputs for the sender (the two index queries) and two outputs (the message m_s), hence four choices in total; and there are four choices of inputs for the receiver (the two messages m_0 and m_1). Hence the need for 8 versions.

In [GWZ09], the authors also show how to extend their bit OT based on the DDH version of the static OT of Peikert *et al.* [PVW08] to string OT by repeating the protocol in parallel and adding an equivocal commitment to the index and a zero-knowledge proof to ensure that the sender always uses the same index s . Actually, for both of our instantiations and for the one in [GWZ09], we can do better, just by using the same commitment C to s (in our case) or the

same CRS (the one obtained by coin tossing) and the same public key of the dual encryption system (in their case). This enables us to get rid off the additional zero-knowledge proof and can also be applied to the QR instantiation in [GWZ09]. In addition, the commitment C to s (in our case) or the CRS and the public key (in their case) only needs to be sent in the first somewhat non-committing channel.

Furthermore, if the original semi-adaptive OT is a 1-out-of- k OT (with $k = 2^{\nu_k}$), then we just need to use a 2^{k+1} -somewhat NCE instead of a 8-somewhat NCE encrypt (because there are 2^k possible inputs for the sender, and k possible inputs and 2 possible outputs for the receiver, so $2^k + 2k \leq 2^{k+1}$ possible versions for the transcript).

Finally, combining all the above remarks yield a ν_m -bit string 1-out-of- k OT scheme requiring only ν_m 2^{k+1} -somewhat NCE channels, and so only $\nu_m(k+1)$ bits sent through NCE.

Second Scheme. Our second scheme can be significantly more efficient than our first one, for several parameter choices. Essentially, it consists in using NCE channels to send $k\nu_m$ random bits to mask the messages (in case the sender is corrupted first) and $2\nu_k$ random bits to enable the simulator to make the commitment binding to the index s (in case the receiver gets corrupted first). Methods used for this second part are specific to our new SPHF-friendly commitment scheme, but can also be applied to the commitment scheme in [ABB⁺13].

More precisely, the scheme is depicted in Figure 4. Our 1-out-of- k OT protocol uses a NCE channel of $\nu_{\text{NCE}} = 2\nu_k + k\nu_m$ bits, where $k = 2^{\nu_k}$, for ν_m -bit strings. This channel is used to send a random value R . The last $k\nu_m$ bits of R are k ν_m -bit values R_1, \dots, R_k . These values are used to mask the messages m_1, \dots, m_k sent by the sender, to be able to reveal the correct messages, in case of corruption of the sender (when both the sender and the receiver were honest at the beginning, and so when m_1, \dots, m_k were completely unknown to the simulator).

The first $2\nu_k$ bits of R are used to make the commitment C (which is normally simulated when the receiver is honest) perfectly binding to the revealed index s , in case of corruption of the receiver (when both the sender and the receiver were honest at the beginning, and so when s was completely unknown to the simulator). More precisely, they are used to partially hide the last component of commitments: the $w_{i,b}$; the bit R_{2i+b-1} indicates whether $w_{i,b}$ has to be inverted or not before use. The full security proof is given in Appendix E.

Remark 1. Though the new protocol uses our new commitment scheme, it could alternatively use the commitment scheme in [ABB⁺13], by just replacing $w_{i,b}$ by the last part of the Cramer-Shoup ciphertexts in these schemes. The proof would be very similar. This replacement may yield a more efficient scheme (under SXDH however) when ν_m is large, since the projection key in [ABB⁺13] is shorter than for our scheme and multiple projection keys need to be sent due to the generic transformation of SPHF to EPH.

Comparison. In Table 2, we compare our OT schemes with the DDH-based OT in [GWZ09]. The QR-based one is less efficient anyway. We see that, for every parameters ν_m and k , at least one of our two schemes (if not both) is the most efficient scheme regarding both the number of rounds and the communication complexity.

The exact communication complexity cost depends on the exact instantiation of NCE. But in all cases, at least one of our schemes outperforms existing schemes both in terms of number of bits sent via a NCE channel, and in terms of auxiliary elements (elements which are not directly used by the NCE scheme). In addition, our second scheme always uses the smallest number of

<p>CRS: $\text{crs} \xleftarrow{\\$} \text{C.Setup}(1^{\kappa})$ and $\text{NCE.param} \xleftarrow{\\$} \text{NCE.Setup}(1^{\kappa})$.</p> <p>Pre-flow:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. P_i generates $(\text{ek}, \text{dk}) \xleftarrow{\\$} \text{NCE.KG}(\text{NCE.param})$ 2. P_i sends ek to P_j <p>Index query on s:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. P_j chooses a random $R \xleftarrow{\\$} \{0, 1\}^{\nu_{\text{NCE}}}$ and computes $\chi \xleftarrow{\\$} \text{NCE.Enc}(\text{ek}, R)$ 2. P_j computes $(C = ((e_{I,b}, u_{I,b}, v_{I,b}, w_{I,b})_{I,b}), \delta) \xleftarrow{\\$} \text{C.Com}^{\ell}(s)$ with $\ell = (\text{sid}, \text{ssid}, P_i, P_j)$ 3. P_j sets $w'_{I,b} = w_{I,b}$ if $R_{2I+b-1} = 0$ and $w'_{I,b} = 1/w_{I,b}$ otherwise, for $I = 1, \dots, \nu_k$ and $b = 0, 1$; and sets $C' = ((e_{I,b}, u_{I,b}, v_{I,b}, w'_{I,b})_{I,b})$ 4. P_j sends χ and C' to P_i <p>Database input (m_1, \dots, m_k):</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. P_i computes $R \xleftarrow{\\$} \text{NCE.Dec}(\text{dk}, \chi)$ 2. P_i sets $w_{I,b} = w'_{I,b}$ if $R_{2I+b-1} = 0$ and $w_{I,b} = 1/w'_{I,b}$ otherwise, for $I = 1, \dots, \nu_k$ and $b = 0, 1$; and sets $C = ((e_{I,b}, u_{I,b}, v_{I,b}, w_{I,b})_{I,b})$ 3. P_i sets $(R_t)_t$ to the last $k\nu_m$ bits of R (R_t being a ν_m-bit variable) 4. P_i computes $\text{hk}_t \xleftarrow{\\$} \text{HashKG}(\text{crs})$, $\text{hp}_t \leftarrow \text{ProjKG}(\text{hk}_t, \text{crs}, (\ell, C))$, $K_t \leftarrow \text{Hash}(\text{hk}_t, (\text{crs}, t), (\ell, C))$, and $M_t \leftarrow R_t \text{ xor } K_t \text{ xor } m_t$, for $t = 1, \dots, k$ 5. P_i sends $(\text{hp}_t, M_t)_{t=1, \dots, k}$ <p>Data recovery:</p> <p>Upon receiving $(\text{hp}_t, M_t)_{t=1, \dots, k}$, P_j computes $K_s \leftarrow \text{ProjHash}(\text{hp}_s, (\text{crs}, s), (\ell, C), \delta)$ and gets $m_s \leftarrow R_s \text{ xor } K_s \text{ xor } M_s$, with $(R_t)_t$ the last $k\nu_m$ bits of R.</p>
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Fig. 4. UC-Secure 1-out-of- k OT from our SPHF-Friendly Commitment for Adaptive Adversaries

auxiliary elements; and it requires $k\nu_m + 2\nu_k$ bits to be sent via a NCE channel, which is not worse than the $(k+1)\nu_m$ bits required by our first scheme, as long as $\nu_m \geq 2\nu_k$.

More precisely, here are some details on the comparison. We suppose we use the NCE scheme proposed in [CDMW09] (which is 2-round) and the ElGamal encryption as simulation encryption scheme for the NCE scheme and the somewhat NCE construction (which also requires a simulation encryption scheme). So all our schemes are secure under DDH (plus existence of collision resistant hash functions and symmetric key encryption, but only for efficiency, since DDH implies that also).

Table 2. Comparison of 1-out-of- k OT UC-Secure against Adaptive Adversaries, without Erasures, with $k = 2^{\nu_k}$

	Rnd ^a	Communication Complexity
[GWZ09]	≥8	$(k+1) \cdot \nu_m \times \text{NCE} + 3 \cdot (2^k + 2k) \cdot \nu_m \times \mathbb{G} + (2^k + 2k) \cdot (\text{com}(4 \times \mathbb{G}) + 2\nu_k \times \mathbb{G} + \nu_k \times \text{ZK} + 4\nu_m \nu_k \times \mathbb{G})$
1st	4	$(k+1) \cdot \nu_m \times \text{NCE} + 3 \cdot (2^k + 2k) \cdot \nu_m \times \mathbb{G} + (2^k + 2k) \cdot (7\nu_k \times \mathbb{G} + \nu_m \cdot (2 \times \mathbb{G} + (\mathbb{Z}_p)^{\text{b}+2}))$
2nd	3	$(k\nu_m + 2\nu_k) \times \text{NCE} + 7\nu_k \times \mathbb{G} + \nu_m \cdot (2 \times \mathbb{G} + (\mathbb{Z}_p)^{\text{b}+2})$

^a number of rounds

^b this element in \mathbb{Z}_p is not required when $\nu_m = \nu_k = 1$

Legend:

– ZK: zero-knowledge proof used in [GWZ09].

– $\text{com}(x)$: communication complexity of a UC-commitment scheme for x bits. This is used to generate the CRS for the scheme in [PVW08]. If this commitment is interactive, this increases the number of required rounds.

– $x \times \text{NCE}$: x bits sent by non-committing encryption scheme.

In the comparison, we extend the schemes in [GWZ09] to 1-out-of- k schemes using the method explained in Section 6.2 and the 1-out-of- k version of the schemes of Peikert *et al.* [PVW08], which consists in doing ν_k schemes in parallel and secret sharing the messages (where $k = 2^{\nu_k}$).

To understand the costs in the table, recall that a 2^l -somewhat non-committing encryption scheme works as follows: one player sends a l -bit value I using a full NCE scheme (2 rounds) together with 2^l public keys all samples obviously except the I^{th} one, and then the other player sends 2^l ciphertexts samples obviously except the I^{th} one which contains a symmetric key K . Then to send any message through this 2^l -somewhat NCE channel, a player just sends 8 messages all random except the I^{th} one which is an encryption of the actual message under K . This means that if the original semi-adaptive protocol is x -round, then the protocol resulting from the transformation of Garay *et al.*, is $(x + 2)$ -round; and this costs a total of $3 \cdot 2^l$ group elements, in addition of the group elements for the l -bit non-committing encryption.

6.3 Password Authenticated Key Exchange

In this section, we present two PAKE constructions UC-secure against adaptive adversaries: a (very) inefficient 3-round PAKE and an efficient constant-round PAKE Remark 1 (page 17) also applies. Please notice that slightly more efficient variants can be constructed using more rounds, since if the projection keys can be sent after the commitments, only GL-EPHFs are needed and GL-EPHFs are much more efficient than KV-EPHFs. This remark also holds for our semi-adaptive PAKE.

Optimized for Round Complexity. If we apply a variant⁷ of the transformation of Garay *et al.* to our efficient semi-adaptive PAKE, we get a 3-round PAKE UC-secure against adaptive adversary, without erasures. It uses a NCE channel with ν_{NCE} bits, where ν_{NCE} is the number of bits exchanged by the two players in the semi-adaptive protocol (plus a one-time signature). The value R is divided in two parts R_1 and R_2 : the first one is used to mask the first flow, while the second one is used to mask the second flow.

The security proof is straightforward from the semi-adaptive security of the underlying PAKE.

The scheme can be slightly improved by replacing the KV-EPHF to hash C_j by a GL-EPHF, which is possible since P_i receives C_j before computing hp_j . Even with this modification, this protocol remains highly inefficient.

