

# A note on the Certificateless Multi-receiver Signcryption Scheme

S. Sharmila Deva Selvi<sup>1</sup>, S. Sree Vivek<sup>1,\*</sup>, C. Pandu Rangan<sup>1,\*</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Department of Computer Science and Engineering,  
Indian Institute of Technology Madras.

sharmila@cse.iitm.ac.in, svivek@cse.iitm.ac.in, prangan@iitm.ac.in.

**Abstract.** Certificateless cryptography aims at combining the advantages of identity based and public key cryptography, so as to avoid the key escrow problem inherent in the identity based system and cumbersome certificate management in public key infrastructure. Signcryption achieves confidentiality and authentication simultaneously in an efficient manner. Multi-receiver signcryption demands signcrypting the same message efficiently for a large number of receivers. In this note, we strengthen the security of the certificateless multi-receiver signcryption scheme in [23] by proposing suitable enhancement to the scheme.

**Keywords.** Certificateless, Signcryption, Multi-receiver, Bilinear Pairing, Cryptanalysis.

## 1 Introduction

Signcryption proposed by Zheng in [3] is a cryptographic primitive providing signature and encryption simultaneously, at a lower computational cost and communication overhead than the signature-then-encryption approach. A proper signcryption scheme should provide confidentiality as well as authentication and non-repudiation. Besides this, security model for signcryption should consider insider attacks also i.e. a corrupted receiver should not be able to forge a valid signcryption from any legal user  $A$  to another user  $B$  on a message that was not already sent from  $A$  to  $B$ . Sometimes forward secrecy is also a desired property, which requires that even if a sender's secret key is exposed at some point of time, the past messages sent by him should remain secret.

Need for multi-receiver signcryption arises when the same message is to be sent to a large number of receivers. Consider the case of a company in which there are several managers and each of them has to send authenticated and confidential report to a large number of employees. In this case, simply signcrypting the message for each receiver will be highly inefficient. Therefore, there is a need

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to design efficient schemes for this task. In [23], an efficient multi-receiver sign-cryption scheme (CLMSC) in certificateless setting was proposed to achieve this functionality.

The certificateless multireceiver sign-cryption scheme in [23] resists against Type-II adversary, but it does not resist TYPE-I adversary. In order to make it secure against the TYPE-I adversary we propose some enhancement to the existing scheme in [23].

## 2 Preliminaries

### 2.1 Computational Assumptions

In this section, we recall the computational assumptions related to bilinear maps [16] that are relevant to the security of our scheme:

1. **Strong Diffie-Hellman Problem (SDHP)** SDH problem is a stronger version of DHI (Diffie-Hellman Inversion problem) [16]. Given  $(P, aP) \in \mathbb{G}_1^2$  for any random  $a \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ , the SDH problem in  $\mathbb{G}_1$  is to compute  $(h, (a+h)^{-1}P)$ ,  $h \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ .

The advantage of any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$  in solving the SDH problem in  $\mathbb{G}_1$  is defined as:

$$Adv_{\mathcal{A}}^{SDH} = Pr[\mathcal{A}(P, aP) = (h, (a+h)^{-1}P) \mid a, h \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*]$$

We say that SDH is  $(t, \epsilon)$  hard if for any  $t$  time probabilistic algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$ , the advantage  $Adv_{\mathcal{A}}^{SDH} < \epsilon$ .

2. **Collusion Attack Algorithm with k-traitors (k-CAA)** Given  $(P, aP, (h_1 + a)^{-1}P, \dots, (h_k + a)^{-1}P) \in \mathbb{G}_1^{k+2}$  for any random  $a \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$  and known values  $h_1, \dots, h_k \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ , the k-CAA problem in  $\mathbb{G}_1$  is to compute  $(a+h)^{-1}P$  for some  $h \notin \{h_1, \dots, h_k\}$ .

