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Intergroup Name-Calling and Conditions for Creating Assertive Bystanders

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Racial and ethnic name-calling and other forms of verbal abuse (e.g., hurtful teasing, humiliating and controlling words) are common forms of discrimination among children, as well as adolescents and adults (Corenblum & Stephan, 2001; McNeilly et al., 1996; Schofield, 1982). Regardless of whether the epithet reflects underlying prejudice on the part of the name caller, it serves to subdue and publicly humiliate the victim. Furthermore, it provides a model for peer onlookers and, if not addressed, sets a norm for discriminatory behavior. Nasty name-calling, in particular (hereafter referred to as simply name-calling), which has gained recent prominence as the most common form of schoolyard bullying, was experienced by 75% of victims in one British study (Smith & Shu, 2000). Racial name-calling was explicit in 14% of the cases reported in this study as in others (e.g., Pepler, personal communication), but the personal and intergroup damage arises when any demeaning name and words are directed to a socially different person.

Bullying in general and name-calling in particular underscore status differences because they are usually directed by someone with (or who

is seeking) higher social status toward someone with lower status (Olweus, 1994). Consequently, they concretely reaffirm existing hierarchies among different social categories. Among children, the prominent categories are usually ethnicity (including race, religion, and language), gender, body appearance, socioeconomic status, and competence (see Powlishta, Serbin, Doyle, & White, 1994), with sexual preference gaining significance in the adolescent years (see Horn, this volume). Because intergroup name-calling is used to put down someone perceived as different, it is a form of discrimination. Names such as "fatso," "sissy," "stupid," "white trash," and "pervert" clearly identify the differentness. As Schofield (1982) remarked, racial and ethnic name-calling are perceived as such if the antagonists are from different groups regardless of the specific slur. Name-calling was the most commonly described concrete example of discrimination witnessed or experienced by children in the Netherlands between 10 and 13 years of age (Verkuyten, 2002; Verkuyten, Kinket, & van der Wielen, 1997). By 10 years of age, children understand that stereotypes and prejudice underlie discrimination, whether or not it is made explicit in the words

(Brown & Bigler, 2005). Boys and girls from different ethnic groups have similar perceptions, though age-related social-cognitive abilities such as understanding race, perspective taking, and moral judgments of equality versus equity may determine whether an incident is perceived as discrimination (Brown & Bigler, 2005).

Efforts are being made worldwide to reduce bullying and derogatory name-calling, as the prime example, in elementary schools, where it is most prevalent. Evaluations of programs in countries such as Australia, Belgium, Britain, Canada, Norway, and the United States (see, e.g., Pepler, Craig, O'Connell, Atlas, & Charach, 2004; Stevens, van Oost, & de Bourdeaudhuij, 2004) show inconsistent declines in the number of children who report bullying and being bullied. Most of the programs include antibullying rules, as well as discussions with teachers, bullies, victims, and classrooms of students. Some now acknowledge that not enough attention has been paid to the role of bystanding students in speaking out against bullying when it occurs (e.g., Stevens et al., 2004). In her antibias program, Derman-Sparks was one of the first to appeal to students to speak out against bias within their spheres of influence (Derman-Sparks & Phillips, 1997). While raising self-efficacy and empathy is relatively easy (Slaby, 1999), persuading bystanders to speak out is much more difficult (Pepler et al., 2004). Social and developmental theories and research are needed to help us understand the puzzling perspective of bystanders and to inform us as to how we can mobilize them to respond to name-calling.

Our chapter presents a program of research aimed at understanding how elementary school children, as potential bystanders, react to name-calling episodes. Although our interest is in name-calling, the literature on bullying is relevant as name-calling is the most common form (other less common forms of bullying are physical harm, exclusion, and rumors). We first outline some developmental evidence about bullies and victims in order to set the stage for our focus on bystanders. Because name-calling episodes generally occur in unsupervised school settings and victims are usually too emotionally distressed to retaliate, it is left up to peer bystanders to intervene. Most would like to intervene; at least 80% of peers find bullying and name-calling unpleasant to witness, and they admire those who intervene. However, a gap exists between their attitudes toward name-calling and their behavior. Most watch and do not intervene to stop it (Hawkins, Pepler, & Craig, 2001). We therefore examine social psychological explanations

for bystander apathy in light of developmental evidence. Briefly, the evidence suggests that, rather than simple apathy, children's reactions appear to be better characterized as an approach-avoidance conflict, in which high intentions and inhibitions leave bystanders in limbo. Consequently, our research paradigm now uses various socialization mechanisms such as modeling, role-playing, and induction to overcome the inhibitions to act. The results we present here identify the specific assertive interventions that are most acceptable to bystanders and most effective with the antagonists.