Optimized for Communication Complexity. We then propose a second construction, much more efficient regarding the communication complexity. This construction is actually generic and can transform any PAKE (for 1-bit passwords) UC-secure against semi-adaptive adversaries into a UC-secure PAKE (for ν_m -bit passwords) UC-secure against adaptive adversaries. The scheme just requires to send $2\nu_m + \mathfrak{K}$ bits, via a fully non-committing encryption scheme, of which $2m$ are used to create ν_m 4-somewhat non-committing encryption schemes used to deal with inputs. The remaining \mathfrak{K} bits are used to mask the final shared key. The scheme is constant-round, if the associated semi-adaptive PAKE is constant-round, and the communication complexity is roughly $4\nu_m$ times the one of the semi-adaptive PAKE, plus the cost of the non-committing encryption scheme.

⁷ The original transformation implicitly only deals with authenticated channels. But by using one-time signatures or signature schemes in a way similar to the one proposed in [BCL⁺05], we can make this transformation work with PAKE protocols which use non-authenticated channels.




Fig. 5. UC-Secure PAKE from an SPHF-Friendly Commitment for Adaptive Adversaries

More precisely, the transformation works as follows. First, the two players exchanged verification keys vk_i and vk_j for a signature scheme. Then, as in [BCL⁺05], each player signs his flows together with the previous flows, using his signature key. This provides a kind of weakly authenticated channel. Then, the two players run m semi-adaptive PAKE, one for each bit $\pi[k]$ of their password, each PAKE being run inside a 4-somewhat non-committing encryption scheme. In addition, one player will send a κ -bit random value R using a fully non-committing encryption scheme. The final shared key is the xor of all keys of all PAKE protocols and R .

The security proof is very similar to the one for the transformation of Garay *et al.* [GWZ09]. Basically, when both parties are honest, in each 4-somewhat non-committing encryption channel, the simulator puts 4 versions of the protocol: depending which party gets corrupted first and which was its password bit $\pi[k]$. In case of corruption, it reveals the correct version of the protocol and chooses R to match the revealed shared key.

This construction is far more efficient than the construction of Canetti *et al.* [CDVW12], which requires $2\nu_m$ adaptively-secure OT for κ -bit strings. Indeed, each such OT could be used

as a non-committing channel of \mathfrak{K} bits⁸, and so their construction requires to send at least $2\nu_m\mathfrak{K}$ bits via a non-committing channel, compared to only $2\nu_m + \mathfrak{K}$ for our scheme. The other parts of the protocols also require to send fewer elements in our case.

Acknowledgments

This work was supported in part by the French ANR-12-INSE-0014 SIMPATIC Project, the CFM Foundation, and the European Research Council under the European Community’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013 Grant Agreement no. 339563 – CryptoCloud).

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⁸ And actually, as we have seen before, currently, the most efficient OT for \mathfrak{K} bits, even requires $2\mathfrak{K} + 2$ bits sent via a non-committing channel.

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A Related Work

Hash proof systems were introduced by Cramer and Shoup [CS98, CS02] as a means to design chosen-ciphertext-secure public-key encryption schemes. Variants of smooth projective hash functions (SPHFs) have thereafter been proposed in [GL03, KV11, BBC⁺13b] to build more efficient

password-authenticated key-exchange (PAKE) protocols both in the standard model and in the UC framework (please refer to [BBC⁺13b, BBC⁺13a] for a more precise characterization of these variants). More recently, Abdalla *et al.* [ABB⁺13] further improved these results by providing new constructions of SPHFs and commitment schemes and used them to build quite efficient PAKE and OT protocols with adaptive security in the UC framework, but under the assumption of *reliable erasures*. Removing the need for reliable erasures is the main goal of this work.

Our notion of *explainable projective hash functions* (EPHFs) is close to the notion of *dual projective hashing* (DPH) [Wee12]: the latter also provides a trapdoor that allows us to compute the hashing key that leads to any hash value for a word outside the language. But EPHFs can be seen as the *dual* of DPH:

- In DPH, the word outside the language is honestly generated, but not \mathbf{hp} ;
- In EPHFs, \mathbf{hp} is honestly generated, but not the word outside the language.

In both cases, a trapdoor allows the recovery of an \mathbf{hk} that is compatible with \mathbf{hp} and H , for any hash value H .

Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) protocols were first proposed by Bellare and Merritt [BM92] as key exchange protocols where the authentication is done using a simple password, subject to exhaustive search. Since then, several PAKE protocols have been proposed in the random-oracle model (e.g., [BPR00, BMP00, AP05]), in the standard model (e.g., [KOY01, GL03, KV11, BBC⁺13b]), and in the plain model (e.g., [GL01, GJO10]). Among those not relying on ideal models, the most efficient constructions are the one of Groth and Katz [GK10] and those based on the Gennaro-Lindell (GL) framework [GL03], which itself is a generalization of the PAKE construction by Katz, Ostrovsky, and Yung (KOY) [KOY01] based on the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme [CS98].

All the previous protocols are not secure in the UC model, but only in the Bellare-Pointcheval-Rogaway [BPR00]. The first ideal functionality for PAKE (for the UC model) was proposed by Canetti *et al.* [CHK⁺05], together with an efficient protocol based on the GL/KOY methodology [GL03]. Their construction, however, was not known to be secure against adaptive adversaries. The first reasonably practical adaptively secure PAKE scheme was proposed by Abdalla *et al.* [ACP09], later improved by Abdalla *et al.* in [ABB⁺13], to make it one-round. However, both these protocols require reliable erasures. Besides the generic but inefficient construction of Barak *et al.* in their seminal work [BCL⁺05], the only previously known PAKE UC-secure against adaptive adversaries without erasure was the one of Canetti *et al.* [CDVW12]. This last scheme requires to perform $2\nu_m$ OT for \mathfrak{K} -bit strings (with ν_m the password size, and \mathfrak{K} the security parameter), and which requires at the very least to send $2\nu_m\mathfrak{K}$ bits through NCE, compared to $2\nu_m + \mathfrak{K}$ for our construction. A detailed comparison can be found in Section 6.3.

Oblivious Transfer (OT) was introduced in 1981 by Rabin [Rab81] as a way to allow a receiver to get exactly one out of k messages sent by another party, the sender. In these schemes, the receiver should be oblivious to the other values, and the sender should be oblivious to which value was received. Several concrete constructions have been proposed in the UC framework [NP01, CLOS02], some of which being quite efficient [PVW08, CKWZ13, ABB⁺13]. The first one of these efficient schemes use a different CRS between each pair of user, which we believe not to be reasonable in real life⁹. Among those that are secure against adaptive corruptions in the global

⁹ This problem can be solved by running a coin-tossing protocol to generate the CRS between each user as explained in [GWZ09], but this is costly.

single CRS model, the scheme by Abdalla *et al.* in [ABB⁺13] seems to be the most efficient. However, it requires *reliable erasures*.

When reliable erasures are not possible, the most efficient protocol so far was the one of Garay *et al.* [GWZ09], based on their new primitive, somewhat NCE, and the OT scheme of Peikert, Vaikuntanathan, and Waters [PVW08]. Our new construction outperforms this scheme both in term of round complexity and communication complexity. A detailed comparison can be found in Section 6.2.

B Notations

We first recall the classical definitions on distances of distribution, and the notions of success and advantage. We then review the basic cryptographic tools we use along this paper, with the corresponding security notions.

B.1 Distances, Advantage and Success

Statistical Distance. Let \mathcal{D}_0 and \mathcal{D}_1 be two probability distributions over a finite set \mathcal{S} and let X_0 and X_1 be two random variables with these two respective distributions. The statistical distance between \mathcal{D}_0 and \mathcal{D}_1 is also the statistical distance between X_0 and X_1 :

$$\text{Dist}(\mathcal{D}_0, \mathcal{D}_1) = \text{Dist}(X_0, X_1) = \sum_{x \in \mathcal{S}} |\Pr[X_0 = x] - \Pr[X_1 = x]|.$$

If the statistical distance between \mathcal{D}_0 and \mathcal{D}_1 is less than or equal to ε , we say that \mathcal{D}_0 and \mathcal{D}_1 are ε -close or are ε -statistically indistinguishable. If the \mathcal{D}_0 and \mathcal{D}_1 are 0-close, we say that \mathcal{D}_0 and \mathcal{D}_1 are perfectly indistinguishable.

Success/Advantage. When one considers an experiment $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{sec}}(\mathfrak{K})$ in which adversary \mathcal{A} plays a security game SEC, we denote $\text{Succ}^{\text{sec}}(\mathcal{A}, \mathfrak{K}) = \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{sec}}(\mathfrak{K}) = 1]$ the success probability of this adversary. We additionally denote $\text{Succ}^{\text{sec}}(t) = \max_{\mathcal{A} \leq t} \{\text{Succ}^{\text{sec}}(\mathcal{A}, \mathfrak{K})\}$, the maximal success any adversary running within time t can get.

When one considers a pair of experiments $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{sec}-b}(\mathfrak{K})$, for $b = 0, 1$, in which adversary \mathcal{A} plays a security game SEC, we denote $\text{Adv}^{\text{sec}}(\mathcal{A}, \mathfrak{K}) = \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{sec}-0}(\mathfrak{K}) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{sec}-1}(\mathfrak{K}) = 1]$ the advantage of this adversary. We additionally denote $\text{Adv}^{\text{sec}}(t) = \max_{\mathcal{A} \leq t} \{\text{Adv}^{\text{sec}}(\mathcal{A}, \mathfrak{K})\}$, the maximal advantage any adversary running within time t can get.

Computational Distance. Let \mathcal{D}_0 and \mathcal{D}_1 be two probability distributions over a finite set \mathcal{S} and let X_0 and X_1 be two random variables with these two respective distributions. The computational distance between \mathcal{D}_0 and \mathcal{D}_1 is the best advantage an adversary can get in distinguishing X_0 from X_1 : $\text{Adv}^{\mathcal{D}_0, \mathcal{D}_1}(\mathcal{A}, \mathfrak{K}) = \Pr[\mathcal{A}(X_0) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(X_1) = 1]$, and thus $\text{Adv}^{\mathcal{D}_0, \mathcal{D}_1}(t) = \max_{\mathcal{A} \leq t} \{\text{Adv}^{\mathcal{D}_0, \mathcal{D}_1}(\mathcal{A}, \mathfrak{K})\}$. When the advantage $\text{Adv}^{\mathcal{D}_0, \mathcal{D}_1}(t) \leq \varepsilon$, we say that \mathcal{D}_0 and \mathcal{D}_1 are (t, ε) -computationally indistinguishable.

We can note that for two distributions \mathcal{D}_0 and \mathcal{D}_1 that are ε -close, for any t and ε , \mathcal{D}_0 and \mathcal{D}_1 are (t, ε) -computationally indistinguishable.

B.2 Formal Definitions of the Basic Primitives

Hash Function Family. A hash function family \mathcal{H} is a family of functions H_k from $\{0, 1\}^*$ to a fixed-length output, either $\{0, 1\}^{\mathfrak{R}}$ or \mathbb{Z}_p . Such a family is said *collision-resistant* if for any adversary \mathcal{A} on a random function $H \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{H}$, it is hard to find a collision. More precisely, we denote

$$\text{Succ}_{\mathcal{H}}^{\text{coll}}(\mathcal{A}, \mathfrak{R}) = \Pr \left[H \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{H}, (m_0, m_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(H) : H(m_0) = H(m_1) \right].$$

It is well-known that under the discrete logarithm problem, and thus under the DDH assumption, such collision-resistant hash functions can be built.

Randomness Extractor. A randomness extractor allows to extract uniform bit-strings from high-entropy bit-string sources. The most famous method is provided by the Leftover Hash Lemma [HILL99], which requires the use of universal hash function families. From an additional independent random source to select the hash function, one can extract a bit-string that is almost uniform.

More precisely, by randomly selecting a random function h , from a universal hash function family, in the CRS, from a random variable X with min-entropy m , one can extract k -bit strings that are 2^e -close to uniform by computing $h(X)$, if $k \leq m - 2e + 2$.