The advantage of any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$  in solving the k-CAA problem in  $\mathbb{G}_1$  is defined as:

$$\begin{aligned} Adv_{\mathcal{A}}^{k-CAA} &= Pr[\mathcal{A}(P, aP, (h_1 + a)^{-1}P, \dots, (h_k + a)^{-1}P, h_1, \dots, h_k) \\ &= (a+h)^{-1}P \mid a, h \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*, h \notin \{h_1, \dots, h_k\}] \end{aligned}$$

We say that k-CAA is  $(t, \epsilon)$  hard if for any  $t$  time probabilistic algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$ , the advantage  $Adv_{\mathcal{A}}^{k-CAA} < \epsilon$ .

3. **Modified BDHI for k-values (k-mBDHIP)** k-mBDHIP is the bilinear variant of the k-CAA problem [22]. Given  $(P, sP, (h_1 + s)^{-1}P, \dots, (h_k + s)^{-1}P) \in \mathbb{G}_1^{k+2}$  for any random  $s \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$  and known values  $h_1, \dots, h_k \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ , the k-mBDHIP problem is to compute  $\hat{e}(P, P)^{(s+h)^{-1}}$  for some  $h \notin \{h_1, \dots, h_k\}$ .

The advantage of any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$  in solving the k-mBDHIP problem is defined as:

$$Adv_{\mathcal{A}}^{k-mBDHIP} = Pr[\mathcal{A}(P, sP, (h_1 + s)^{-1}P, \dots, (h_k + s)^{-1}P, h_1, \dots, h_k)$$

$$= \hat{e}(P, P)^{(s+h)^{-1}} \mid s, h \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*, h \notin \{h_1, \dots, h_k\}$$

We say that k-mBDHIP is  $(t, \epsilon)$  hard if for any  $t$  time probabilistic algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$ , the advantage  $Adv_{\mathcal{A}}^{k-mBDHIP} < \epsilon$ .

4. **Gap Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (GBDHP)**[12] Given  $(P, aP, bP, cP) \in \mathbb{G}_1^4$  for any random  $a, b, c \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ , the GBDH problem in  $(\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \hat{e})$  is to compute  $\hat{e}(P, P)^{abc}$  given access to DBDH oracle  $\mathcal{O}_\Gamma$  which on input  $(P, aP, bP, cP, T) \in \mathbb{G}_1^4 \times \mathbb{G}_2$  outputs 1 if  $T = \hat{e}(P, P)^{abc}$  and 0 otherwise. The advantage of any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$  in solving the GBDH problem in  $(\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \hat{e})$  is defined as:

$$Adv_{\mathcal{A}}^{GBDH}(\mathcal{O}_\Gamma, q_{DBDH}) = Pr[\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_\Gamma}(P, aP, bP, cP) = \hat{e}(P, P)^{abc} \mid a, b, c \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*]$$

where  $q_{DBDH}$  is the number of queries to the decisional oracle. We say that GBDHP is  $(t, \epsilon, q_{DBDH})$  hard if for any  $t$  time probabilistic algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$  asking  $q_{DBDH}$  oracle queries, advantage  $Adv_{\mathcal{A}}^{k-CAA} < \epsilon$ .

### 3 Certificateless Multi-receiver Signcryption

#### 3.1 Framework of Certificateless Multi-receiver Signcryption

Any generic certificateless multi-receiver signcryption scheme is a five tuple of probabilistic polynomial time algorithms defined as follows-

