FAST MENTAL POKER PROTOCOL

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Abstract. We present a fast and secure mental poker protocol. It is twice as fast as Barnett-Smart's and Castellà-Roca's protocols. This protocol is provably secure under DDH assumption.

1. Introduction

1.1. **Mental Poker.** Mental poker is the study of protocols that allows players to play fair poker games over the net without a trusted third party. It can be considered as a kind of multiparty computation. In the study of mental poker, there are very few assumptions on the behavior of adversaries. Adversaries are typically allowed to have coalition of any size and can make active attacks.

The apparent application of mental poker is playing online poker game over the Internet. However, it is not easy to design a fast enough protocol to satisfy practical needs. Despite many protocols have been proposed ([1, 2, 6, 8, 7, 13, 14, 16, 18, 19, 21, 23, 26, 27, 28]), online poker rooms are still based on client-server architectures. Therefore, online players are assumed to trust the server. However, it is not uncommon for players to question the integrity of online games. These players might be right. In fall 2007, there is a major employee cheating scandal occurred at a famous online poker room, Absolute Poker. In 2008, similar scandal occurred at another famous online poker room, UltimateBet (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Online_poker for detail and news sources).

Therefore, an efficient decentralized poker protocol is desirable. We present a fast protocol in this paper.

1.2. **Previous Works.** The first mental poker protocol was proposed by Shamir et al in 1979 ([23]), which allows only two players to play. Unfortunately, it has a security flaw (see [22, 18]). The first secure mental poker protocol is proposed by Crépeau in 1987 ([14]). Since then, several other secure protocols have been proposed([1, 2, 6, 8, 7, 13, 14, 16, 18, 19, 21, 23, 26, 27, 28], see [6] for a survey).

Barnett-Smart's protocol is proposed in 2003 ([2]). It can be implemented by using either ElGamal or Paillier encryption scheme. However, Paillier encryption based version depends on Boneh-Franklin's protocol ([3, 5]), which is only secure under the assumption that adversaries are coalition of size at most $\frac{N-1}{2}$, where N is the number of players. In this paper, we consider active adversaries with coalition of size up to $N-1$. Therefore, in the rest of this paper, we consider only the ElGamal based version.

Castellà-Roca's protocol is proposed in 2004 ([6]). It is similar to Barnett-Smart, but faster than Barnett-Smart in shuffle.

Both Barnett-Smart's and Castellà-Roca's are secure and efficient.

1.3. **Our Result.** We present a fast and secure mental poker protocol. It shares the similar basic structure with Barnett-Smart's and Castellà-Roca's protocol.

The difference between these protocols is the card encryption and decryption procedure. The difference is crucial, therefore, the security proof of Barnett-Smart and Castellà-Roca does not work on our protocol.

In Barnett-Smart and Castellà-Roca, every player uses two kinds of secrets to shuffle a deck. Loosely speaking, the first secret is used to turn the cards face down at the beginning of the game. When shuffling, players mix up the cards and use the second secret to hide the permutation of the cards. The second secret is different in each round of shuffle and never used again. Only the first secret is needed to decrypt a card. Therefore, we can prove the security of the shuffle, card dealing and opening separately. Then use composition theorem to show the security of whole protocol.

In our protocol, however, every player uses only one secret to turn the cards face down and mix them up at the same time. The same secret is also used for decrypting cards.

Before further discussion, let us briefly describe the idea of the card encryption procedure in our protocol. Let G be a cyclic group and $g \in G$ a generator. Each card i is represented by an element $a_i \in G$. These a_i are chosen from G randomly via a multiparty protocol, so that a_i are indistinguishable from independent uniform random variable (under DDH assumption, which we discuss below). A face-up deck of M cards can be considered as the set $\{a_i\}_{i \leq M}$. When a player, say Player j, wishes to shuffle the deck $\{a_i\}$, he privately chooses a secret x_j and then encrypts the deck as $\{a_i^{x_j}\}$ and the generator as g^{x_j}.

At some point of dealing a card, other players send an element $b \in G$ to Player j. Player j then send back $b^{x_j^{-1}}$ to other players. The owner of the card then use this information to decrypt the card. Obviously, if b can be freely chosen by other players, they can easily break Player j's shuffle. Therefore, there must have some restrictions on b in the card dealing protocol.So, there is no way to prove the security of the shuffle alone without investigating the card dealing protocol.

On the other hand, each card encryption requires only one exponentiation in our protocol. In Barnett-Smart and Castellà-Roca, each card encryption requires two exponentiation. Therefore, our protocol is is roughly twice as faster. Detail comparison can be found in Section 4.

The security of our protocol depends on a computation intractability assumption, namely Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption. This assumption is widely used in cryptography. There are many cryptographic primitives based on DDH assumption. For example, ElGamal encryption scheme ([15]), Diffie-Hellman key exchange, Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem ([11]). The security of Barnett-Smart and Castellà-Roca is also depends on DDH assumption.

Let Γ be a family of cyclic groups. DDH assumption (for Γ) states that, for any generator $g \in G \in \Gamma$, the following two distributions

- (g, g^a, g^b, g^{ab}), where a, b are independent uniformly random;
- (g, g^a, g^b, g^c), where a, b, c are independent uniformly random;

are indistinguishable.

DDH assumption is believed to be true for some families of groups. The typical example is the group of quadratic residues modulo a safe prime (i.e., prime of the form $2p + 1$ where p is a prime). It is also believe to hold on a prime-order elliptic curve E over the field $GF(p)$, where p is prime and E has large embedding degree. More detail can refer to [4].

It is well known that DDH assumption implies that the following two distributions

- $(a_0, a_1, a_2, \cdots, a_M, a_0^x, a_1^x, \cdots, a_M^x)$ where a_i, x are uniformly random;
- $(a_0, a_1, a_2, \cdots, a_M, b_0, b_1, \cdots, b_M)$ where a_i, b_i are uniformly random;

are indistinguishable.

This is because for any given $a, b, c, d \in G$, we can generate $a_i = a^{t_i} c^{s_i}$, $b_i = b^{t_i} d^{s_i}$ for random s_i, t_i. Observe that $\log_{a_i} b_i = \log_a b$ for all $i \leq M$ iff $\log_c d = \log_a b$ (except some negligible case). Thus, if we can answer whether $\log_{a_i} b_i = \log_a b$ for all i, then we can answer the DDH problem.