In the particular case of cyclic groups, in well-chosen finite fields or elliptic curves, some efficient deterministic extractors, such as the truncation, can be used [CFPZ09].

Signature Schemes and One-Time Signature Schemes. A signature scheme is defined by three algorithms:

- $\text{Sig.KG}(1^{\mathfrak{R}})$ generates a verification key vk together with a signing key sk ;
- $\text{Sig.Sign}(\text{sk}, M)$ generates a signatures σ of M ;
- $\text{Sig.Verify}(\text{vk}, \sigma, M)$ returns 1 if σ is a valid signature of M ; and 0 otherwise.

The basic security notion for signatures is existential unforgeability under chosen-message attacks (defined in [GMR88]), where no adversary should be able to forge a valid message-signature pair, even with access to the signing oracle, for a new message.

A one-time signature is defined by the same algorithms OT.KG , OT.Sign , and OT.Verify , but just requires this security level, after at most one signing query.

B.3 SPHF-Friendly Commitment Schemes

In this section, we provide a more formal definition of SPHF-friendly commitment schemes, slightly improving on [ABB⁺13].

SPHF-Friendly Commitment Schemes. Such an SPHF-friendly commitment is defined by the following algorithms:

- $\text{C.Setup}(1^{\mathfrak{R}})$ takes as input the security parameter \mathfrak{R} and outputs the global parameters, passed through the global CRS crs to all other algorithms;
- $\text{C.SetupT}(1^{\mathfrak{R}})$ is an alternative to $\text{C.Setup}(1^{\mathfrak{R}})$ that additionally outputs a trapdoor τ ;
- $\text{C.Com}^{\ell}(\mathbf{M})$ takes as input a label ℓ and a message \mathbf{M} , and outputs a pair (C, δ) , where C is the commitment of \mathbf{M} for the label ℓ , and δ is the corresponding opening data (a.k.a., decommitment information);

- $\text{C.Ver}^\ell(C, \mathbf{M}, \delta)$ takes as input a commitment C , a label ℓ , a message \mathbf{M} , and the opening data δ and outputs 1 (true) if δ is a valid opening data for C , \mathbf{M} and ℓ . It always outputs 0 (false) on $\mathbf{M} = \perp$;
- $\text{C.Sim}^\ell(\tau)$ takes as input the trapdoor τ and a label ℓ and outputs a pair (C, eqk) , where C is a commitment and eqk an equivocation key;
- $\text{C.Open}^\ell(\text{eqk}, C, \mathbf{M})$ takes as input a commitment C , a label ℓ , a message \mathbf{M} , and an equivocation key eqk for this commitment, and outputs an opening data δ for C and ℓ on \mathbf{M} .
- $\text{C.Ext}^\ell(\tau, C)$ takes as input the trapdoor τ , a commitment C , and a label ℓ , and outputs the committed message \mathbf{M} , or \perp if the commitment is invalid;
- $\text{C.IsBinding}^\ell(\tau, C, \mathbf{M})$ takes as input the trapdoor τ , a commitment C , a message \mathbf{M} and a label ℓ , and outputs 0 if the commitment is not perfectly binding to \mathbf{M} , i.e., if there exists $\mathbf{M}' \neq \mathbf{M}$ and δ , such that $\text{C.Ver}^\ell(C, \mathbf{M}', \delta) = 1$.

Correctness. An SPHF-friendly commitment first has to verify the following properties:

- for all correctly generated CRS crs , all commitments and opening data honestly generated pass the verification test: $\forall \ell \forall \mathbf{M}, (C, \delta) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{C.Com}^\ell(\mathbf{M}) \Rightarrow \text{C.Ver}^\ell(C, \mathbf{M}, \delta) = 1$;
- all simulated commitments can be opened on any message:

$$\forall \ell \forall \mathbf{M}, ((C, \text{eqk}) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{C.Sim}^\ell(\tau) \wedge \delta \leftarrow \text{C.Open}^\ell(\text{eqk}, C, \mathbf{M})) \Rightarrow \text{C.Ver}^\ell(C, \mathbf{M}, \delta) = 1$$
;
- all commitments honestly generated can be correctly extracted:

$$\forall \ell \forall \mathbf{M}, (C, \delta) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{C.Com}^\ell(\mathbf{M}) \Rightarrow \text{C.Ext}^\ell(\tau, C) = \mathbf{M}$$
;
- all commitments honestly generated are considered binding by C.IsBinding , with overwhelming probability:

$$\forall \ell \forall \mathbf{M}, (C, \delta) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{C.Com}^\ell(\mathbf{M}) \Rightarrow \text{C.IsBinding}^\ell(\tau, C, \mathbf{M}) = 1$$
;
- all commitments C under some label ℓ for which $\text{C.IsBinding}^\ell(\tau, C, \mathbf{M}) = 1$ are such that for all $\mathbf{M}' \neq \mathbf{M}$ and δ , $\text{C.Ver}^\ell(C, \mathbf{M}', \delta) = 0$.

Of course, to be SPHF-friendly, the commitment scheme has to admit an SPHF for the following language:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{full-aux}} = \{(\ell, C) \mid \exists \delta, \text{C.Ver}^\ell(C, \mathbf{M}, \delta) = 1\},$$

where $\text{full-aux} = (\text{crs}, \text{aux})$ and $\mathbf{M} = \text{aux}$.

We now list the additional security properties that these algorithms have to satisfy.

Setup Indistinguishability. One should not be able to distinguish the CRS generated by C.Setup from the one generated by C.SetupT . The commitment scheme is said (t, ε) -setup-indistinguishable if the two distributions for CRS are (t, ε) -computationally indistinguishable. We denote $\text{Adv}^{\text{setup-ind}}(t)$ the distance between the two distributions.

Strong Simulation Indistinguishability. Let us denote C.SCom the algorithm that takes as input the trapdoor τ , a label ℓ and a message \mathbf{M} and which outputs $(C, \delta) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{C.SCom}^\ell(\tau, \mathbf{M})$, computed as $(C, \text{eqk}) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{C.Sim}^\ell(\tau)$ and $\delta \leftarrow \text{C.Open}^\ell(\text{eqk}, C, \mathbf{M})$.

One should not be able to distinguish a real commitment (generated by C.Com) from a fake commitment (generated by C.SCom), even with oracle access to the extraction oracle (C.Ext), the binding test oracle (C.IsBinding), and to fake commitments (using C.SCom). The commitment scheme is said (t, ε) -strongly-simulation-indistinguishable if $\text{Adv}^{\text{s-sim-ind}}(t) \leq \varepsilon$, according to $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{s-sim-ind}}(\mathcal{R})$ in Figure 6.

Remark 2. In this experiment, as in the following ones, the oracle C.SCom is supposed to store each query/answer (ℓ, \mathbf{M}, C) in a list A and C.Ext -queries on such an C.SCom -output (ℓ, C) are answered by \mathbf{M} (as it would be when using C.Com instead of C.SCom). The same way, C.IsBinding returns 1 on such commitments (although it is not the case). This is just to exclude trivial attacks.

Robustness. One should not be able to produce a commitment and a label that extracts to \mathbf{M} (possibly $\mathbf{M} = \perp$) such that $\text{C.IsBinding}^\ell(\tau, C, \mathbf{M}) = 0$, even with oracle access to the extraction oracle (C.Ext), the binding test oracle (C.IsBinding), and to fake commitments (using C.SCom). The commitment scheme is said (t, ε) -robust if $\text{Succ}^{\text{robust}}(t) \leq \varepsilon$, according to the experiment $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{robust}}(\mathfrak{K})$ in Figure 6.

$\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{s-sim-ind-}b}(\mathfrak{K})$ $(\text{crs}, \tau) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{C.SetupT}(1^{\mathfrak{K}});$ $(\ell, \mathbf{M}, \text{st}) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{A}^{\text{C.SCom}^\ell(\tau, \cdot), \text{C.Ext}^\ell(\tau, \cdot), \text{C.IsBinding}^\ell(\tau, \cdot, \cdot)}(\text{crs})$ if $b = 0$ then $(C, \delta) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{C.Com}^\ell(\mathbf{M})$ else $(C, \delta) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{C.SCom}^\ell(\tau, \mathbf{M})$ return $\mathcal{A}^{\text{C.SCom}^\ell(\tau, \cdot), \text{C.Ext}^\ell(\tau, \cdot), \text{C.IsBinding}^\ell(\tau, \cdot, \cdot)}(\text{st}, C, \delta)$	$\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{robust}}(\mathfrak{K})$ $(\text{crs}, \tau) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{C.SetupT}(1^{\mathfrak{K}})$ $(C, \ell) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{A}^{\text{C.SCom}^\ell(\tau, \cdot), \text{C.Ext}^\ell(\tau, \cdot), \text{C.IsBinding}^\ell(\tau, \cdot, \cdot)}(\text{crs})$ $\mathbf{M} \leftarrow \text{C.Ext}^\ell(\tau, C)$ if $(\ell, \mathbf{M}, C) \in A$ then return 0 if $\text{C.IsBinding}^\ell(\tau, C, \mathbf{M}) = 1$ then return 0 return 1
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Fig. 6. Strong Simulation Indistinguishability and Strong Binding Extractability (A is defined in Remark 2)

Pseudo-Randomness vs. Strong Pseudo-Randomness. As in [ABB⁺13], from the smoothness of the SPHF on $\mathcal{L}_{(\text{crs}, \text{aux})}$, one can derive the *pseudo-randomness* property on SPHF-friendly commitments, modeled by the experiment $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{c-ps-rand}}$ in Figure 7.

If the adversary \mathcal{A} is given a commitment C by C.Sim with label ℓ (adversary-chosen), even with access to the oracles C.SCom , C.Ext , and C.IsBinding , then for any \mathbf{M} , it cannot distinguish the hash value of (ℓ, C) on language $\mathcal{L}_{(\text{crs}, \mathbf{M})}$ from a random value, while being given hp , since C could have been generated as $\text{C.Com}^\ell(\mathbf{M}'')$ for some $\mathbf{M}'' \neq \mathbf{M}$, which excludes it to belong to $\mathcal{L}_{(\text{crs}, \mathbf{M})}$, under the robustness. In the experiment $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{c-ps-rand}}$, we let the adversary choose (ℓ, \mathbf{M}) , and we have: $\text{Adv}^{\text{c-ps-rand}}(t) \leq \text{Adv}^{\text{s-sim-ind}}(t) + \text{Succ}^{\text{robust}}(t) + \text{Adv}^{\text{smooth}}$.

Note that when hk and hp do not depend on \mathbf{M} nor on C , and when the smoothness holds even if the adversary can choose C after having seen hp (i.e., the SPHF is actually a KV-SPHF [BBC⁺13b]), they can be generated from the beginning of the game, with hp given to the adversary much earlier.

However, for our PAKE protocols, as for those in [ABB⁺13], one needs a stronger property called *strong pseudo-randomness*. It is modeled by the experiment $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{c-s-ps-rand}}$ depicted in Figure 7. This property is only defined for SPHF-friendly commitment with a KV-SPHF.

It is similar to the pseudo-randomness game except the adversary can also ask a hash value of a commitment C' under a label ℓ' (under the restriction that (ℓ', C') was not generated by C.SCom) under the hashing key hk .

Generically, a property like the 2-universality of [CS02] may be needed for the SPHF. However, for our new commitment scheme and the one in [ABB⁺13], this property holds directly, while the used SPHF is not 2-universal (and so may be more efficient).

