

Generating Pairing-friendly Parameters for the CM Construction of Genus 2 Curves over Prime Fields

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Abstract. We present two contributions in this paper. First, we give a quantitative analysis of the scarcity of pairing-friendly genus 2 curves, assuming the Riemann Hypothesis. This result is an improvement relative to prior work which estimated the density of pairing-friendly genus 2 curves heuristically. Second, we present a method for generating pairing-friendly parameters for which $\rho \approx 8$, where ρ is a measure of efficiency in pairing-based cryptography. This method works by solving a system of equations given in terms of coefficients of the Frobenius element. The algorithm is easy to understand and implement.

1 Introduction

In order to use the Jacobian variety of a curve over a finite field for discrete logarithm based cryptography, suitable parameters must be chosen, and a curve with those parameters must be found. One such parameter is the underlying finite field \mathbb{F}_p over which the curve is defined. Another important parameter is the cardinality N of the group of \mathbb{F}_p -rational points on the Jacobian of the curve. For many implementations of discrete logarithm based cryptographic protocols, \mathbb{F}_p is a prime field, i.e., p is a prime number, and N is prime number or a prime times a small cofactor, to resist the Pohlig-Hellman attack [19] on the discrete logarithm problem. Pairing-based cryptography poses further restrictions on the curves since in addition a small embedding degree is required.

Genus 2 point-counting methods ([13], [11]) choose random curve equations over a finite field and compute the number of points on the Jacobian of the curve until one that is good for discrete logarithm-based cryptography is found. An alternative to point counting is to use the genus 2 Complex Multiplication (CM) algorithm ([25]) to construct curves with a given number of points on its Jacobian. Like the case of the elliptic curve CM method, the genus 2 CM method is very efficient once the class polynomials of the CM field are computed. The hard problem is to find CM fields such that the class polynomials can be computed *and* such that the order of the Jacobian of the curve N and the embedding degree are suitable. For a history of the genus 2 CM method, the reader can refer to [6]. In brief, the algorithm works as follows: Let K be a quartic CM field with primitive CM type.

1. Find a prime p such that there exists $\omega \in K$ with $\omega\bar{\omega} = p$, and an integer N depending on p and \mathcal{O}_K which will be the group order of the Jacobian of the genus 2 curve having CM by \mathcal{O}_K . Such p and N can be identified by using a method in [25].
2. Compute the Igusa class polynomials $H_i(x)$, $i = 1, 2, 3$ of K . This step can be done using the methods as described in one of [23], [25], [6], [14].
3. Construct a curve C from a set of roots of $H_i(x)$ over \mathbb{F}_p via the Mestre-Cardona-Quer Algorithm [18], [5], and check if the Jacobian of the curve has order N .

In practice to use the CM method, the quartic CM field K must have small discriminant. So it is desirable to have algorithms which take as input a given field K , and output good cryptographic parameters p and N for a curve C over \mathbb{F}_p with $\#\text{Jac}(C, \mathbb{F}_p) = N$, where $\text{Jac}(C, \mathbb{F}_p)$ denotes the \mathbb{F}_p -rational points of the Jacobian of the curve C .

The genus 2 CM method is a useful alternative to point counting, since genus 2 point counting methods are still slow, and the low density of pairing-friendly curves among cryptographically strong ones, as we will see in Section 4, makes it extremely hard to find suitable curves for pairing-based cryptography via point counting. This indicates that the CM method is probably the only suitable method for finding pairing-friendly genus 2 curves currently available. In this paper, we

present a method for generating pairing-friendly parameters for the CM construction of genus 2 curves.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews related work. Section 3 gives background on CM fields and pairings. Section 4 shows quantitatively the scarcity of pairing-friendly genus 2 curve among all those that are suitable for discrete-logarithm-based cryptography. Sections 5 and 6 propose two methods, without and with polynomial parameterization, for generating pairing-friendly genus 2 curves. Some sample numerical data can be found in the appendices.

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2 Related work

In 2002, Rubin and Silverberg [20] showed that supersingular Jacobians of genus 2 hyperelliptic curves have small embedding degrees (≤ 12). In 2007, Hitt [15] presented, for characteristic 2, the construction of families of genus 2 curves with small embedding degree. Freeman [7] gave a method in 2007 for constructing genus 2 curves with ordinary Jacobians over prime fields, which uses parameterization of the CM fields to obtain conditions that lead to the result, and produces a value $\rho \approx 8$.¹ In 2008, Kawazoe and Takahashi [16] suggested a way to find pairing-friendly parameters to generate curves of the form $y^2 = x^5 + ax$ over \mathbb{F}_p for a prime p written as $p = c^2 + 2d^2$, by exploiting the closed formulas for the order of the Jacobian of such curves. This method produces curves with $\rho \leq 4$, whose Jacobians are however not absolutely simple. In 2008, Freeman, Steinhilber and Streng [10] and Freeman [8] proposed methods for generating parameters for more general pairing-friendly ordinary abelian varieties. The former constructs a suitable Frobenius element which leads to a pairing-friendly abelian variety by extending a method of Cocks and Pinch [9]. The latter finds suitable polynomials parameterizing key elements and generates good parameters by evaluating such polynomials at many different input values. When applied to the case of genus 2, [10] produces $\rho \approx 8$ and [8] is able to further reduce the value to $\rho < 8$.

Although it is known to some extent (see [12]) that pairing-friendly parameters are very rare, among all the work generating such parameters for genus 2 curves, this is the first paper that analyzes quantitatively how unlikely cryptographically strong pairing-friendly parameters are.

The algorithms presented in this paper, together with those in [7], [10], and [8], are the only known methods that generate pairing-friendly parameters for ordinary genus 2 curves over prime fields, which have absolutely simple Jacobians. Unlike [7], we do not need to parameterize the CM field. Our algorithms are also more concrete and more explicit when compared to [10] and [8]. Therefore, these algorithms are easier to understand and implement.