In other words, DDH assumption implies that the "shuffled deck", $\{a_i^x\}$ is indistinguishable from random variables $\{b_i\}$. This evidence strongly suggests the security of our protocol. However, as we discuss above, this result alone is not enough to prove the security of whole protocol. The proof is given in Section 3.

2. Protocol Description

2.1. **Overview.** The basic structure and usage of our protocol is same as those of Barnett-Smart and Castellà-Roca. Detail considerations and theoretical description can be found in [2].

The poker protocol can be divided into four parts: Deck Preparation (Protocol 1), Shuffle (Protocol 3), Card Drawing (Protocol 5) and Card Opening (Protocol 6).

To play a card game, players first use Deck Preparation to prepare a deck of cards. Players only need to prepare the deck once. After a deck being prepared, players can shuffle the deck or draw cards from the deck many times.

Players use Shuffle to shuffle the deck. When dealing cards, players can draw cards from the shuffled deck using Card Drawing. By using Card Opening, a player can show his hole cards to other players. Dealing a community card can be simulated by Card Drawing and Card Opening.

2.2. **Deck Preparation.** Let us fix a family of cyclic groups Γ that satisfies DDH assumption. We assume that there is a way to efficiently generate a group $G \in \Gamma$ for arbitrary large order and the group operation of G can be computed efficiently. For example, DDH assumption is generally believed to be true for the group of quadratic residues modulo a safe primes (a prime of the form $2p+1$ where p is a prime). For more detail consideration on the efficiency of G and Γ, please refer 4.1 of [12].

Let us fix a large prime n and a group $G \in \Gamma$ of order n. Consider there are N players playing with a deck of M cards. We name the cards in the deck as Card 1, Card 2, ..., Card M.

Protocol 1. *Deck Preparation*

(1) *Players generate distinct generators $a_i \in G$ for every $0 \leq i \leq M$ via some multiparty protocol, so that a_i are indistinguishable from independent uniform random variables (from the view of any proper subset of players).*
(2) $(a_i)_{0 \leq i \leq M} = a_0, a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_M$ *is the prepared deck of M cards.*

$(a_i)_{0\le i\le M}$ can be considered as the "face up" representation of the deck. a_0 is used as a "base" and for every $i \ge 1$, Card i is represented by a_i.

At step 1, players can choose any suitable protocol to generate a_i. For example, the following protocol is secure under DDH assumption.

Protocol 2. *Generate a random element*

(1) *For $j = 1, \ldots, N$, one by one, Player j does the following:*
  (a) *randomly choose generators $g_j, h_j \in G$ and randomly choose $0 < x_j < n$..*
  (b) *broadcast $g_j, g_j^{x_j}, h_j$.*
(2) *For $j = 1, \ldots, N$, one by one, Player j does the following:*
  (a) *broadcast $h_j^{x_j}$.*
  (b) *use an auxiliary input zero-knowledge argument ([10, 2] for example) to convince other players that $\log_{g_j} g_j^{x_j} = \log_{h_j} h_j^{x_j}$.*
(3) *The result element $h = \prod h_j^{x_j}$ is indistinguishable from a uniform random variable.*

The result h is indistinguishable from an independent uniform random variable if at least one player is honest.

2.3. **Shuffle.** Let $(a_i)_{0\le i\le M}$ be a prepared deck of cards. To shuffle the deck, a player first encrypts the deck as $(a_i^x)_{0\le i\le M}$ with a secret x. The encrypted deck $(a_i^x)_{0\le i\le M}$ can be considered as a "face down" representation of the deck. Then the player can mix the cards up, so that the shuffled deck becomes

$$a_0^x, a_{\pi(1)}^x, a_{\pi(2)}^x, \ldots, a_{\pi(M)}^x,$$

where π is a permutation. Conversely, given a properly shuffled deck

$$(b_i)_{0\le i\le M} = b_0, b_1, b_2, \ldots, b_M,$$

we can recover $x = \log_{a_0} b_0$ and π by comparing a_i^x and b_i (with unbounded computation power). That is, there is a unique face up deck corresponding to a properly shuffled deck. The player can use Protocol 4, which is a zero-knowledge proof, to convince other players that the result of his shuffle is proper.

Following is the detail description of the Shuffle protocol.

Protocol 3. *Shuffle*

(1) *Let $B_0 = (b_{0,i})$, where $b_{0,i} = a_i$.*
(2) *For $j = 1, \ldots, N$, one by one, Player j does the following:*
  (a) *randomly choose a secret integer $0 < x_j < n$;*
  (b) *randomly choose a permutation π_j of $(0, 1, 2, \ldots, M)$, such that $\pi_j(0) = 0$;*
  (c) *compute $B_j = (b_{j,i})$, where $b_{j,i} = \left(b_{j-1,\pi(i)}\right)^{x_j}$;*
  (d) *broadcast B_j to other players;*
  (e) *execute Protocol 4 with other players to prove his shuffle.*
(3) *$B = B_N = (b_{N,i})_{1\le i\le M}$ is the shuffled deck.*

Player j use the following protocol to prove his shuffle to other players at step 2(e) of Protocol 3.

Protocol 4. *Shuffle Verification*

(1) *Player j randomly chooses integers $0 < y_1, y_2, \cdots, y_K < n$.*

(2) *Player j randomly chooses permutations $\pi'_1, \pi'_2, \cdots, \pi'_K$ of $(0, 1, 2, 3, \ldots, M)$.*
(3) *Player j computes $C_k = (c_{k,i})_{0 \le i \le M}$, where $c_{k,i} = b^{y_k}_{j,\pi'_k(i)}$ for $k = 1, 2, \ldots, K$.*
(4) *For each $k = 1, 2, \cdots, K$*
   (a) *Player j broadcasts C_k to other players.*
   (b) *Other players cooperatively generate a bit e_k via some multiparty protocol, so that the of e_k is indistinguishable from a random bit.*
   (c) *Send e_k to Player j.*
   (d) *If $e_k = 0$, Player j broadcasts y_k, π'_k and every player compute $d_{k,i} = \left(b_{j,\pi'_k(i)}\right)^{y_k}$ for every i.*
   (e) *If $e_k = 1$, Player j broadcasts $x_k y_k$, $\pi'_k \pi_j$ and every player compute $d_{k,i} = \left(b_{j-1,\pi'_k\pi_j(i)}\right)^{x_k y_k}$ for every i.*
   (f) *If $d_{k,i} \ne c_{k,i}$ for any i, then Player j does not pass the verification.*
(5) *Player j passes the shuffle verification.*

The same verification scheme is also used in Barnett-Smart's and Castellà-Roca's protocol. Shuffle Verification is a zero-knowledge proof and if Player j does not shuffle properly, then the probability of players accepting Player j's shuffle is at most $2^{-K} + \epsilon$, where ϵ is negligible.