Developmental Research on Bullies, Victims, and Bystanders

Due to its detrimental impact on the physical, psychological, and social health of developing children, bullying has been the subject of an international study sponsored by the World Health Organization (Nansel, Craig, Overpeck, Saluja, & Ruan, 2004). Bullying was measured according to the definition first proposed by Olweus (1994): It is aggressive behavior or intentional harm-doing that is carried out repeatedly over time in an interpersonal relationship characterized by an imbalance in power. The bullying behavior may be physical or verbal, but with increasing age it is most likely to be verbal. Rarely do such studies ask specifically about racial or ethnic name-calling because it is not clear whether students would identify this by the name called or the antagonists involved. Children from 11 to 16 years of age were asked how frequently they had bullied others and how frequently they had been bullied themselves during the current school term (a cutoff of two or more incidents was used to identify bullies and victims). Although much of the early research was conducted in Scandinavia and the United Kingdom, both have low prevalence rates. The United States and Canada have higher and equal rates of approximately 12% bullies and 12% victims. Similar rates are reported by Craig and Pepler (2003), Olweus (1994), and Smith and Shu (2000) for children starting at 6 years of age. The highest are found in Lithuania, Greenland, Germany, Denmark, Austria, and Latvia.

Bullies tend to use less physical and more verbal forms of abuse after the preschool years. For this reason, name-calling predominates in elementary school. Rates of bullying may be higher in boys, especially as they are more engaged in establishing their status in the social hierarchy. However, evidence shows that girls may avoid reporting

bullying that has to do with social exclusion. Thus rates may be somewhat equivalent. Research also shows that bullies do not have low social status despite others' disapproval of bullying. In fact, they often have good relationships with classmates and may be perceived as popular because of their displays of social control and power (Cillessen & Mayeux, 2004; Craig & Pepler, 2003; Nansel et al., 2004). However, in adolescence they are more likely to use alcohol and have a police record for misconduct. Their bullying behavior has often been characterized as motivated by the desire to exert social control and dominate others for that end alone. Preventing or stopping the control and domination that comes from name-calling and verbal abuse is required if we are to resolve the problem.

Victims of bullying and name-calling are often targeted because they are different in some way and do not retaliate. As mentioned previously, all of the features that lead to stereotyping and prejudice are cues for bullying: ethnicity (religion, race, language), gender, appearance, SES, and competence. Girls tend to be victims of girls and boys of boys, although bullying occurs in large mixed-gender groups as well (O'Connell, Pepler, & Craig, 1999). Likewise, most bullying occurs within an ethnic or a racial group, although cross-ethnic name-calling obviously increases in a diverse student population (e.g., Schofield, 1982; Verkuyten, 2002). Because victims are selected on the basis of their perceived difference and inability to retaliate, their peers often fail to support them. Perhaps they also become isolated because of their reputation as a victim and because they are seen as passive and emotional in the face of name-calling. Victims tend to experience numerous health problems, emotional problems such as low self-esteem, and school problems (Nansel et al., 2004). Victimization is seen as a cause of early school dropout if it persists to high school. Coping strategies that develop with age are presumably responsible for declining numbers of victims (Smith & Shu, 2000); however, bullies also become more verbally articulate and perceptive about the weaknesses of potential victims. Social reputation and belonging also become more important in adolescence, as does sexuality and appeal to the opposite sex. Consequently, some researchers feel that bullying may persist but simply take different forms across childhood and adolescence (Pellegrini & Long, 2002).

Bystanders are usually present during a bullying episode, according to observational studies of outdoor playtime in three multiethnic Toronto elementary schools (Hawkins et al., 2001;

O'Connell et al., 1999). The 120 hours of video and audiotaping focused on 120 children nominated by their classmates as bullies and victims, who were then tracked through wireless transmitters given to all of the children. For the bystander analyses, the behavior of peers present during 88% of the episodes was coded. The bystanders may be bully tagalongs, but are often acquaintances or friends of the victim, or others who are playing or hanging around with the antagonists. As mentioned previously, attitudes toward bullying are generally negative, with 80% saying that they found it unpleasant to watch a bullying incident, 43% saying they would try to help the victim, 33% saying they felt they should help but did not, and 24% saying it was none of their business (cited in Hawkins et al., 2001). Consequently, it is surprising that bystanders intervened in fewer than 20% of the observed episodes (Hawkins et al., 2001) and 25% when two or more peers were present (O'Connell et al., 1999). In contrast, more than half watched the episode with interest, thus passively reinforcing the bully, and the remainder actively joined the bullying (O'Connell et al., 1999). Similar proportions were derived from a methodology in which Finnish students nominated classmates for various bullying roles such as intervenor, reinforcer, and outsider (Salmivalli, Lappalainen, & Lagerspetz, 1998). The puzzle, then, is why intentions to intervene and negative attitudes toward bullying do not translate into action.

