

Defense Policy and Doctrinal Insulation

Author: CHARLES R. MILLER, PH.D. Published in PAM, Vol. 10 No. 2

The U.S. Army changed its core battle-fighting doctrine in response to external and internal pressures throughout the 20th Century. Exogenous, material pressures found under the balance of power approach explain a great deal of doctrinal change, particularly through the first half of the Cold War, but these pressures alone were not enough to prevent typical organizational autonomy characteristics from surfacing towards the end of the Cold War due to an inability of the organization to respond to an enlargement of its scope of responsibilities. Thus, while Army decision-makers were cognizant of systemic cues when they modified their doctrine, eventually doctrinal change became a means of insulating the Army from the uncertainties found in fluctuating defense policies.

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