3 Background

3.1 The CM field and the Frobenius element

Let $K := \mathbb{Q}(\eta)$, where

$$\eta = \begin{cases} i\sqrt{a + b\sqrt{d}} & \text{if } d \equiv 2, 3 \pmod{4} \\ i\sqrt{a + b\frac{-1 + \sqrt{d}}{2}} & \text{if } d \equiv 1 \pmod{4} \end{cases},$$

be a fixed primitive quartic CM field, where $d > 0$ is squarefree and $\mathbb{Q}(\sqrt{d})$ has class number 1. The condition that K is primitive is equivalent to $\Delta > 0$ is not a square, where $\Delta = a^2 - b^2d$, if $d \equiv 2, 3 \pmod{4}$, and $\Delta = a^2 - a \cdot b - b^2 \left(\frac{d-1}{4}\right)$, if $d \equiv 1 \pmod{4}$. We want to construct a genus 2 hyperelliptic curve C over a finite field \mathbb{F}_p of prime order such that $\text{End}(\text{Jac}(C, \mathbb{F}_p)) \otimes \mathbb{Q} = K$,

¹ The definition of ρ can be found later in Section 5. It is a measure of efficiency in pairing-based cryptography. In general, the smaller ρ is, the more efficient the pairing is for cryptography.

and $N := \#\text{Jac}(C, \mathbb{F}_p)$ is “almost prime”, meaning that N is a product of a large prime number and a small cofactor.

If such a curve C is found, then there exists an element, called the Frobenius element, $\pi \in \text{End}(\text{Jac}(C, \mathbb{F}_p))$ that satisfies the condition $|\pi| = \sqrt{p}$, where $|\pi|$ is the usual absolute value of the complex number π .

Assume for simplicity that the Frobenius element π is in an order

$$\mathcal{O} := \begin{cases} \mathbb{Z} + \sqrt{d}\mathbb{Z} + \eta\mathbb{Z} + \eta\sqrt{d}\mathbb{Z} & \text{if } d \equiv 2, 3 \pmod{4} \\ \mathbb{Z} + \frac{-1+\sqrt{d}}{2}\mathbb{Z} + \eta\mathbb{Z} + \eta\frac{-1+\sqrt{d}}{2}\mathbb{Z} & \text{if } d \equiv 1 \pmod{4} \end{cases}.$$

We first look at the case $d \equiv 2, 3 \pmod{4}$ and write

$$\pi = c_1 + c_2\sqrt{d} + \eta(c_3 + c_4\sqrt{d}), \quad c_i \in \mathbb{Z}.$$

The relationship $\pi\bar{\pi} = p$ gives us

$$(c_1^2 + c_2^2d + c_3^2a + c_4^2ad + 2c_3c_4bd) + (2c_1c_2 + 2c_3c_4a + c_3^2b + c_4^2bd)\sqrt{d} = p.$$

Since 1 and \sqrt{d} are linearly independent over \mathbb{Q} we must have

$$c_1^2 + c_2^2d + c_3^2a + c_4^2ad + 2c_3c_4bd = p \quad (1)$$

$$2c_1c_2 + 2c_3c_4a + c_3^2b + c_4^2bd = 0 \quad (2)$$

Let $\bar{\alpha}$ and α^σ denote the imaginary and real embeddings of K into \bar{K} . The characteristic polynomial of π is

$$\begin{aligned} h(x) &= (x - \pi)(x - \bar{\pi})(x - \pi^\sigma)(x - \bar{\pi}^\sigma) \\ &= x^4 - 4c_1x^3 + (2p + 4(c_1^2 - c_2^2d))x^2 - 4c_1px + p^2 \end{aligned}$$

The fact that $\#\text{Jac}_{\mathbb{F}_p}(C) = h(1)$ gives the condition

$$N = (p + 1)^2 - 4(p + 1)c_1 + 4(c_1^2 - c_2^2d). \quad (3)$$

We want N to be almost prime, i.e., $N = c \cdot r$ with r prime and c small (say, $c < 2000$).

We have $p \sim N^{\frac{1}{2}}$. Based on the discussions above, Weng ([25]) gives a probabilistic method for searching for parameters for discrete logarithm based cryptography, which produces a prime p and an almost prime N .

3.2 Weil and Tate-Lichtenbaum pairings

An excellent survey of the best known implementations of pairings on Jacobians of hyperelliptic curves is given in [2]. In this section we give only some basic information that we need about pairings on general abelian varieties.

For an abelian variety \mathcal{A} over a finite field F and an integer r coprime to the characteristic of F , the Weil pairing is a nondegenerate, skew-symmetric bilinear map

$$e_r^W : \mathcal{A}(\bar{F})[r] \times \mathcal{A}(\bar{F})[r] \rightarrow \mu_r(\bar{F}),$$

where \bar{F} is an algebraic closure of F and $\mu_r(\bar{F})$ is the group of r^{th} roots of unity in \bar{F} ; the Tate-Lichtenbaum pairing is a nondegenerate bilinear map

$$e_r^{TL} : \mathcal{A}(F)[r] \times \mathcal{A}(F)/r\mathcal{A}(F) \rightarrow F^*/(F^*)^r.$$

$F^*/(F^*)^r$ is isomorphic to $\mu_r(\bar{F})$ if and only if $\mu_r(\bar{F}) \subseteq F$.

Definition 1 (Embedding degree). Let \mathcal{A} be an abelian variety over a finite field $F = \mathbb{F}_p$. Let r be an integer coprime to p which divides $\#\mathcal{A}(F)$. The field $F(\mu_r(\bar{F}))$ is a finite extension \mathbb{F}_{p^k} of F . The number k is called the **embedding degree of \mathcal{A} with respect to r** , and it is the smallest integer such that $r|(p^k - 1)$.

We also call the embedding degree of the Jacobian of a nonsingular projective curve C the “embedding degree of the curve C .” For pairing-based cryptography, we need an abelian variety \mathcal{A} with $\#\mathcal{A}$ almost prime, i.e., $\#\mathcal{A} = h \cdot r$, where h is a small positive integer and r is a prime number, and the embedding degree k of \mathcal{A} with respect to r which is not too large.

