Cryptanalysis of Multiple-Server Password-Authenticated Key Agreement Schemes Using Smart Cards

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Abstract

Password-based user-authentication schemes have been widely used when users access a server to avail internet services. Multiserver password-authentication schemes enable remote users to obtain service from multiple servers without separately registering with each server. In 2008, Jia-Lun Tsai proposed an improved and efficient password-authenticated key agreement scheme for a multiserver architecture based on Chang-Lee's scheme proposed in 2004. However, we found that Tsai's scheme does not provide forward secrecy and is weak to insider impersonation and denial of service attacks. In this article, we describe the drawbacks of Tsai's scheme and provide a countermeasure to satisfy the forward secrecy property.

1. Introduction

Password authentication is one of the simplest and most convenient authentication mechanisms followed over public networks. Conventional password-authentication schemes are suitable for solving the privacy and security problems of a single user operating under a client-server architecture. As the network becomes larger, the password-authentication schemes that only support a single server are clearly not sufficient to address the users' growing needs. Therefore, many dynamic password-authentication schemes have been proposed for the multiserver architecture [1 ～ 5]. In the multiserver architecture, there are two types of servers-the service server and the control server. The service server is a public server that allows all legitimate users to access the network, whereas the control server is a private back end server, which is not disclosed. Multiserver password-authentication schemes enable remote users with a single password to access multiple servers without separately registering with each server. In addition, most of them provide an added functionality to derive a session key (SK), such as an encryption key or a message authentication code (MAC) key, for each session, particularly for subsequent secure communication use, to protect the messages transmitted during each session. These schemes are therefore referred to as password-authenticated key agreement protocols.

In 2004, Juang proposed a password-authenticated key agreement scheme for a multiserver architecture using symmetric encryption methods without the need for a verification table [3]. However, Juang's scheme lacks efficiency, and each server needs to additionally protect and securely maintain an encrypted key table. In the same year, Chang and Lee proposed a similar but more efficient and secure scheme using symmetric encryption [1]. Their scheme is claimed to be able to achieve the following six vital requirements of the multiserver password-authentication scheme: choose and change password at will; less computation; security; mutual authentication; single registration; SK agreement. However Chang-Lee's scheme

assumes that the registration centre(RC) and all the service servers are trustworthy and that the RC sends each server a shared secret key through a secure channel. This assumption is not practical because the service server is a public domain and thus is the major target of the adversary. Moreover, sharing of the secret key between the RC and the service server facilitates impersonation of each other. In 2007, Tsai proposed a password-authenticated key agreement scheme for a multiserver architecture using hash functions without the need for a verification table [6]. Tsai's scheme assumes that only the RC is trustworthy. This assumption is more practical because the service server is open to all legitimate users, but the control server is maintained private in the back end. However, we find that Tsai's scheme does not provide for forward secrecy under its assumption, and some potential threats to the scheme have been negligently unexplored in the corresponding security analysis. In this study, we will analyze these issues in detail.

The structure of this article is organized as follows. In the next section, we will recapitulate Tsai's multiserver password-authenticated key agreement scheme using smart cards. In section 3, we will discuss a few cryptographic flaws of Tsai's schemes and provide a countermeasure to satisfy the forward secrecy property. In the last section, we will conclude this article.

2. Review of Tsai's Scheme

The main notations used throughout this article are listed as follows.

Table 1. Symbol Definition

Symbol	Definition
RC	Registration centre
U_i	User U_i
S_j	Service server S_j
ID_{U_i}, ID_{S_j}	Identity of user U_i and service server S_j respectively
PW_{U_i}	Password for user U_i
N_{U_i}, N_{S_j}, N_{RC}	Nonce generated by User U_i, service server S_j, and registration centre respectively
$N_{S_j U_i}$	Nonce generated by S_j for mutual authentication to U_i
x	Secret key of RC for users authentication
y	Secret key of RC for servers authentication
$h(\cdot)$	One-way hash function
$\oplus$	XOR operation
$\parallel$	Concatenation
$\Rightarrow$	Secure channel transfer
$\rightarrow$	Common channel transfer

This subsection reviews Tsai's multiserver password-authenticated key agreement scheme [2]. Tsai's scheme consists of 4 phases: *registration* phase, *login* phase, *authentication-server and RC* phase, and *authentication-server and user* phase. The details of these phases can be described as follows.