$\text{Exp}_A^{\text{c-ps-rand-}b}(\mathfrak{R})$ $(\text{crs}, \tau) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{C.SetupT}(1^{\mathfrak{R}})$ $(\ell, \mathbf{M}, \text{st}) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{A}^{\text{C.SCom}^*(\tau, \cdot), \text{C.Ext}^*(\tau, \cdot), \text{C.IsBinding}^*(\tau, \cdot, \cdot)}(\text{crs})$ $(C, \text{eqk}) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{C.Sim}^\ell(\tau)$ $\text{hk} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{HashKG}(\text{crs})$ $\text{hp} \leftarrow \text{ProjKG}(\text{hk}, (\text{crs}, \mathbf{M}), (\ell, C))$ if $b = 0$ then $H \leftarrow \text{Hash}(\text{hk}, (\text{crs}, \mathbf{M}), (\ell, C))$ else $H \xleftarrow{\$} \Pi$ $b \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{A}^{\text{C.SCom}^*(\tau, \cdot), \text{C.Ext}^*(\tau, \cdot), \text{C.IsBinding}^*(\tau, \cdot, \cdot)}(\text{st}, C, \text{hp}, H)$ return b	$\text{Exp}_A^{\text{c-s-ps-rand-}b}(\mathfrak{R})$ $(\text{crs}, \tau) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{C.SetupT}(1^{\mathfrak{R}})$ $(\ell, \mathbf{M}, \text{st}) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{A}^{\text{C.SCom}^*(\tau, \cdot), \text{C.Ext}^*(\tau, \cdot), \text{C.IsBinding}^*(\tau, \cdot, \cdot)}(\text{crs})$ $(C, \text{eqk}) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{C.Sim}^\ell(\tau)$ $\text{hk} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{HashKG}(\text{crs})$ $\text{hp} \leftarrow \text{ProjKG}(\text{hk}, (\text{crs}, \mathbf{M}), \perp)$ if $b = 0$ then $H \leftarrow \text{Hash}(\text{hk}, (\text{crs}, \mathbf{M}), (\ell, C))$ else $H \xleftarrow{\$} \Pi$ $(\ell', C', \text{st}) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{A}^{\text{C.SCom}^*(\tau, \cdot), \text{C.Ext}^*(\tau, \cdot), \text{C.IsBinding}^*(\tau, \cdot, \cdot)}(\text{st}, C, \text{hp}, H)$ if $(\ell', ?, C') \in \Lambda$ then $H' \leftarrow \perp$ else $H' \leftarrow \text{Hash}(\text{hk}, (\text{crs}, \mathbf{M}), (\ell', C'))$ return $\mathcal{A}^{\text{C.SCom}^*(\tau, \cdot), \text{C.Ext}^*(\tau, \cdot), \text{C.IsBinding}^*(\tau, \cdot, \cdot)}(\text{st}, H')$
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Fig. 7. Pseudo-Randomness and Strong Pseudo-Randomness (Λ is defined in Remark 2)

The functionality $\mathcal{F}_{(1,k)\text{-OT}}$ is parameterized by a security parameter \mathfrak{R} . It interacts with an adversary \mathcal{S} and a set of parties P_1, \dots, P_n via the following queries:

- **Upon receiving an input** (**Send**, **sid**, **ssid**, P_i , P_j , (m_1, \dots, m_k)) **from party** P_i , with $m_i \in \{0, 1\}^{\mathfrak{R}}$: record the tuple $(\text{sid}, \text{ssid}, P_i, P_j, (m_1, \dots, m_k))$ and reveal (**Send**, **sid**, **ssid**, P_i , P_j) to the adversary \mathcal{S} . Ignore further **Send**-message with the same **ssid** from P_i .
- **Upon receiving an input** (**Receive**, **sid**, **ssid**, P_i , P_j , s) **from party** P_j , with $s \in \{1, \dots, k\}$: record the tuple $(\text{sid}, \text{ssid}, P_i, P_j, s)$, and reveal (**Receive**, **sid**, **ssid**, P_i , P_j) to the adversary \mathcal{S} . Ignore further **Receive**-message with the same **ssid** from P_j .
- **Upon receiving a message** (**Sent**, **sid**, **ssid**, P_i , P_j) **from the adversary** \mathcal{S} : ignore the message if $(\text{sid}, \text{ssid}, P_i, P_j, (m_1, \dots, m_k))$ or $(\text{sid}, \text{ssid}, P_i, P_j, s)$ is not recorded; otherwise send (**Sent**, **sid**, **ssid**, P_i , P_j) to P_i and ignore further **Sent**-message with the same **ssid** from the adversary.
- **Upon receiving a message** (**Received**, **sid**, **ssid**, P_i , P_j) **from the adversary** \mathcal{S} : ignore the message if $(\text{sid}, \text{ssid}, P_i, P_j, (m_1, \dots, m_k))$ or $(\text{sid}, \text{ssid}, P_i, P_j, s)$ is not recorded; otherwise send (**Received**, **sid**, **ssid**, P_i , P_j , m_s) to P_j and ignore further **Received**-message with the same **ssid** from the adversary.

Fig. 8. Ideal Functionality for 1-out-of- k Oblivious Transfer $\mathcal{F}_{(1,k)\text{-OT}}$

B.4 Ideal Functionnalities

UC-Secure Oblivious Transfer. The ideal functionality of an Oblivious Transfer (OT) protocol is depicted in Figure 8. It is inspired from [CKWZ13].

UC-Secure Password-Authenticated Key Exchange. We present the PAKE ideal functionality \mathcal{F}_{pwKE} on Figure 9). It was described in [CHK⁺05].

The main idea behind this functionality is as follows: If neither party is corrupted and the adversary does not attempt any password guess, then the two players both end up with either the same uniformly-distributed session key if the passwords are the same, or uniformly-distributed independent session keys if the passwords are distinct. In addition, the adversary does not know whether this is a success or not. However, if one party is corrupted, or if the adversary successfully guessed the player's password (the session is then marked as **compromised**), the adversary is granted the right to fully determine its session key. There is in fact nothing lost by allowing it to determine the key. In case of wrong guess (the session is then marked as **interrupted**), the

The functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{pwKE}}$ is parameterized by a security parameter k . It interacts with an adversary \mathcal{S} and a set of parties P_1, \dots, P_n via the following queries:

- **Upon receiving a query (NewSession, sid, ssid, P_i, P_j, π) from party P_i :**
Send (NewSession, sid, ssid, P_i, P_j) to \mathcal{S} . If this is the first NewSession query, or if this is the second NewSession query and there is a record (sid, ssid, P_j, P_i, π'), then record (sid, ssid, P_i, P_j, π) and mark this record **fresh**.
- **Upon receiving a query (TestPwd, sid, ssid, P_i, π') from the adversary \mathcal{S} :**
If there is a record of the form (P_i, P_j, π) which is **fresh**, then do: If $\pi = \pi'$, mark the record **compromised** and reply to \mathcal{S} with “correct guess”. If $\pi \neq \pi'$, mark the record **interrupted** and reply with “wrong guess”.
- **Upon receiving a query (NewKey, sid, ssid, P_i, SK) from the adversary \mathcal{S} :**
If there is a record of the form (sid, ssid, P_i, P_j, π), and this is the first NewKey query for P_i , then:
 - If this record is **compromised**, or either P_i or P_j is corrupted, then output (sid, ssid, SK) to player P_i .
 - If this record is **fresh**, and there is a record (P_j, P_i, π') with $\pi' = \pi$, and a key SK' was sent to P_j , and (P_j, P_i, π) was **fresh** at the time, then output (sid, ssid, SK') to P_i .
 - In any other case, pick a new random key SK' of length κ and send (sid, ssid, sk') to P_i .
 Either way, mark the record (sid, ssid, P_i, P_j, π) as **completed**.

Fig. 9. Ideal Functionality for PAKE $\mathcal{F}_{\text{pwKE}}$

two players are given independently-chosen random keys. A session that is nor **compromised** nor **interrupted** is called **fresh**, which is its initial status.

Finally notice that the functionality is not in charge of providing the password(s) to the participants. The passwords are chosen by the environment which then hands them to the parties as inputs. This guarantees security even in the case where two honest players execute the protocol with two different passwords: This models, for instance, the case where a user mistypes its password. It also implies that the security is preserved for all password distributions (not necessarily the uniform one) and in all situations where the password, are related passwords, are used in different protocols. Also note that allowing the environment to choose the passwords guarantees forward secrecy.

In case of corruption, the adversary learns the password of the corrupted player, after the NewKey-query, it additionally learns the session key.

C Semi-Adaptive OT and PAKE

In this appendix, we provide the complete proofs for the security of the OT and PAKE protocols from Section 4: security holds in the UC framework, against semi-adaptive adversaries, without requiring reliable erasures.

C.1 Security Proof of our OT Scheme

To prove the security of our OT protocol (see Section 4.2), in the UC-framework, against semi-adaptive adversaries but without erasures, we exhibit a sequence of games. The sequence starts from the real game, where the adversary \mathcal{A} interacts with real players and ends with the ideal game, where we have built a simulator \mathcal{S} that makes the interface between the ideal functionality \mathcal{F} and the adversary \mathcal{A} . Essentially, we do the following:

1. we make the setup algorithm additionally output the trapdoor (setup-indistinguishability);

2. we then replace all the commitment queries by simulated (fake) commitments (simulation-indistinguishability);
3. when simulating a sub-session between two honest receivers, the simulator commits to an arbitrary value s (e.g., $s = 0$ — hiding property of the commitment) and uses arbitrary messages (e.g., $m_t = 0$ for all t — pseudo-randomness of the SPHF on robust commitment).

Recall that no corruption is authorized in this case. We now just need to deal with sub-session where either the sender or the receiver is corrupted:

4. when simulating a honest receiver, when the (corrupted) sender submits the values $(\mathbf{hp}_t, M_t)_t$ and the simulator can extract all the messages thanks to the trapdoor (simulatability of the commitment). This allows to simulate the **Send**-query to the ideal functionality;
5. when simulating a honest sender, the simulator extracts the committed value s from the commitment C of the (corrupted) receiver. This allows to simulate the **Receive**-query to the ideal functionality, which gives back the message m_s that should be received. We can then use this value m_s instead of the one provided by the environment.
6. still when simulating a honest sender, the simulator simulate (**SimKG**) projection keys and use random messages m_t for $t \neq s$ (smoothness of the SPHF on robust commitment and GL-indistinguishability of the EPHF). In case of corruption, we get the correct messages m_t for $t \neq s$ (m_s being already known), that we can explain using **Explain**.

On one hand, if the adversary corrupts a sender with input s and plays honestly the protocol with s , the simulator will extract correctly s from the commitment C of the sender (trapdoor correctness of extractable commitments) and do a **Send**-query with the same s . On the other hand, if the adversary corrupts a receiver with inputs $(M_t)_t$ and plays honestly the protocol with $(M_t)_t$, the simulator will compute correctly the hash values H_t and so extract correctly $(M_t)_t$ and do a **Receive**-query with the same messages $(M_t)_t$. This means that in both cases, the extracted value is the one used by the adversary, which property is called *input-preserving*, as required by the definition of semi-adaptivity of Garay *et al.* [GWZ09]. Another property required by their definition is the so-called *setup-adaptive simulation*, which says that the CRS or any setup is generated independent of which party will be corrupted. This is clearly the case of our simulation. So the protocol is semi-adaptive.

Let us now go into more details:

Game G_0 : This is the **real game**.

Game G_1 : In this game, the simulator generates correctly every flow on behalf of the honest players, as they would do themselves, knowing the inputs (m_1, \dots, m_k) and s sent by the environment to the sender and the receiver. In all the subsequent games, the players use the label $\ell = (\text{sid}, \text{ssid}, P_i, P_j)$. In case of corruption, the simulator can give the internal data generated on behalf of the honest players.

Game G_2 : In this game, we just replace the setup algorithm **C.Setup** by **C.SetupT** that additionally outputs the trapdoor $(\text{crs}, \tau) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{C.SetupT}(1^{\mathbb{R}})$, but nothing else changes, which does not alter much the view of the environment under setup indistinguishability. Corruptions are handled the same way.