Definition 2 (Pairing-friendly abelian variety). Let H and K be positive integers. Let \mathcal{A} be an abelian variety over a finite field \mathbb{F}_p . We say \mathcal{A} is **pairing-friendly with respect to parameters H and K** if $\#\mathcal{A} = h \cdot r$ for some positive integer $h \leq H$ and a prime number r , and the embedding degree k of \mathcal{A} with respect to r is no larger than K .

By convention, we call an abelian variety “pairing-friendly” if H and K are “small.” We also say a nonsingular projective curve C is “pairing-friendly” if C has a pairing-friendly Jacobian. We also call the parameters $(p, \#\mathcal{A})$ “pairing-friendly”.

4 Pairing-friendly genus 2 curves are rare: a quantitative analysis

In this section, we shall show (assuming the Riemann Hypothesis) quantitatively that there are very few pairing-friendly parameters for genus 2 hyperelliptic curves among all possible almost prime group orders for Jacobians of genus 2 hyperelliptic curves over prime fields. Inspired by [3], in which elliptic curves of prime orders over finite fields are considered, we generalize its result to the genus 2 case to also deal with Jacobians of *almost prime* orders. A heuristic estimation of the density of pairing-friendly genus 2 curves was performed earlier in [12]. Our result shows a more explicit improvement to this prior work. The main result of this section is Theorem 1. Before proving it, we first introduce several lemmas.

Let p be an odd prime number, and let $\log(\cdot)$ denote the natural logarithm.

Lemma 1. Let M and c be positive constants with $c < 4$. For a fixed positive integer a , let $\mathcal{S}_{a,c,M}$ denote the set of pairs of primes (x, y) such that $\frac{M}{2} \leq x \leq M$ and $|x^2 - a \cdot y| \leq c \cdot x^{3/2}$. If the Riemann Hypothesis (R.H.) holds, then for large enough M , we have

$$|\mathcal{S}_{a,c,M}| \geq \frac{1}{15} \cdot \frac{c}{a} \cdot \frac{M^{5/2}}{(\log M)^2}.$$

Proof. Let $\pi(x)$ be number of primes in the interval $[1, x]$. Let $N = \pi(M) - \pi(\frac{M}{2})$ be the number of primes in $(M/2, M]$. The Prime Number Theorem (P.N.T.) implies $N > \frac{1}{3} \cdot \frac{M}{\log M}$ for M large enough.

Now let p be a prime number in $(M/2, M]$. We look at the number of primes y such that $|p^2 - a \cdot y| \leq c \cdot p^{3/2}$, i.e., $\frac{1}{a} (p^2 - c \cdot p^{3/2}) \leq y \leq \frac{1}{a} (p^2 + c \cdot p^{3/2})$. Denote this number by N_p . By a theorem of von Koch (see [1], Theorem 8.3.3), if the R.H. is true,

$$\pi(x) = \text{li}(x) + O(\sqrt{x} \log x),$$

where $\text{li}(x) = \int_2^x dt / \log t$. Moreover, by a result of L. Schoenfeld (see [21], Corollary 1), if R.H. is true, there exists an effectively computable positive constant c_1 such that $|\pi(x) - \text{li}(x)| <$

$c_1 \cdot \sqrt{x} \log x$, when $x \geq 2657$. According to this result, when p is large, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
N_p &\geq \pi\left(\frac{1}{a}(p^2 + c \cdot p^{3/2})\right) - \pi\left(\frac{1}{a}(p^2 - c \cdot p^{3/2})\right) \\
&> \text{li}\left(\frac{1}{a}(p^2 + c \cdot p^{3/2})\right) - \text{li}\left(\frac{1}{a}(p^2 - c \cdot p^{3/2})\right) \\
&\quad - \frac{1}{a} \cdot c_1 (p^2 + c \cdot p^{3/2})^{1/2} \log(p^2 + c \cdot p^{3/2}) \\
&\quad - \frac{1}{a} \cdot c_1 (p^2 - c \cdot p^{3/2})^{1/2} \log(p^2 - c \cdot p^{3/2}) \\
&> \int_{\frac{1}{a}(p^2 - c \cdot p^{3/2})}^{\frac{1}{a}(p^2 + c \cdot p^{3/2})} \frac{dt}{\log t} - \frac{1}{a} \cdot 2c_1 (p^2 + c \cdot p^{3/2})^{1/2} \log(p^2 + c \cdot p^{3/2}) \\
&> \frac{1}{\log\left(\frac{1}{a} \cdot (M^2 + c \cdot M^{3/2})\right)} \cdot \frac{1}{a} \left(2c \left(\frac{M}{2}\right)^{3/2}\right) - \frac{1}{a} \cdot 2c_1 (2M^2)^{1/2} \log(2M^2) \\
&> \frac{1}{\log(2M^2) - \log a} \cdot \frac{c}{a\sqrt{2}} M^{3/2} - \frac{1}{a} \cdot 8c_1 M \log M \\
&> \frac{1}{a} \left(\frac{cM^{3/2}}{4 \log M} - 8c_1(M \log M)\right) \\
&> \frac{1}{5} \cdot \frac{c}{a} \cdot \frac{M^{3/2}}{\log M}.
\end{aligned}$$

The last inequality holds if $\frac{1}{20} \cdot cM^{3/2}/\log M > 8 \cdot c_1 M \log M$, i.e., $M^{1/2}/(\log M)^2 > 160 \cdot c_1/c$.

Note that the value p does not appear in the resulting inequality above. Summing over all suitable primes p , we obtain

$$|\mathcal{S}_{a,c,M}| = \sum_{\substack{\frac{M}{2} \leq p \leq M \\ p \text{ prime}}} N_p \geq \frac{1}{5} \cdot \frac{c}{a} \cdot \frac{M^{3/2}}{\log M} \cdot \frac{1}{3} \cdot \frac{M}{\log M} = \frac{1}{15} \cdot \frac{c}{a} \cdot \frac{M^{\frac{5}{2}}}{(\log M)^2}$$

for large enough M . □

Remark 1. Note that in the proof above, the constant $c/15$ depends only on M (and constant c_1), but not on a .

