

具有已知代理人的不可否认门限代理签密方案*

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A Nonrepudiable Threshold Proxy Signcryption Scheme with Known Proxy Agent

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Abstract: In 1996, Mambo *et al.* introduced the concept of proxy signature. However, a proxy signature only provides the delegated authenticity and doesn't provide the confidentiality. Chan and Wei proposed a threshold proxy signcryption scheme (denoted as Chan-Wei scheme), which extended the concept of proxy signature. In this paper, the authors demonstrate Chan-Wei scheme does not satisfy strong unforgeability, strong nonrepudiation and strong identifiability. Based on Chan-Wei scheme, a nonrepudiable threshold proxy signcryption scheme with known proxy agents is proposed. The proposed scheme overcomes the weaknesses of Chan-Wei scheme. Completeness proof and security analysis of the proposed scheme are presented. In addition, compared with

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Chan-Wei scheme, the proposed scheme exactly finds out which proxy agents present bogus secret shadow or tamper secret shadow.

Key words: proxy signcryption; proxy signature; threshold cryptography; discrete logarithm; nonrepudiation

摘要: 1996年, Mambo等人提出了代理签名概念.但是,代理签名仅能提供授权的认证而不能提供保密性. Chan和Wei提出一个门限代理签密方案(记为Chan-Wei方案),扩展了代理签名的概念.指出他们的方案不满足强不可伪造性、强不可否认性和强识别性.基于Chan-Wei方案,提出一个能够克服Chan-Wei方案缺点的不可否认门限代理签密方案.给出方案的完备性证明和安全性分析.此外,与Chan-Wei方案相比,所提出的方案能够确切地发现哪些代理人提供假子密钥或篡改子密钥.

关键词: 代理签密;代理签名;门限密码学;离散对数;不可否认性

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The concept of proxy signature introduced by Mambo, Usuda, and Okamoto^[1] in 1996 allows a designated person, called a proxy signer, to sign on behalf of an original signer. Mambo *et al.* showed proxy signature should have the properties of proxy signer's deviation, unforgeability, verifiability, distinguishability, identifiability, and undeniability. The proxy signature plays an important role in many applications^[2,3] and has received great attention since it was proposed. So far, three types of delegation: full delegation, partial delegation and delegation with warrant have been proposed. Kim *et al.*^[4] proposed a threshold proxy signature in 1997, which is a variant of the proxy signature. Sun *et al.*^[5] showed that their threshold proxy signatures suffered from some weaknesses and gave a modified scheme. Latter, Sun^[6] proposed an efficient nonrepudiable threshold proxy signature. However Hwang *et al.*^[7] showed that Sun's scheme had two disadvantages and proposed a modified scheme which remedies the weakness of Sun's scheme. Sun^[8] proposed a time-stamped proxy signature scheme with traceable receivers which can ascertain whether a proxy signature is created at a certain time and trace the receivers who receive the proxy signature from the proxy signer.

To avoid the abuse of signing power, a threshold proxy signature scheme should have the nonrepudiation property that provides the ability to identify the actual proxy signers of the proxy signature. Based on Kim *et al.*'s scheme, Sun^[6] proposed an efficient nonrepudiable threshold proxy signature scheme with known signers to achieve the above goal. However, Hsu *et al.*^[9] showed Sun's scheme was vulnerable against the conspiracy attack and gave an improved scheme. In 2000, Yi *et al.*^[10] proposed a new type of proxy scheme: proxy multi-signature scheme. Recently, Li *et al.*^[11-14] proposed some proxy signature schemes which analyzed and improved proxy schemes in Ref. [1,4,5,10], respectively. In Ref.[3], Lee *et al.* showed that a strong proxy signature scheme should satisfy the following five properties:

(1) Strong unforgeability: Anyone except the proxy signer cannot generate a valid proxy key pair. Only the legitimate proxy signer can create a valid proxy signature.

(2) Verifiability: The original signer's delegation on the signed message is verifiable using publicly available parameters.

(3) Strong identifiability: Anyone can determine the identity of the corresponding proxy signer from a proxy signature.

(4) Strong undeniability: Once a proxy signer creates a valid proxy signature for an original signer, he cannot repudiate his signature creation against anyone else.

(5) Prevention of misuse: It should be confident that a proxy key pair should be used only for creating a proxy signature which conforms to delegation information. In case of any misuse of the proxy key pair, the responsibility of a proxy signer should be determined explicitly.

