

Key Agreement Protocols Using Multivariate Equations on Non-commutative Ring

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SUMMARY: In this paper we propose two KAP(key agreement protocols) using multivariate equations. As the enciphering functions we select the multivariate functions of high degree on non-commutative ring H over finite field Fq . Two enciphering functions are slightly different from the enciphering function previously proposed by the present author. In proposed systems we can adopt not only the quaternion ring but also the non-associative octonion ring as the basic ring. Common keys are generated by using the enciphering functions. Proposed systems are immune from the Gröbner bases attacks because obtaining parameters of the enciphering functions to be secret keys arrives at solving the multivariate algebraic equations, that is, one of NP complete problems. Our protocols are also thought to be immune from the differential attacks because of the equations of high degree.

We can construct our system on the some non-commutative rings, for example quaternion ring, matrix ring or octonion ring.

key words: key agreement protocol, multivariate equations, Gröbner bases, NP complete problems, non-commutative ring

1. Introduction

In this paper we propose two KAP(key agreement protocols) using multivariate equations which have slightly different enciphering functions from the enciphering function of previously proposed KAP by the present author[10].

Since Diffie and Hellman proposed the concept of KAP and the public key cryptosystem (PKC) in 1976[1], various KAP and PKC were proposed.

Typical examples of KAP are almost based on the discrete logarithm problem over finite fields. Typical examples of PKC are classified as follows.

- 1) RSA cryptosystem[2] based on factoring problem ,
- 2) ElGamal cryptosystem[3] based on the discrete logarithm problem over finite fields ,
- 3) the elliptic curve cryptosystem[4] based on the discrete logarithm problem on the elliptic curve[5],[6],
- 4) multivariate public key cryptosystem (MPKC)[7], and so on.

It is said that the problem of factoring large integers, the problem of solving discrete logarithms and the problem of computing elliptic curve discrete logarithms

are efficiently solved in a polynomial time by the quantum computers.

It is thought that MPKC is immune from the attack of quantum computers. But MPKC proposed until now almost adopts multivariate quadratic equations because of avoiding the explosion of key length.

In the current paper, we propose two KAP using multivariate equations on non-commutative ring H over finite fields Fq without the explosion of key length. We choose the quaternion[8] ring as the non-commutative ring. The security of these systems is based on the computational difficulty to solve the multivariate algebraic equations of high degree.

To break these cryptosystems it is thought that we probably need to solve the multivariate algebraic equations of high degree that is equal to solving the NP complete problem. Then it is thought that our systems are immune from the attacks by quantum computers.

In the next section, we define multiplication on quaternion ring over Fq .

In section3 we begin with generating the first multivariate function of high degree on the quaternion ring as the enciphering function. We construct the KAP by the first enciphering function.

In section4 we generate the second multivariate function of high degree on the quaternion ring. This multivariate function is slightly different from one in section 3. We construct second KAP using the second enciphering function by the same way in section3.

In these systems we can adopt not only the quaternion ring but also the non-associative octonion ring as the basic ring. In the last section, we provide concluding remarks.

2. The multiplication on quaternion ring

Let q be an odd prime. Let H be the quaternion ring over the finite field Fq as follows;

$$H = \{(a_0, a_1, a_2, a_3) \mid a_i \in Fq (i=0,1,2,3)\}. \quad (1)$$

In case of selecting the quaternion ring or octonion ring as the non-commutative ring, the modulus q needs to be more than 2 to keep non-commutative.

Here we define the product AB of $A=(a_0, a_1, a_2, a_3)$ and $B=(b_0, b_1, b_2, b_3)$ on quaternion ring H over Fq such that

$$\begin{aligned}
AB &= (a_0 b_0 - a_1 b_1 - a_2 b_2 - a_3 b_3 \bmod q, \\
& a_0 b_1 + a_1 b_0 + a_2 b_3 - a_3 b_2 \bmod q, \\
& a_0 b_2 - a_1 b_3 + a_2 b_0 + a_3 b_1 \bmod q, \\
& a_0 b_3 + a_1 b_2 - a_2 b_1 + a_3 b_0 \bmod q). \quad (2)
\end{aligned}$$

where

$$A, B \in \mathbf{H}.$$

3. Proposition of the first KAP

3.1 The first enciphering function $F(X_1, \dots, X_d)$

Let m and d be positive integers.