Remark 2. If we take $a = 1$, the result of Lemma 1 is comparable to the heuristic result in [12] (estimate of the volume of S in Section 4.2 of [12]).

Lemma 2. *Let M and K be positive constants. For a fixed positive integer a , let $\mathcal{T}_{a,M,K}$ denote the set of pairs of primes (x, y) such that $\frac{M}{2} \leq x \leq M$, $|x^2 - a \cdot y| \leq 5x^{3/2}$ and $y|(x^k - 1)$ for some $k \leq K$. Then $|\mathcal{T}_{a,M,K}| < \frac{45}{8} M^{3/2} (K+1)^2 \log(5^{3/2} M)$.*

Proof. For every nonzero integer h with $|h| \leq 5M^{3/2}$, let $\mathcal{B}_h^{(e)}$ be the set of primes y such that $y|h^{k/2} - 1$ for some even integer k with $0 < k \leq K$. Since $h^{k/2} - 1$ has fewer than $\log(|h|^{k/2})$ distinct prime divisors, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
|\mathcal{B}_h^{(e)}| &< \sum_{\substack{k=2 \\ k \text{ even}}}^K \frac{k}{2} \log |h| \leq \frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{K}{2}\right) \left(\frac{K}{2} + 1\right) \log |h| \\
&\leq \frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{K}{2}\right) \left(\frac{K}{2} + 1\right) (3/2) \log(5^{3/2} M) \\
&\leq \frac{3}{16} K(K+2) \log(5^{3/2} M).
\end{aligned}$$

Now for the same h , let $\mathcal{B}_h^{(o)}$ denote the set of primes y such that $y|h^k - 1$ for some odd integer k with $0 < k \leq K$. Since $h^k - 1$ has fewer than $\log(|h|^k)$ distinct prime divisors,

$$\begin{aligned} |\mathcal{B}_h^{(o)}| &< \sum_{\substack{k=1 \\ k \text{ odd}}}^K k \log |h| \leq \frac{\lceil \frac{K}{2} \rceil (K+1)}{2} \log |h| \\ &\leq \frac{1}{4} (K+1)^2 (3/2) \log \left(5^{3/2} M \right) \\ &= \frac{3}{8} (K+1)^2 \log \left(5^{3/2} M \right). \end{aligned}$$

Let \mathcal{B}_h be the set of pairs of primes (x, y) such that $x^2 - a \cdot y = h$. When k is even, we have

$$h^{k/2} = (x^2 - a \cdot y)^{k/2} = x^k + y \cdot (\text{polynomial in } x \text{ and } y);$$

thus $y|h^{k/2} - 1$ is equivalent to $y|x^k - 1$. Similarly, when k is odd, $y|x^k - 1$ implies $y|x^{2k} - 1$, which again implies $y|h^k - 1$. Therefore, we must have

$$\begin{aligned} |\mathcal{B}_h| &\leq |\mathcal{B}_h^{(e)}| + |\mathcal{B}_h^{(o)}| \\ &\leq \frac{3}{16} K(K+2) \log \left(5^{3/2} M \right) + \frac{3}{8} (K+1)^2 \log \left(5^{3/2} M \right) \\ &< \frac{9}{16} (K+1)^2 \log \left(5^{3/2} M \right). \end{aligned}$$

Summing over all such integer h and note that $\frac{M}{2} \leq x \leq M$, we have

$$|\mathcal{T}_{a,M,K}| \leq \sum_{0 < |h| \leq 5M^{3/2}} |\mathcal{B}_h| < \frac{45}{8} M^{3/2} (K+1)^2 \log \left(5^{3/2} M \right).$$

□

Remark 3. It is worth noting that the result in Lemma 2 does not require M to be large.

Remark 4. It is possible that the result of Lemma 2 may be further refined to be closer to the heuristic result in [12] (the estimate of the volume of S' in Section 4.2 of [12]). However, such a refinement would likely require techniques different from those used in the proof of Lemma 2.

Lemma 3. *Let $\tilde{\mathcal{S}}_{H,c,M}$ denote the set of pairs of primes (x, y) such that $\frac{M}{2} \leq x \leq M$ and $|x^2 - a \cdot y| \leq c \cdot x^{3/2}$ for some $a \in \mathbb{Z}$, $1 \leq a \leq H$. Let $\tilde{\mathcal{T}}_{H,M,K}$ denote the set of pairs of primes (x, y) such that $\frac{M}{2} \leq x \leq M$, $|x^2 - a \cdot y| \leq 5x^{3/2}$ for some $a \in \mathbb{Z}$, $1 \leq a \leq H$, and $y|(x^k - 1)$ for some $k \leq K$. If the R.H. holds, then for large M ,*

$$\frac{\tilde{\mathcal{T}}_{H,M,K}}{\tilde{\mathcal{S}}_{H,c,M}} < c' \frac{H \cdot (K+1)^2 (\log M)^3}{c \cdot M}$$

for an effectively computable positive constant c' . A possible choice of such a constant is $c' = 90$.

Proof. Let a be an integer such that $1 \leq a \leq H$. By Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\mathcal{T}_{a,M,K}}{\mathcal{S}_{a,c,M}} &< \frac{\frac{45}{8} M^{3/2} (K+1)^2 \log \left(5^{3/2} M \right)}{\frac{1}{15} \cdot \frac{c}{a} \cdot \frac{M^{\frac{5}{2}}}{(\log M)^2}} \\ &< 90 \cdot \frac{a \cdot (K+1)^2 (\log M)^3}{c \cdot M} \\ &< 90 \cdot \frac{H \cdot (K+1)^2 (\log M)^3}{c \cdot M} \end{aligned}$$

for M large enough. Note that $\tilde{\mathcal{T}}_{H,M,K} = \sum_{1 \leq a \leq H} \mathcal{T}_{a,M,K}$ and $\tilde{\mathcal{S}}_{H,c,M} = \sum_{1 \leq a \leq H} \mathcal{S}_{a,c,M}$, and consider Remark 1 following Lemma 1. Hence we have

$$\frac{\tilde{\mathcal{T}}_{H,M,K}}{\tilde{\mathcal{S}}_{H,c,M}} < 90 \cdot \frac{H \cdot (K+1)^2 (\log M)^3}{c \cdot M}$$

for large M . □

Theorem 1. *Assume the Riemann Hypothesis. Let H and K be positive constants. Let (p, N) be a randomly (w.r.t. uniform distribution) chosen pair in which p is a prime in the interval $[\frac{M}{2}, M]$ and N is the group order of the Jacobian of a genus 2 curve C defined over \mathbb{F}_p with $N = \#\text{Jac}(C, \mathbb{F}_p) = h \cdot r$, with $1 \leq h \leq H$ and r prime. For M large enough, the probability that (p, N) is pairing-friendly with respect to parameters H and K is less than*

$$c'' \frac{H \cdot (K+1)^2 (\log M)^3}{M}$$

for an effectively computable positive constant c'' .