2.1 Registration phase

Step R1. $U_i \Rightarrow RC : \{ID_{U_i}, PW_{U_i}\}$

Initially, a user U_i, with identity ID_{U_i}, chooses a password PW_{U_i} and submits ID_{U_i}, PW_{U_i} to the RC through a secure channel.

Step R2. $RC \Rightarrow U_i$: Smart cards with information $\{h(\cdot), C_0\}$.

On reception of the same, RC computes

$$R_{U_i} = h(ID_{U_i} \| x) \; ; \tag{1}$$

and

$$C_0 = R_{U_i} \oplus h(PW_{U_i}). \tag{2}$$

Then, the RC successfully issues a smart cards containing information $\{h(\cdot), C_0\}$ to U_i through a secure channel.

2.2 Login phase

Step L1. U_i inserts the smart card into a card reader and enters his/her identity ID_{U_i} and password PW_{U_i} to request access to the server S_j.

Step L2. $U_i \rightarrow S_j : ID_{U_i}, C_1$

The smart card extracts information $h(ID_{U_i} \| x)$ from the smart card by computing $h(ID_{U_i} \| x) = C_0 \oplus h(PW_{U_i})$. The reader generates a random nonce N_{U_i} and computes

$$C_1 = h(ID_{U_i} \| x) \oplus N_{U_i}. \tag{3}$$

The reader sends ID_{U_i} and C_1 to the server S_j.

2.3 Authentication-server and RC phase

Step SR1. $S_j \rightarrow RC : ID_{U_i}, ID_{S_j}, C_1, C_2$

S_j generates a random nonce N_{S_j}, and computes

$$C_2 = h(ID_{S_j} \| y) \oplus N_{S_j}. \tag{4}$$

Then S_j sends ID_{U_i}, ID_{S_j}, C_1, and C_2 to the RC.

Step SR2. $RC \rightarrow S_j : C_3$

The RC computes $N'_{S_j} = C_2 \oplus h(ID_{S_j} \| y)$ and generates a random nonce N_{RC} to computes

$$C_3 = h(ID_{S_j} \| y) \oplus N_{RC} \; ; \tag{5}$$

C_3 is then sent to S_j.

Step SR3. $S_j \rightarrow RC : C_4$

S_j retrieves N'_{RC} by computing $C_3 \oplus h(ID_{S_j} \| y)$ and further computes

$$C_4 = h(h(ID_{S_j} \| y) \| N_{S_j}) \oplus N'_{RC}. \tag{6}$$

It sends C_4 to the RC.

Step SR4. $C'_4 \overset{?}{=} C_4$

The server S_j computes $C_4' = h(h(ID_{S_j} \| y) \| N_{S_j}') \oplus N_{RC}$ and checks whether

$$C_4' \stackrel{?}{=} C_4. \tag{7}$$

If Eq. (7) does not hold, S_j is legal, and the following steps are processed. If they are not equal, S_j is not legal, and RC terminates the session.

Step SR5. $RC \rightarrow S_j : C_5, C_6$

RC retrieves information $N_{U_i}' = h(ID_{U_i} \| x) \oplus C_1$ and next computes C_5 and C_6 as follows:

$$C_5 = h(h(ID_{S_j} \| y) \| N_{S_j}' \| N_{RC}) \text{, and} \tag{8}$$

$$C_6 = h(h(ID_{S_j} \| y) \| N_{S_j}' + 1 \| N_{RC} + 2) \oplus h(h(ID_{U_i} \| x) \| N_{U_i}'). \tag{9}$$

It sends C_5 and C_6 to S_j.

Step SR6. $C_5' \stackrel{?}{=} C_5$

S_j computes $C_5' = h(h(ID_{S_j} \| y) \| N_{S_j} \| N_{RC}')$ and verifies whether

$$C_5' \stackrel{?}{=} C_5. \tag{10}$$

If Eq. (10) does not hold, S_j terminates the session. If yes, S_j proceeds to the next phase.