2.4. **Card Drawing and Opening.** Fix an arbitrary efficient auxiliary input zero-knowledge argument of equality of discrete logarithms (see [10, 2] for example). Player j_0 can use the following protocol to draw a card from the shuffled deck B.

Protocol 5. *Card Drawing*

(1) *Player j_0 picks a $c_0 \in B$.*
(2) *For $j = 1, 2, \cdots, N$, one by one, Player j does the followings:*
   (a) *if $j \ne j_0$, then compute $c_j = c_{j-1}^{x_j^{-1}}$;*
   (b) *if $j = j_0$, then compute $c_j = c_{j-1}$;*
   (c) *broadcast c_j;*
   (d) *if $j \ne j_0$, use the zero-knowledge argument to convince other players that $\log_{c_j} c_{j-1} = \log_{b_{j-1,0}} b_{j,0}$.*
(3) *Player j_0 computes $c = c_N^{x_{j_0}^{-1}}$ and finds the i for which $a_i = c$.*
(4) *Card i is the card Player j_0 drew.*

After Player j_0 has drew a Card i, he can reveal the card to other players by the following protocol.

Protocol 6. *Card Opening*

Player j_0 claims that he has Card i and use the auxiliary input zero-knowledge argument to show that $\log_{a_i} c_N = \log_{b_{j_0-1,0}} b_{j_0}$.

3. Security Analysis

3.1. **Overview.** Let us first consider an ideal model of card game, the *physically secure ideal card game*, or *ideal game* in short.

In a *physically secure ideal card game*, the shuffle is done by a trusted third party and no player can track the shuffle. No player can mark, steal, duplicate, or forge cards. No player can peek any face down card other than his own cards. However, players can communicate to each other via reliable and safe private channels and open channel.

Players, including malicious players, are modeled as auxiliary input polynomial time Turing machines. The goal of a mental poker protocol is to allow players to play a card game over the network resemble an ideal game. We use the terminology "game history" to denote the complete information of the idea game that the mental game tries to mimic. The game history can be considered as the "pure card game" part of the transcript of a mental game.

To prove the security of our protocol, we show that cheaters can do no *better* in a mental card game than in an ideal game. Let us explain what we mean by "better". Let A be an event of the card game, that is, A is an event that can be decided by the game history alone. Denote by $\Pr_{mental}(A)$, $\Pr_{ideal}(A)$ the probability of A in a mental game, and an ideal game, respectively.

Definition 1. Let Z be a group of players. Assume all other players are honest and play the same way in the mental game as in the ideal game. Let A be an arbitrary event of card game and C be the event that Z is caught on cheating in the mental game. Say Z *does no better in the mental game for event* A if for any polynomial time strategy S of the mental game for Z, we can efficiently derive an expected polynomial time strategy S' of the ideal game for Z, so that $\Pr_{mental}(A \backslash C) - \Pr_{ideal}(A) < \epsilon$, where ϵ is negligible.

For convenience, we consider the event C in above definition as an event of card game and $\Pr_{ideal}(C) = 0$. If all players play honestly, we should have $\Pr_{mental}(A) = \Pr_{ideal}(A)$. A can be any event of the card game. However, we are mostly interested in those can be efficiently decided, i.e., can be decided by an auxiliary input polynomial time machine and game history.

Note that S' is expected polynomial time, not a polynomial time strategy like S. This is a situation not unlike that of the definition of zero-knowledge. Since the definition of zero-knowledge is generally accepted, this may not be a big issue. However, one may still wish to have the same notion of efficiency for both S and S'. It is possible to allow both S and S' being in a wider class of efficient machine (see [17, 20] or what we suggested in [25]).

We prove in Theorem 2 that if there is at least one honest player, then for any event A that can be decided efficiently, no cheater can do better in mental games. Therefore, no player can increase his chance of winning a poker (or bridge, blackjack) game in our protocol by cheating. No player can lose a mental game more than he can in an ideal game. The information that a player learns in a mental game does not help his future games more than what he can learn in an ideal game.

Since players can private communication channels, there is no way to prevent coalitions entirely. What a mental poker protocol can do is to "minimize the effect of coalitions", as stated in Crépeau's requirements ([13]). That is, having coalitions should get no more advantage in a mental game than in an ideal game.

To simplify the proof of Theorem 2, we consider the worst scenario for the honest player. We can assume that there are 3 players in the card game and Player 2 is the only honest player, Bob. Player 1 and Player 3 are both played by the adversary, Alice. It is easy to check that it is enough to prove the security for this setting.

In order to to simplify our proof, we introduce a sequence of games in Section 3.2. This a common technique to present an otherwise complicate security proof (see [24] for more information). Fix an event A of the card game. We define a series of games played by Alice and Bob, where the first game, Game 0, is the mental game and last game, Game 8, is the ideal game. For every k, Alice wins Game k if A occurs and she is not caught on cheating.

Fix a strategy S_0 of Game 0 for Alice. We show in Theorem 2 that there is a correspondence strategy S_k for Game k, such that Alice does no worse in Game k then in Game $k-1$.

3.2. **Games.** Let us fix a card game of 3 players. Fix an event $A = A \backslash C$ of the card game that can be efficiently decided, where C is the event Alice being caught on cheating. Following games are played by the honest player Bob and the adversary Alice. Since Bob is honest, he has a card game strategy that depends only on game history and and other information he supposed to know in the ideal game, like his hole cards. He use the same card game strategy to play all following games.