Proof. The Riemann Hypothesis for abelian varieties over finite fields, proved by Weil in [24], implies the Hasse-Weil bound for genus 2 curves, i.e.,

$$\#\text{Jac}(C, \mathbb{F}_p) \in [(\sqrt{p}-1)^4, (\sqrt{p}+1)^4].$$

For p large enough, we have $\#\text{Jac}(C, \mathbb{F}_p) \in [p^2 - 5p^{3/2}, p^2 + 5p^{3/2}]$. Let $c = 1/9$. By Proposition 2.4 of [17], almost all integers $z \in [p^2 - cp^{3/2}, p^2 + cp^{3/2}]$ can be assumed to be the cardinality of the Jacobian of a genus 2 hyperelliptic curve (given by a quintic or sextic polynomial) over \mathbb{F}_p . In Lemma 3, let $c = 1/9$, $x = p$, $y = r$ and $a = h$. The conclusion then follows, observing that $c = 1/9$ is small enough so that the total number of pairs (p, N) in the statement of Theorem 1 is strictly larger than $\tilde{\mathcal{S}}_{H,c,M}$. Note that we can choose $c'' = 10c'$, where c' is the constant from Lemma 3. □

Theorem 1 says there are very few pairing-friendly parameters for genus 2 hyperelliptic curves when H and K are much smaller than p .

5 Algorithms for generating pairing-friendly genus 2 curves over prime fields

Let k be a desired embedding degree. Let C be a genus 2 hyperelliptic curve defined over a finite field \mathbb{F}_p whose Jacobian over \mathbb{F}_p has a subgroup of order r such that $\text{Jac}(C, \mathbb{F}_p)$ has embedding degree k with respect to r . The ratio of the bit length of $\#\text{Jac}(C, \mathbb{F}_p)$ to the bit length of r is a good measure of efficiency in pairing-based cryptography. Define

$$\rho = 2 \log(p) / \log(r).$$

In many pairing-based cryptographic applications, we prefer this value to be close to 1.

In [7], a method to generate genus 2 curves with ordinary Jacobians over prime fields with low embedding degrees is proposed. An important part of this method is a parameterization of the CM field. The method generates curves with value $\rho \approx 8$. We propose another way of generating good parameters, without parameterizing the CM field, which gives a similar ρ value.

Let $K := \mathbb{Q}(\eta)$ be a fixed quartic CM field. We want to construct a genus 2 hyperelliptic curve C over a prime field \mathbb{F}_p such that $\text{Jac}(C, \mathbb{F}_p)$ has CM by K , and such that $\text{Jac}(C, \mathbb{F}_p)$ has a subgroup of prime order r , and $\text{Jac}(C, \mathbb{F}_p)$ has a prescribed embedding degree k with respect to r . For cryptographic applications, we need p and r to be large. We will present the algorithm for the

case $d \equiv 2, 3 \pmod{4}$ in this paper, where d is as defined in Section 3.1. The case $d \equiv 1 \pmod{4}$ can be treated similarly.

In the case $d \equiv 2, 3 \pmod{4}$, such a curve can be constructed if we can find a simultaneous integral solution $(c_1, c_2, c_3, c_4, p, r)$, in which p and r are large prime numbers, to the following system of equations:

$$c_1^2 + c_2^2 d + c_3^2 a + c_4^2 ad + 2c_3 c_4 bd = p \quad (4)$$

$$2c_1 c_2 + 2c_3 c_4 a + c_3^2 b + c_4^2 bd = 0 \quad (5)$$

$$(p+1)^2 - 4c_1(p+1) + 4(c_1^2 - dc_2^2) \equiv 0 \pmod{r} \quad (6)$$

$$\Phi_k(p) \equiv 0 \pmod{r}. \quad (7)$$

Here a, b, d and k are fixed, and $\Phi_k(x)$ is the k^{th} cyclotomic polynomial. Equations (4) and (5) mean that the prime p corresponds to a good Weil number, as discussed in Section 3.1. Equation (6) ensures that the Jacobian has a subgroup of prime order r . Equation (7) guarantees that the Jacobian of the curve the embedding degree with respect to r is at most k . Note that Equation 7 implies $p^k \equiv 1 \pmod{r}$. Given that $p^{r-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{r}$, we must have $k|(r-1)$, i.e., $r \equiv 1 \pmod{k}$.

Algorithm 1 Generating pairing parameters for $K = \mathbb{Q}(\eta)$, $d \equiv 2, 3 \pmod{4}$

Require: Integers a, b, d with $d > 0$ squarefree, $d \equiv 2, 3 \pmod{4}$, $a^2 - b^2 d > 0$ not a square; a prescribed embedding degree k ; a bit size n of the desired subgroup order; maximum numbers of trials, M_1 and M_2 .

Ensure: Integers c_1, c_2, c_3, c_4 , prime numbers p and r , where r has n bits, satisfying Equations (4), (5), (6), (7); or “Not found.”