Let S_I be system parameters such that

$$S_I = [q, d, m]. \quad (3)$$

As secret keys SK_I , we choose arbitrary parameters

$A_{ij} \in \mathbf{H}$ ($i=1, \dots, m; j=1, \dots, d$), that is,

$$SK_I = [A_{ij}] (i=1, \dots, m; j=1, \dots, d). \quad (4)$$

We define the multivariate function $F(X_1, \dots, X_d)$ of high degree as the enciphering function such that

$$F(X_1, \dots, X_d) = \sum_{i=1}^m \left[\prod_{j=1}^d X_j A_{ij} \right]. \quad (5)$$

We determine the values of m and d later so that the number of variables (i.e. secret keys) is nearly equal to the number of equations.

Although we adopt the quaternion ring as the basic ring \mathbf{H} , we can discuss in the same way on the matrix ring or the octonion[8] ring.

3.2 The element expression of $F(X_1, \dots, X_d)$

Let (f_0, f_1, f_2, f_3) be the element expression of $F(X_1, \dots, X_d)$. From (3), f_j ($j=0, \dots, 3$) is given as follows;

$$F(X_1, \dots, X_d) = (f_0, f_1, f_2, f_3), \quad (6)$$

$$f_j = \sum_{e_{10} \dots e_{d3}} f_j e_{10} e_{d3}^{x_{10}} \dots x_{13}^{e_{13}} \dots x_{d0}^{e_{d0}} \dots x_{d3}^{e_{d3}} \bmod q \quad (7)$$

with the coefficients $f_j e_{10} \dots e_{d3} \in \mathbf{F}q$ to be published, where

$$X_i = (x_{i0}, x_{i1}, x_{i2}, x_{i3}) \in \mathbf{H},$$

$$x_{ij} \in \mathbf{F}q, (i=1, \dots, d; j=0, \dots, 3).$$

$e_{ij} \in \{0, 1\}$ ($i=1, \dots, d; j=0, \dots, 3$) which satisfy $e_{i0} + \dots + e_{i3} = 1$ ($i=1, \dots, d$).

Then the number n of $f_j e_{10} \dots e_{d3}$ is

$$n = 4(4^d) = 4^{d+1}. \quad (8)$$

Let $\{f_j e_{10} \dots e_{d3}\}$ be the set that includes all $f_j e_{10} \dots e_{d3}$.

3.3 Construction of the first KAP

Let's describe the procedure that user U and user V

obtain the common keys by using $F(X_1, \dots, X_d)$ and $T(X_1, \dots, X_d)$ as follows.

1) The set of system parameters $S_I = [q, d, m]$ is published by the system center which is trusted third party (TTP).

2) User U chooses randomly parameters $A_{ij} \in \mathbf{H}$ ($i=1, \dots, m; j=1, \dots, d$).

The secret key of user U is

$$SK_I = [A_{ij}] (i=1, \dots, m; j=1, \dots, d).$$

3) User U generates $F(X_1, \dots, X_d)$ such that

$$F(X_1, \dots, X_d) = \sum_{i=1}^m \left[\prod_{j=1}^d X_j A_{ij} \right]. \quad (9)$$

4) User U calculates the set of coefficients $\{f_j e_{10} \dots e_{d3}\}$ from (9) which consists of n parameters in $\mathbf{F}q$.

5) Let PK_I be the public key of user U such that

$$PK_I = \{f_j e_{10} \dots e_{d3}\}. \quad (10)$$

Beforehand user U publishes PK_I which consists of n parameters in $\mathbf{F}q$.

6) User V chooses randomly parameters $B_{ij} \in \mathbf{H}$ ($i=1, \dots, m; j=1, \dots, d$).

