Cryptanalysis of the Smart-Vercauteren and Gentry-Halevi's Fully Homomorphic Encryption

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Abstract: In this paper, we first analyze the security of the fully homomorphic encryption schemes based on principal ideal lattice in [SV10, GH11] by using block lattice reduction algorithm. Our result implies that their schemes are insecure for lattice dimensions n=2048, and even for n=8192 if we suppose the random assumption and the geometric series assumption of [Sch03] for a lattice basis. If we suppose the average-case behavior of LLL in [NS06], then their schemes are also insecure for lattice dimension n less than 6000. Moreover, we further analyze how to find the small generator of a principal ideal lattice for the practical parameters in their schemes.
Keywords: Fully Homomorphic Encryption, Cryptanalysis, Principal Ideal Lattice, Lattice Reduction

1. Introduction

Homomorphic encryption has many applications in cryptography. Rivest, Adleman and Dertouzos [RAD78] first presented this concept. But until 2009, Gentry [Gen09] constructed the first fully homomorphic encryptions based on ideal lattice, all previous schemes are insecure. After the scheme of [Gen09], Smart and Vercauteren presented an optimization FHE scheme with smaller ciphertext and key [SV10] by using principal ideal lattice. Dijk, Gentry, Halevi, and Vaikuntanathan [vDGHV10] proposed a simple fully homomorphic encryption scheme over the integers, whose security depends on the hardness of finding an approximate integer GCD. Stehle and Steinfeld [SS10] improved Gentry's fully homomorphic scheme and obtained to a faster fully homomorphic scheme. Gentry and Halevi [GH11] implemented Gentry's scheme also by applying principal ideal lattice. Currently, the security of FHE in [SV10, GH11] depends on the hardness assumption of finding small principal ideal lattice, given its HNF form or two elements form. The problem is whether or not it is hard to solve small principal ideal lattice? In this paper, we negatively answer this problem for practical parameter values (such as n=2048, 8192). That is, we can recover the message bit in an

encrypted ciphertext. Moreover, we can also solve the small principal ideal lattice problem for the practical parameter values of their schemes.

1.1 Our Cryptanalysis

In our cryptanalysis of their FHE schemes we use for the concrete parameters suggested in [SV10, GH11]. We show that their scheme are not secure for the practical parameters (such as lattice dimensions *n*=2048 or *n*=8192 under certain assumption) by using block lattice reduction algorithm [Sch87, GHKN06]. In addition, according to the average case behavior of LLL [NS06], we may use the LLL lattice reduction algorithm [LLL82] to attack lattice dimensions $n \approx 6000$ for the parameter setting in [GH11]. Since the average-case bound of $\frac{\|b_1\|}{(\det L)^{1/n}}$ is about $(1.02)^n$, namely, $\|b_1\| \le (1.02)^{2n} \lambda_1(L) \approx 10^{104} \lambda_1(L) < 2^{380} \lambda_1(L)$, where 380 is the bit length of each coefficient in the secret key polynomial of [SV10, GH11]. Our second result is to solve the small principal ideal lattice by using ideal-GCD algorithm given the HNF form or two elements representation of principal ideal lattice for the practical parameters in their schemes.

1.2 Organization

The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we give some notations and definitions, and the lattice reduction algorithms, and then in Section 3, 4, we respectively analyze the security of the Smart-Vercauteren's scheme and the Gentry-Halevi's scheme. In Section 5, we describe an algorithm that solves the smallest generator of a principal ideal lattice by using standard ideal-GCD algorithm for the practical parameters in [SV10, GH11]

2. Preliminaries

2.1 Notations

Let n be a security parameter, $[n] = \{0,1,...,n\}$. Let R be the ring of integer polynomials modulo $f_n(x)$, i.e., $R = \mathbb{Z}[x]/f(x)$, where $f_n(x)$ is an integer monic and irreducible polynomial of degree n. Let R_p denote the polynomial ring $\mathbb{Z}_p[x]/f(x)$ over modulo p. For $\forall u \in R$, we denote by $\|u\|_\infty$ the infinity norm of u, $\vec{u} = [u_0,...,u_{n-1}]$ the coefficient vector of u, $[u]_2$ the polynomial of u's coefficients modulo 2. For the ring R, its expansion factor is n, that is, $\|u \times v\|_\infty \le n \cdot \|u\|_\infty \cdot \|v\|_\infty$, where $\times$ is multiplication over

the ring R.