- 1: Let $c_1 = \pm 1$.
 - 2: **repeat**
 - 3: Choose a prime number r of n bits such that $r \equiv 1 \pmod{k}$.
 - 4: With c_1 fixed as above, try to solve the system of equations given by (4), (5), (6), (7) over the finite field \mathbb{F}_r for a simultaneous solution $(\bar{c}_2, \bar{c}_3, \bar{c}_4, \bar{p})$.
 - 5: **if** such a solution exists **then**
 - 6: **repeat**
 - 7: Choose lifts c_3 and c_4 of \bar{c}_3 and \bar{c}_4 to \mathbb{Z} such that $f := bc_3^2 + 2ac_3c_4 + bdc_4^2$ is even. Set $c_2 = -c_1 f/2$.
 - 8: Let $p = ac_3^2 + 2bdc_3c_4 + 2adc_4^2 + 1 + dc_2^2$.
 - 9: **if** p is prime **then**
 - 10: Return $(c_1, c_2, c_3, c_4, p, r)$.
 - 11: **end if**
 - 12: **until** Lines 7 through 11 have been tried M_2 times.
 - 13: **end if**
 - 14: **until** M_1 primes r have been tried.
 - 15: Return “Not found.”
-

Theorem 2. *If $(c_1, c_2, c_3, c_4, p, r)$ is returned by Algorithm 1, then it provides a solution to the system of equations (4), (5), (6), (7).*

Proof. It is clear that if $(c_1, c_2, c_3, c_4, p, r)$ is returned, then Equations (6) and (7) are automatically satisfied. Equations (4) and (5) are satisfied by the constructions in Step 7 and 8. Step 9 ensures that p is prime. \square

Depending on p and \mathcal{O}_K , there are 2 or 4 possibilities for the group order $\#\text{Jac}(C, \mathbb{F}_q)$ [25] [6]. However, for a demonstration purpose, in the algorithm above we are only interested in curves C whose Jacobian has exact group order given by

$$N = (p+1)^2 - 4c_1(p+1) + 4(c_1^2 - dc_2^2).$$

Algorithm 1 looks difficult to analyze because we do not know how likely it is that a solution is found in Step 4. However, experimental results show that the algorithm returns valid parameters quickly and with high probability.

Example 3. Using Algorithm 1 in the case of $a = 2, b = -1, d = 2$, some suitable pairing parameters are found in Appendix A, where r are 160, 256, 512 and 1024 bits, respectively. The computations were performed by the computer algebra system MAGMA [4]. Note that $K = \mathbb{Q}(i\sqrt{2} - \sqrt{2}) \neq \mathbb{Q}(\zeta_5)$ is Galois, so there are only two possibilities for the group order $\#\text{Jac}(C, \mathbb{F}_p)$ [25], namely,

$$N_1 = (p + 1)^2 - 4c_1(p + 1) + 4(c_1^2 - dc_2^2),$$

or the group order for a quadratic twist of the curve:

$$N_2 = 2(p + 1)^2 + 8(c_1^2 - c_2^2d) - N_1.$$

6 Generating parameters with polynomial parameterization of coefficients c_i

The parameter c_1 produced by Algorithm 1 is always ± 1 and the size of c_2 dominates that of c_1, c_3 and c_4 . In fact, this is not necessary. We can modify the search method using the idea of polynomial parameterization and produce pairing parameters with c_1, c_2, c_3 and c_4 roughly of the same size. The algorithm is stated as Algorithm 2.

Algorithm 2 Generating pairing parameters for $K = \mathbb{Q}(\eta)$, $d \equiv 2, 3 \pmod{4}$ with polynomial parameterization

Require: Integers a, b, d with $d > 0$ squarefree, $d \equiv 2, 3 \pmod{4}$, $a^2 - b^2d > 0$ not a square; a prescribed embedding degree k ; a bit size n of the desired subgroup order; maximum numbers of trials, M_1 and M_2 .

Ensure: Integers c_1, c_2, c_3, c_4 , prime numbers p and r , where r has n bits, satisfying Equations (4), (5), (6), (7); or “Not found.”

1: Choose degree 2 bivariate polynomials $C_3(x, y)$ and $C_4(x, y) \in \mathbb{Z}[x, y]$ such that there is a factorization in $\mathbb{Z}[x, y]$

$$bC_3^2 + 2aC_3C_4 + bdC_4^2 = U \cdot V,$$

where U and V are bivariate polynomials of degree 2. Let $C_1(x, y) = U(x, y)$ and $C_2(x, y) = -\frac{1}{2}V(x, y)$.

2: **repeat**

3: Choose a prime number r of n bits such that $r \equiv 1 \pmod{k}$.

4: Try to solve the system of equations given by (5), (6), (7), with c_i replaced by $C_i(x, y), i = 1, 2, 3, 4$, over the finite field \mathbb{F}_r for a simultaneous solution $(\bar{x}, \bar{y}, \bar{p})$.

5: **if** Such a solution exists **then**

6: **repeat**

7: Choose lifts x and y of \bar{x} and \bar{y} to \mathbb{Z} such that $c_i := C_i(x, y), i = 1, 2, 3, 4$ are all integers. Let $p = ac_3^2 + 2bdc_3c_4 + 2adc_4^2 + c_1^2 + dc_2^2$.

8: **if** p is prime **then**

9: Return $(c_1, c_2, c_3, c_4, p, r)$.

10: **end if**

11: **until** Lines 7 through 10 have been tried M_2 times.

12: **end if**

13: **until** M_1 primes r have been tried.

14: Return “Not found.”

Similarly to Theorem 2, we have

Theorem 3. *If $(c_1, c_2, c_3, c_4, p, r)$ is returned by Algorithm 2, then it provides a solution to the system of equations (4), (5), (6), (7).*

In Algorithm 2, it is clear that we need $\gcd(C_1, C_2, C_3, C_4) = 1 \in \mathbb{Z}[x, y]$ so that a prime p can be found.

Example 3. Let $C_3(x, y) = C_4(x, y) = xy$, $C_1(x, y) = x^2$ and $C_2(x, y) = -(a+b(1+d)/2)y^2$. Then they satisfy $bC_3^2 + 2aC_3C_4 + bdC_4^2 + 2C_1C_2 = 0$. Using these polynomials in the above algorithm, we have found for $K = \mathbb{Q}(i\sqrt{2} - \sqrt{2})$ (i.e., $a = 2, b = -1, d = 2$) parameters in which r are 160, 256, 512 and 1024 bits, respectively. Some of these parameters are presented in Appendix B.