1. **Setup** $(1^\kappa)$ : This algorithm is run by the KGC. It takes as input the security parameter  $1^\kappa$  and returns the KGC's master secret key  $Msk$ , master public key  $Mpk$ , public parameters  $Params$  and a description of message space  $(\mathcal{M}_{CLMSC})$  and cipher-text space  $(\mathcal{C}_{CLMSC})$ .
2. **Partial Private Key Extract** $(ID_i, Msk, Params)$ : This algorithm is run by the KGC. It takes as input  $Msk, Params$ , a string  $ID_i \in \{0, 1\}^*$  and returns a partial private key  $D_i$ .
3. **Key Extract** $(ID_i, D_i, Params)$ : This algorithm is run by the user. It takes as input the partial private key of the user and returns a public key  $PK_i$  and a secret value  $x_i$ . The full secret key of the user is set to  $SK_i = \langle x_i, D_i \rangle$ .
4. **Signcrypt** $(m, ID_S, SK_S, PK_S, L = \{ID_1, ID_2, \dots, ID_n\}, PK_1, \dots, PK_n, Params)$ : The signcryption algorithm takes as input a message  $m \in \mathcal{M}_{CLMSC}$ , identity  $ID_S$  and the full secret key  $SK_S$  of the sender, a list  $L$  of the receiver identities and their public keys and returns a ciphertext  $\sigma \in \mathcal{C}_{CLMSC}$ .
5. **Designcrypt** $(\sigma, SK_R, ID_R, PK_R, ID_S, PK_S, L)$ : This is a deterministic algorithm which takes as input the ciphertext  $\sigma$ , receivers full secret key  $SK_R$ , identity  $ID_R$ , the public key  $PK_R$  of the receiver, list of receivers  $L$ , the identity  $ID_S$  and the public key  $PK_S$  of the sender and returns either a plaintext  $m \in \mathcal{M}_{CLMSC}$  or an error symbol  $\perp$ .

For consistency, we require that

if  $\sigma = \text{Signcrypt}(m, ID_S, SK_S, PK_S, L = \{ID_{R_1}, \dots, ID_{R_n}\}, PK_1, \dots, PK_n, Params)$ , then  $m = \text{Designcrypt}(\sigma, SK_{R_i}, ID_{R_i}, PK_{R_i}, ID_S, PK_S, L)$  for  $1 \leq i \leq n$ .

### 3.2 Security Model For Certificateless Multi-receiver Signcryption

Now, we describe the security model for certificateless multi-receiver signcryption. In confidentiality and unforgeability game we provide access to the following six oracles :

1. **Extract Partial Private Key:** On input of an identity  $ID_i$ , this oracle returns the partial private key  $D_i$  generated using the *Partial Private Key Extract* algorithm.
2. **Extract Secret Key:** On input of an identity  $ID_i$ , this oracle returns the full secret key  $SK_i = \langle x_i, D_i \rangle$  of the identity using the appropriate algorithms.
3. **Request Public Key:** On input of an identity  $ID_i$ , this oracle returns the corresponding public key  $PK_i$  associated with  $ID_i$ . If such a key does not exist then it is constructed using *Key Extract* algorithm.
4. **Replace Public Key:** On input of an identity  $ID_i$  and a valid public key  $PK'_i$ , this oracle replaces the public key associated with  $ID_i$  with  $PK'_i$ . If such a key does not exist then it is generated using the *Key Extract* algorithm and then the public key corresponding to  $ID_i$  is replaced with  $PK'_i$ .
5. **Signcrypt:** On input of a message, a sender's identity  $ID_S$  and a set of receiver identities  $L = \{ID_{R_1}, ID_{R_2}, \dots, ID_{R_n}\}$ , this oracle returns the result of running the signcryption algorithm on the message, sender's full secret key and the receiver's public parameters.
6. **Designcrypt:** On input of a ciphertext, a sender's identity  $ID_S$  and a receiver's identity  $ID_R$ , this oracle returns the result of running the *Designcrypt* algorithm on the ciphertext, the sender's public parameters and the receiver's full secret key.

Next, we give the security definitions. Following the trend in literature we also consider Type-I and Type-II adversary. Roughly speaking Type-I adversary models a common user who is not in possession of the master secret key  $MsK$  and a type-II adversary models the honest but curious  $KGC$ .

**Confidentiality:** Security game that captures the confidentiality is based on the ciphertext indistinguishability. We define it separately for Type-I and Type-II adversary:

**Type-I:** A certificateless multi-receiver signcryption scheme is Type-I-iCCA2 secure if every probabilistic polynomial-time attacker  $\mathcal{A}$  has negligible advantage in winning the IND-CLMSC-iCCA2-I game. A type-I adversary is given access to all the 6 oracles defined above under the following constraints-

1. Adversary does not have access to master secret key  $MsK$ .
2. No *Extract Secret Key* query is allowed on any of the challenge identities.
3. Adversary is not allowed to ask *Extract Partial Private Key* query for any of the challenge identities.