3.2.1. *Game 0.* Alice and Bob play the card game using our mental poker protocol. Bob plays the card game as Player 2. Player 1 and Player 3 are played by Alice. Bob follows the protocol properly but Alice may cheat. Alice wins Game 0 iff event A occurs.

3.2.2. *Game 1.* Game 1 is similar to Game 0, but after step 2(e) of Shuffle (Protocol 3), Bob attempts to extract x'_1 and x'_3 from Alice, where $x'_j = \log_{b_{j-1,0}} b_{j,0}$. Note that if Alice follows the Protocol 3 properly, then $x'_j = x_j$, for $j = 1, 2, 3$.

If Alice does not pass Shuffle Verification (Protocol 4), then Bob wins.

Otherwise, Alice passes the Shuffle Verification. Let (e_k) be the bits generated at step 4(b) of Shuffle Verification. Bob then uses Alice as a blackbox to extract x'_j:

Protocol 7. *Extract* x_j

For each $k = 1, 2, \ldots, K$,

1. *Rewinds Alice back to step 4(b) for* k *of Shuffle Verification.*
2. *Run step 4(b)-4(f) of Shuffle Verification and let* e'_k *be the random bit generated at step 4(b).*
3. *If Alice does not passes the verification at step 4(f) of Shuffle Verification, got to step 1.*

If some e'_k is different from the e_k, then Bob knows both y_k and $x_j y_k$ and he can easily calculate $x'_j = x_j y_k / y_k$. Note that if Bob can extract x'_j, then B_j is properly shuffled by 4(d)(e) of Protocol 4.

Let A_1 be the event that Alice passes Shuffle Verification but Bob can not extract both x'_1, x'_3. Alice wins Game 1 iff event $A \backslash A_1$ occurs.

3.2.3. *Game 2.* Similar to Game 1, but Bob uses the knowledge of $x_1 = x'_1$ and $x_3 = x'_3$ to detect cheating. That is, in addition to the zero-knowledge argument at step 2(d) in Card Drawing (Protocol 5) and Card Opening (Protocol 6), Bob also checks whether $\log_{c_j} c_{j-1} = x_j$ directly for $j = 1, 3$ if $j \neq j_0$.

Let A_2 be the event that Alice is caught on cheating by the additional cheating detection. Alice wins Game 2 iff $A \backslash (A_1 \cup A_2)$.

3.2.4. *Game 3.* Same as Game 2, except that Bob uses a different way to decrypt cards at step 2(a) and 3 of Card Drawing (Protocol 5). Suppose $c_0 = b_{N,\pi_3\pi_2\pi_1(i)}$. Bob first use the knowledge of x_1, x_3 to recover π_1, π_3 efficiently.

If $j_0 \neq 2$, instead of computing $c_2 = c_1^{x_2^{-1}}$, Bob compute c_2 as

$$\begin{cases} a_i^{x_1 x_3} & \text{if } j_0 = 1 \\ a_i^{x_3} & \text{if } j_0 = 3 \end{cases}$$

at step 2(a) of Protocol 5.

If $j_0 = 2$, instead of computing $c = c_3^{x_2^{-1}}$, Bob compute $c = a_i$ at step 3 of Protocol 5.

Note that the value of c_2 and c remain the same, Bob merely uses a different way to compute them. Alice wins Game 3 iff $A \backslash (A_1 \cup A_2)$.

3.2.5. *Game 4.* Same as Game 3, except that

(1) At step 2(d) of Card Drawing (Protocol 5), Bob does not execute the zero-knowledge argument to prove $\log_{c_2} c_1 = \log_{b_{1,0}} b_{2,0}$. Instead, Bob runs the simulator for the zero-knowledge argument and generates a transcript that is indistinguishable to the real transcript.
(2) Bob does not use Shuffle Verification(Protocol 4) to prove his shuffle at 2(e) of Shuffle) (Protocol 3). Instead, Bob uses the following simulator to generate a transcript:

Protocol 8. *Simulator for Shuffle Verification*

For each $k = 1, 2, \ldots, K$

(a) *Choose a random bit* e'*, a random* $0 < y < n$ *and a random permutation* π'
(b) *If* $e' = 0$*, compute* $(c_i)_{0 \leq i \leq M}$*, where* $c_i = b^y_{j,\pi'(i)}$.
(c) *If* $e' = 1$*, compute* $(c_i)_{0 \leq i \leq M}$*, where* $c_i = b^y_{j-1,\pi'(i)}$.
(d) *Use Alice as a blackbox and run step 4(b) of Shuffle Verification to generate a random bit* e *by treating* $(c_i)_{0 \leq i \leq M}$ *as* C_k.
(e) *If* $e \neq e'$*, go to step (a).*
(f) *Write* $(c_i)_{0 \leq i \leq M}$*, the transcript generated in step 2(d),* e*,* y*,* π' *into the transcript.*

Alice wins Game 4 iff $A \backslash (A_1 \cup A_2)$ occurs.

3.2.6. *Game 5.* Same as Game 4 except that Bob uses a different way to generate $B_2 = (b_{2,i})_{0 \leq i \leq M}$ in Shuffle (Step 2(a)-(c) of Protocol 3).

Bob does not do Step 2(a)-(c) of Protocol 3. Instead, recall that $(a_i)_{0 \leq i \leq M}$ is the face up deck generated in Deck Preparation (Protocol 1). Bob generates a random x and let $f_i = a_i^x$. He uses the knowledge of x_1 to recover π_1 and computes $b_{2,i} = f_{\pi_2 \circ \pi_1(i)}$, where π_2 is a random permutation that $\pi_2(0) = 0$.

3.2.7. *Game 6.* Same as Game 5, except that Bob generates uniformly random f_i and does not generate x. Alice wins Game 6 iff $A \backslash (A_1 \cup A_2)$ occurs

3.2.8. *Game 7.* Same as Game 6, except that Bob uses a different way to encrypt cards. Instead of computing $b_{2,i} = f_{\pi_2(i)}$, Bob computes $b_{2,i} = f_i$. Bob still generates π_2 privately, which is used for card drawing (see the description of Game 3).

Put all modification together, Alice and Bob play Game 7 as following:

Deck Preparation: Protocol 1.