Since x and y are roughly the same size as r , the value of p obtained by this method is $\approx r^4$. It is thus a natural thought that if we parameterize the polynomials $C_i(x, y)$ with degree 1 polynomials in $\mathbb{Z}[x, y]$, then the size of p may be reduced to $\approx r^2$. Unfortunately, the following Proposition 1 shows that such parameterizations will not succeed in achieving this goal.

Proposition 1. *Let a, b, d be integers such that d is squarefree and $a^2 - b^2d > 0$ is not a square. Let $f(X, Y) = bX^2 + 2aXY + bY^2$ be a bivariate polynomial in $\mathbb{Q}[X, Y]$. Let F, G be polynomials of total degree 1 in $\mathbb{Q}[X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n]$ such that F and G are not associated with one another. Then $f(F, G)$ is irreducible in $\mathbb{Q}[X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n]$.*

Proof. First we note that $b \neq 0$, as indicated by the condition that $a^2 - b^2d > 0$ is not a square. Let $D = a^2 - b^2d$. Let $\alpha = -a/b + \sqrt{D}/b$ and $\beta = -a/b - \sqrt{D}/b$. Then $f(X, Y)$ can be factored over $\overline{\mathbb{Q}}$ as

$$f(X, Y) = bX^2 + 2aXY + bY^2 = b(X - \alpha Y)(X - \beta Y),$$

where $\overline{\mathbb{Q}}$ is an algebraic closure of \mathbb{Q} .

Let F and G be polynomials of total degree 1 in $\mathbb{Q}[X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n]$. Write

$$\begin{aligned} F(X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n) &= \sum_{i=1}^n f_i X_i + f_0, \\ G(X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n) &= \sum_{i=1}^n g_i X_i + g_0, \end{aligned}$$

where $f_i, g_i \in \mathbb{Q}$. Suppose $f(F, G)$ is reducible in $\mathbb{Q}[X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n]$. Then we can write

$$f(F, G) = bH_1 \cdot H_2,$$

where $H_j = \sum_{i=1}^n h_i^{(j)} X_i + h_0^{(j)} \in \mathbb{Q}[X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n]$, $j = 1, 2$, both of total degree 1.

Now we have

$$b(F - \alpha G)(F - \beta G) = f(F, G) = bH_1 \cdot H_2.$$

Note that $\mathbb{Q}(\sqrt{D})[X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n]$ is a unique factorization domain. Because $F - \alpha G$, $F - \beta G$, H_1 and H_2 are of degree 1, they are irreducible. without of loss of generality, we may assume

$$F - \alpha G = \gamma H_1, \tag{8}$$

for some $\gamma \in \mathbb{Q}(\sqrt{D})^\times$. We can write $\gamma = s + t\sqrt{D}$ with $s, t \in \mathbb{Q}$ and $t \neq 0$. Here we require $t \neq 0$ as the polynomial on the left hand side of Equation (8) is in $\mathbb{Q}(\sqrt{D})[X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n] \setminus \mathbb{Q}[X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n]$.

Equation (8) gives

$$F - (-a/b + \sqrt{D}/b)G = (s + t\sqrt{D})H_1.$$

Equating the coefficients of X_i and the constant terms on both sides of the above equation, we obtain

$$f_i + (a/b)g_i + (g_i/b)\sqrt{D} = s \cdot h_i^{(1)} + t \cdot h_i^{(1)}\sqrt{D}, \quad 0 \leq i \leq n.$$

This in turn gives

$$f_i + (a/b)g_i = s \cdot h_i^{(1)}, \quad (9)$$

$$g_i/b = t \cdot h_i^{(1)}. \quad (10)$$

If $g_i = 0$ for some i , we must have $h_i^{(1)} = 0$ by (10), which again implies $f_i = 0$ by (9). Otherwise, if $g_i \neq 0$, we can divide both sides of (9) and (10) to obtain

$$b(f_i/g_i) = s/t,$$

thus

$$f_i/g_i = s/(b \cdot t).$$

Therefore, for all $0 \leq i \leq n$, we have $f_i = c \cdot g_i$, where the constant $c = s/(b \cdot t) \in \mathbb{Q}$. Hence $F = c \cdot G$, i.e., F and G are associated. \square

An alternative way to do polynomial parameterization in Step 1 of Algorithm 2 is to use degree 1 and degree 2 polynomials for $C_3(x, y)$ and $C_4(x, y)$. This will produce different kinds of c_i 's, but the resulting ρ value is still approximately 8 in general. On-going research is aiming at reducing further the value of ρ .

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Pairing-friendly Genus 2 Curves: Numerical Data

A Parameters produced by Algorithm 1

Here are some parameters found by Algorithm 1 for the CM field $K = \mathbb{Q}\left(i\sqrt{2-\sqrt{2}}\right)$ and embedding degree $k = 5$. Corresponding to this CM field there is a genus 2 curve defined over the rationals [23].

$$C : y^2 = -x^5 + 3x^4 + 2x^3 - 6x^2 - 3x + 1.$$

The curves over prime fields corresponding to these parameters are either C reduced modulo p , or its quadratic twist C' .

On average, a MAGMA script found one set of parameters with $r = 160, 256, 512$ and 1024 bits in $0.0918, 0.3486, 2.9938,$ and 46.5615 seconds, respectively. The computations were performed on an AMD Quad-Core Opteron(TM) 2.4GHz computer running Linux kernel release 2.6.9-34.0.1.ELsmp; only one processor was used for computation.

$r : 160$ bits. $k = 5$.