Interestingly, the observations at the Toronto elementary schools revealed that, when bystanders intervened, they were often effective; indeed, 57% of the interventions stopped the bullying within 10 seconds. Two-thirds of the observed interventions were directed toward the bully, and one-fifth to both bully and victim (Hawkins et al., 2001; O'Connell et al., 1999). Only 15% were directed to the victim alone, and these tended to elicit more aversive consequences. These findings are encouraging in that they demonstrate that students' efforts to intervene in name-calling episodes are a quick and effective way to put a stop to bullying.

A Social-Psychological Analysis of Bully Bystanders

Our analysis seeks explanations for the fact that more than half of children watch while a bully verbally abuses another child of similar or slightly younger age; it also discusses the conditions under which they could be persuaded

to intervene. Due to the limited research on children, adult research and theory provide a starting point for our analysis of the key variables that affect the behavior of child bystanders. Darley's decision-tree explanation of adult bystanders' apathy in the face of emergencies focused on the diffusion of responsibility among bystanders and their perception of the episode as not serious (e.g., Darley, Teger, & Lewis, 1973). Although undergraduate participants in their research were less likely to respond to an emergency in the presence of others, those who observed even a small startle response on the part of their cobystander responded at levels (80%) comparable to those of lone bystanders. Darley's research generally used physical harm as the eliciting stimulus.

Few studies examined interventions to relieve psychological harm. One unique study of adults' naturally occurring witness of child abuse found that, similar to the bullying studies, only 26% intervened (Christy & Voigt, 1994). This was unrelated to the number of other witnesses but strongly related to knowledge of the perpetrator and speaking previously with the person about the abuse. Compared to those who did not intervene, those who did had witnessed abuse before, acknowledged the psychological/physical harm, and felt confident about how they should intervene.

Consistent with the witnesses of child abuse, school children may not be negatively influenced by the presence of others. Unlike the situation that Darley and colleagues studied, in which strangers together witnessed physical harm, most bullying takes place at school, where children are with friends or acquaintances, not strangers. In fact, the presence of friends appears to bolster the confidence of bystanders to contradict a name-caller without reducing their perception of responsibility (O'Connell et al., 1999). In other research, we have also found that the presence of friends strengthens mature, prosocial talk among children rather than conformity to a norm of prejudice (e.g., Aboud & Doyle, 1996).

After considering the Darley et al. and Christy and Voigt studies, we wondered whether bystanders would recognize the psychological harm caused by nasty names or consider the names harmless and not worthy of emergency intervention. According to Helwig's research (e.g., Helwig, Hildebrandt, & Turiel, 1995; Helwig, Zelazo, & Wilson, 2001), children as young as 6 years of age use information about hostile intentions and aversive consequences to evaluate negatively a peer's name-calling.

Almost all of the children from 6 to 11 years said name-calling was not acceptable; however, 6-year-olds were more likely than older children to feel that, in a game context, name-calling was alright even if someone's feelings were hurt. By 9 years of age, psychological consequences overruled any contextual considerations. Given that most children—almost 80% in Crozier and Dimmock's study (1999)—have experienced name-calling, teasing, or ridicule at least once and found it hurtful, their understanding of verbal abuse is personal and emotionally salient. Repeatedly in our studies, students rate names such as "stupid," "fatso," and "asshole" as hurtful on a 0 to 9 scale, though surprisingly "fatso" received the lowest score of 4. There seems to be no question, therefore, that bystanders resonate to the psychological hurt suffered when one is called a nasty name and distinguish it from harmless teasing between friends.

In summary, it appears that neither the presence of acquaintances nor the dismissal of the name-calling as harmless is a useful explanation of child bystanders' inaction in the face of bullying. Attitudes toward both bullying and intervening are also unrelated to action. Consequently, it was important to collect firsthand reports of bullying episodes from children to analyze what transpired from the perspective of bystanders. This and subsequent studies were conducted at a lower-middle- to middle-class elementary school in Montreal with a mixed ethnic population of approximately 35% white, 35% Caribbean black, 20% South Asian, and 10% East Asian. Our respondents were from the third and sixth grades.