2.2 Lattices

A lattice in $\mathbb{R}^m$ is the set of all integral combination of n linearly independent vectors $b_1,...,b_n$ in $\mathbb{R}^m$ ($m \geq n$), namely $L = L(b_1,...,b_n) = \{\sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i b_i, x_i \in Z\}$, usual denoted as a matrix B. Any such n-tuple of vectors $b_1,...,b_n$ is called a basis of the lattice L. Every lattice has an infinite number of lattice bases. Two lattice bases $B_1, B_2 \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$ are equivalent if and only if $B_1 = B_2 U$ for some unimodular matrix $U \in \mathbb{Z}^{n \times n}$. The volume of a lattice L is the determinant of any basis of L, namely $vol(L) = \det(L) = \sqrt{B^T B}$. For every full-rank lattice L, there is a unique Hermite normal form (HNF) basis which given any basis of L can be efficiently computed by using Gaussian elimination. The HNF usually uses as the public key of the lattice-based public key cryptography.

2.3 Ideal Lattices

In this paper, we take $f_n(x) = x^n + 1$ with n a power of 2. Let I be a principal ideal of R, namely, it only has a single generator. For the coefficient vector $\vec{u} = (u_0, u_1, ..., u_{n-1})^T$ of $u \in R$, we define the cyclic rotation $rot(\vec{u}) = (-u_{n-1}, u_0, ..., u_{n-2})^T$, and the corresponding circulant matrix $Rot(u) = (\vec{u}, rot(\vec{u}), ..., rot^{n-1}(\vec{u}))^T$. $Rot(u)$ is called the rotation basis of the ideal lattice (u). For $\forall f, u \in R$, $[f]_u$ is the coefficient vector of f modulo the rotation basis of u, namely, $\vec{f} \bmod Rot(u)$. So, we consider each element of R as being both a polynomial and a vector.

We focus on principal ideals of R_p in this paper since the scheme in [SV10, GH11] only used the principal ideals.

2.4 Lattice Reduction Algorithm

Given a basis of the lattice $b_1,...,b_n$, one of the most famous problems of the algorithm

theory of lattices is to find a short nonzero vector. Currently, there is no polynomial time algorithm for solving a shortest nonzero vector in a given lattice. The most celebrated LLL reduction finds a vector whose approximating factor is at most $2^{(n-1)/2}$. In 1987, Schnorr [Sch87] introduced a hierarchy of reduction concepts that stretch from LLL reduction to Korkine-Zolotareff reduction which obtains a polynomial time algorithm with $(4k^2)^{n/2k}$ approximating factor for lattices of any rank. The running time of Schnorr's algorithm is poly(size of basis)*HKZ(2*k*), where HKZ(2*k*) is the time complexity of computing a 2*k*-dimensional HKZ reduction, and equal to $O(k^{k/2+o(k)})$. If we use the probabilistic AKS algorithm, HKZ(2*k*) is about $O(2^{2k})$. In the following, we will choose $k=16$ to guarantee computation to be feasible.

Theorem 2.1 (Sch87 Theorem 2.6) Every block $2k$-reduced basis $b_1,...,b_{mk}$ of lattice L satisfies $\|b_1\| \le \sqrt{\gamma_k}\beta_k^{\frac{m-1}{2}}\lambda_1(L)$, where β_k is another lattice constant using in Schnorr's analysis of his algorithm.