IND-CLMSC-iCCA2-I game played between the challenger  $\mathcal{C}$  and the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  is defined below:

**Setup:** Challenger  $\mathcal{C}$  runs the setup algorithm to generate master secret key  $Msk$  and public parameters  $Params$ .  $\mathcal{C}$  gives  $Params$  to  $\mathcal{A}$  while keeping  $Msk$  secret. After receiving  $Params$   $\mathcal{A}$  outputs list of target identities denoted by  $L^* = \{ID_1^*, ID_2^*, \dots, ID_n^*\}$  respectively.  $\mathcal{C}$  interacts with  $\mathcal{A}$  in two phases:

**Phase1:**  $\mathcal{A}$  is given access to all the six oracles.  $\mathcal{A}$  adaptively queries the oracles consistent with the constraints described above.

**Challenge:**  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs two equal length messages  $m_0, m_1$  and an arbitrary sender's identity  $ID_S$ .  $\mathcal{C}$  randomly chooses a bit  $b \in_R \{0, 1\}$  and computes a signcryption

$$\sigma^* = \text{Signcrypt}(m_b, ID_S, SK_S, PK_S, L = \{ID_1^*, \dots, ID_n^*\}, PK_1^*, \dots, PK_n^*)$$

$\sigma^*$  is sent to  $\mathcal{A}$  as challenge.

**Phase2:**  $\mathcal{A}$  adaptively queries the oracles consistent with the constraints described above. Besides this it cannot query *Designcrypt* on  $\sigma^*$  for any  $ID \in \{ID_1^*, ID_2^*, \dots, ID_n^*\}$ .

**Guess:**  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs a bit  $b'$  at the end of the game.  $\mathcal{A}$  wins if  $b = b'$ . The advantage of  $\mathcal{A}$  is defined as-

$$Adv_{\mathcal{A}}^{IND-CLMSC-iCCA2-I} = |2Pr[b = b'] - 1|$$

**Type-II:** A certificateless multi-receiver signcryption scheme is Type-II-iCCA2 secure if every probabilistic polynomial-time attacker  $\mathcal{A}$  has negligible advantage in winning the IND-CLMSC-iCCA2-II game. A type-II adversary is given access to all the 6 oracles defined above and master secret key  $Msk$  under the following constraints-

1. No *Extract Secret Key* query is allowed on any of the challenge identities.
2. No *Replace Public Key* query is allowed on any of the challenge identities before the challenge phase.

IND-CLMSC-iCCA2-II game played between the challenger  $\mathcal{C}$  and the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  is same as the IND-CLMSC-iCCA2-I game with the restrictions mentioned above

The advantage of  $\mathcal{A}$  is defined as-

$$Adv_{\mathcal{A}}^{IND-CLMSC-iCCA2-II} = |2Pr[b = b'] - 1|$$

**Authenticity:** Strong existential unforgeability(sEUF-CLMSC-iCMA) game captures the authenticity as a security requirement for any certificateless multi-receiver signcryption. By strong unforgeability we mean that adversary should not be able to signcrypt a message on behalf of a sender even if it knows the secret keys of all the receivers. The game is defined as below :

**Type-I:** A certificateless multi-receiver signcryption scheme is Type-I-sEUF-iCMA secure if every probabilistic polynomial-time attacker  $\mathcal{F}$  has negligible advantage in winning the sEUF-CLMSC-iCMA-I game. A type-I adversary is given access to all the 6 oracles defined above under the following constraints-

1. Adversary does not have access to master secret key  $MsK$ .
2. No *Extract Secret Key* query is allowed on any of the challenge identities.
3. Adversary is not allowed to ask *Extract Partial Private Key* query for any of the challenge identities.

sEUF-CLMSC-iCMA-I game played between the challenger  $\mathcal{C}$  and the adversary  $\mathcal{F}$  is defined below:

**Setup:** Challenger  $\mathcal{C}$  runs the setup algorithm to generate master secret key  $MsK$  and public parameters  $Params$ .  $\mathcal{C}$  gives  $Params$  to  $\mathcal{F}$  while keeping  $MsK$  secret. After receiving  $Params$   $\mathcal{F}$  outputs list of target identities denoted by  $L^* = \{ID_1^*, ID_2^*, \dots, ID_n^*\}$  respectively.  $\mathcal{C}$  interacts with  $\mathcal{F}$  in two phases:

**Attack:**  $\mathcal{F}$  is given access to all the six oracles.  $\mathcal{F}$  adaptively queries the oracles consistent with the constraints described above.