Bystanders' Accounts of Name-Calling and Interventions

To understand students' perceptions of bullying episodes and how bystanders react, we asked them to recount recently witnessed episodes. Qualitative methodology of this nature is useful for outlining events from a new perspective, in this case bystanders, in order to develop a more structured method and hypotheses. Fifty students, 19 third- and 31 sixth-graders were interviewed, two students every few days to ensure that different episodes would be described. First we gave them instructions about the kinds of psychological harm we wanted them to notice, namely name-calling, rumor spreading, and social exclusion. On the following two days, each student was

interviewed privately with a semistructured set of questions if they had an incident to describe: what happened, what was said, who was present, and how the respondent and others reacted. To encourage truthful accounts devoid of the motivation to tell on someone, we did not record personal information, including names or ethnic backgrounds. More than 75% of the third- and sixth-graders had at least one serious incident to report as a bystander, mostly name-calling, sometimes accompanied by physical contact or exclusion. Usually the name-calling was unprovoked between people who knew each other but were not friends. Frequent names were "stupid," "fatso," "midget," "F-word," "bastard," "bitch," "asshole," "big ass," "big nose," "ugly," "pig in a pink dress," "faggot," "slut," "whore," and combinations such as "You stupid midget, why'd you touch the ball?" and "Fuck you, you stupid slut." The provocation seemed to be simply that the person was overweight, short, or younger or had made a mistake while playing a game.

Sometimes the victim tried to retaliate by saying something directly to the name caller (33% third grade, 18% sixth grade). Third-grade victims often retaliated with mean words and then the situation turned into a shouting match with shoving, pushing, and chasing; sixth-grade victims often retaliated with reasonable words such as "You think I'm that way, but I'm not." Twelve percent of victims (more in third grade) sought out an adult. Rarely did the victim ignore the bully or walk away, only to be pursued with more taunts. Otherwise 40% of victims were reported as passive or hurt. Actual victim reports from other studies indicate higher levels of hurt, so it would seem that bystanders minimize their reports of victim hurt.

Most bystanders were not helpful. Sometimes up to ten bystanders were present: In 44% of the incidents some or all of the bystanders watched or left (63% third grade, 30% sixth grade); in 25% they encouraged the bullying by laughing or provoking (12% third grade, 33% sixth grade). These proportions are consistent with observational studies (e.g., Hawkins et al., 2001; O'Connell et al., 1999). Common reports given by informants included the following: Other people were watching; I watched; it was funny; some yelled "fight," some were laughing, no one said anything to the person who was mean; I walked away so I wouldn't get into trouble for watching; I didn't talk to [the bully] about it because I knew we'd have a big fight and I didn't want that; every day on the bus she calls the girl names, but no one tells her to stop.

In 63% of the incidents a peer and/or adult intervened. In 44% of the incidents a peer bystander directly intervened (38% third grade, 48% sixth grade), but our respondents themselves intervened only 30% of the time (21% third grade, 36% sixth grade). The figure of 30% is consistent with previous observational studies (e.g., Hawkins et al., 2001), but the figures of 44% and 63% are atypical and may reflect a reporting bias. In other words, students may have selected to report incidents in which a peer intervened. In a sense, this suited our purposes as we were interested in learning how peer bystanders reacted and intervened. In 47% an adult intervened (54% third grade, 42% sixth grade) at the request of the victim or a bystander. Teachers were more likely to get involved if the verbal abuse turned physical. When our respondents themselves intervened, alone or with others, they felt good about having done so but were not confident that they could stop the name-calling.

The main developmental finding was that among third-graders bystanders were less likely to intervene, victims were more likely to respond aggressively, and an adult was more likely involved, as noted in the following student reports of verbal abuse:

> I told the monitor who came and made them apologize.
>
> I told the teacher, and all the [bully] boys ran away.
>
> A boy walking by overheard and said, "Stop, or I'll tell a teacher."
>
> I asked the boy [victim] if he wanted to play with us, and he did.
>
> Why are you saying that? Please say sorry.

Sixth-graders summoned an adult monitor only when the fight became physical, presumably because at this age children want to take responsibility for resolving peer conflicts. They commonly directed their comments to the name caller rather than the victim, but they were nonconfrontational. Sixth-graders seemed to have some insight into bullies and were more confident and articulate in their interventions. This age-related difference, alluded to by others (e.g., Stevens et al., 2004), is apparent in the following quotes:

> I asked, "Why do you make fun of her? She doesn't do anything to you." He said, "I don't like her." I said, "Well, if you don't like her,

don't hang around with her. You don't have to make fun of her." He just walked away.

I said, "We don't want to play with your ball; you don't treat people equally." Then the mean boy came and apologized and let everyone play with his ball.

They told me to buzz off. I came back with a group of friends, and they left. We scared them off. Other people saw her being called names and didn't care. They just walked away. They [bullies] came back later, and I tried to stop it by myself, but they wouldn't listen. I said, "Quit it." They said, "Make me."