Game G_3 : We first deal with **honest receivers** P_j : we replace all the commitments $(C, \delta) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{C.Com}^\ell(s)$ with $\ell = (\text{sid}, \text{ssid}, P_i, P_j)$ in Step 1 of the index query phase of honest receivers by simulated commitments $(C, \delta) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{C.SCom}^\ell(\tau, s)$, which means $(C, \text{eqk}) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{C.Sim}^\ell(\tau)$ and $\delta \leftarrow \text{C.Open}^\ell(\text{eqk}, C, s)$. We then store (ℓ, s, C, δ) in Λ .

With an hybrid proof, applying the $\text{Exp}^{\text{sim-ind}}$ security game for each session, in which C.SCom is used as an atomic operation in which the simulator does not see the intermediate values, and in particular the equivocation key, one can show the indistinguishability of the two games. In case of corruption of the receiver, we just learn the already known value s .

Game G_4 : We now deal with sub-sessions between an **honest sender** P_i and an **honest receiver** P_j : on behalf of the receiver, the simulator computes K_t as the sender does, i.e., using hk_t instead of hp_t and δ (for all t): $K_t = \text{Hash}(\text{hk}_t, (\text{crs}, t), (\ell, C))$. Notice that hk_t is known since it has also been generated by the simulator on behalf of the sender.

This game is indistinguishable from the previous one, thanks to the correctness of the SPHF.

Game G_5 : Still in this case, we replace K_t by a random value (both for the sender and the receiver and for all t). This game is indistinguishable from the previous one, thanks to the pseudo-randomness of the SPHF. The basic pseudo-randomness game can be used since the sender and the receiver cannot be corrupted in this case (because the adversary is semi-adaptive) and so, neither C nor any hk_t never have to be revealed later.

Game G_6 : Still in this case, instead of using the messages (m_1, \dots, m_t) provided by the environment, we use $(m'_1, \dots, m'_k) = (0, \dots, 0)$. Since the masks K_t (for all t) are random, this game is perfectly indistinguishable from the previous one.

When simulating sub-sessions between two honest players, we do not use the inputs provided by the environment (except s to compute the opening information δ , but δ actually is not used, and so s could be chosen arbitrarily).

From now on, we only consider sub-sessions where at least one player is corrupted.

Game G_7 : We now deal with **honest senders** P_i : when receiving a commitment C (from a corrupted receiver P_j), the simulator extracts the committed value s and aborts if it is not binding, i.e., if $\text{C.IsBinding}^\ell(\tau, C, s) = 0$.

With an hybrid proof, applying the robustness property of the commitment scheme, for every honest sender, this game is indistinguishable from the previous one, since it is hard for an adversary to generate non-binding commitments. Notice that labels are important here and enables the simulator to extract C (for label ℓ) and call C.IsBinding on it, because even if C is replayed, it cannot be replayed with the same label.

Game G_8 : Still in this case, when receiving a commitment C (from a corrupted receiver P_j), the simulator extracts the committed value s . For $t \neq s$, instead of generating hk_t and hp_t honestly using HashKG and ProjKG , it generates $(\text{hp}, \text{expk}) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{SimKG}(\text{crs}, \tau, C)$, chooses $K_t \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \Pi = \{0, 1\}^{\nu_m}$ and sets $\text{hk} \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{Explain}(\text{hp}, (\text{crs}, t), (\ell, C), K_t, \text{expk})$.

With an hybrid proof, applying the GL-indistinguishability of EPHF for every honest sender, on every index $t \neq s$, since C is not in $\mathcal{L}_{(\text{crs}, t)}$ because $\text{C.IsBinding}^\ell(\tau, C, s) = 1$, this game is indistinguishable from the previous one.

Game G_9 : We do not use anymore the knowledge of $(m_t)_{t \neq s}$ when simulating an **honest sender** P_i : when receiving a commitment C , the simulator extracts the committed value s . For all $t \neq s$, instead of choosing a random K_t , and setting $\text{hk}_t \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{Explain}(\text{hp}, (\text{crs}, t), (\ell, C), H, \text{expk})$ and $M_t \leftarrow K_t \text{ xor } m_t$, the simulator chooses a random $M_t \in \Pi$, and does not generate hk_t , since it has to be given to the adversary only in case of corruption. In case of corruption, the simulator learns m_t and can set $K_t \leftarrow M_t \text{ xor } m_t$, and $\text{hk}_t \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{Explain}(\text{hp}, (\text{crs}, t), (\ell, C), H, \text{expk})$.

The distributions of M_t and K_t are left unchanged since K_t was random (and m_t was independent of K_t). Therefore, this game is perfectly indistinguishable from the previous one.

Game G_{10} : We do not use anymore the knowledge of s when simulating an **honest receiver** P_j : the simulator generates $(C, \text{eqk}) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{C.Sim}^\ell(\tau)$, with $\ell = (\text{sid}, \text{ssid}, P_i, P_j)$, to send C during the

index query phase of honest receivers. It then stores $(\ell, \perp, C, \text{eqk})$ in Λ . We essentially break the atomic C.SCom in the two separated processes C.Sim and C.Open . This does not change anything from the previous game since δ is never revealed. Λ is first filled with $(\ell, \perp, C, \text{eqk})$, it can be updated with correct values in case of corruption of the receiver.

When it thereafter receives $(\text{Send}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}, P_i, P_j, (\text{hp}_1, M_1, \dots, \text{hp}_k, M_k))$ from the adversary, the simulator computes, for $t = 1, \dots, k$, opening values $\delta_t \leftarrow \text{C.Open}^\ell(\text{eqk}, C, t)$, the masks $K_t \leftarrow \text{ProjHash}(\text{hp}_t, (\text{crs}, t), (\ell, C), \delta_t)$ and $m_t = K_t \text{ xor } M_t$. This provides the database submitted by the sender.

Game \mathbf{G}_{11} : We can now make use of the ideal functionality, without knowing the inputs from the environment.

C.2 Security Proof of our PAKE Scheme

To prove the security of our PAKE protocol (see Section 4.3), in the UC-framework, against semi-adaptive adversaries but without erasures, we exhibit a sequence of games. The sequence starts from the real game, where the adversary \mathcal{A} interacts with real players and ends with the ideal game, where we have built a simulator \mathcal{S} that makes the interface between the ideal functionality \mathcal{F} and the adversary \mathcal{A} .

We say that a flow is *oracle-generated* if the pair (hp, C) was sent by an honest player (or the simulator) and received without any alteration by the expected receiver. It is said *non-oracle-generated* otherwise.

The steps in the proof are similar to the previous proof. Here are detailed games:

Game \mathbf{G}_0 : This is the **real game**.

Game \mathbf{G}_1 : First, in this game, the simulator generates correctly every flow on behalf of the honest players, as they would do themselves, knowing the inputs π_i and π_j sent by the environment to the players. In case of corruption, the simulator can give the internal data generated on behalf of the honest players.

Game \mathbf{G}_2 : We now replace the setup algorithm C.Setup by C.SetupT that additionally outputs the trapdoor $(\text{crs}, \tau) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{C.SetupT}(1^\kappa)$, but nothing else changes, which does not alter much the view of the environment under setup indistinguishability. Corruptions are handled the same way.

Game \mathbf{G}_3 : We now deal with **honest players** P_i receiving an oracle-generated flow (hp_j, C_j) from P_j , with a **different password**: $\pi_j \neq \pi_i$. In this case, P_i and P_j are honest at the beginning and so a semi-adaptive adversary cannot corrupt any of them. So, we can replace the hash value $H_i = \text{Hash}(\text{hk}_i, (\text{crs}, \pi_i), (\ell_j, C_j))$ by a random value. This game is indistinguishable from the previous one thanks to the smoothness of the SPHF.

Game \mathbf{G}_4 : Still in this case, we replace $\text{SK}_i = H_i \text{ xor } H'_j$ by a random value. This game is perfectly indistinguishable from the previous one.

Game \mathbf{G}_5 : We now deal with all honest players. We replace all the commitments $(C, \delta) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{C.Com}^\ell(\pi)$ ($\pi = \pi_i$ or π_j) with $\ell = \ell_i$ or ℓ_j by simulated commitments $(C, \delta) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{C.SCom}^\ell(\tau, \pi)$, which means $(C, \text{eqk}) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{C.Sim}^\ell(\tau)$ and $\delta \leftarrow \text{C.Open}^\ell(\text{eqk}, C, s)$. We then store (ℓ, π, C, δ) in Λ .

With an hybrid proof, applying the $\text{Exp}^{\text{sim-ind}}$ security game for each session, in which C.SCom is used as an atomic operation in which the simulator does not see the intermediate values, and in particular the equivocation key, one can show the indistinguishability of the two games.

Game G_6 : We now deal with **honest players** P_i receiving an oracle-generated flow (hp_j, C_j) from P_j , with the **same password** as P_i : $\pi_j = \pi_i$. We remark that the hash value $H'_i = \text{ProjHash}(\text{hp}_j, (\text{crs}, \pi_i), (\ell_i, C_i), \delta_i)$ computed by the player P_i using δ_i is equal to the hash value $H_i = \text{Hash}(\text{hk}_j, (\text{crs}, \pi_j), (\ell_i, C_i))$ that P_j would compute if he gets the oracle-generated flow (hp_i, C_i) sent by P_i . So the first time we need to compute one of this values (H_i or H'_i), we compute it as $\text{Hash}(\text{hk}_j, (\text{crs}, \pi_j), (\ell_i, C_i))$, and if the other value needs to be computed, we just sets it equal to the first one.

Therefore, in this case, δ_i is no more used, since a semi-adaptive adversary is not allowed to corrupt P_i .

This game is indistinguishable from the previous one due to the correctness of the SPHF.

Game G_7 : Still in this case, we replace H'_i (and H_i if P_j received the oracle-generated flow generated flow sent by P_i) by a random value.

To prove this game is indistinguishable from the previous one, we consider two cases:

- P_j received the oracle-generated flow generated by P_i . In this case, hk_j is only used to compute $H_i = H'_i$, and since δ_i is no more used, we can apply the pseudo-randomness game on C_i to prove that $H_i = H'_i$ is indistinguishable from random;
- P_j received a non-oracle-generated flow (hp'_i, C'_i) . In this case hk_j is only used to compute $H'_i = \text{Hash}(\text{hk}_j, (\text{crs}, \pi_i), (\ell_i, C_i))$ and $H_i = \text{Hash}(\text{hk}_j, (\text{crs}, \pi_i), (\ell_i, C'_i))$. In this case, we can apply the strong pseudo-randomness game to prove that H'_i still looks random.

Game G_8 : Still in this case, we replace $\text{SK}_i \leftarrow H'_i \text{ xor } H_j$ by a random value, and if P_j also received the oracle-generated flow sent by P_i , then we set $\text{SK}_j = \text{SK}_i$. This game is perfectly indistinguishable from the previous one.

Game G_9 : In this game, if P_i receives a non-oracle-generated flow (hp_j, C_j) , then we extract π_j from C_j . If $\pi_j \neq \pi_i$, then we check if $\text{C.IsBinding}^{\ell_i}(\tau, C_j, \pi_j) = 1$ and aborts if this is not the case. With an hybrid proof, applying the robustness property, for every P_i , this game is indistinguishable from the previous one.

Game G_{10} : In this game, we deal with the case when P_i receives a non-oracle-generated flow such that the extracted π_j is not equal to π_i . In this case, instead of generating hk_i and hp_i honestly using HashKG and ProjKG , we generate $(\text{hp}_i, \text{expk}_i) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{SimKG}(\text{crs}, \tau, \perp)$ and choose $H_j \xleftarrow{\$} \Pi$ and sets $\text{hk}_i \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Explain}(\text{hp}_i, (\text{crs}, \pi_i), (\ell_j, C_j), H_j, \text{expk}_i)$. With an hybrid proof, applying the KV-indistinguishability property of EPHF, for every P_i , this game is indistinguishable from the previous one.

Game G_{11} : Still in the same case, we choose SK_i at random and sets $H_j \leftarrow H'_i \text{ xor } \text{SK}_i$. This game is perfectly indistinguishable from the previous one.