Shuffle:

Protocol 9. *Game 7 Shuffle*

(1) *Let* $B_0 = (b_{0,i})$, *where* $b_{0,i} = a_i$.
(2) *Run step 2 of Shuffle (Protocol 3) to generate* B_1.
(3) *Rewind the game to extract* x_1 *from Alice (Protocol 7).*
(4) *Generate a random* $B_2 = (b_{2,i})_{0 \le i \le M}$.
(5) *Simulate the Shuffle Verification and generate an indistinguishable transcript (Protocol 8).*
(6) *Run step 2 of Shuffle (Protocol 3) to generate* B_3 *from* B_2.
(7) *Rewind the game to extract* x_3 *from Alic (Protocol 7).*
(8) *Let* $B = (b_{N,i})_{1 \le i \le M}$ *be the shuffled deck.*

Moreover, Bob also privately generates a permutation π_2 *such that* $\pi_2(0) = 0$.

After the shuffle, Bob can recover π_1, π_3 by x_1 and x_3. Let $\pi = \pi_3\pi_2\pi_1$. When Alice and Bob run steps from the original protocols, Alice runs the steps the same way as she would in Game 0.

Card Drawing:

Protocol 10. *When Player* j_0 *draws a face down card* $c_0 = b_{i'}$ *from a shuffled deck* B.

(1) *Bob computes* $i = \pi^{-1}(i')$
(2) *If* $j_0 \neq 2$ *(when Alice draws the card):*
    (a) *Run step 2(a)-(d) of Card Drawing (Protocol 5) to generate* c_1.
    (b) *Bob broadcasts*

$$c_2 = \begin{cases} a_i^{x_1 x_3} & \text{if } j_0 = 1 \\ a_i^{x_3} & \text{if } j_0 = 3 \end{cases}$$

    and uses the simulator to generate a fake transcript of zero-knowledge argument.
    (c) *Run step 2(a)-(d) of Card Drawing (Protocol 5) to generate* c_3.
    (d) *Alice can run step 3, 4 of Card Drawing (Protocol 5) to find out* i.
(3) *If* $j_0 = 2$ *(when Bob draws the card):*
    (a) *Run step 2 of Card Drawing (Protocol 5).*
    (b) *Bob knows that the card he drew is Card* i.

Card Opening:

Alice uses Card Opening (Protocol 6). Bob opens the card by showing i and then use the simulator to generate a fake transcript of zero-knowledge argument.

Alice wins Game 7 iff $A \backslash (A_1 \cup A_2)$ occurs.

3.2.9. *Game 8.* Alice and Bob play the card game using the following protocol.

Shuffle: Bob randomly choose a π.

Drawing: Player j_0 picks a number $i_0 \le M$. Bob sends $\pi^{-1}(i_0)$ to Player j_0.

Opening: When a player wish to open a face down card i_0, Bob announces $\pi^{-1}(i_0)$.

This is the idea game where Bob acts as a trusted party. Bob uses the same card game strategy of Game 0 to play Game 8. Alice uses the partial information of π that Bob sent her and the real game history of Game 8 to simulate a correspondent Game 7. Then she copies her next move in the simulation to play Game 8. If Alice is caught on cheating or $A_2 \cup A_1$ occurs in the simulated game, then Alice continues to play Game 8 randomly.

Alice wins Game 8 iff event A occurs.

3.3. **Security Proof.**

Theorem 2. *Assume K is bounded by a polynomial of n and 2^{-K} is negligible, where $K = K(n)$ is the parameter in Shuffle Verification (Protocol 4). Assume the running time T of the card game is bounded by a polynomial of n and all players are modeled as auxiliary input polynomial time Turing machine. If there is at least one honest player, then cheaters can do no better in mental game than in ideal game for any event of card game that can be efficiently decided.*

Proof. As discussed in Section 3.1, we fix a card game of 3 players. Alice plays as Player 1 and Player 3. Bob plays as Player 2 honestly. Both Alice and Bob are modeled as auxiliary input polynomial time Turing machines. Fix an event $A = A \backslash C$ of the card game that can be efficiently decided, where C is the event Alice being caught on cheating.

Let P_k be the probability that Alice wins Game k. We need to show that $P_k \leq P_{k+1} + \epsilon$ for $k = 0, \ldots, 7$, where ϵ is a negligible function.

($|P_0 - P_1| < \epsilon$)

Game 1 and Game 0 are otherwise the same except A_1 occurs. We have $|P_0 - P_1| \leq \Pr(A_1)$.

Recall that A_1 is the event that Alice passes the Shuffle Verification but Bob can not extract both x_1', x_3'.

Let G_t be the event that a Shuffle Verification starts at time t (in Game 0) and Alice, as a prover, passes the Shuffle Verification.

Also let E_t be the event that G_t occurs and Bob can not extract x_1' or x_3' for the Shuffle Verification starts at time t.

Note that there are at most T executions of Shuffle Verification in a mental game, so $\Pr(A_1) \leq \varsigma \cdot \sup_t \Pr(E_t)$, where ς is the polynomial time bound of T. Therefore, we only need to show that $\sup_t \Pr(E_t)$ is negligible. The following lemma implies that $\sup_t \Pr(E_t)$ is negligible

Lemma. *For every m, for large enough n,* $\Pr(E_t) < n^{-m}$ for all t..

Proof. Fix an arbitrary m. Let $E_{t,k}'$ be the event that a Shuffle Verification starts at time t and Alice, as a prover, passes the step 4(f) in Shuffle Verification for k.

Assume E_t occurs. Denote by $s_{t,k}$ the transcript of Game 0 before step 4(b) for k in the Shuffle Verification. Let

$$S = \{(z_k) \,|\, \Pr((s_{t,k}) = (z_k)\,|G_t) > 0\},$$

the space of all possible transcripts.

Recall that Bob extracts x_j' by repeatedly rewinding Alice until Alice passes the step 4(f) again for every k.

Since the bit generated in step 4(b) is indistinguishable from a random bit, we have

$$\Pr\left(e'_k = e_k | s_{t,k} = z_k\right) \le \frac{\frac{1}{2}+\epsilon}{\Pr\left(E'_{t,k} | s_{t,k} = z\right)},$$

for all possible transcript $(z_k) \in S$ and some negligible ϵ. Note that the event $e'_k = e_k$ depends only on $s_{t,k}$.