7) User V generates $T(X_1, \dots, X_d)$ such that

$$T(X_1, \dots, X_d) = \sum_{i=1}^m \left[\prod_{j=1}^d X_j B_{ij} \right]. \quad (11)$$

8) Let (t_0, t_1, t_2, t_3) be the element expression of $T(X_1, \dots, X_d)$. From (11) user V calculates the set of coefficients $\{t_j e_{10} \dots e_{d3}\}$ which consists of n parameters in $\mathbf{F}q$.

t_j ($j=0, \dots, 3$) is given such that

$$T(X_1, \dots, X_d) = (t_0, t_1, t_2, t_3), \quad (12)$$

where

$$t_j = \sum_{e_{10} \dots e_{d3}} t_j e_{10} e_{d3}^{x_{10}} \dots x_{13}^{e_{13}} \dots x_{d0}^{e_{d0}} \dots x_{d3}^{e_{d3}} \bmod q \quad (13)$$

with the coefficients $t_j e_{10} \dots e_{d3} \in \mathbf{F}q$, where

$e_{ij} \in \{0, 1\}$ which satisfy

$$e_{i0} + \dots + e_{i3} = 1. (i=1, \dots, d).$$

Then the number n' of $t_j e_{10} \dots e_{d3}$ is $n' = 4(4^d) = 4^{d+1}$.

Let $\{t_j e_{10} \dots e_{d3}\}$ be the set that includes all $t_j e_{10} \dots e_{d3}$.

9) User V sends $\{t_j e_{10} \dots e_{d3}\}$ to user U.

10) User V calculates common keys $Kv0$ and $Kv1$ as follows.

Let $Kv0$ be

$$Kv0 = (Kv0_0, Kv0_1, Kv0_2, Kv0_3)$$

$$\begin{aligned}
&= \sum_{i=1}^m F(B_{i1}, \dots, B_{id}) \\
&= \sum_{i=1}^m \left[\sum_{r=1}^m \prod_{j=1}^d B_{ij} A_{rj} \right]. \quad (14)
\end{aligned}$$

Then $Kv0_j(j=0,1,2,3)$ are obtained from (7) such that

$$Kv0_j = \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{e_{10} \dots e_{d3}} f_{je_{10} \dots e_{d3}} v_{i10}^{e_{10}} \dots v_{i13}^{e_{13}} \dots v_{id0}^{e_{d0}} \dots v_{id3}^{e_{d3}} \text{ mod } q \quad (15)$$

where

$$(v_{ij0}, v_{ij1}, v_{ij2}, v_{ij3}) = B_{ij}, (i=1, \dots, m; j=1, \dots, d),$$

$e_{ij} \in \{0,1\} (i=1, \dots, d; j=0, \dots, 3)$ which satisfy

$$e_{i0} + \dots + e_{i3} = 1 \quad (i=1, \dots, d).$$

Next let $Kv1$ be

$$Kv1 = (Kv1_0, Kv1_1, Kv1_2, Kv1_3) \\ = \sum_{i=1}^m F(1, B_{i1}, \dots, B_{id} - 1) B_{id} \quad (16)$$

$$= \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{r=1}^m \left[1 \cdot \prod_{j=1}^{d-1} A_{rj} B_{ij} \right] A_{rd} B_{id} \\ = \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{r=1}^m \prod_{j=1}^d A_{rj} B_{ij} \quad (17)$$

Then $Kv1_j(j=0,1,2,3)$ are obtained from (7) and (16) such that

$$Kv1_j = \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{e_{10} \dots e_{d3}} f'_{je_{10} \dots e_{d3}} v_{i10}^{e_{10}} \dots v_{i13}^{e_{13}} \dots v_{id0}^{e_{d0}} \dots v_{id3}^{e_{d3}} \text{ mod } q \quad (18)$$

with the coefficients $f'_{je_{10} \dots e_{d3}} \in \mathbb{F}_q$,
where

$$(v_{ij0}, v_{ij1}, v_{ij2}, v_{ij3}) = B_{ij}, (i=1, \dots, m; j=1, \dots, d).$$

$e_{ij} \in \{0,1\} (i=1, \dots, d; j=0, \dots, 3)$ which satisfy

$$e_{i0} + \dots + e_{i3} = 1 \quad (i=1, \dots, d).$$

11) User U calculates common keys $Ku0$ and $Ku1$ as follows.