Game G_{12} : We can now make use of the ideal functionality, without knowing the inputs from the environment.

D New SPHF-Friendly Commitment Scheme

In this appendix, we show how to construct SPHFs for our new commitment scheme in Section 5, and give its security proof.

D.1 SPHF

To construct SPHFs for our commitment schemes, we use the framework from [BBC⁺13b].

KV-SPHF. Let us consider a commitment $C = (e_{i,b}, u_{i,b}, v_{i,b}, w_{i,b})_{i,b}$ under some label ℓ . From the definition, this is a commitment of \mathbf{M} if, for $i = 1, \dots, m$, $(e_{i,M_i}, e_{i,M_i}^\xi, u_{i,M_i}, u_{i,M_i}^\xi, v_{i,M_i}, w_{i,M_i})$ is a linear combination of the rows, with coefficients $(r_{i,M_i}, r_{i,M_i}\xi, s_{i,M_i}, s_{i,M_i}\xi)$, of the following matrix:

$$\Gamma = \begin{pmatrix} g & 1 & 1 & 1 & \hat{h} & c \\ 1 & g & 1 & 1 & 1 & c' \\ 1 & 1 & g & 1 & h & d \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & g & 1 & d' \end{pmatrix}. \quad (1)$$

Therefore, the hashing key is a random tuple $\mathbf{hk} = (\eta_{i,j})_{i,j} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^{m \times 6}$, the projection key is $\mathbf{hp} = (\mathbf{hp}_{i,k})_{i,k} \in \mathbb{G}^{m \times 4}$ with:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{hp}_{i,1} &= g^{\eta_{i,1}} \cdot \hat{h}^{\eta_{i,5}} \cdot c^{\eta_{i,6}} \\ \mathbf{hp}_{i,2} &= g^{\eta_{i,2}} \cdot c'^{\eta_{i,6}} \\ \mathbf{hp}_{i,3} &= g^{\eta_{i,3}} \cdot h^{\eta_{i,5}} \cdot c^{\eta_{i,6}} \\ \mathbf{hp}_{i,4} &= g^{\eta_{i,4}} \cdot d'^{\eta_{i,6}} \end{aligned}$$

and the hash value is:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Hash}(\mathbf{hk}, (\text{crs}, \mathbf{M}), (\ell, C)) &:= \prod_{i=1}^m \left(e_{i,M_i}^{\eta_{i,1} + \xi \eta_{i,2}} \cdot u_{i,M_i}^{\eta_{i,3} + \xi \eta_{i,4}} \cdot v_{i,M_i}^{\eta_{i,5}} \cdot w_{i,M_i}^{\eta_{i,6}} \right) \\ &= \prod_{i=1}^m \left(\mathbf{hp}_{i,1}^{r_{i,M_i}} \cdot \mathbf{hp}_{i,2}^{\xi r_{i,M_i}} \cdot \mathbf{hp}_{i,3}^{s_{i,M_i}} \cdot \mathbf{hp}_{i,4}^{s_{i,M_i}} \right) \\ &=: \text{ProjHash}(\mathbf{hp}, (\text{crs}, \mathbf{M}), (\ell, C), \delta). \end{aligned}$$

GL-SPHF. For a GL-SPHF, ξ is known in advance. So we can use a simpler matrix Γ . In addition, we can re-use the same \mathbf{hp} for all bits of the commitment by using a scalar ε of at least \mathfrak{R} bits (for the sake of simplicity, we suppose that $\varepsilon \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$). Also notice that ε is not required when $m = 1$.

More precisely, C is a commitment of \mathbf{M} , if, for $i = 1, \dots, m$, $(e_{i,M_i}, u_{i,M_i}, v_{i,M_i}, w_{i,M_i})$ is a linear combination of the rows, with coefficients (r_{i,M_i}, s_{i,M_i}) , of the following matrix:

$$\Gamma = \begin{pmatrix} g & 1 & \hat{h} & c \cdot c'^\xi \\ 1 & g & h & d \cdot d'^\xi \end{pmatrix}$$

Therefore the hashing key is a random tuple $\mathbf{hk} = (\eta_1, \eta_2, \eta_3, \eta_4, \varepsilon) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^5$, the projection key is $\mathbf{hp} = (\mathbf{hp}_1, \mathbf{hp}_2, \varepsilon) \in \mathbb{G}^2 \times \mathbb{Z}_p$ with:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{hp}_1 &= g^{\eta_1} \cdot \hat{h}^{\eta_3} \cdot (c \cdot c'^\xi)^{\eta_4} \\ \mathbf{hp}_2 &= g^{\eta_2} \cdot h^{\eta_3} \cdot (d \cdot d'^\xi)^{\eta_4} \end{aligned}$$

```

ExpAw-ps-rand-b( $\mathcal{R}$ )
(crs,  $\tau$ )  $\xleftarrow{\$}$  C.SetupT( $1^{\mathcal{R}}$ )
( $\ell$ ,  $\mathbf{M}$ ,  $\mathbf{st}$ )  $\xleftarrow{\$}$   $\mathcal{A}^{\text{C.SCom}(\tau, \cdot), \text{C.Ext}(\tau, \cdot), \text{C.IsBinding}(\tau, \cdot)}$ (crs)
for  $i = 1, \dots, m$  do
   $r_{i,0}, r_{i,1}, s_{i,0} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$ ;  $s_{i,1} \leftarrow t - s_{i,0}$ 
   $e_{i,0} \leftarrow g^{r_{i,0}}$ ;  $u_{i,0} \leftarrow g^{s_{i,0}}$ ;  $v_{i,0} = \hat{h}^{r_{i,0}} h^{s_{i,0}}$ 
   $e_{i,1} \leftarrow g^{r_{i,1}}$ ;  $u_{i,1} \leftarrow g^{s_{i,1}}$ ;  $v_{i,1} = \hat{h}^{r_{i,1}} h^{s_{i,1}}$ 
   $\xi = H(\ell, (e_{i,b}, u_{i,b}, v_{i,b})_{i,b})$ 
  for  $i = 1, \dots, m$  do
     $w_{i, M_i} \leftarrow (c^{r_{i, M_i}} \cdot d^{s_{i, M_i}}) \cdot (c'^{r_{i, M_i}} \cdot d'^{s_{i, M_i}})^{\xi}$ 
    if  $b = 0$  then
       $w_{i, \overline{M}_i} \leftarrow (c^{r_{i, \overline{M}_i}} \cdot d^{s_{i, \overline{M}_i}}) \cdot (c'^{r_{i, \overline{M}_i}} \cdot d'^{s_{i, \overline{M}_i}})^{\xi}$ 
    else
       $w_{i, \overline{M}_i} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{G}$ 
   $C \leftarrow (e_{i,b}, u_{i,b}, v_{i,b}, w_{i,b})_{i,b}$ 
   $\delta \leftarrow (r_{i, M_i}, s_{i, M_i})_i$ 
return  $\mathcal{A}^{\text{C.SCom}(\tau, \cdot), \text{C.Ext}(\tau, \cdot), \text{C.IsBinding}(\tau, \cdot)}$ ( $\mathbf{st}, C, \delta$ )

```

Fig. 10. w -pseudo-randomness

and the hash value is:

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{Hash}(\text{hk}, (\text{crs}, \mathbf{M}), (\ell, C)) &:= \prod_{i=1}^m (e_{i, M_i}^{\eta_1} \cdot u_{i, M_i}^{\eta_2} \cdot v_{i, M_i}^{\eta_3} \cdot w_{i, M_i}^{\eta_4})^{\varepsilon^i} \\
&= \prod_{i=1}^m (\text{hp}_1^{r_{i, M_i}} \cdot \text{hp}_2^{s_{i, M_i}})^{\varepsilon^i} \\
&=: \text{ProjHash}(\text{hp}, (\text{crs}, \mathbf{M}), (\ell, C), \delta).
\end{aligned}$$

D.2 Preliminaries: w -Pseudo-Randomness

To prove that our commitment scheme is SPHF-friendly, we will first prove an intermediate property we call w -pseudo-randomness, which is defined by the experiments $\text{Exp}_A^{w\text{-ps-rand-}b}$ in Figure 10, where the Remark 2 from the definitions in Appendix B.3 still applies. It roughly says that simulating commitments with valid w_{i, \overline{M}_i} is indistinguishable from generating them with random w_{i, \overline{M}_i} . This can be seen as a pseudo-randomness property for the implicit underlying 2-universal hash proof system.

The proof is close (though slightly different) from the proof of vector-indistinguishability with partial opening under chosen-ciphertexts attacks in [ABB⁺13]. More precisely, the proof first consists in aborting as soon as the value ξ of a commitment queried to C.Ext or C.IsBinding is equal to the value ξ in our experiment. Thanks to the collision resistance of the hashing function, this is computationally indistinguishable. Then it consists in the following sequence of hybrid games: in the hybrid game i ($i = 0, \dots, m$),

$$\begin{cases} w_{j, \overline{M}_j} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{G} & \text{for } j = 1, \dots, i \\ w_{j, \overline{M}_j} \leftarrow (c^{r_{j, \overline{M}_j}} \cdot d^{s_{j, \overline{M}_j}}) \cdot (c'^{r_{j, \overline{M}_j}} \cdot d'^{s_{j, \overline{M}_j}})^{\xi} & \text{for } j = i + 1, \dots, m \end{cases}$$

so that the hybrid game 0 is $\text{Exp}_A^{w\text{-ps-rand-}0}$ while the hybrid game m is $\text{Exp}_A^{w\text{-ps-rand-}1}$. It remains to prove that the hybrid game k is indistinguishable from the hybrid game $k + 1$. This is done by the following sequence of subgames:

Game G_0 : This is the hybrid game $i - 1$. And then for all the indices $j \leq i - 1$, $w_{j, \overline{M}_j} \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{G}$, while for the indices $j \geq i$, $w_{j, \overline{M}_j} \leftarrow (c^{r_{j, \overline{M}_j}} \cdot d^{s_{j, \overline{M}_j}}) \cdot (c^{r_{j, \overline{M}_j}} \cdot d^{s_{j, \overline{M}_j}})^\xi$.

Game G_1 : In this game, we compute w_{i, \overline{M}_i} as:

$$w_{i, \overline{M}_i} = e_{i, \overline{M}_i}^{\alpha + \xi \alpha'} \cdot u_{i, \overline{M}_i}^{\beta + \xi \beta'} \cdot v_{i, \overline{M}_i}^{\gamma + \xi \gamma'}$$

instead of

$$w_{i, \overline{M}_i} = (c^{r_{i, \overline{M}_i}} \cdot d^{s_{i, \overline{M}_i}}) \cdot (c^{r_{i, \overline{M}_i}} \cdot d^{s_{i, \overline{M}_i}})^\xi.$$

This modification is purely syntactical, and this game is perfectly indistinguishable from the previous one.

Game G_2 : In this game, we pick v_{i, \overline{M}_i} at random, instead of computing it as $v_{i, \overline{M}_i} = \hat{h}^{r_{i, \overline{M}_i}} h^{s_{i, \overline{M}_i}}$. This game is indistinguishable from the previous one, under the DDH assumption. Indeed, given a tuple $(g, \hat{h}, e_{i, \overline{M}_i}, v')$, we can set $v_{i, \overline{M}_i} = v' \cdot h^{s_{i, \overline{M}_i}}$; and if this tuple is a DDH tuple, v_{i, \overline{M}_i} is computed as in the previous game, and otherwise, it is computed as in this game. Notice that the discrete logarithm r_{i, \overline{M}_i} of e_{i, \overline{M}_i} is not used, which enables to use the DDH assumption.

Game G_3 : In this game, we generate h as $h \leftarrow g^a$, $\hat{h} \leftarrow g^{\hat{a}}$, with $a, \hat{a} \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p$. This modification is purely syntactical and this game is perfectly indistinguishable from the previous one.