Sally said, "If you want to stop fighting, follow me," so I followed, and everyone else did, and it stopped.

In most cases, the term "apathy" is a misnomer. Children were anything but apathetic. The self-descriptions reveal a mixture of aroused excitement and sadness, especially among the older children, who were more likely to either encourage or try to stop the harm. Some students identified with the victim's sadness and humiliation. Others felt angry and disappointed that no one would listen to their attempts to stop: "They didn't listen, ignored me, gave me a dirty look. At the end, they left, saying 'This is boring. Let's go bother someone else.' " Still, we can conclude that most students witness name-calling with psychological harm on a regular basis and have strong feelings about their own and others' responses.

In order to identify the reasons bystanders would or would not intervene and what they would do if they did intervene, we asked another sample of sixth-graders from the same school to discuss these two points with a friend. Again the methodology was qualitative, but taped vignettes were used to elicit reactions from the students. The stimulus material was an audiotaped name-calling scenario based on bystanders' accounts but performed by other same-aged students. Similar scenarios were used in subsequently described studies. Briefly, there were 15 verbal exchanges by a bully and a victim, with a few neutral turns taken by a bystander who appeared to be an acquaintance of both. The bully makes two name-calling statements in sequence. In this study the first was a string of nasty racial names, and the second was a slur on the child's mother, especially provocative in this school. The voices

on the tape were mixed sex of indeterminate ethnic background, though in subsequent studies we used separate boy and girl tapes with the same lines, photos that revealed the interactants' ethnic background, and common derogatory names.

After listening to the tape twice, the pairs of friends were left alone to talk about what they would do if they were bystanders in that episode and why. Their discussion was taped and subsequently coded. We assumed that the taped scenario and the friend would provoke the students to express their views more openly than if an adult interviewed them. Most said they would walk away, talk with a teacher, or tell the bully to stop; a few would provide support for the victim. Those who said they would not intervene usually claimed it was none of their business or they did not want to fight or become victimized. However, the majority provided clear rationales for stopping the name-calling (e.g., it is bad, mean, rude; it is disrespectful; it hurts feelings; and people have "no right to say that"). This study in particular provided insight into bystanders' perspectives on the pros and cons of intervening. Intervening was not straightforward: While one friend might propose intervening, the other would generally raise the possibility that it would provoke the bully to turn on them. Considering how to respond to a name-calling episode evoked conflicting rather than apathetic reactions in bystanders.

Approach-Avoidance Conflict to Bystander Intervention: A Social-Developmental Framework

The conflicting reactions aroused in bystanders may best be conceptualized as an approach-avoidance conflict in which strong approach and avoidance tendencies result in immobility and the outward appearance of apathy. What are the conflicting reactions, and how can approach tendencies be strengthened? Theories relevant to decisional balance and peer socialization provide the backdrop.

Theories of behavior change that address readiness to change (Prochaska, 2002) recognize the internal conflict that prevents good intentions from being translated into behavior. They measure cognitive pros and cons of the behavior and find that the balance between them predicts the likelihood of change. Although most of the research has been on adolescents and adults, a

number of studies now indicate that the framework applies equally well to children. Similarly, we identified the pros and cons of intervening in name-calling from the dyadic discussions of children who listened to the name-calling scenario described earlier. The pros (or facilitating tendencies) they raised involve attitudes and cognitions about all three interactants: the victim, the name caller, and oneself as the bystander. They were as follows: (1) desire to prevent further/future comments; (2) anger at the comments; (3) desire to protect the victim; and (4) desire to change the bully's attitudes. The cons (or avoidance tendencies) were self-focused and include the following: (1) fear of provoking the bully to turn on me; (2) my input wouldn't do any good anyhow; (3) it's none of my business; and (4) no words came to mind. In a first study Rabiau and Darwish (2002) asked students how important each reaction was in determining whether they responded to a name caller. The summed importance of facilitating reactions was slightly greater than inhibiting reactions, but it was only the latter that correlated significantly and negatively with an overt bystander response to the name caller. It seems that the avoidance reactions need to be minimized if students are to turn their good intentions and attitudes into practice. They need to know that their intervention would do some good; it may not stop the bully, but it will set a new schoolyard norm and embolden others to intervene.

Moreover, students need to be given words to use that will not provoke the bully but will be effective in letting interactants and bystanders know that name-calling does not enhance status. Consequently the approach-avoidance framework identifies a number of facilitating and inhibiting reactions to be altered, though our research focuses on minimizing the latter with the help of socialization processes.