Let $Ku0$ be

$$Ku0 = (Ku0_0, Ku0_1, Ku0_2, Ku0_3)$$

$$= \sum_{i=1}^m T(1, A_{i1}, \dots, A_{id} - 1) A_{id} \quad (19)$$

$$= \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{r=1}^m \left[1 \cdot \prod_{j=1}^{d-1} B_{rj} A_{ij} \right] B_{rd} A_{id} \\ = \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{r=1}^m \prod_{j=1}^d B_{rj} A_{ij} \quad (20)$$

$Ku0_j(j=0,1,2,3)$ are obtained from (13) and (19) such that

$$Ku0_j =$$

$$\sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{e_{10} \dots e_{d3}} t'_{je_{10} \dots e_{d3}} u_{i10}^{e_{10}} \dots u_{i13}^{e_{13}} \dots u_{id0}^{e_{d0}} \dots u_{id3}^{e_{d3}} \text{ mod } q \quad (21)$$

with the coefficients $t'_{je_{10} \dots e_{d3}} \in \mathbb{F}_q$,

where

$$(u_{ij0}, u_{ij1}, u_{ij2}, u_{ij3}) = A_{ij}, (i=1, \dots, m; j=1, \dots, d),$$

$e_{ij} \in \{0,1\} (i=1, \dots, d; j=0, \dots, 3)$ which satisfy

$$e_{i0} + \dots + e_{i3} = 1 \quad (i=1, \dots, d).$$

Next let $Ku1$ be

$$Ku1 = (Ku1_0, Ku1_1, Ku1_2, Ku1_3) \\ = \sum_{i=1}^m T(A_{i1}, \dots, A_{id}) \\ = \sum_{i=1}^m \left[\sum_{r=1}^m \prod_{j=1}^d A_{ij} B_{rj} \right] \quad (22)$$

$Ku1_j(j=0,1,2,3)$ are obtained from (13) such that

$$Ku1_j = \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{e_{10} \dots e_{d3}} t_{je_{10} \dots e_{d3}} u_{i10}^{e_{10}} \dots u_{i13}^{e_{13}} \dots u_{id0}^{e_{d0}} \dots u_{id3}^{e_{d3}} \text{ mod } q \quad (23)$$

where

$$(u_{ij0}, u_{ij1}, u_{ij2}, u_{ij3}) = A_{ij}, (i=1, \dots, m; j=1, \dots, d),$$

$e_{ij} \in \{0,1\} (i=1, \dots, d; j=0, \dots, 3)$ which satisfy

$$e_{i0} + \dots + e_{i3} = 1 \quad (i=1, \dots, d).$$

From (14), (20) and (17), (22) we can confirm that

$$Ku0 = Kv0, \quad (24)$$

and

$$Ku1 = kv1. \quad (25)$$

The common key of user U and user V is $[Ku0, Ku1]$ or $[Kv0, Kv1]$.

3.4 Verification of the strength of the first KAP

Let's examine the strength of the first KAP. The strength of the first KAP depends on the strength of the multivariate functions described in section 3.1. In other words, we mention the difficulty to obtain $A_{ij} (i=1, \dots, m; j=1, \dots, d)$ from the set of coefficients $\{f_{je_{10} \dots e_{d3}}\}$ of $F(X_1, \dots, X_d)$ to be the public keys.

3.4.1 Multivariate algebraic equations from $F(X_1, \dots, X_d)$

Let A_{ij} be

$$A_{ij} = (A_{ij0}, A_{ij1}, A_{ij2}, A_{ij3}) \in \mathbf{H}, (i=1, \dots, m; j=1, \dots, d). \quad (26)$$

From (5) all $f_{je^{i_0} \dots e^{i_d}}$ have the form such that

$$f_{je^{i_0} \dots e^{i_d}} = \sum_{i=1}^m h_{ji, b_{i0} \dots b_{i3}} A_{i10}^{b_{i0}} \dots A_{i13}^{b_{i3}} \dots A_{id0}^{b_{id0}} \dots A_{id3}^{b_{id3}} \text{ mod } q \quad (27)$$