Bob can extract x'_j unless $e'_k = e_k$ for all $1 \le k \le K$. Therefore,

$$\Pr\left(E_t | \left(s_{t,k}\right) = (z_k)\right) \le \frac{\left(\frac{1}{2}+\epsilon\right)^K}{\prod_k \Pr\left(E'_{t,k} | s_{t,k} = z_k\right)}.$$

Let $\varepsilon = \left(\frac{1}{2}+\epsilon\right)^K$, which is negligible.

Let

$$S_1 = \left\{ (z_k) \in S | 0 < \prod_k \Pr\left(E'_{t,k} | s_{t,k} = z_k\right) < n^{2m} \cdot \varepsilon \right\},$$

$$S_2 = \left\{ (z_k) \in S | n^{2m} \cdot \varepsilon \le \prod_k \Pr\left(E'_{t,k} | s_{t,k} = z_k\right) \right\}.$$

When $(z_k) \in S_2$,

$$\Pr\left(E_t | \left(s_{t,k}\right) = (z_k)\right) \le \frac{\varepsilon}{n^{2m} \cdot \varepsilon} = n^{-2m}.$$

Let event $F_t = G_t \cap \left(s_{t,k}\right) \in S_1$ and $F'_t = G_t \cap \left(s_{t.k}\right) \in S_2$. Note that E_t only depends on $\left(s_{t,k}\right)$, not on G_t, so

$$\Pr\left(E_t | \left(s_{t,k}\right) = (z_k) \cap G_t\right) = \Pr\left(E_t | \left(s_{t,k}\right) = (z_k)\right).$$

We have

$$\begin{array}{rcl} \Pr\left(E_t | F'_t\right) & = \sum_{z \in S_2} & \Pr\left(E_t | \left(s_{t,k}\right) = (z_k)\right) \Pr\left(\left(s_{t,k}\right) = (z_k) | F'_t\right) \\ & \le & n^{-2m}. \end{array}$$

On the other hand, For fix an arbitrary $(z_k) \in S_1$, since

$$\Pr\left(E'_{t,k} \cap s_{t,k} = z_k\right) \quad = \quad \Pr\left(E'_{t,k} | s_{t,k} = z_k\right) \Pr\left(s_{t,k} = z_k\right)$$

and

$$\Pr\left(s_{t,k} = z_k\right) = \Pr\left(s_{t,k} = z_k | E'_{t,k-1} \cap s_{t,k-1} = z_{k-1}\right) \Pr\left(E'_{t,k-1} \cap s_{t,k-1} = z_{k-1}\right),$$

we have

$$\Pr\left(E'_{t,K} \cap s_{t,K} = z_K | s_{t,1} = z_1\right) \quad \le \quad n^{2m} \varepsilon \prod_{k=2}^{K} \Pr\left(s_{t,k} = z_k | E'_{t,k-1} \cap s_{t,k-1} = z_{k-1}\right).$$

Observe that, for any z_{k-1},

$$\sum_{z'_k} \Pr\left(s_{t,k} = z'_k | E'_{t,k-1} \cap s_{t,k-1} = z_{k-1}\right) = 1.$$

So, let $S_0 = \{(z'_k) \in S | z'_1 = z_1\}$, we have

$$\sum_{(z'_k) \in S_0} \prod_{k=2}^{K} \Pr\left(s_{t,k} = z'_k | E'_{t,k-1} \cap s_{t,k-1} = z'_{k-1}\right) = 1.$$

Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned}\Pr\left(E'_{t,K}\cap(s_{t,k})\in S_1\cap s_{t,1}=z_1\right) &= \sum_{(z'_k)\in S_0}\Pr\left(E'_{t,K}\cap s_{t,K}=z'_K\right)\\ &\le n^{2m}\varepsilon\Pr\left(s_{t,1}=z_1\right).\end{aligned}$$

Since $G_t=E'_{t,K}$, we have $F_t=E'_{t,K}\cap(s_{t,k})\in S_1$ and

$$\begin{aligned}\Pr\left(F_t\right) &= \textstyle\sum_{z_1}\Pr\left(F_t|s_{t,1}=z_1\right)\Pr\left(s_{t,1}=z_1\right)\\ &\le n^{2m}\varepsilon\sum_{z_1}\Pr\left(s_{t,1}=z_1\right)\\ &\le n^{2m}\varepsilon.\end{aligned}$$

Thus,

$$\begin{aligned}\Pr\left(E_t|G_t\right) &= \Pr\left(F_t|G_t\right)\Pr\left(E_t|F_t\right)+\Pr\left(F'_t|G_t\right)\Pr\left(E_t|F'_t\right)\\ &\le \Pr\left(F_t\right)/\Pr\left(G_t\right)+\Pr\left(E_t|F'_t\right)\\ &< n^{2m}\varepsilon/\Pr\left(G_t\right)+n^{-2m}\end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned}\Pr\left(E_t\right) &= \Pr\left(E_t|G_t\right)\cdot\Pr\left(G_t\right)\\ &\le n^{2m}\varepsilon+n^{-2m}\\ &< n^{-m}\end{aligned}$$

essentially. □

($|P_2-P_1|=\epsilon$)

$|P_2-P_1|\le\Pr(A_2)$. Because of the soundness, $\Pr(A_2)\le\varepsilon\cdot\varsigma$, where ε is the possibility that the cheating prover convinces the verifier a false statement being true in the zero-knowledge argument and ς is the polynomial bound of the running time of Game 0. Thus, $\Pr(A_2)$ is negligible.

($P_2=P_3$)

Bob uses a different way to decrypt cards that does not affect the result. Therefore, $P_2=P_3$.

($|P_3-P_4|=\epsilon$)

In Game 4, zero-knowledge arguments are replaced by simulations.

For the modification described in (2) of Game 4, note that e' is independent to (c_i). Thus, the distribution of the transcript generated by the simulator identical to the real one. So, this modification does not affect the game.

Therefore, we only need to consider the modification in (1) of Game 4.

Let s be the transcript of Game 3 and s' be the transcript of Game 4. Since the running time T of Game 0 is bounded by a polynomial of n, the length of s and s' is also bounded by a polynomial of n, say L_0.