Peer socialization theory (Bugental & Goodnow, 1998) often refers to the adoption of new behaviors through the co-construction of perspectives between peers. Peers who model a new attitude or behavior and provide a rationale have been successful at changing attitudes and behavior in children (Aboud & Doyle, 1996; Toner & Potts, 1981). This does not generally take place through direct imitation or conformity but through the observers' constructing their own response. Imitation and conformity are seen as more likely when adults socialize children. Both peers and adults are involved in socialization, and comparisons are often made between the two (e.g., Walker, Hennig, & Drettenauer, 2000). Bullying programs combine adult and peer socialization processes, for example, by disseminating explicit antibullying rules with a rationale (e.g., Grusec & Goodnow, 1994) and eliciting peer consensus through discussion. Yet children typically do not reprimand their peers for misdeeds that involve others, though they do when in conflict with their own friends (Walker et al., 2000). Consequently, their most likely model for stopping bullying is a teacher who intervenes in classroom bullying or, as we saw in the bystander accounts, an assertive peer.

An analysis of bystanders' interventions indicates that they follow some of the principles thought to enhance value internalization (Grusec & Goodnow, 1994; Smetana, Kochanska, & Chuang, 2000). These include stating an explicit behavioral rule or value and providing a rationale or reason. When responses to name-calling were coded by Hawkins et al. (2001), 53% were found to state the rule or value, such as requests that the bullying stop and the unacceptability of the behavior. The remaining 47% were aggressive—physically, verbally, or socially (e.g., pushing, swearing, or excluding). Reasons for and against name-calling have not been examined, though they have for social exclusion (e.g., Killen & Stangor, 2001). Consequently we examined the reasons in our first interview study before testing hypotheses about whether children's interventions would improve after hearing a bystander peer model who stated a rule and a rationale against name-calling.

Behavior Change Training for Assertive Bystanders

The experimental paradigm that we used to study bystanders' responses to name callers was as follows. Students were given a list of nasty names used at their school and asked to rate them on a 0 (harmless) to 9 (hurtful) scale. This demonstrated whether students would perceive the names as causing psychological harm and to forewarn them of the following name-calling scenes. They then listened to an audiotaped 15-turn scene of a bully, a victim, and a bystander, in which two nonracial name-calling statements were made. A large photo of their schoolyard, along with blurred photos of the bully and the victim, provided realism. On a replay of the scenario, we told the students that 20-second pauses would occur on the tape after each name for them to say something

to *the bully* if they were in *the bystander's* shoes. The instructions were as follows: "Let's see what you could think of saying to the bully if you were there." To increase self-consciousness, though not necessarily to the levels bystanders experience in a real situation, we used a handheld tape recorder to record their words. Although we told them that we used acting students to recreate the scene, most of the students said that the tape and simulation were realistic.

In the first interview study we asked students to listen to the tape without pauses and afterward tell us what they would do and why. The literature on rules for social misdeeds and their rationales generally derives three categories: moral, social conventional, and personal (or psychological). One perspective is that of social domain theory, which defines name-calling, teasing, and exclusion as episodes that fall in the moral domain and finds that children's justifications for stopping them rest on the principles of harm and unfairness (e.g., Helwig et al., 1995; Killen & Stangor, 2001; Yau & Smetana, 2003). Social domain theory has found that rules and reasons that match a particular domain are more persuasive than ones that do not match it. However, our purpose in using these categories was in line with Smetana et al. (2000), who examined parents' attempts to justify rules to children and used the psychological category to refer to psychological states and dispositions rather than personal choice. We wondered whether children would use moral reasons to stop peers from calling names or give the peer a social conventional or psychological reason.

To achieve our goals, we modified the definitions of moral, social conventional, and psychological typically used in social domain theory in the following way: We defined moral reasons as explicitly referring to the principle or responsibility of making sure people had rights and were treated with fairness, equality, and respect (e.g., "It's wrong to say that to anyone even if . . ."; "He doesn't deserve to be called names") or the principle of not intervening (e.g., "It's not my responsibility"; "It's their business, not mine"). Social conventional reasons included references to good, bad, and nice and to peer or adult rules or approval (e.g., "You won't have any friends if you talk like that"; "You'll get into trouble"; "That's how everyone talks"). Furthermore, we identified psychological reasons as those that refer to the interactants' feelings, traits, or personal relationships (e.g., "It hurts him"; "The bully wasn't provoked"; "They know each other better than I do"; "It's up to victims to stand up for themselves

if they don't like it"). Psychological reasons, as stated, may not generalize beyond the individuals, whereas social conventional reasons apply to the schoolyard group, and moral reasons generalize beyond.