**Forgery:**  $\mathcal{F}$  outputs a signature  $\sigma^*$  and  $n$  arbitrary receiver's identities  $L = \{ID_{R_1}, \dots, ID_{R_n}\}$  (there exists atleast one receiver  $ID_{R_i}$  such that,  $ID_{R_i} \notin L^*$ ).  $\mathcal{F}$  wins if  $Designcrypt(\sigma^*, SK_{R_i}, ID_{R_i}, PK_{R_i}, ID_j^*, PK_j^*, L)$  returns  $m$  for  $i, j \in \{1, \dots, n\}$  and  $\sigma^*$  was not the output of any signcrypt query  $Signcrypt(m, ID_i^*, L = \{ID_{R_1}, \dots, ID_{R_n}\})$ . That is,  $\mathcal{F}$  wins if it outputs a valid signcryption from a target identity to the set of receiver identities  $L$  by itself.

$Adv_{\mathcal{F}}^{sEUF-CLMSC-iCMA-II}$  is defined as the probability that  $\mathcal{F}$  wins the above game.

**Type-II:** A certificateless multi-receiver signcryption scheme is Type-II-sEUF-iCMA secure if every probabilistic polynomial-time attacker  $\mathcal{F}$  has negligible advantage in winning the sEUF-CLMSC-iCMA-II game. A type-II adversary is given access to all the 6 oracles defined above and the master secret key  $MsK$  under the following constraints-

1. No *Extract Secret Key* query is allowed on any of the challenge identities.
2. Adversary is not allowed to ask *Replace Public Key* for any of the challenge identities.

sEUF-CLMSC-iCMA-II game played between the challenger  $\mathcal{C}$  and the adversary  $\mathcal{F}$  is same as sEUF-CLMSC-iCMA-I with the restrictions given above.

$Adv_{\mathcal{F}}^{sEUF-CLMSC-iCMA-II}$  is defined as the probability that  $\mathcal{F}$  wins the sEUF-CLMSC-iCMA-II game.

## 4 Enhancement of the Scheme in [23]

The scheme in [23] doesnot resist type-I adversary. When the adversary sees any signcryption  $\sigma = \langle c, d_1, d_2, \dots, d_n, L \rangle$  from  $ID_S$  to  $L = \{ID_1, \dots, ID_n\}$ . The adversary can perform the following,

$$\begin{aligned} d &= d_{i1} - d_{j1}, ID_i, ID - j \in L \\ &= r_1 P \end{aligned}$$

Knowing  $d = r_1 P$  the type-I adversary can compute both the keys used for encryption namely  $\hat{e}(P, Q)^{r_1} = \hat{e}(d, Q)$  and  $(\hat{e}(P, Q)^{r_1})^{x_i}$ , because the type-I adversary knows the secre value  $x_i$  and  $P, Q$  are public parameters. This is possible

because of the randomness being re-used in the computation of  $d_{i1}$  of all receivers. Hence, we overcome the weakness by performing the following enhancement,

**Setup**( $1^\kappa$ ): On providing security parameter  $1^\kappa$  as input, the KGC chooses two groups  $\mathbb{G}_1$  and  $\mathbb{G}_2$  of prime order  $q$ , two random generators  $P$  and  $Q$  of  $\mathbb{G}_1$  such that  $P \neq Q$  and a bilinear map  $\hat{e} : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_1 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_2$ . It then computes  $g = \hat{e}(P, Q) \in \mathbb{G}_2$  and defines five hash functions  $H_1 : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ ,  $H_2 : \mathbb{G}_2 \times \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ ,  $H_3 : \{0, 1\}^m \times \mathbb{G}_2 \times \{0, 1\}^* \times \mathbb{G}_2 \times \mathbb{G}_1 \times \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ ,  $H_4 : \mathbb{Z}_q^* \times \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ ,  $H_5 : \mathbb{G}_2 \times \mathbb{G}_2 \times \mathbb{G}_2 \times \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{k_1+k_2}$ , where  $k_1$  and  $k_2$  are the number of bits required to represent  $\mathbb{G}_1$  and  $\mathbb{Z}_q^*$  elements respectively. Then KGC chooses  $s \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q^*$  as the master secret key and sets  $P_{pub} = sP$ . The KGC now publishes the public parameters  $Params$  of the system as  $(\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, P, Q, P_{pub}, \hat{e} : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_1 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_2, g, H_1, H_2, H_3, H_4, H_5)$ .