Fix an arbitrary auxiliary input expected polynomial time Turing machineα, we shall show that

$$\left|\Pr\left(\alpha\left(s\right)=1\right)-\Pr\left(\alpha\left(s'\right)=1\right)\right|$$

is negligible.

Let t be a transcript of Game 3 or Game 4 and $l\le L_0$. Denote by t_l the shortest initial segment of t, such that the sub-transcripts of the zero-knowledge argument or the simulation are not being truncated, and the length of t_l is at least l. We call t_l a truncated transcript.

Given a truncated transcript t_l, Alice and Bob can continue playing Game 4 and complete the transcript. Then, run α for the generated transcript. The whole procedure can be viewed as an auxiliary input expected polynomial time algorithm β. The expected running time of β is bounded by $T_\beta = T_4 + T_\alpha$, where T_4, T_α are the time bound of Game 4 and α, respectively.

Fix a transcript t_l and view it as auxiliary input of length at most L_0. We have

$$|\Pr(\beta(t_l + u) = 1) - \Pr(\beta(t_l + u') = 1)| < \epsilon_0$$

for a negligible function ϵ_0, where u is the transcript generated by the zero-knowledge argument and u' is the transcript generated by simulation. By the following lemma,

$$|\Pr(\alpha(s) = 1) - \Pr(\alpha(s') = 1)| \quad \leq \quad L\epsilon_0.$$

Therefore, s and s' are indistinguishable. In particular, $|P_3 - P_4|$ is negligible.

Lemma.

$$|\Pr(\beta(s_l) = 1) - \Pr(\beta(s_l') = 1)| < l\epsilon_0.$$

In particular

$$|\Pr(\alpha(s) = 1) - \Pr(\alpha(s') = 1)| \leq L\epsilon_0.$$

Proof. We prove this by induction. The case $l = 0$ is clearly true. Suppose when $l \leq l_0$,

$$|\Pr(\beta(s_l) = 1) - \Pr(\beta(s_l') = 1)| < l\epsilon_0.$$

Fix an arbitrary truncated transcript t_{l_0}. Let $u = u(t_{l_0})$ be the random variable so that $t_{l_0+1} = t_{l_0} + u$ if we generate t_{l_0+1} from t_0 by running Game 3. Let $u' = u'(t_{l_0})$ be the random variable so that $t_{l_0+1} = t_{l_0} + u'$ if we generate t_{l_0+1} from t_0 by running Game 4.

If u, u' are the transcript of the zero-knowledge argument and the one generated by simulation, then

$$|\Pr(\beta(t_{l_0} + u) = 1) - \Pr(\beta(t_{l_0} + u') = 1)| < \epsilon_0.$$

Otherwise, the distributions of u and u' are identical.

Thus, since $s_{l_0+1} = s_{l_0} + u(s_{l_0})$, we have

$$|\Pr(\beta(s_{l_0+1}) = 1) - \Pr(\beta(s_{l_0} + u'(s_{l_0})) = 1)| < \epsilon_0.$$

For any truncated transcript t, observer that $u'(t)$ is what Game 4 would generate next after t, so $\beta(t + u'(t)) = \beta(t)$. Thus, by induction hypothesis, we have

$$\begin{array}{cc} & \left|\Pr(\beta(s_{l_0} + u'(s_{l_0})) = 1) - \Pr\left(\beta\left(s'_{l_0+1}\right) = 1\right)\right| \\ = & \left|\Pr(\beta(s_{l_0}) = 1) - \Pr\left(\beta\left(s'_{l_0}\right) = 1\right)\right| \\ < & l_0\epsilon_0 \end{array}.$$

Therefore,

$$\left|\Pr(\beta(s_{l_0+1}) = 1) - \Pr\left(\beta\left(s'_{l_0+1}\right) = 1\right)\right| < (l_0 + 1)\epsilon_0.$$

□

$(P_4 = P_5)$

Bob uses a different way to generate B_2 that does not affect the result. Therefore, $P_4 = P_5$.

$(|P_5 - P_6| = \epsilon)$

DDH assumption implies that the distribution of $(f_i)_{0\le i\le M}$ in Game 5 and Game 6 are indistinguishable. Since the game is played efficiently, $|P_5 - P_6| = \epsilon$.

$(P_6 = P_7)$

Since $(f_i)_{i\le M}$ is random, this is only a conceptional change to emphasize that π is information theoretically secure. Clearly, $P_6 = P_7$.

$(P_7 \le P_8 + \epsilon)$

The first difference between Game 7 and Game 8 is that $(a_i)_{i\le M}$ in Game 7 is generated by Deck Preparation (Protocol 1). Since, $(a_i)_{i\le M}$ is indistinguishable to random distribution from the Alice's point of view, this difference is negligible.

The second difference is that when Alice is caught on cheating or $A_1 \cup A_2$ occurred in Game 7, then Alice plays randomly.

Since Alice loses Game 7 if $A_1 \cup A_2$, we have $P_7 \le P_8 + \epsilon$. □

In some sense, the theorem states that under the game history of Game 8 and Game 0 are indistinguishable unless the event C, Alice being caught on cheating , occurs. In particular, if $\Pr_{mental}(C)$ is negligible, then the game history of Game 8 and Game 0 are indistinguishable. Moreover, the transcript of Game 0 and Game 7 are also indistinguishable.

Sometimes, we may wish to study the utility function of cheaters.

Corollary 3. *Let X be a bounded random variable that can be computed efficiently from the game history. Assume $E[X|C] = 0$ and $X \ge 0$. Then we have $E_0[X] \le E_8[X] + \epsilon$, where $E_k[X]$ is the expectation of X for Game k.*

Proof. Let m be an arbitrary integer and A be the event that $\frac{i}{n^m} < X \le \frac{i+1}{n^m}$, where i is considered as an auxiliary input. By Theorem 2, $P_0 < P_8 + \epsilon$. Since we may assume

$$i = \arg\max_j \left| \Pr\left(\frac{j}{n^m} < X \le \frac{j+1}{n^m}\right) - \Pr\left(\frac{j}{n^m} < X \le \frac{j+1}{n^m}\right) \right|,$$

we have

$$E_0[X] < E_8[X] + n^m\varepsilon + n^{-m} < E_8[X] + \frac{1}{2}n^{-m}$$

essentially. Therefore, $E_0[X] \le E_8[X] + \epsilon$. □

4. Efficiency Analysis

4.1. **Computational cost.** In this section, we compare the computational cost (time) of our protocol to similar protocols, namely, Castellà-Roca ([6]), and Barnett-Smart ([2]).