In this first interview study we used three methods for evaluating rationales for and against intervening: analyzing spontaneous answers to the "why" question; listing six reasons (two common ones for each category) and asking the children to recall and state in their own words the best one; and evaluating each reason on a 0 to 3 scale. Interrater reliability for the codings was 88% agreement. Recall and goodness ratings were more likely to intercorrelate than either was to correlate with spontaneous reasons. Spontaneous reasons were more likely to refer to social convention ($M = 1.06$ social convention, .74 psychological, .48 moral on two stories), especially by third-graders. However, psychological and (slightly less so) moral reasons were both more likely to be recalled (third grade recall $M = .58$ psychological, .45 moral, .45 social; sixth grade recall $M = .89$ psychological, .53 moral, .36 social, on two stories) and evaluated as good reasons, especially by sixth-graders. Thus, while youngsters spontaneously gave social convention reasons for their actions, upon reflection they knew that psychological and possibly moral reasons were better. Consequently, we concluded that peer models should use psychological and moral rationales in order to be convincing to our would-be interveners.

In the experimental study the design allowed for four intervention trials for each student: (1) a pretest in which the 73 third- and sixth-grade students inserted their own remarks to the name caller during the tape pauses, after hearing the tape once through; (2) an immediate posttest (to insert their own remarks to the name caller again) after they heard a same-sex peer model's remarks to the name caller; (3) a 1-week delayed posttest; and (4) a generalization posttest with a different name-calling scene. The two independent variables were whether the model provided a rationale and whether the victim's skin color was in-group or out-group (white or brown skinned) with respect to the participant. Features on the photo were somewhat blurred so that students would respond to the skin color and not the victim's individual features. The name caller was always an in-group member; the bystander was not photographed because the participant was to take this role.

We expected sixth-graders to assert a more explicit rule than third-graders, and we also expected the rationale to convince all of the students to

assert a more explicit rule to stop calling names. We assumed that the victim's ethnicity would influence the students' assertions, but two opposing outcomes were possible. Out-group victims might arouse negative attitudes and reduce interventions. On the other hand, if students interpret the cross-ethnic abuse as ethnic discrimination, they might intervene more assertively because of greater perceived psychological harm, social disapproval, or moral unfairness.

To code students' responses, we used a detailed behavioral system (from Aboud & Fenwick, 1999; Hawkins et al., 2001) based on a continuum of explicitness as follows:

0 = remained silent, agreed, made comments about leaving the scene

1 = continued as if nothing special was said; made excuses for the victim

2 = questioned the comment or made an indirectly disagreeing remark

3 = expressed direct disagreement

4 = stopped the comment without addressing the content; told the bully what or what not to do

5 = asserted the undesirability of the comment; negatively evaluated or disapproved

6 = stopped the comment and negatively evaluated it

When we have tried to validate the order of explicitness or intrusiveness, undergraduates generally place examples of each code in this order, though there is a big gap between levels 1 and 2.

The same-sex peer model's assertions to the name caller, played during the 20-second pauses, was at a 2 + 3 level of explicitness after the first name-calling ("Why would you want to call him that? He's not that way.") and at a 4 + 5 level after the second name-calling ("Stop calling him names. It's mean and rude."). Students in the assertion-plus-rationale condition heard a psychological rationale with the first assertion ("You hurt people's feelings by calling them names, and he didn't do anything to you.") and a moral rationale with the second assertion ("It's wrong to call anyone names. No one deserves to be called that."). That way, we exposed students to different levels and rationales so they could select whichever they felt comfortable repeating or reconstructing. We then coded the subjects' assertions on the 0 to 6 scale and analyzed the highest code they used.

Analyses of these assertion scores revealed no participant ethnicity or gender differences. Assertion levels increased from the pretest to the immediate posttest, remained high at the delayed posttest, and dropped slightly at the generalization scene ($M = 2.4, 2.8, 3.0, 2.8$, respectively). Third-graders started out at a lower level of explicitness but eventually rose to the same level as sixth-graders. More third-graders did not initially intervene (levels 0 or 1) compared to sixth-graders (50% for third grade and 30% for sixth grade), but sixth-graders' level was lower than expected at posttest because many preferred the less explicit level 3 disagreement response. Still, at the delayed posttest, 47% explicitly addressed the behavior or the value. Furthermore, students were not simply repeating the model's words; in all but 4 cases out of 73, they reconstructed a new assertive reply and sometimes used parts or paraphrases of the model's words but always added their own words. Consequently, we concluded that peer models provide an effective socialization experience for bystanders. Our subsequent study indicated that adult models may be even more effective than peers with third-graders, whereas the opposite is true for sixth-graders. This is consistent with the view that children become more attentive to peers as they enter puberty.