$(j = 0, \dots, 3)$

with the coefficients $h_{ji, b_{i0} \dots b_{i3}} \in \mathbf{Fq}$
where $b_{ij} \in \{0, 1\} (i=1, \dots, d; j=0, \dots, 3)$ which satisfy

$$b_{i0} + \dots + b_{i3} = 1 \quad (i=1, \dots, d).$$

From (27) we obtain $n (= 4^{d+1})$ multivariate algebraic equations over \mathbf{Fq} where $A_{ijr} (i=1, \dots, m; j=1, \dots, d; r=0, \dots, 3)$ are the variables i.e. unknown numbers.

3.4.2 Cryptanalysis using Gröbner bases

It is said that the Gröbner bases attacks is efficient for solving multivariate algebraic equations. We calculate the complexity G[9] to obtain the Gröbner bases for our multivariate algebraic equations on quaternion ring so that we confirm immunity of our KAP to the Gröbner bases attack.

We describe in case of $d=4$ and $q=O(10^{10})$ as samples of lower degree equations.

s : degree of equations $= d=4$.

n : the number of equations $= 4(4^d) = 1024$.

We select m so that the number of variables (i.e. secret keys) is nearly equal to n , that is, as $d=4$,

$$m = \lceil (4 * 4^d) / (4d) \rceil = 64,$$

where $\lceil * \rceil$ means the largest integer less than or the integer equal to $*$.

z : the number of variables $= 4dm = 1024$

$$d_{reg} = s + 1 = 5$$

$G = O((n G_{dreg})^w) = O(2^{102})$ is more than 2^{80} which is the standard for safety where $w=2.39$.

So our KAP is immune from the Gröbner bases attacks and is immune from the differential attacks because of the equations of high degree in (27).

It is thought that the polynomial-time algorithm to break our first KAP does not exist probably.

3.5 The size of the keys of the first KAP

We consider the size of the system parameter q . We choose $q=O(2^{10})$ so that the size of the space of $Ku1$ and $Ku2$ is more than $O(2^{80})$.

In the case of $d=4$, the size of PK_1 and SK_1 is 11kbits,

11kbits each.

4. Proposition of the second KAP

4.1 The second enciphering function

Let m and d be positive integers.

Let S_2 be system parameters such that

$$S_2 = [q, d, m] \quad (28)$$

As secret keys SK_2 , we choose arbitrary parameters

$$A_j = (a_{i0}, a_{i1}, a_{i2}, a_{i3}) \in \mathbf{H} \quad (i=1, \dots, m),$$

$$SK_2 = [A_j] (i=1, \dots, m) \quad (29)$$

We define the multivariate function $F(X)$ of high degree such that

$$F(X) = \sum_{i=1}^m (a_{i0}x_0, a_{i1}x_1, a_{i2}x_2, a_{i3}x_3)^d \quad (30)$$

where

$$X = (x_0, x_1, x_2, x_3) \in \mathbf{H},$$

$$x_i \in \mathbf{Fq}, (i = 0, \dots, 3).$$

We determine the value of m later so that the number of variables (i.e. secret keys) is nearly equal to the number of equations.

Although we adopt the quaternion ring as the basic ring \mathbf{H} , we can discuss in the same way on the matrix ring or the octonion ring.

4.2 The element expression of $F(X)$

Let (f_0, f_1, f_2, f_3) be the element expression of $F(X)$. From (30), $f_j (j=0, \dots, 3)$ is given as follows;

$$F(X) = (f_0, f_1, f_2, f_3), \quad (31)$$

$$f_j = \sum_{e_0 + \dots + e_3 = d} f_{je^{e_0} \dots e^{e_3}} x_0^{e_0} x_1^{e_1} x_2^{e_2} x_3^{e_3} \text{ mod } q \quad (32)$$

with the coefficients $f_{je^{e_0} \dots e^{e_3}} \in \mathbf{Fq}$ to be published, where

$e_i (i=0, \dots, 3)$ are non-negative integers which satisfy $e_0 + \dots + e_3 = d$.