2.4 Authentication-server and user phase

Step SU1. $S_j \rightarrow U_i : V_2, C_9$

After successfully verifying the identity of the RC, S_j must obtain the user -authentication key. S_j computes C_7 as follows;

$$C_7 = C_6 \oplus h(h(ID_{S_j} \| y) \| N_{S_j} + 1 \| N_{RC}' + 2)$$
$$= h(h(ID_{U_i} \| x) \| N_{U_i}'); \tag{11}$$

and generates a random nonce $N_{S_j U_i}$. It also computes C_8, C_9 and V_2 as shown below;

$$C_8 = C_7 \oplus C_1 = C_7 \oplus h(ID_{u_i} \| x) \oplus N_{U_i}, \tag{12}$$

$$V_2 = C_7 \oplus N_{S_j U_i}, \tag{13}$$

and

$$C_9 = h(C_7 \| N_{S_j U_i}) \oplus C_8. \tag{14}$$

It sends V_2 and C_9 to U_i

Step SU2. $C_9' \stackrel{?}{=} C_9$

U_i computes $C_7' = h(h(ID_{U_i} \| x) \| N_{U_i})$, $N_{S_j U_i}' = C_7' \oplus V_2$, and $C_8' = C_7' \oplus C_1$ $= C_7' \oplus h(ID_{U_i} \| x) \oplus N_{U_i}$.

It also computes

$$C_9' = h(C_7' \| N_{S_j U_i}) \oplus C_8' \tag{15}$$

and verifies whether

$$C_9' \stackrel{?}{=} C_9. \tag{16}$$

If the result is negative, U_i terminates the session. If positive, U_i proceeds to the next step.

Step SU3. $U_i \rightarrow S_j : C_{10}$

U_i computes

$$C_{10} = h(C_7' \parallel C_8' \parallel N_{S_j U_i}') \tag{17}$$

and sends it to S_j.

Step SU4. $C_{10}' \overset{?}{=} C_{10}$

S_j computes

$$C_{10}' = h(C_7 \parallel C_8 \parallel N_{S_j U_i}) \tag{18}$$

and verifies whether

$$C_{10}' \overset{?}{=} C_{10}. \tag{19}$$

If it does not hold, S_j aborts. If it holds, S_j computes the SK

$$SK = h(C_7 + 1 \parallel C_8 + 2 \parallel N_{S_j U_i} + 3). \tag{20}$$

U_i also can computes the SK

$$SK = h(C_7' + 1 \parallel C_8' + 2 \parallel N_{S_j U_i}' + 3). \tag{21}$$

The SK is applied for the encryption of all ensuing communications between S_j and U_i.

3. Weaknesses

3.1 Weakness to Forward Secrecy.

Provision of the forward-secrecy property by a password-based authenticated key agreement protocol is of the utmost importance for avoiding past SKs from being recovered by the compromise of any participating entity's long-term secret key. Tsai's scheme assumes that only the RC is trustworthy. The service server, which is open to all legitimate users, can be penetrated through various means, such as hackers, viruses, worms, misconfigurations, and disgruntled system administrators. Therefore, assuming that the adversary can obtain the service server's long-term authentication key, $h(ID_{S_j} \parallel y)$, is entirely reasonable.

Let us assume that an adversary has acquired a set of transaction messages of the previous session and the service server's long-term authentication key $h(ID_{S_j} \parallel y)$. The adversary can compute N_{S_j}, N_{RC}, C_7, and $N_{S_j U_i}$ using Eqs. (4), (5), (9) and (13), respectively, and C_8 using Eqs. (3) and (11). Now, the adversary can compute the SK of the previous session with the knowledge obtained from the derived information $\{ C_7, C_8, N_{S_j U_i} \}$.

Countermeasure. From our experience, we can say that forward secrecy in a key agreement protocol cannot be achieved using only the hash function and symmetric encryption schemes. We need to use public-key techniques (e.g., exponentiations in a multiplicative group).