Shnorr [Sch87] showed that $\beta_k \le 4k^2$, and Ajtai improved this bound to $\beta_k \le k^{\varepsilon}$ for some positive number $\varepsilon > 0$. Recently, Gama Howgrave, Koy and Nguyen [GHKN06] improved the approximation factor of the Schnorr's 2*k*-reduction to $\|b_1\| / \lambda_1(L) \le \sqrt{\gamma_k}(4/3)^{(3k-1)/4}\beta_k^{n/2k-1}$, and proved the following result via Rankin's constant.

Theorem 2.2 (GHKN06 Theorem 2, 3) For all $k \ge 2$, Schnorr's constant β_k satisfies: $k/12 \le \beta_k \le (1+k/2)^{2\ln 2+1/k}$. Asymptotically it satisfies $\beta_k \le 0.1\times k^{2\ln 2+1/k}$. In particular, $\beta_k \le k^{1.1}$ for all $k \le 100$.

3. Cryptanalysis of Smart-Vercauteren's Scheme

3.1 Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE)

For completeness, we here give the somewhat homomorphic encryption (SHE) and the fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) in [SV10].

Key Generation Algorithm (SHE-KeyGen).

(1) Choose a random polynomial $u(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} u_i x^i \in Z[x]$, such that $\|u(x)\|_\infty$ is a η-bit integer, $u(x) = 1 \bmod 2$, and $p = \det(Rot(u(x)))$ is a prime.

(2) Compute $d(x) = \gcd(u(x), f_n(x))$ over $F_p[x]$. Assume $\alpha \in F_p$ is the unique root of $d(x)$.

(3) Apply the XGCD-algorithm over $Q[x]$ to obtain $v(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} v_i x^i \in Z[x]$ such that $u(x) \times v(x) = p \bmod f_n(x)$.

(4) Set $\beta = (v(x) \bmod x) \bmod (2p)$.

(5) Output the public key $pk = (p, \alpha)$, the secret key $sk = (p, \beta)$.

Encryption Algorithm (Enc). Given the public key pk and a bit $m \in \{0,1\}$, choose a small random polynomial $r(x)$ with $\|r(x)\|_\infty$ is a μ-bit integer. Output the ciphertext $c = (2r(\alpha) + m) \bmod p$.

Add Operation (Add). Given the public key pk, and two ciphertexts c_1, c_2, evaluate the ciphertext $c = (c_1 + c_2) \bmod p$.

Multiplication Operation (Mul). Given the public key pk and two ciphertexts c_1, c_2, evaluate a new ciphertext $c = (c_1 \times c_2) \bmod p$.

Decryption Algorithm (Dec). Given the secret key sk and a ciphertext c, decipher the message bit $m = (c - \lfloor c \times \beta / p + 0.5 \rfloor) \bmod 2$.

Key Generation Algorithm (FHE-KeyGen).

(1) Choose s_1 uniformly random integers β_i in $[-p, p]$ such that there is a subset S of s_2 elements with $\sum_{i \in S} \beta_i = \beta$.

(2) Define $sk_i = 1$ if $i \in S$ and $sk_i = 0$ otherwise.

(3) Encrypt the bits sk_i under the SHE to get $\vec{\beta}_i = Enc(sk_i, pk)$.

(4) Output the public key $pk = (p, \alpha, s_1, s_2, \{\vec{\beta}_i, \beta_i\}_{i=1}^{s_1})$, the secret key $sk = (p, \beta)$.

To implement FHE, Smart and Vercauteren constructed Recrypt algorithm by introducing the sparse subset sum problem. Here we omit this algorithm.

3.2 Cryptanalysis of Smart-Vercauteren's FHE

In this subsection, we merely give an algorithm recovering message bit and postpone to Section 5 recovering the private key.

According to SHE-KeyGen algorithm, we know that $\gamma = u(x)$ is an element of prime norm in the number field K defined by $f_n(x)$, and α is a root of $f_n(x) \bmod p$. Namely, we get the prime ideal $I = \gamma \bullet Z[x] = p \bullet Z[x] + (x-\alpha) \bullet Z[x]$, and $u(\alpha) = 0 \bmod p$.