Then the number n of $f_{je^{e_0} \dots e^{e_3}}$ is

$$n = 4(4^H_d) \quad (33)$$

Let $\{f_{je^{e_0} \dots e^{e_3}}\}$ be the set that includes all $f_{je^{e_0} \dots e^{e_3}}$.

4.3 Construction of the second KAP

Let's describe the procedure that user U and user V obtain the common keys using $F(X)$ as follows.

1) The set of system parameters $S_2 = [q, d, m]$ is published by the system center which is trusted third party (TTP).

4) User U chooses randomly parameters $A_j = (a_{i0}, a_{i1}, a_{i2}, a_{i3}) \in \mathbf{H} (i=1, \dots, m)$.
The secret key of user U is

$$SK_2=[A_i] \ (i=1,\dots,m).$$

5) User U generates $F(X)$ such that

$$F(X) = \sum_{i=1}^m (a_{i0}x_0, a_{i1}x_1, a_{i2}x_2, a_{i3}x_3)^d. \quad (34)$$

6) From (34) user U calculates the set of coefficients $\{f_{je_0e_1e_2e_3}\}$ which consists of n parameters in Fq .

7) Let PK_2 be the public key of user U such that

$$PK_2=\{f_{je_0e_1e_2e_3}\}. \quad (35)$$

Beforehand user U publishes PK_2 which consists of n parameters in Fq .

8) User V chooses randomly parameters $B_i=(b_{i0},b_{i1},b_{i2},b_{i3}) \in H \ (i=1,\dots,m)$.

7) User V generates $T(X)$ such that

$$T(X) = \sum_{i=1}^m (b_{i0}x_0, b_{i1}x_1, b_{i2}x_2, b_{i3}x_3)^d. \quad (36)$$

8) Let (t_0,t_1,t_2,t_3) be the element expression of $T(X)$. From (36) user V calculates the set of coefficients $\{t_{je_0e_1e_2e_3}\}$ which consists of n parameters in Fq .

$t_j(j=0,\dots,3)$ is given such that

$$T(X)=(t_0,t_1,t_2,t_3), \quad (37)$$

where

$$t_j = \sum_{e_0+\dots+e_3=d} t_{je_0\dots e_3} x_0^{e_0} x_1^{e_1} x_2^{e_2} x_3^{e_3} \mod q \quad (38)$$

$e_i(i=0,\dots,3)$ are non-negative integers which satisfy $e_0+\dots+e_3=d$.

Then the number n' of $t_{je_0e_1e_2e_3}$ is $n'=4({}_4H_d)$.

Let $\{t_{je_0e_1e_2e_3}\}$ be the set that includes all $t_{je_0e_1e_2e_3}$.

11) User V sends $\{t_{je_0e_1e_2e_3}\}$ to user U.

12) User V calculates common keys Kv as follows.

Let Kv be

$$\begin{aligned} Kv &= (Kv_0, Kv_1, Kv_2, Kv_3) \\ &= \sum_{r=1}^m F(b_{r0}, b_{r1}, b_{r2}, b_{r3}) \\ &= \sum_{r=1}^m \left[\sum_{i=1}^m (a_{i0}b_{r0}, a_{i1}b_{r1}, a_{i2}b_{r2}, a_{i3}b_{r3})^d \right]. \quad (39) \end{aligned}$$

Then $Kv_j(j=0,1,2,3)$ are obtained such that

$$\begin{aligned} Kv_j &= \\ &= \sum_{r=1}^m \sum_{e_0+\dots+e_3=d} f_{je_0\dots e_3} b_{r0}^{e_0} b_{r1}^{e_1} b_{r2}^{e_2} b_{r3}^{e_3} \mod q \quad (40) \end{aligned}$$

where

$e_i(i=0,\dots,3)$ are non-negative integers which satisfy $e_0+\dots+e_3=d$.

11) User U calculates common keys Ku as follows.