However, a proxy signature only provides the delegated authenticity and doesn't provide the confidentiality. In 1999, Gamage *et al.*^[15] extended the proxy signature and introduced a proxy signcryption scheme by combining proxy signature and encryption technology. It enables a principal to delegate its authority in producing authenticated and encrypted message (i.e. signcryption) to a trusted proxy agent. Recently, Chan and Wei^[16] proposed a threshold proxy signcryption scheme. In a threshold proxy signcryption scheme, at least t proxy agents in the entrusted group of n proxy agents are required to produce a valid authenticated and encrypted message on behalf of the original rights owner, the principal. In this paper, the authors demonstrate Chan-Wei scheme doesn't satisfy the strong unforgeability, strong nonrepudiation and strong identifiability. Furthermore, a nonrepudiable threshold proxy signcryption scheme with known proxy agents is proposed.

The paper is organized as follows: In Section 1, Chan-Wei scheme is reviewed and analyzed. In Section 2, on basis of Chan-Wei scheme, a nonrepudiable threshold proxy signcryption scheme with known proxy agents is presented. In Section 3, completeness proof and security analysis of the proposed scheme are presented. Finally, we draw our conclusions in Section 4.

1 Review and Cryptanalysis of Chan-Wei Scheme

Assume p, q are large primes and $q|p-1$, g is an element of order q in the multiplicative group Z_p^* , $E_e(\cdot)$ is the symmetric encryption algorithms with the private key e , $D_e(\cdot)$ is the decryption algorithms with the private key e , $H_e(\cdot)$ is a secure keyed hash function with the private key e . $(x_a \in_R Z_q^*, y_a = g^{x_a} \bmod p)$ and $(x_b \in_R Z_q^*, y_b = g^{x_b} \bmod p)$ are the discrete logarithm key pairs of the principal and the receiver, respectively.

In this section, a brief review of Chan-Wei scheme is given and the readers can refer to the original paper^[16] for more details. Chan and Wei presented two schemes: a (n, n) threshold proxy signcryption scheme and a (t, n) threshold proxy signcryption scheme. The schemes involve $n+2$ parties, which are the principal, Alice, the receiver, Bob, and n entrusted proxy agents P_i , where i is its unique ID number. Assume that Alice, with the (x_a, y_a) key pair, wants to delegate her signcryption rights to the proxy agents and let them signcrypt the message m , on behalf of her to Bob, with the (x_b, y_b) key pair. Because of space limitation, we only review the (t, n) threshold proxy signcryption scheme.

1.1 (t, n) threshold proxy signcryption scheme

The (t, n) threshold proxy signcryption scheme consists of the following three phases:

Group key and proxy key generation:

Input: Defined public parameters p, q, g , and Alice's key pair (x_a, y_a) .

Output: Proxy ID u_i , proxy signcryption key x_{u_i} , and parameter K .

(1) Generation of group secret: The principal, Alice, randomly chooses x , where $1 \leq x \leq q-1$ and computes $K = g^x \bmod p$. Then Alice computes group's private key $x_G = x_a + x \cdot K \bmod p-1$ and group's public key $y_G = g^{x_G} \bmod p$.

(2) Generation of proxy shares: The principal, Alice, randomly chooses a polynomial over Z_q of degree $t-1$, $f(z) = x_G + a_1 z + \dots + a_{t-1} z^{t-1} \bmod q$. Then Alice generates $U = \{u_i, u_j \in Z_q \ \& \ i, j \in Z_{n-1} \ \& \ u_i \neq u_j \ \& \ i \neq j\}$ which are ID of the proxy agents and generates n key pair of proxy agent $P_{u_i}, (x_{u_i}, y_{u_i})$, where $x_{u_i} = f(u_i) \bmod q$. Finally, Alice sends (u_i, x_{u_i}, K) securely to proxy agent P_{u_i} and broadcasts $y_G, g^{a_1}, g^{a_2}, \dots, g^{a_{t-1}}$ to all proxy agents in the group.

(3) Verification of proxy share: Each $P_i, i \in U$, checks whether the equation $g^{x_i} = y_G \times \prod_{n=1}^{t-1} (g^{a_n})^{i^n} \bmod p$ holds. If $P_i, i \in U$, finds out that the equation is not justified, P_i rejects and broadcasts (i, x_i) . If $P_i, i \in U$, receives (j, x_j) , where $j \neq i$, P_i rejects (i, x_i) . If any proxy agent rejects, the protocol terminates.

(4) Verification of group public key: Each $P_i, i \in U$, checks whether the equation $y_G = y_a \cdot K^K \bmod p$ holds. If

the equation is not justified, the protocol is rejected and terminated.

(t, n) threshold proxy signcryption: Let \tilde{U} be a set containing all the ID of t proxy agents participating in the proxy signcryption.