The security of the scheme above depends on the hardness of solving the following small principal ideal problem.

Definition 3.1 (Small Principal Ideal Problem (SPIP)). Given a principal ideal π in either two element or HNF representation, compute a small generator of the ideal.

On the surface, we need to get the private key $v(x)$ to attack the scheme. In fact, if we can get a small multiple $w(x) = \delta(x) \times v(x)$ of the secret key $v(x)$, where $\delta(x)$ is a small integer polynomial, then we can directly decrypt a ciphertext. Since $C(x) = c + q(x) \times \gamma$ according to [SV10], we have $\delta(x) \times (C(x) - c) = \lfloor c \bullet w(x) + 0.5h \rfloor \times \gamma = q'(x) \times \gamma$, where $q'(x) = \delta(x) \times q(x)$, namely, $\left[\delta(x) \times (C(x) - c)\right]_2 = q'(x)$ via $\left[\gamma\right]_2 = 1$. Thus, we may select a small polynomial $C(x)$, evaluate its corresponding ciphertext $c = C(\alpha) \bmod p$, and then solve $\left[\delta(x)\right]_2$ by the above equation. Once one knows $w(x)$ and $\left[\delta(x)\right]_2$, one can decipher arbitrary ciphertext with small error term. Now, we only need to give an algorithm which generates a suitable polynomial $w(x)$.

Theorem 3.1. Given a principal ideal π in either two element (p, α) or HNF representation, there is a polynomial time algorithm which finds $w(x) = \delta(x) \times v(x)$ over $\mathbb{Z}$ such that $\left\|\delta(x)\right\|_\infty \le \sqrt{\gamma_k}\,(4/3)^{(3k-1)/4}\,\beta_k^{n/2k-1}$.

Proof. Since α is a root of $f_n(x) = x^n + 1$ over modulo p, so we can factor $x^n + 1 = (x-\alpha) \bullet g(x) \bmod p$. It is easy to verify $g(x) = t(x) \bullet v(x)$ over modulo p. Without loss of generality, assume $g(x) = x^{n-1} + g_{n-2}x^{n-2} + \cdots + g_0$. We need to row reduce the following matrix

$$M=\begin{pmatrix} g_0 & g_1 & \cdots & g_{n-2} & 1 \\ -1 & g_0 & \cdots & g_{n-3} & g_{n-2} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\ -g_1 & -g_2 & \cdots & -1 & g_0 \\ p & 0 & \cdots & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & p & \cdots & 0 & 0 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \cdots & \vdots & \vdots \\ 0 & 0 & \cdots & 0 & p \end{pmatrix}.$$

We call the lattice reduction algorithm in [Sch87, GHKN06] to get $w(x)=\delta(x)\times v(x)$ such that $\|\delta(x)\|_\infty \le \|\delta(x)\|_2 \le \sqrt{\gamma_k}(4/3)^{(3k-1)/4}\beta_k^{n/2k-1}$. Recall that here $w(x)\in R$ since $u(x)\times v(x)=p \bmod f_n(x)$.■

Thus, if $\|w(x)\times C(x)\|_\infty < p/2$, we can correctly recover the message bit in a ciphertext. According to Theorem 2.2, when $n=2048$, $k=16$, we can recover the message bit in an encrypted ciphertext if $\sqrt{\gamma_k}(4/3)^{(3k-1)/4}\beta_k^{n/2k-1} < 2^{\eta-12}$, namely $\eta > 298$.

Example 3.1 Let $n=4$, $u(x)=159+8x+4x^2+2x^3=[159\ 8\ 4\ 2]$, $p=\det(Rot(u(x)))=641407153$, $v(x)=4027071-204800x-91520x^2-40898x^3$.

