

基于收益分享契约的VMI模型研究

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Study on VMI Model Based on Revenus-Sharing Contract

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摘要 本文讨论了一个季节性商品销售环境下的供应商管理库存(Vendor Managed Inventory,VMI)模型,建立了零售商与供应商之间的Stackelberg博弈模型,并求出了该博弈的均衡解.在此基础上,文章引入了剩余补贴策略对模型进行了优化,并找到了在协调供应链前提下实现供应链成员期望收益帕累托改进的最优集.用一个算例对结论进行了说明.

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Abstract: A vendor managed inventory(VMI)model is analyzed,and the products are sold over a single selling season.The interaction between the supplier and the retailer is modeled as a Stackelberg game with complete information,where the retailer acts as a leader by setting the revenue share.We also analyze the contract when the retailer pays the supplier a surplus subsidy for the products that are not sold out,and we show that,by using this two-parameter contract,the performance of the supply chain can be improved,and the channel can be coordinated.We also find the range in which the expected profits of all parties are increased.All our findings are illustrated by a numerical example.

收稿日期: 2005-10-04;

基金资助:国家自然科学基金资助项目(70471042);湖北省科技攻关项目(2003AA401C22)

引用本文:

蔡建湖, 黄卫来, 周根贵. 基于收益分享契约的VMI模型研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2006,V(4): 108-113

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