

Prajñākaragupta on *parāthānumāna*

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The concept “*parāthānumāna*” is an invention of Dignāga. It is, however, not clear why Dignāga had to divide inference into two categories, i.e., the *svārthānumāna* and the *parāthānumāna*, because the latter is essentially a verbal expression that Buddhist logicians can never recognize as valid cognition. We could assume that with this concept Dignāga tried to distinguish logical and dialectical problems, and above all intended to provide a proper section for explaining his most favourite invention, “*hetucakra*”. Praśastapāda as well as Jaina’s logicians accepted the concept, while Kumārila criticized this.

In the Buddhist logical school, Dharmakīrti and his followers accepted the categorization of inference. Tibetan Buddhist scholars also held it. Nevertheless, the tendency not to make much of the concept “*parāthānumāna*” seems to have appeared even in Dharmakīrti’s thought. He actually neglected the theory of the *hetucakra*, so that in his system the *parāthānumāna* only means a section which deals with the thesis and fallacious reasons. In short, the necessity of maintaining the concept “*parāthānumāna*” became unclear in Dharmakīrti’s system.

It is probably Prajñākaragupta who first theoretically reconsidered the concept “*parāthānumāna*”. In his commentary on the *parāthānumāna* section of the *Pramāṇavārttika*, he reflected on the concept. He tried to show that the *parāthānumāna* is essentially not different from the *svārthānumāna* and the concept is at least not contradictory to Dharmakīrti’s system. The purpose of this paper is to elucidate Prajñākaragupta’s reconsideration and point out its importance by interpreting his text and Yamāri’s commentary, which is extant only in Tibetan translation.