All these protocols are discrete logarithm based. The most time consuming operations in these protocols are exponentiation and zero-knowledge argument of equality of discrete logarithms. In order to compare with the result of [6], the computational cost of multiplication is also considered. The computational cost of other operations are assumed to be much cheaper and can be ignored. Denote by z, e, m the computational cost of a zero-knowledge proof, an exponentiation, a multiplication respectively.

Assume the game played by N players with a deck of M cards. The cost of the Shuffle is compared in 4.2, and the cost of Card Opening and Drawing is compared in 4.2.

To give some ideas of empirical execution time and how practical these protocols might be, we make some estimations of execution time in 4.4.

4.2. **Shuffle.** Shuffle is usually the most time consuming part of a mental poker protocol.

Recall the security parameter K in Shuffle Verification (Protocol 4). We have the following table (the calculation of the computational cost of Castellà-Roca and Barnett-Smart can be found in [6]) .

Table 1. Computational cost for Shuffle

	Total cost	Cost for each player
Protocol 3	$(KN+1)(M+1)Ne+\frac{1}{2}KNm$	$(KN+1)(M+1)e+\frac{1}{2}Km$
Castellà-Roca	$2(KN+1)MNe+\frac{1}{2}KMNm$	$2(KN+1)Me+\frac{1}{2}KMm$
Barnett-Smart	$2(KN+1)MN(e+m)+Mm$	$2(KN+1)Me+\left(2KN+2+\frac{1}{N}\right)Mm$

Our shuffle is roughly twice as fast as others. If the computational cost m of multiplication is ignored, then Castellà-Roca and Barnett-Smart have the same cost.

4.3. **Card Opening and Drawing.** Card Opening and Drawing are much cheaper compare to Shuffle. The following table compares the computational cost of Card Opening and Card Drawing.

Table 2. Total computational cost for drawing and opening

	Card Opening	Card Drawing
Ours	z	$(N-1)z+Ne$
Castellà-Roca	$z+(N-1)e$	$(N-1)z+\left(N+\frac{M}{2}\right)e$
Barnett-Smart	$z+N(N-1)m$	$(N-1)z+Ne+Nm$

Our protocol is faster than the rest, but only slightly. If the computation cost m of multiplication is ignored, then the computational cost of ours and Barnett-Smart are the same.

4.4. **Execution time.** To give some sense of empirical execution time, let us assume $M=52$ and $N=9$, which is typical for a full table poker game.

On an AMD X2 3800+ 2Ghz, which is fairly mediocrity in today's PC hardware standard, e and m are about 4.4×10^{-4} and 1.3×10^{-6} seconds for 512 bits integers (when using both cores). We have the following estimation.

Table 3. Computational cost (seconds) for each player (512 bits)

	$K=10$	$K=20$	$K=100$
Protocol 3	2.12	4.22	21.01
Castellà-Roca	4.16	8.28	41.23
Barnett-Smart	4.18	8.31	41.35

On the same machine, e and m is about 3×10^{-3} and 3×10^{-6} seconds for 1024 bits integers. We have the following estimation.

TABLE 4. Computational cost (seconds) for each player (1024 bits)

	$K = 10$	$K = 20$	$K = 100$
Protocol 3	14.47	28.78	143.26
Castellà-Roca	28.39	56.47	281.12
Barnett-Smart	28.42	56.53	281.39

The difference between Castellà-Roca and Barnett-Smart are less than 1% and ours is roughly twice as fast.

Considering it is reasonable to expect a human player taking 10 to 15 seconds to shuffle and cut a deck physically, these protocols seems to be nearly practical when using 512 bits primes and lower security parameter K. Since our protocol is the fastest, it is more close to be practical than others.

When using 1024 bits primes and $K = 100$, all protocols are too slow.

To estimate the execution time of Card opening and Card Drawing, assume using Chaum-Pedersen's protocol (see [9]) as the zero-knowledge argument. Thus, $z = (2N-1)(2e+m)$. We have the following table.

TABLE 5. Total computational cost when using Chaum-Pedersen

	Opening + Drawing
Our protocol	$\left(4N^2 - N\right) e + \left(2N^2 - N\right) m$
Castellà-Roca	$\left(4N^2 - 1 + \frac{M}{2}\right) e + \left(2N^2 - N\right) m$
Barnett-Smart	$\left(4N^2 - N\right) e + \left(3N^2 - N\right) m$

Note that theoretically, Chaum-Pedersen's protocol is only known to be honest verifier zero-knowledge. However, it is widely used and it serves well for a rough estimation of empirical execution time. We have the following table.

TABLE 6. Total computational cost (seconds) when using Chaum-Pedersen

	Opening + Drawing (512 bits)	Opening + Drawing (1024 bits)
Our protocol	0.139	0.945
Castellà-Roca	0.154	1.047
Barnett-Smart	0.139	0.946

The computational cost of ours and Barnett-Smart are roughly the same, while Castellà-Roca is about 10% slower. The speed of Card Drawing and Opening of these protocols seems to be acceptable for practical use.

5. CONCLUSION

Our protocol is proved to be secure in Section 3 under DDH assumption. Theorem 2roughly states that cheating will be detected and other than that, the mental game is indistinguishable from the ideal game.

However, there are limitations of the security proof. For example, we assume the cheater loses if he is caught on cheating for every event A. To make this assumption practical, the penalty and compensation of cheating should be high enough. Moreover, the execution time of Game 8 is longer than Game 0. We implicitly assume the difference is insignificant.

Our protocol is fast. Considering the advance of computer hardware, efficient protocols like Castellà-Roca and Barnett-Smart may become fast enough to be practical in a few years. Our protocol is even faster, requires only half of the computing power to achieve same performance. We didn't discuss the communication costs of our protocol. However, for it can be easily verify that the communication cost of our protocol is also cheaper, roughly half as much compares to other protocols.

We hope our contribution can shorten the gap between theoretical study and the practical application of mental poker.

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