Let Ku be

$$\begin{aligned} Ku &= (Ku_0, Ku_1, Ku_2, Ku_3) \\ &= \sum_{r=1}^m T(a_{r0}, a_{r1}, a_{r2}, a_{r3}) \\ &= \sum_{r=1}^m \left[\sum_{i=1}^m (b_{i0}a_{r0}, b_{i1}a_{r1}, b_{i2}a_{r2}, b_{i3}a_{r3})^d \right]. \quad (41) \end{aligned}$$

$Ku_j(j=0,1,2,3)$ are obtained such that

$$Ku_j = \sum_{r=1}^m \sum_{e_0+\dots+e_3=d} t_{je_0\dots e_3} a_{r0}^{e_0} a_{r1}^{e_1} a_{r2}^{e_2} a_{r3}^{e_3} \mod q \quad (42)$$

where

$e_i(i=0,\dots,3)$ are non-negative integers which satisfy $e_0+\dots+e_3=d$.

From (39) and (41) we can confirm that

$$Ku = Kv. \quad (43)$$

The common key of user U and user V is $[Ku]$ or $[Kv]$.

4.4 Verification of the strength of the second KAP

Let's examine the strength of the second KAP. The strength of the second KAP depends on the strength of the multivariate functions described in section 4.1. In other words, we mention the difficulty to obtain A_i ($i=1,\dots,m$) from the set of coefficients $\{f_{je_0e_1e_2e_3}\}$ of $F(X)$ to be the public keys.

4.4.1 Multivariate algebraic equations from $F(X)$

Let A_j be

$$A_j=(a_{j0},a_{j1},a_{j2},a_{j3}) \in H, (j=1,\dots,m).$$

From (30) all $f_{je_0e_1e_2e_3}$ have the form such that

$$\begin{aligned} f_{je_0e_1e_2e_3} &= \sum_{i=1}^m h_{ji,c_0c_1c_2c_3} a_{i0}^{c_0} a_{i1}^{c_1} a_{i2}^{c_2} a_{i3}^{c_3} \quad (44) \\ & \quad (j=0,\dots,3) \end{aligned}$$

with the coefficients $h_{ji,c_0c_1c_2c_3} \in Fq$

where $c_i(i=0,\dots,3)$ are non-negative integers which satisfy

$$c_0+\dots+c_3=d.$$

From (44) we obtain n multivariate algebraic equations over Fq where a_{ir} ($i=1,\dots,m; r=0,\dots,3$) are the variables i.e. unknown numbers.

4.4.2 Cryptanalysis using Gröbner bases

It is said that the Gröbner bases attacks is efficient for solving multivariate algebraic equations .We calculate the complexity $G[9]$ to obtain the Gröbner bases for our multivariate algebraic equations on quaternion ring so that we confirm immunity of our second KAP to the Gröbner bases attack .

We describe in case of $d=6$ and $q=O(10^{20})$ as samples of lower degree equations.

s :degree of equations $=d=6$.

n :the number of equations $=4({}_4H_d)=336$.

We select m so that the number of variables(i.e secret keys) is nearly equal to n , that is,

$m = \lceil n/4 \rceil = 84$,

where $\lceil * \rceil$ means the largest integer less than or the integer equal to $*$.

z :the number of variables $=4m=336$

$d_{reg} = s+1=7$

$G=O(({}_nG_{dreg})^w)=O(2^{110})$ is more than 2^{80} which is the standard for safety where $w=2.39$.

So the second KAP is immune from the Gröbner bases attacks and is immune from the differential attacks because of the equations of high degree in (44).

It is thought that the polynomial-time algorithm to break the second KAP does not exist probably.

4.5 The size of the keys of the second KAP

We consider the size of the system parameter q . We choose $q=O(2^{20})$ so that the size of the space of Ku or Kv is more than $O(2^{80})$.

In the case of $d=6$, the size of PK_2 and SK_2 is $7kbits$, $7kbits$ each.

5. Conclusion

We proposed two KAP using multivariate functions on non-commutative quaternion ring over Fq . It is a computationally difficult problem to obtain the secret keys from the public keys because the problem is one of NP complete problems. In order to ensure the safety, the size of q is to be more than 10 bits in the first KAP and to be more than 20 bits in the second KAP.

We can construct two KAP on the other non-commutative ring ,for example matrix ring or octonion ring.

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