Game G_4 : Then, for all commitments $C' = (e'_{j,b}, u'_{j,b}, v'_{j,b}, w'_{j,b})_{j,b}$ with label ℓ' queried to the oracle $\mathsf{C.Ext}$ or $\mathsf{C.IsBinding}$, each time we need to perform a test of the form:

$$w_{j', b'} \stackrel{?}{=} e'_{j', b'}{}^{\alpha + \xi' \alpha'} \cdot u'_{j', b'}{}^{\beta + \xi' \beta'} \cdot v'_{j', b'}{}^{\gamma + \xi' \gamma'}, \quad (2)$$

where $\xi' = \mathcal{H}(\ell', (e'_{j,b}, u'_{j,b}, v'_{j,b})_{j,b})$, we reject the test as soon as: $v'_{j', b'} \neq u'_{j', b'}{}^a \cdot e'_{j', b'}{}^{\hat{a}}$.

This game is statistically indistinguishable from the previous one. To prove it, we use a sequence of hybrid games to add one by one this new test: for each commitment (in order of the queries to $\mathsf{C.Ext}$ and $\mathsf{C.IsBinding}$) and then each pair (j', b') (e.g., in lexicographical order). We remark that the newly added test for some C' , j' and b' , the only information (from an information theory point of view) the adversary has about $\alpha, \alpha', \beta, \beta', \gamma, \gamma'$ is at most:

- $\log c = \alpha + \gamma \hat{a}$ and $\log c' = \alpha' + \gamma' \hat{a}$ from the definition of c and c' (where \log is the discrete logarithm in base g)
- $\log d = \beta + \gamma a$ and $\log d' = \beta' + \gamma' a$ from the definition of d and d'
- $\log w_{i, \overline{M}_i} = (\alpha + \xi \alpha') \log e_{i, \overline{M}_i} + (\beta + \xi \beta') \log u_{i, \overline{M}_i} + (\gamma + \xi \gamma') \log v_{i, \overline{M}_i}$, from the value of w_{i, \overline{M}_i}
- and values of the form $e''_{j,b}{}^{\alpha + \xi'' \alpha'} \cdot u''_{j,b}{}^{\beta + \xi'' \beta'} \cdot v''_{j,b}{}^{\gamma + \xi'' \gamma'}$ for commitments $C'' = (e''_{j,b}, u''_{j,b}, v''_{j,b}, w''_{j,b})_{j,b}$ with label ℓ'' , queried before C' . But in this case, necessarily, $v''_{j,b} = u''_{j,b}{}^a \cdot e''_{j,b}{}^{\hat{a}}$, since otherwise this value would not have been computed. And so, this value can be computed by linear combinations of the previous equations (which can be seen easily on the matrix below).

Finally, we get that, from the adversary point of view, $\alpha, \alpha', \beta, \beta', \gamma, \gamma'$ are random values verifying the following system of equations:

$$\begin{pmatrix} \log c \\ \log c' \\ \log d \\ \log d' \\ \log w_{i, \overline{M}_i} \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \hat{a} & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \hat{a} \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & a & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & a \\ \log e_{i, \overline{M}_i} & \xi \log e_{i, \overline{M}_i} & \log u_{i, \overline{M}_i} & \xi \log u_{i, \overline{M}_i} & \log v_{i, \overline{M}_i} & \xi \log v_{i, \overline{M}_i} \end{pmatrix} \cdot \begin{pmatrix} \alpha \\ \alpha' \\ \beta \\ \beta' \\ \gamma \\ \gamma' \end{pmatrix}.$$

Since $\xi' \neq \xi$, if $v'_{j',b'} \neq u'_{j',b'} \cdot e'_{j',b'}^{\hat{a}}$, then

$$\left(\log e'_{j',b'} \quad \xi' \log e'_{j',b'} \quad \log u'_{j',b'} \quad \xi' \log u'_{j',b'} \quad \log v'_{j',b'} \quad \xi' \log v'_{j',b'} \right)$$

is linearly independent of the rows of the above rectangular matrix, and so $e'^{\alpha+\xi'\alpha'} \cdot u'^{\beta+\xi'\beta'}$. $v'^{\gamma+\xi'\gamma'}$ is completely random, from the adversary point of view. Therefore, with probability $1/p$, $w'_{j',b'} \neq e'^{\alpha+\xi'\alpha'} \cdot u'^{\beta+\xi'\beta'} \cdot v'^{\gamma+\xi'\gamma'}$, and the test in Equation Equation (2) would also have failed. And adding this new test is statistically indistinguishable.

Game \mathbf{G}_5 : In this game, we remark that, from the adversary point of view, before w_{i,\bar{M}_i} is computed, $\alpha, \alpha', \beta, \beta', \gamma, \gamma'$ are random values verifying the following system of equations:

$$\begin{pmatrix} \log c \\ \log c' \\ \log d \\ \log d' \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \hat{a} & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \hat{a} \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & a & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & a \end{pmatrix} \cdot \begin{pmatrix} \alpha \\ \alpha' \\ \beta \\ \beta' \\ \gamma \\ \gamma' \end{pmatrix}.$$

Since, with high probability, $v_{i,\bar{M}_i} \neq u'_{i,\bar{M}_i} \cdot e'_{i,\bar{M}_i}^{\hat{a}}$ (v_{i,\bar{M}_i} being chosen at random), then

$$\left(\log e_{i,\bar{M}_i} \quad \xi' \log e'_{i,\bar{M}_i} \quad \log u'_{i,\bar{M}_i} \quad \xi' \log u'_{i,\bar{M}_i} \quad \log v'_{i,\bar{M}_i} \quad \xi' \log v'_{i,\bar{M}_i} \right)$$

is linearly independent of the rows of the above rectangular matrix, and so $w_{i,\bar{M}_i} = e'^{\alpha+\xi'\alpha'} \cdot u'^{\beta+\xi'\beta'}$. $v'^{\gamma+\xi'\gamma'}$ is completely random, from the adversary point of view.

So, in this game, we replace w_{i,\bar{M}_i} by a random value in \mathbb{G} , and this is statistically indistinguishable from the previous game.

Game \mathbf{G}_6 : In this game, we now remove the extra tests introduced in \mathbf{G}_4 . This game is statistically indistinguishable from the previous one, using a proof similar to the one in \mathbf{G}_4 (except this time, it is even easier, since w_{i,\bar{M}_i} gives no information on $\alpha, \alpha', \beta, \beta', \gamma, \gamma'$ to the adversary.

Game \mathbf{G}_7 : In this game, we compute again v_{i,\bar{M}_i} as $v_{i,\bar{M}_i} = \hat{h}^{r_{i,\bar{M}_i}} h^{s_{i,\bar{M}_i}}$, instead of picking it at random. This game is computationally indistinguishable from the previous one under the DDH. The proof is similar to the one for \mathbf{G}_1 .

Finally, we remark that this game is exactly the hybrid game i .

As a consequence, each hybrid step just involves the DDH assumption.

D.3 Strong Simulation Indistinguishability

The strong simulation indistinguishability can be proven using the following sequence of games:

Game \mathbf{G}_0 : This is the game $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{s-sim-ind-1}}(\mathcal{R})$ for strong simulation indistinguishability (for $b = 1$) recalled in Figure 6.

Game \mathbf{G}_1 : In this game, for all queries $\text{C.SCom}^\ell(\tau, \mathbf{M})$, we pick the values w_{i,\bar{M}_i} at random (for all $i = 1, \dots, m$). With an hybrid proof, applying the w -pseudo-randomness to all simulated commitments, this game is indistinguishable from the previous one.

Game \mathbf{G}_2 : In this game, for all queries $\text{C.SCom}^\ell(\tau, \mathbf{M})$, we pick v_{i, \bar{M}_i} at random, instead of computing it as $v_{i, \bar{M}_i} = \hat{h}^{r_{i, \bar{M}_i}} h^{s_{i, \bar{M}_i}}$. This game is indistinguishable from the previous one, under the DDH assumption. Indeed, given a tuple $(g, \hat{h}, e_{i, \bar{M}_i}, v')$, we can set $v_{i, \bar{M}_i} = v' \cdot h^{s_{i, \bar{M}_i}}$; and if this tuple is a DDH tuple, v_{i, \bar{M}_i} is computed as in the previous game, and otherwise, it is computed as in this game. Notice that the discrete logarithm r_{i, \bar{M}_i} of e_{i, \bar{M}_i} is not used, which enables to use the DDH assumption.

This last game is actually exactly the game $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{s-sim-ind-0}}(\mathfrak{R})$ for strong simulation indistinguishability (for $b = 0$) recalled in Figure 6.

D.4 Robustness

The robustness can be proven using the following sequence of games:

Game \mathbf{G}_0 : This is the game $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{robust}}(\mathfrak{R})$ for robustness recalled in Figure 6.

Game \mathbf{G}_1 : In this game, we answer all queries $\text{C.SCom}^\ell(\tau, \mathbf{M})$ by $\text{C.Com}^\ell(\mathbf{M})$. In other words, we replace all simulated commitments by normal ones. This game is indistinguishable from the previous one thanks to the strong simulation indistinguishability.

Game \mathbf{G}_2 : In this game, we generate h as $h \leftarrow g^a$ and $\hat{h} \leftarrow g^{\hat{a}}$, with $a, \hat{a} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$. This modification is purely syntactical and this game is perfectly indistinguishable from the previous one.

Game \mathbf{G}_3 : In this game, we remark that if $\text{C.IsBinding}^\ell(\tau, C, \mathbf{M})$ returns 0, and if $\mathbf{M} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{C.Ext}^\ell(\tau, C)$, then there exists $i = i^*$ such that:

$$w_{i^*, b} = e_{i^*, b}^{\alpha + \xi \alpha'} \cdot u_{i^*, b}^{\beta + \xi \beta'} \cdot v_{i^*, b}^{\gamma + \xi \gamma'} \quad \text{for } b = 0, 1.$$

And so, we abort the game if $v_{i^*, b} \neq u_{i^*, b}^a \cdot e_{i^*, b}^{\hat{a}}$ for $b = 0$ or $b = 1$. This game is statistically indistinguishable from the previous one. The proof is similar to the one for \mathbf{G}_4 in the proof for w -pseudo-randomness in Section D.2.

In this last game, we finally remark that $v_{i^*, 0} \cdot v_{i^*, 1} / (e_{i^*, 0}^{\hat{a}} \cdot e_{i^*, 1}^{\hat{a}}) = u_{i^*, 0}^a \cdot u_{i^*, 1}^a = h^t$. So if an adversary breaks this last game, we can break the CDH for the tuple (g, h, T) , by not doing this last check $v_{i^*, b} \neq u_{i^*, b}^a \cdot e_{i^*, b}^{\hat{a}}$ (and so not knowing the discrete logarithm a of h) and simply returning $v_{i^*, 0} \cdot v_{i^*, 1} / (e_{i^*, 0}^{\hat{a}} \cdot e_{i^*, 1}^{\hat{a}})$ as a candidate CDH value (recall that the discrete logarithm t of T is no more used, while the discrete logarithm a of h is just used to abort the game).

D.5 Strong Pseudo-Randomness

To prove the strong pseudo-randomness, we use the following sequence of games:

Game \mathbf{G}_0 : This game is the experiment $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{c-s-ps-rand-0}}$.

Game \mathbf{G}_1 : In this game, before computing H' , we compute $\mathbf{M}' \leftarrow \text{C.Ext}^{\ell'}(\tau, C')$ and we abort if $\text{C.IsBinding}^{\ell'}(\tau, C', \mathbf{M}') = 0$.

This game is indistinguishable from the previous one thanks to the robustness.

Game \mathbf{G}_2 : In this game, if $\mathbf{M}' \neq \mathbf{M}$, we replace H' by a random value.

