

A universal forgery of Hess's second ID-based signature against the known-message attack

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Abstract. In this paper we propose a universal forgery attack of Hess's second ID-based signature scheme against the known-message attack.

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Recently, several ID-based signature schemes based on binary maps on elliptic curves were proposed [CC02,Hes02,Pat02,SOK01]. In [Hes02], he proposed two ID-based signature schemes and provided a formal proof for the first scheme, but only sketch of proof for the second scheme. In this paper, we propose a universal forgery attack of Hess's second ID-based signature scheme against the known-message attack.

First, we introduce Hess's second ID-based signature scheme.

Let $(G, +)$ and (V, \cdot) be groups of prime order ℓ and $e : G \times G \rightarrow V$ be a bilinear non-degenerate pairing. We further assume two hash functions $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow G \setminus \{0\}$ and $h : \{0, 1\}^* \times G \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_\ell^*$.

1. **Setup.** The TA picks a random element $P \in G \setminus \{0\}$ and a secret integer $t \in \mathbb{F}_\ell^*$. The TA then compute

$$Q_{TA} = tP$$

and publishes (P, Q_{TA}) . The value t is stored by the TA.

2. **Extract.** Given an identity ID of a user, the algorithm computes his public key $Q_{ID} = H(ID)$ and his private key $S_{ID} = tQ_{ID}$.
3. **Sign.** To sign a message m the signer picks a random integer $k \in \mathbb{F}_\ell^*$ and then compute
 - (a) $r = kP$
 - (b) $v = h(m, r)$
 - (c) $u = (v/k)S_{ID}$
4. **Verify.** On receiving a message m and signature (u, r) the verifier computes:
 - (a) $v = h(m, r)$
 - (b) Accept the signature if and only if $e(u, r) = e(Q_{ID}, Q_{TA})^v$.

This completes the description of the second ID-based signature scheme. That this verification equation holds for a valid signature follows from the following algebra:

$$e(u, r) = e((v/k)S_{ID}, kP) = e(S_{ID}, P)^v = e(Q_{ID}, Q_{TA})^v.$$

Now, we give a universal forgery attack of the above ID-based signature scheme against the known-message attack.

Assume we have a valid signature (u, r) of a message m . For arbitrary message m' , compute $v' = h(m', r)$ and $v = h(m, r)$. Also, we compute $u' = (v'/v)u = (v'/k)S_{ID}$. Then (u', r) is a valid signature of m' since

$$e(u', r) = e((v'/k)S_{ID}, kP) = e(S_{ID}, P)^{v'} = e(Q_{ID}, Q_{TA})^{v'}$$

and $v' = h(m', r)$.

References

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