$p = 252823257935282285362732638695054084330470208363294037922085422639242$
 $9740214286170166852568584783960631710497763211466425437626783979662947366$
 $79271737114219377482492730434694368080216503567747137$

$r = 1461501637330902918203684832716283019655932544881$

$N = 639195997530102770743719375835116542403184563967996666440138384615623$
 $1104135942006766949461178052253303126123108270449109818252877992852236693$
 $9854055782191379965677314562703378699008278543675026648680068400692359055$
 $6954728131135395897277972576354640367835735384699586219721088378014250469$
 $0516520543753456431447895666619342429338048350855555475511765095933553626$
 $5110336972288875552378947584$

$c_1 = 1$

$c_2 = 11243292621276079848206331730630023731174251699959569954973786$

$210137165821520551831056883188430192$

$c_3 = -64248144848395594424557829122788871673183688623832$

$c_4 = -109802017909327381229794505154259988889529711346380$

$\rho \approx 8.072$

The equation of the curve over \mathbb{F}_p is $y^2 = -x^5 + 3x^4 + 2x^3 - 6x^2 - 3x + 1$.

$r : 256$ bits. $k = 5$.

$p = 704881071480907162078296670102869074389758456316878620976045254499487$
 $7530570186125117122017350141805247723779624730169393101671127446215490847$
 $0128180097731192247524353202667866344441677798408664226182036087805320910$
 $7260269920646366156330351242218700528276622717003991911130319025660067745$
 840160149952389932917329

$r = 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564039457584007913$
 129642241

$N = 496857324932071752145912383893889169489835622033784989598880614229969$
 $9600573805281453411826215444363606741797229694154849558866843478727700264$
 $1105324414001856604997470007681554137437103159261172089255501470358581691$
 $0913734818476522890003367060634939104658599174570132609823174216276573137$
 $8669572028319853268929729746434758497120580756345226145068054586116990212$
 $0443929992312351457834418288528071757692892289663780177801079095634553929$
 $6480701514721219823943376856364544844490404257431312550838391605233331165$

2091324748046447124154493757683497657698145122503447211715505414438313883
50786300229054528190120614531020814267875552

$c_1 = 1$

$c_2 = -5936670242993572074752240216934048675593535867493623642911929101631$
 $173773140911746797304941643773775512483626195984512654911475975189673396$
 5375133869149502

$c_3 = -3548809313566683873624287099133190257445712680595264225876058829990$
 309058529874

$c_4 = -5936979480813871848895779658124341164096655715011808647348987318596$
 163181064168

$\rho \approx 8.093$

The equation of the curve over \mathbb{F}_p is $y^2 = 3(-x^5 + 3x^4 + 2x^3 - 6x^2 - 3x + 1)$.

B Parameters produced by Algorithm 2

Below are some examples of the parameters found by Algorithm 2 for $K = \mathbb{Q}(i\sqrt{2 - \sqrt{2}})$ and embedding degree $k = 3$. Here, we choose $C_3(x, y) = C_4(x, y) = xy$, $C_1(x, y) = x^2$ and $C_2(x, y) = -(a + b(1 + d)/2)y^2$ in Step 1 of Algorithm 2.

On average, our MAGMA implementation found one set of parameters with $r = 160, 256, 512$ and 1024 bits in 0.1092, 0.4468, 4.1718, and 50.0140 seconds, respectively. The computations were performed on an AMD Quad-Core Opteron(TM) 2.4GHz computer running Linux kernel release 2.6.9-34.0.1.ELsmp; only one processor was used for computation.

$r : 160$ bits. $k = 3$.

$p = 276032206782791857604308501919988591136740885931343898740256384866241$
 $6467553702979623124723634053832810065253894017495098779682257468497626596$
 $054621968600128109029276968729859800558964868162387810481$

$r = 1461501637330902918203684832716283019655932543447$

$N = 761937791813779631994733941106633708154739036303135746201414612683681$
 $3740229511268625176061099440881442259428060861564412453929893287845956340$
 $3416154738013818777886228088337842186582031203981403522971082031628644450$
 $8345243160595796537771020027471372909123195630278485253513049270650615256$
 $4351364423861208959016750122994621253699118662098804381727358336213778156$
 $291342604171682918546278978314937568$

$c_1 = 853413751674246325960655910542033278192644078137851807206531855460335$
 $897482560901762777003565546321$

$c_2 = -467312771754171603865894820458465529298297100229438686497717835334$
 $951148694691783854304471959958498$

$c_3 = c_4 = -89309702244271126870314830090645570026648145619900427099516737$
 $4051672546438742749426798352836518846$

$\rho \approx 8.2401$

The equation of the curve over \mathbb{F}_p is $y^2 = 3(-x^5 + 3x^4 + 2x^3 - 6x^2 - 3x + 1)$.

$r : 256$ bits. $k = 3$.

$p = 822920761971611209794051125149779261868007917105814333422807428702492$
 $4832300832671377221070075398952222821601421270215446432556547906612969293$
 $7035389322967570019147721601855015109361465658238392802910598977307884581$
 $9669931262786638243789783462295242237448794562285423898483720827257224421$
 582887155754347373346337

$r = 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564039457584007913$
 129640743

$N = 677198580483937194263730753359784807376570572162519246889869342280825$
 $3032215444487859365278749079347589549730845666733117453777198238279219494$

5280678988988024443378725219717152986643553771096267443036427016707389095
 7249248397038280644492111218229707870352901997265602267012008190367799204
 249089289555013596712575651692176016210908268738361775620639618631060792
 5033229572686474111206272193416927126310352656009315433216497023049930883
 5373318602217711383763542668793170469526104112283163915538814071400367342
 3775883028281057290061738442630720051414075948315034087299281022702814170
 14852155526683323382176465726972979082574048

$c_1 = 899567387391479217381476947274351584712780874649839002409060884043691$
 $7034478629557785770257234423972877031276763948663931761267676699233257997$
 62748414274889

$c_2 = -379916236281151103764633380973143102421074912906860994641809351833$
 $4237736166615736185164181781338965280295434753862169111244409012722954687$
 785372266393538

$c_3 = c_4 = 8267529934618186873729771614246762778267959823408343148411442228$
 $8087906493405752740627824201485645210824879536505195273507388849360615838$
 257032702979376742

$\rho = 8.0950$

The equation of the curve over \mathbb{F}_p is $y^2 = -x^5 + 3x^4 + 2x^3 - 6x^2 - 3x + 1$.