An efficient approach to the preservation of the forward-secrecy property is to slightly modify the protocol specification. Instead of choosing N_{U_i}, N_{S_j}, and N_{RC} as random nonces, we redefine them as the user's, the server's, and the RC's ephemeral public key, computed respectively as follows:

$$N_{U_i} = g^{r_{U_i}} \text{, for } r_{U_i} \in {}_R Z_q^* ; \tag{22}$$

$$N_{S_j} = g^{r_{S_j}} \text{, for } r_{S_j} \in {}_R Z_q^* ; \tag{23}$$

and

$$N_{RC} = g^{r_{RC}} \text{, for } r_{RC} \in {}_R Z_q^* . \tag{24}$$

Moreover, we include additional components $N_{RC}^{r_{S_j}} = g^{r_{RC}r_{S_j}}$, $N_{RC}^{r_{U_i}} = g^{r_{RC}r_{U_i}}$, and $(N_{RC}^{r_{U_i}})^{r_{S_j}} = (N_{RC}^{r_{S_j}})^{r_{U_i}} = (N_{RC}^{r_{S_j}})^{r_{U_i}} = g^{r_{RC}r_{U_i}r_{S_j}}$ in the SK derivation function such that

$$U_i : SK_{U_iS_j} = h((N_{RC}^{r_{S_j}})^{r_{U_i}} \| N_{RC}^{r_{S_j}} \| N_{RC}^{r_{U_i}} \| ID_{U_i} \| ID_{S_j} \| N_{S_jU_i}) ; \text{ and} \tag{25}$$

$$S_j : SK_{S_jU_i} = h((N_{RC}^{r_{U_i}})^{r_{S_j}} \| N_{RC}^{r_{S_j}} \| N_{RC}^{r_{U_i}} \| ID_{U_i} \| ID_{S_j} \| N_{S_jU_i}) . \tag{26}$$

With these modifications, if an adversary happens to learn $h(S_j \| y)$ after completion of a key-establishment session, he/she will only be able to derive $N_{RC}^{r_{S_j}}$ and $N_{RC}^{r_{U_i}}$ but not the shared secret $g^{r_{U_i}r_{S_j}r_{RC}}$ (bound by the intractability of the Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem) because he/she does not possess the knowledge of any private ephemeral key r_{U_i}, r_{S_j}, or r_{RC}. Intuitively, the secrecy of the SK and the security of the scheme can be significantly preserved.

3.2 Insider impersonation attack

Tsai's scheme does not check the freshness of the nonce. Exploiting this fault, an adversary can impersonate as a legal user. Let us assume that an adversary has acquired a service server's long-term authentication key $h(ID_{S_j} \| y)$. As the first step of the attack, the adversary replays the login message $\{ ID_{U_i}, C_1 \}$ of U_i from the previous session to login. Because the adversary has the service server's long-term authentication key, he/she can pass the authentication-server and RC phase and generate a legal response C_{10} in the authentication-server and user phase. Finally, the adversary agrees to a new SK represented as follows: $SK = h(C_7 + 1 \| C_8 + 2 \| N_{S_jU_i} + 3)$. Hence, we can easily deduce that Tsai's scheme cannot withstand Insider impersonation attack also.

3.3 Denial of service attack

In the specification for Tsai's protocol, the server and RC do not check whether the login request is legal until the session reaches the Step SU3 of the authentication-server and user phase. The adversary can launch denial of service (DoS) attacks by just sending login messages $\{ ID_{U_i}, C_{1A} \}$, where C_{1A} is an arbitrary nonce chosen by the adversary. The adversary can deprive both the service server and the RC of computing power without incurring any cost except that of sending a message.

4. Conclusion

We have recapitulated the security features of Tsai's password-authenticated key agreement scheme. Particularly, we have pointed out the absence of the forward secrecy property and provided a countermeasure to satisfy the forward-secrecy property. In addition, we have further highlighted the threats possible due to KCI and DoS attacks. We hope that our discussion will provide adequate awareness to protocol designers for contemplating

appropriate security considerations while designing future password-authenticated key agreement schemes to preclude the above-discussed vulnerabilities.

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