The victim's skin color influenced the students' first response to the name caller (i.e., after the first pause). More explicit assertions were directed to the name caller when the victim was an out-group member compared to in-group ($M = 3.35$ vs. 2.53). The victim's skin color also influenced the number of moral reasons the students spontaneously offered for stopping the name-calling: Out-group victims elicited more moral reasons than did in-group victims ($M = .16$ versus .06, with a theoretical range of 0–2). Because more explicit rules and more moral reasons for out-group victims occurred across all trials, the most parsimonious explanation is that students viewed the out-group name-calling as ethnic discrimination even though an ethnic name was not used. As such it called for a stronger reprimand and a moral justification. Moral justifications indicate the need for a principle that will hold regardless of the individual interactants, as in the following justification: "Even if you don't like him, he doesn't deserve to be treated like that."

Other than the out-group effect, models who used a rationale along with the rule did not elicit more assertive interventions from the participants than those who simply stated the rule. Thus, contrary to our prediction, rationales

did not motivate students to be more explicit in their interventions.

Sixth-graders seemed more likely to intervene directly by talking to the bully rather than telling a teacher. However, only about half asserted an explicit rule or value against name-calling, while half used a less explicit intervention. This might be a good strategy if they were afraid of provoking the bully further or simply wanted to maintain good relations with the bully. Interventions unlikely to provoke would include a rhetorical question such as "Why would you want to call him those names?" or "What right do you have to speak like that?" or a disagreement such as "He's not stupid." Although such statements are less assertive, they are still likely to make the victim feel vindicated. More socially sophisticated sixth-graders might also be conscious of maintaining good relations with the bully. In a symmetrical and reciprocal relation, indirect comments may be seen as more appropriate ways to reprimand a peer and stay on good terms.

Finally, we wondered whether the students perceived the model's or their own interventions to be effective. We viewed the bystander's intervention as having the potential to be effective from the perspective of four interactants: the bully, the victim, the bystander, and other onlookers. Participants rated on a 0 (no) to 9 (yes, definitely) scale whether the intervention would stop the name-calling, make the victim feel better, make the intervener feel better, and impress other onlookers. Alpha coefficients were high for the four ratings, so we combined them. Students rated their own delayed-posttest intervention as less effective than the model's Level 2 + 3 intervention after the first name and the model's Level 4 + 5 intervention after the second name (M = 6.86, 7.24, and 7.15, respectively). Furthermore, those in the Assertion + Rationale condition rated everyone's intervention as more effective than those who heard only an assertion (M = 7.47 vs. 6.75, respectively). This confirmed that students saw the model's words in a positive light, especially when accompanied by a psychological and moral reason. Real-life peer models might therefore follow this formula in order to promote bystanders' interventions.

Conclusions

In the schoolyard, name-calling is the most common form of discrimination against children who are different in terms of race, sex role, body appearance, SES, and competence. Victims are singled out not necessarily because the name caller is prejudiced but because the abuser knows that prejudice is tolerated in the schoolyard since few attempt to stop it. Intergroup discrimination, of which name-calling is only one form, takes place because societal prejudice creates a power differential that is picked up by schoolyard bullies. Abusers, who seek to dominate, capitalize on the tolerance of prejudice among other school children and its recognition by visible minorities. In fact, it is so easily recognized that our participants interpreted intergroup name-calling, without the use of a racial name, as racial discrimination, which requires a more explicit assertion with a moral justification. The use of racial slurs is unnecessary. Nonetheless, intergroup name-calling deserves further study: We already know it exists, but we do not know how to reduce it.

Recently an awareness has been growing that intergroup name-calling is a wider social event that is influenced by bystanders and in turn influences them to see it as a normative event. The focus of our research is therefore on ways to encourage bystanders to intervene. They clearly want to say something directly to the name caller but are rendered inert by conflicting tendencies that account for their inaction. Developers of antibias school programs have long advocated teaching students how to speak out against discrimination when it occurs on their turf (Derman-Sparks & Phillips, 1997), but this has not been explicitly addressed in any antibias or antibullying program (except that of Stevens et al., 2004). The most important consequence of such a program may be that a social norm is created among students to speak up on behalf of tormented individuals. To overturn an old social norm and create a new one, Cialdini, Kallgren, and Reno (1991) point out that one must visibly act to counter the old norm. Their example is that to overcome littering, one must publicly pick up and throw someone else's litter into a garbage can—not simply dispose of one's own litter. Likewise, to stop name-calling, student bystanders must publicly counter it. Our research has shown that students disapprove of name-calling, recognize it as discrimination, and are willing to intervene at moderate levels of assertiveness. Future research and antibullying programs should examine other methods to increase the incidence of bystander interventions and investigate additional variables in name-calling episodes, such as the effect of an outgroup name caller.

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