**Partial Private Key Extract**( $ID_i, msk, Params$ ): On input  $ID_i$ , the partial private key of user with identity  $ID_i$  is computed as  $D_i = (q_i + s)^{-1}Q$ , where  $q_i = H_1(ID_i)$ .

**Key Extract**( $ID_i, D_i, Params$ ): This algorithm is run by each user to compute his private and public keys. The user  $ID_i$  chooses  $x_i \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q^*$  and sets his private key  $SK_i = \langle x_i, D_i \rangle$  and sets his public key as  $PK_i = \langle PK_{i1}, PK_{i2} \rangle = \langle g^{x_i}, x_i T_i \rangle$ , where  $T_i = (q_i + s)P$ .

**Signcrypt**( $m, ID_S, SK_S, PK_S, L = \{ID_{R_1}, ID_{R_2}, \dots, ID_{R_n}\}, PK_{R_1}, PK_{R_2}, \dots, PK_{R_n}, Params$ ):

1. Choose  $r \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q^*$  and compute  $\alpha = g^r$
2.  $h = H_2(\alpha, m, ID_S, L)$  and  $h_3 = H_3(m, \alpha, h, ID_S, PK_{S1}, PK_{S2}, L)$
3. Compute  $Z_S = \frac{r}{(x_S + h_3)} D_S$
4. Compute  $c = H_4(h, ID_S, L) \oplus m \parallel \alpha$
5. Repeat the following steps for all  $ID_{R_i} \in L, i = 1, 2, \dots, n$ .
  - (a) Choose  $r_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$
  - (b) Parse  $PK_{R_i}$  as  $\langle PK_{i1}, PK_{i2} \rangle$
  - (c) Set  $h_{5i} = H_5(g^{r_i}, (PK_{i1})^{r_i}, PK_{i1}, ID_{R_i})$
  - (d) Compute  $d_{i1} = r_i(q_i + s)P$  and  $d_{i2} = h_{5i} \oplus h \parallel Z_S$
  - (e) Set  $d_i = \langle d_{i1}, d_{i2} \rangle$
6. Return ciphertext  $\sigma = \langle c, d_1, d_2, \dots, d_n, L \rangle$ .

**Designcrypt**( $\sigma = \langle c, d_1, d_2, \dots, d_n, L \rangle, ID_S, ID_i, SK_i, Params$ ):

1. Parse  $d_i$  as  $\langle d_{i1}, d_{i2} \rangle$  and  $SK_i$  as  $\langle x_i, D_i \rangle$
2. Compute  $\omega' = \hat{e}(d_{i1}, D_i)$  and  $(\omega')^{x_i} = (PK_{i1})^{r_i}$
3. Set  $h'_{5i} = H_5(\omega', (\omega')^{x_i}, PK_{i1}, ID_i)$
4. Compute  $h' \parallel Z'_S = h'_{5i} \oplus d_{i2}$
5. Compute  $m' \parallel \alpha' = c \oplus H_4(h', ID_S, L)$
6. Set  $h'_3 = H_3(m', \alpha', h', ID_S, PK_{S1}, PK_{S2}, L)$
7. If  $h' \stackrel{?}{=} H_2(\alpha', ID_S, L)$  and  $\hat{e}(PK_{S2} + h'_3(q_S + s)P, Z'_S) = \alpha'$  then return  $m'$ , else return  $\perp$ .

## 5 Conclusion

We have proposed an enhancement for the security weakness in the certificateless signcryption scheme for multiple receivers in [23].

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