Input: Defined public parameters p, q, g , participating proxy agents' proxy share (u_i, x_{u_i}, K) and receiver's key pair (x_b, y_b) .

Output: A proxy signcrypted text (c, r, s, K) .

(1) Each $P_i, i \in \tilde{U}$, with the key pair (x_i, y_i) computes $t_i = c_i x_i$, where $c_i = \prod_{l \in \tilde{U}, l \neq i} \frac{l}{l-i}$.

(2) Each $P_i, i \in \tilde{U}$, randomly chooses $n_i \in Z_q^*$, computes $e_i = y_b^{n_i} \bmod p$ and broadcasts e_i to all $p_j, j \in \tilde{U} \setminus \{i\}$.

(3) Each $P_i, i \in \tilde{U}$, computes $e = \prod_{j \in \tilde{U}} e_j \bmod p$, $r = H_e(m)$, $c = E_e(m)$, $s_i = t_i r + n_i - t^{-1} r \bmod q$ and broadcasts s_i to

all proxy agents. Finally, $P_i, i \in \tilde{U}$, computes $s = \sum_{j \in \tilde{U}} s_j$.

(t, n) threshold proxy unsigncryption:

Input: $p, q, g, c, r, s, K, y_a, x_b$. Output: Plaintext m .

The receiver first computes $y_G = y_a \cdot K^K \bmod p$, $e = (g^{s+r} \cdot y_G^{-r})^{x_b} \bmod p$ and then decrypts cipher text $m = D_e(c)$. Finally, the receiver checks whether the equation $r = H_e(m)$ holds.

1.2 Cryptanalysis on Chan-Wei scheme

In this section, we give a brief remark on Chan-Wei scheme.

Attack1: Chan-Wei scheme has no strong unforgeability because the principal himself also creates a valid proxy signcryption according to the step of Chan-Wei scheme.

Attack2: Chan-Wei scheme has no strong nonrepudiation. A proxy group can repudiate they are proxy agents because, on one hand, group public key $y_G = y_a \cdot K^K$ which is used to verify the validity of proxy signcryption does not contain any information of the proxy group, on the other hand, there is no private information of the proxy agent P_i in the proxy signcryption equation $s_i = t_i r + n_i - t^{-1} r \bmod q$. On the contrary, an illegal group can also claim that they are the owners of the threshold proxy signcryption.

Attack3: Chan-Wei scheme has no strong identifiability. The verifier doesn't know which proxy agents participate the proxy signcryption because there is no identity information of the proxy group in the (t, n) threshold proxy unsigncryption phase.

Remark1: The (n, n) threshold proxy signcryption scheme of Chan-Wei scheme also has similar weaknesses.

2 Nonrepudiable Threshold Proxy Signcryption Scheme

In this section, based on Chan-Wei scheme, a nonrepudiable threshold proxy signcryption scheme with known proxy agents is proposed. In the scheme, each proxy agent P_i randomly chooses $v_i \in Z_q^*, i = 1, \dots, n$ as his private key and computes $ID_i = g^{v_i} \bmod p$ as his public key which is regarded as identity information of the proxy agent P_i , other parameters are the same as those in Chan-Wei scheme. The (t, n) nonrepudiable threshold proxy signcryption scheme consists of the following three phases:

Group key and proxy key generation:

Input: Defined public parameters p, q, g , and Alice's key pair (x_a, y_a) .

Output: Proxy ID u_i , proxy signcryption key x_{u_i} , and parameter K .

(1) Generation of group secret: The principal, Alice, randomly chooses x , where $1 \leq x \leq q-1$ and computes $K = g^x \bmod p$. Then Alice computes group's private key $x_G = x_a + x \cdot K \bmod p-1$ and group's public key $y_G = g^{x_G} \bmod p$.

(2) Generation of proxy shares: The principal, Alice, randomly chooses a polynomial of degree $t-1$ over Z_q , $f(z) = x_G + a_1z + \dots + a_{t-1}z^{t-1} \bmod q$. Then Alice generates $U = \{u_i, u_j \in Z_q \ \& \ i, j \in Z_{n-1} \ \& \ u_i \neq u_j \ \& \ i \neq j\}$ which are ID of the proxy agents and generates n proxy private key $x_{u_i} = f(u_i) \bmod q, i = 1, \dots, n$. The key pair of proxy agent P_{u_i} is (x_{u_i}, y_{u_i}) , where $y_{u_i} = g^{x_{u_i}} \bmod p$. Finally, Alice sends (u_i, x_{u_i}, K) securely to proxy agent P_{u_i} and broadcasts $y_G, g^{a_1}, g^{a_2}, \dots, g^{a_{t-1}}$ to all proxy agents in the group.