This game is indistinguishable from the previous one thanks to the smoothness of the SPHF, the fact that if $\mathbf{M}' \neq \mathbf{M}$ and $\text{C.IsBinding}^{\ell'}(\tau, C', \mathbf{M}') = 1$, then $(\ell', C') \notin \mathcal{L}_{(\text{crs}, \mathbf{M})}$, and the fact that H could have been computed as follows: $\delta \leftarrow \text{C.Open}^{\ell'}(\text{eqk}, C, \mathbf{M})$ and $H \leftarrow \text{ProjHash}(\text{hp}, (\text{crs}, \mathbf{M}), (\ell, C), \delta)$.

Game G₃: In this game, we replace $(C, \text{eqk}) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{C.Sim}^\ell(\tau)$ by $C \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{C.Com}^\ell(\mathbf{M}'')$ for some arbitrary $\mathbf{M}'' \neq \mathbf{M}$. This game is indistinguishable thanks to strong simulation indistinguishability (since eqk is not used, C.Sim could have been replaced by C.SCom with a \mathbf{M}'' as message).

Game G₄: In this game, when $\mathbf{M}' \neq \mathbf{M}$, we replace H by a random value.

This game is indistinguishable from the previous one thanks to the smoothness of the SPHF, and the fact that $\mathbf{M}'' \neq \mathbf{M}$, $\text{C.IsBinding}^\ell(\tau, C, \mathbf{M}'') = 1$ (since C is a real commitment to \mathbf{M}'') and so, that $(\ell, C) \notin \mathcal{L}_{(\text{crs}, \mathbf{M})}$.

Notice that we could not have done this if $\mathbf{M}' = \mathbf{M}$, since, in this case, we still need to use hk to compute the hash value H' of C' . We are handling this (tricky) case in the following games.

Game G₅: Let $C = (e_{i,b}, u_{i,b}, v_{i,b}, w_{i,b})_{i,b}$. In this game, we compute $v_{i, \overline{M}_i'}$ as $v_{i, \overline{M}_i'} = \hat{h}^{r_{i, \overline{M}_i'}} h^{s_{i, \overline{M}_i'}}$ instead of picking it at random in \mathbb{G} , for all i . This game is indistinguishable from the previous one, under the DDH assumption. Indeed, given a tuple $(g, \hat{h}, e_{i, \overline{M}_i'}, v')$, we can set $v_{i, \overline{M}_i'} = v' \cdot h^{s_{i, \overline{M}_i'}}$; and if this tuple is a DDH tuple, $v_{i, \overline{M}_i'}$ is computed as in this game, and otherwise, it is computed as in the previous game. Notice that the discrete logarithm $r_{i, \overline{M}_i'}$ of $e_{i, \overline{M}_i'}$ is not used, which enables to use the DDH assumption.

Game G₆: In this game, we replace H by a random value, in the case $\mathbf{M}' = \mathbf{M}$. So now H will be completely random, in all cases (since it was already the case when $\mathbf{M}' \neq \mathbf{M}$).

Let $C = (e_{i,b}, u_{i,b}, v_{i,b}, w_{i,b})_{i,b}$ and $C' = (e'_{i,b}, u'_{i,b}, v'_{i,b}, w'_{i,b})_{i,b}$. And let $\xi = \mathcal{H}(\ell, (e_{i,b}, u_{i,b}, v_{i,b})_{i,b})$ and $\xi' = \mathcal{H}(\ell', (e'_{i,b}, u'_{i,b}, v'_{i,b})_{i,b})$. Finally, we write $r'_{i,b} = \log e'_{i,b}$ and $s'_{i,b} = \log u'_{i,b}$ for all i, b , \log being the discrete logarithm in base g . There are two cases:

1. for all i , $v'_{i, M_i} = \hat{h}^{r'_{i, M_i}} \cdot h^{s'_{i, M_i}}$. In this case, since C' extracts to \mathbf{M} , this means that

$$w'_{i, M_i} = (e'_{i, M_i}{}^{\alpha + \xi' \alpha'} \cdot u'_{i, M_i}{}^{\beta + \xi' \beta'} \cdot v'_{i, M_i}{}^{\gamma + \xi' \gamma'}),$$

and so from the definition of c and d , we have that:

$$w'_{i, M_i} = (c^{r'_{i, M_i}} \cdot d^{s'_{i, M_i}}) \cdot (c'^{r'_{i, M_i}} \cdot d'^{s'_{i, M_i}})^\xi.$$

This means that $(\ell', C') \in \mathcal{L}_{(\text{crs}, \mathbf{M})}$, and its hash value H' could be computed knowing only hp , $(r'_{i, M_i})_i$ and $(s'_{i, M_i})_i$. Therefore, the hash value H of C looks random by smoothness.

2. for some i , $v'_{i, M_i} \neq \hat{h}^{r'_{i, M_i}} \cdot h^{s'_{i, M_i}}$. Then since $v_{i, M_i} = \hat{h}^{r_{i, M_i}} \cdot h^{s_{i, M_i}}$, for the KV-SPHF (in Section D.1) the rows of the matrix Γ in Equation 1 (page 34) and the two following vectors

$$\begin{aligned} & (e_{i, M_i}, e_{i, M_i}^\xi, u_{i, M_i}, u_{i, M_i}^\xi, v_{i, M_i}, w_{i, M_i}) \\ & (e'_{i, M_i}, e_{i, M_i}'^{\xi'}, u'_{i, M_i}, u_{i, M_i}'^{\xi'}, v'_{i, M_i}, w'_{i, M_i}) \end{aligned}$$

are independent. Then, even given access to the hash value H' of C' and the projection key hp , the hash value H of C looks perfectly random.

The following games are just undoing the modifications we have done, but keeping H picked at random

Game G₇: Let $C = (e_{i,b}, u_{i,b}, v_{i,b}, w_{i,b})_{i,b}$. In this game, we pick $v_{i, \overline{M}_i'}$ at random, instead of computing it as $v_{i, \overline{M}_i'} = \hat{h}^{r_{i, \overline{M}_i'}} h^{s_{i, \overline{M}_i'}}$, for all i . This game is indistinguishable from the previous one, under the DDH assumption. Indeed, given a tuple $(g, \hat{h}, e_{i, \overline{M}_i'}, v')$, we can set $v_{i, \overline{M}_i'} =$

$v' \cdot h^{s_{i, \overline{M}'_i}}$; and if this tuple is a DDH tuple, v_{i, \overline{M}'_i} is computed as in the previous game, and otherwise, it is computed as in this game. Notice that the discrete logarithm r_{i, \overline{M}'_i} of e_{i, \overline{M}'_i} is not used, which enables to use the DDH assumption.

Game G_8 : In this game, we now compute C as originally using C.Sim. This game is indistinguishable thanks to strong simulation indistinguishability.

Game G_9 : In this game, if $M' \neq M$, we compute H' as originally (as the hash value of C'). This game is indistinguishable from the previous one thanks to the smoothness of the SPHF, and the fact that if $M' \neq M$ and $\text{C.IsBinding}^{\ell'}(\tau, C', M') = 1$, then $(\ell', C') \notin \mathcal{L}_{(\text{crs}, M)}$.

Game G_{10} : In this game, we do not extract M' from C' nor abort when $\text{C.IsBinding}^{\ell'}(\tau, C, M') = 0$. Thanks to the robustness, this game is indistinguishable from the previous one.

We remark that this game is exactly the experiment $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{c-s-ps-rand-1}$.

E Adaptive OT and PAKE

Security Proof for our Second OT Scheme

The proof is similar to the semi-adaptive one in Section C.1, except with games dealing with honest receivers talking to honest senders. More precisely, the game G_5 is no more indistinguishable from the previous one, and we replace it with the following sequence of games:

Game G_0 : When simulating an **honest sender** P_i , instead of honestly computing the keys $(\text{ek}, \text{dk}) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{NCE.KG}(\text{NCE.param})$, we simulate them: $(\text{ek}, \chi, \text{eqk}_{\text{NCE}}) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{NCE.Sim}(\text{NCE.param})$, and $(r_{\text{KG}}, r_{\text{Enc}}) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{NCE.Open}(\text{eqk}_{\text{NCE}}, \text{ek}, \chi, R)$ with some random $R \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{\nu_{\text{NCE}}}$. Finally, we set (ek, dk) to $\text{NCE.KG}(\text{NCE.param}; r_{\text{KG}})$, which should not change ek , otherwise the non-committing encryption scheme would not be simulation indistinguishable. Then, if P_j is not corrupted when he received the pre-flow from P_i , we use the previously computed χ instead of computing a new one.

This game is indistinguishable from the previous one thanks to simulation indistinguishability.

We remark that the computation of dk using r_{KG} is actually only used when P_i receives a flow from a corrupted receiver, in which case he needs to be able to decrypt the ciphertext χ sent by the adversary. In all cases, dk and r_{KG} only need to be computed in case of corruption of P_i and P_j , and so R may be modified depending on the inputs learned by the corruption (inputs which are already known in this game but will not be known at in the last game). Intuitively, the only restriction is to ensure that R looks random to the adversary.

Game G_1 : We still deal with an **honest sender** P_i . If P_i receives an honest flow from P_j , we now pick M_t at random, and then set $R_t = M_t \text{ xor } K_t \text{ xor } m_t$ (for all t). Recall that R_t is part of R and only needs to be revealed in case of corruption of P_i and P_j .

This game is perfectly indistinguishable from the previous one.

We remark that, in this game, as long as P_i and P_j remains uncorrupted, all flows seen by the adversary are completely independent of the messages m_t and the hash values K_t .

Game G_2 : We now deal with the case where an **honest receiver** P_j gets corrupted while its associated sender P_i is **still honest**. If the corruption is before P_i sent his flow, there is nothing to do. Let us focus on the case where the corruption is after P_i sent his flow.

In this case, we learn the index query s (we already knew). We write $s = \mathbf{M}$, and we flip the bits $R_{2I+\overline{M}_I+1}$, in such a way this makes the resulting commitment binding to \mathbf{M} . Indeed, $w_{I,b} = w'_{I,b}$ if $R_{2I+b-1} = 0$ and $w_{I,b} = 1/w'_{I,b}$ otherwise; and so flipping this bits make w_{I, \overline{M}_I} invalid, while w_{I, M_I} stays valid.

Then, we can just compute the state accordingly to this commitment, i.e., compute K_t as the hash value of this commitment, then compute $R_t = M_t \text{ xor } K_t \text{ xor } m_t$, and finally we can set $(r_{\text{KG}}, r_{\text{Enc}}) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{NCE.Open}(\text{eqk}_{\text{NCE}}, \text{ek}, \chi, R)$. We recall that R_t is a part of R , and that P_i being still honest, we know all m_t .

This game is indistinguishable from the previous one, thanks to the w -pseudo-randomness of our commitment scheme (see Figure 10).

We then remark that after this game, when two honest users stay honest for the whole time, the simulator does not need their inputs, since they are only required in case of corruption. In addition, when one user P gets corrupted in a sub-session where both users were initially honest, then the revealed internal state of P corresponds nearly to the one a real user following the protocol with the real inputs would get. More precisely, if we omit the fact that ek and χ are simulated, this is exactly the case for an honest sender P_i . For an honest P_j , there is only one difference: the values $v_{i,b}$ of the commitments are all “valid” (i.e., $v_{i,b} = \hat{h}^{\log e_{i,b}} \cdot h^{\log u_{i,b}}$) while for a real user v_{i,\bar{M}_i} would be completely random. However, the resulting commitment is still perfectly binding, which is very important to be able to explain hk_t for $t \neq s$ in case of later corruption of the sender P_i .

So, the original sequence of games for semi-adaptive adversaries (from \mathbf{G}_7 will also work with minor modifications. Here are the modifications:

- in \mathbf{G}_7 , we do not extract or call C.IsBinding on a commitment C generated by an honest receiver (even if the receiver is now corrupted).
- in \mathbf{G}_8 , we only apply the modifications in this game when at least one player is corrupted. The modifications still makes this game indistinguishable from the previous one, even when C was generated by an honest receiver, since such commitments are also perfectly binding (as recalled above).