(3) Verification of proxy share: Each $P_i, i \in U$, checks whether the equation $g^{x_i} = y_G \times \prod_{n=1}^{t-1} (g^{a_n})^{y_i^n} \bmod p$ holds. If $P_i, i \in U$, finds out that the equation is not justified, P_i rejects and broadcasts (i, x_i) . If $P_i, i \in U$, receives (j, x_j) , where $j \neq i$, P_i rejects (i, x_i) . If any proxy agent rejects, the protocol terminates.

(4) Verification of group public key: Each $P_i, i \in U$, checks whether the equation $y_G = y_a \cdot K^K \bmod p$ holds. If the equation is not justified, the protocol is rejected and terminated.

(t, n) threshold proxy signcryption: Let \tilde{U} be a set containing all the ID of t proxy agents participating in the proxy signcryption.

Input: Defined public parameters p, q, g , participating proxy agents' proxy share $(u_i, x_{u_i}, v_{u_i}, K)$ and receiver's public key y_b .

Output: A proxy signcrypted text (c, r, s, K) .

(1) Each $P_i, i \in \tilde{U}$, with key tuple (x_i, y_i, v_i, ID_i) computes $t_i = c_i x_i$, where $c_i = \prod_{l \in \tilde{U}, l \neq i} \frac{l}{l-i}$.

(2) Each $P_i, i \in \tilde{U}$, randomly chooses $n_i \in Z_q^*$, computes $e_i = y_b^{n_i} \bmod p$ and broadcasts e_i to the receiver and all $P_j, j \in \tilde{U} \setminus \{i\}$.

(3) Each $P_i, i \in \tilde{U}$, computes $e = \prod_{j \in \tilde{U}} e_j \bmod p, r = H_e(m), c = E_e(m), s_i = (t_i + v_i)r + n_i - t^{-1}r \bmod q$ and broadcasts s_i to the receiver and all agents. Finally, $P_i, i \in \tilde{U}$, computes $s = \sum_{j \in \tilde{U}} s_j$.

The tuple (c, r, s, K) is the proxy signcrypted text and it is sent to the receiver. When he receives (c, r, s, K) , he executes the following (t, n) threshold proxy unsigncryption algorithm to authenticate and decrypt the plaintext m .

(t, n) threshold proxy unsigncryption:

Input: $p, q, g, c, r, s, K, y_a, x_b, ID_j, j \in \tilde{U}$. Output: Plaintext m .

The receiver first computes $y_V = y_a \prod_{j \in \tilde{U}} ID_j \cdot K^K \bmod p, e = (g^{s+r} \cdot y_V^{-r})^{x_b} \bmod p$ and then recovers the plaintext $m = D_e(c)$. Finally, the receiver checks whether the equation $r = H_e(m)$ holds. If the equation holds the receiver accepts m , otherwise he rejects m .

The completeness proof of the (t, n) nonrepudiable threshold proxy signcryption scheme can be confirmed through Theorem 1.

Theorem 1. If the proxy agents conform to the steps of the proposed (t, n) nonrepudiable threshold proxy signcryption scheme, the receiver with the proxy signcrypted text (c, r, s, K) can recover the plaintext m by using the equation $m = D_e(c)$ and verify the validity of the plaintext m by using the equation $r = H_e(m)$.

Proof. According to the proxy signcrypted text (c, r, s, K) , the receiver computes

$$\begin{aligned} (g^{s+r} \cdot y_V^{-r})^{x_b} \bmod p &= \left(g^{r + \sum_{j \in \tilde{U}} s_j} \cdot \left(y_a \prod_{j \in \tilde{U}} ID_j \cdot K^K \right)^{-r} \right)^{x_b} \bmod p \\ &= \left(g^{r + \sum_{j \in \tilde{U}} ((t_j + v_j)r + n_j - t^{-1}r)} \cdot \left(y_G \cdot g^{\sum_{j \in \tilde{U}} v_j} \right)^{-r} \right)^{x_b} \bmod p \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 &= \left(g^{\sum_{j \in U} t_j r + \sum_{j \in U} v_j r + \sum_{j \in U} n_j + \sum_{j \in U} (-t^{-1} r)} \cdot \left(g^{x_G + \sum_{j \in U} v_j} \right)^{-r} \right)^{x_b} \text{ mod } p \\
 &= \left(g^{r + x_G r + \sum_{j \in U} v_j r + \sum_{j \in U} n_j - r} \cdot g^{-r \left(x_G + \sum_{j \in U} v_j \right)} \right)^{x_b} \text{ mod } p \\
 &= \left(g^{\sum_{j \in U} n_j} \right)^{x_b} \text{ mod } p \\
 &= y_b^{\sum_{j \in U} n_j} \text{ mod } p \\
 &= \prod_{j \in U} e_j \text{ mod } p \\
 &= e .
 \end{aligned}$$

Thus, the receiver with the proxy signcrypt text (c, r, s, K) can recover the plaintext m by using the equation $m = D_e(c)$ and verify the validity of the plaintext m by using the equation $r = H_e(m)$.

Compared with Chan-Wei scheme, once some proxy agents present bogus secret shadow or tamper secret shadow, the proposed scheme can exactly find out which proxy agents are dishonest. This can be confirmed through Theorem 2.

Theorem 2. In the (t, n) threshold proxy unsignryption phase, if the receiver finds the plaintext text $m = D_e(c)$ doesn't satisfy the equation $r = H_e(m)$, he can find out which proxy agents are dishonest by checking whether the equation $y_b^{s_i + t^{-1}r} = y_i^{c_i x_b r} ID_i^{x_b r} e_i \text{ mod } p$ holds.

Proof. This is due to the fact that the receiver knows the private key x_b . According to the proxy signcrypt text (c, r, s, K) and broadcasted messages e_i and s_i , if the proxy agents don't present bogus secret shadow or tampers secret shadow, the following equation must hold.

$$y_b^{s_i} = y_b^{(t_i + v_i)r + n_i - t^{-1}r} \text{ mod } p = y_b^{c_i x_b r} ID_i^{x_b r} e_i y_b^{-t^{-1}r} \text{ mod } p = y_i^{c_i x_b r} ID_i^{x_b r} e_i y_b^{-t^{-1}r} \text{ mod } p .$$

Namely, $y_b^{s_i + t^{-1}r} = y_i^{c_i x_b r} ID_i^{x_b r} e_i \text{ mod } p$, where $c_i = \prod_{l \in U, l \neq i} \frac{l}{l-i}$.

Remark 2: Similarly, a (n, n) threshold proxy signcryption scheme with known proxy agents can also be proposed.

3 Security Analysis

(1) The security of the proposed scheme is based on the discrete logarithm difficult problem and the verifiable secret sharing scheme proposed by Pedersen^[17]. It is equal to the discrete logarithm difficult problem of solving the x_a, x_b, x_i, v_i from $y_a = g^{x_a} \text{ mod } p, y_b = g^{x_b} \text{ mod } p, y_i = g^{x_i} \text{ mod } p$ and $ID_i = g^{v_i} \text{ mod } p$.

(2) Strong unforgeability: Because $s_i = (t_i + v_i)r + n_i - t^{-1}r \text{ mod } q$ contains private key information v_i of the proxy agent P_i in the threshold proxy signcryption phase, without private key information v_i of the proxy agent P_i , the principal cannot generate a valid threshold proxy signcryption scheme by himself.

(3) Strong identifiability: Because $y_r = y_a \prod_{j \in \tilde{U}} ID_j \cdot K^K \text{ mod } p$ contains identity information $ID_j, j \in \tilde{U}$, of the proxy agents participating proxy signcryption in the proxy unsignryption phase, any verifier can determine which proxy agents participate in the threshold proxy signcryption.

(4) Strong nonrepudiation: In the scheme, proxy agents don't repudiate their participation in threshold proxy signcryption while illegal groups don't claim that they are proxy agents, because $s_i = (t_i + v_i)r + n_i - t^{-1}r \text{ mod } q$ contains private key information v_i of the proxy agent P_i in the threshold proxy signcryption phase, at the same time,

$y_V = y_a \prod_{j \in \tilde{U}} ID_j \cdot K^K \bmod p$ contains identity information $ID_j, j \in \tilde{U}$, of proxy agents P_j participating in proxy signcryption in the proxy unsigncryption phase.

(5) Obviously, the proposed scheme satisfies the properties of verifiability and the prevention of misuse.

4 Conclusions

In this paper, we show Chan-Wei scheme doesn't satisfy strong unforgeability, strong nonrepudiation and strong identifiability. Based on Chan-Wei scheme, a nonrepudiable threshold proxy signcryption scheme with known proxy agents is proposed. The proposed scheme overcomes the weaknesses of Chan-Wei scheme. Completeness proof and security analysis of the proposed scheme are presented. In addition, compared with Chan-Wei scheme, the proposed scheme exactly finds out which proxy agents present bogus secret shadow or tamper secret shadow.

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