We factor $u(x)$ and $f_4(x)=1+x^4$ over modulo p as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}&[159\ 8\ 4\ 2]\\ &=2*[[[26912186\ 1]\ 1]\ [[522671888\ 1]\ 1]\ [[91823081\ 1]\ 1]]\bmod 641407153\end{aligned} \tag{3-1}$$

$$\begin{aligned}&[1\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 1]\\ &=[[[26912186\ 1]\ 1]\ [[258567259\ 1]\ 1]\ [[382839894\ 1]\ 1]\ [[614494967\ 1]\ 1]]\bmod 641407153\end{aligned} \tag{3-2}$$

So, we evaluate $\alpha = p-26912186=614494967$, and output the public key $pk=(p,\alpha)$. By pk, we can evaluate $g(x)=[382839894\ 343459750\ 614494967\ 1]$. Now, we construct the corresponding matrix M and call the LLL algorithm for it to obtain $w(x)$. In fact, we get the exact solution $v(x)$ for this example. Without loss of generality, assume $w(x)=\delta(x)\bullet v(x)=[1\ -1\ 1\ 4]\bullet v(x)=[4896893\ 3824893\ 4303943\ 15954106]$. To be

simplicity, we compute $\alpha^2 \bmod p = 343459750$ and $\alpha^3 \bmod p = 382839894$.

To solve $[\delta(x)]_2$, we first compute a ciphertext

$$\begin{aligned} c = a(x)(\alpha) &= (2r(x) + m(x))(\alpha) \ \bmod(p) \\ &= (3*382839894+4*343459750+5*614494967+9) \ \bmod(p) \\ &= 463576302 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} d &= \lfloor 463576302 / p \times [4896893\ 3824893\ 4303943\ 15954106] + [0.5\ \ 0.5\ \ 0.5\ \ 0.5] \rfloor \\ &= [3539224 \quad -2764437 \quad 3110670 \quad 11530812] \end{aligned}$$

Thus, according to $d \bmod 2 = [\delta(x)]_2 \times [a(x)]_2 \bmod 2$, we have

$$[\delta(x)]_2 = d \bmod 2 \times ([a(x)]_2)^{-1} \bmod 2 = [1\ 1\ 1\ 0]$$

Now, we can decrypt a ciphertext by using $w(x)$ and $[\delta(x)]_2$.□

4. Cryptanalysis of Gentry-Halevi's Scheme

In this section, we first present the SHE and the FHE in [GH11], and then mainly analyze the security of FHE for their practical parameters.

4.1 Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE)

Key Generation Algorithm (SHE-KeyGen).

(1) Choose a random polynomial $u(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} u_i x^i \in Z[x]$, where each entry u_i is a η-bit integer, and $p = \det(Rot(u(x)))$ is an odd integer.

(2) Apply the XGCD-algorithm over $Q[x]$ to obtain $v(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} v_i x^i \in Z[x]$ such that $u(x) \times v(x) = p \bmod f_n(x)$.

(3) Check that $u(x)$ is a good generating polynomial. Here $u(x)$ is good if the Hermite normal form of $J = Rot(u(x))$ has the following form.

$$HNF(J)=\begin{pmatrix} p & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ -\alpha & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ -\alpha^2 \bmod p & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ -\alpha^3 \bmod p & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ & & & \ddots & \\ -\alpha^{n-1} \bmod p & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

(4) Output the public key $pk=(p,\alpha)$, and the secret key $sk=(p,v(x))$.

In fact, the SHE of Gentry and Halevi's scheme are similar as that in [SV10], except that $u(x)$ is an arbitrary good generating polynomial and p does not need to be a prime. Moreover, here the decryption algorithm only uses modulo operation over integers.
Same as that of [SV10], Gentry and Halevi [GH11] also introduced the sparse subset sum problem to squash the depth of decryption circuit. We omit the concrete details.

4.2 Cryptanalysis of Gentry-Halevi's FHE

For the decryption algorithm in [GH11], recall that the ciphertext vector $\vec{c}=(c,0,...,0)$. Hence, $\left[\vec{c}\times Rot(v)\right]_p=\left[c\bullet(v_0,v_1,...,v_{n-1})\right]_p=(\left[cv_0\right]_p,\left[cv_1\right]_p,...,\left[cv_{n-1}\right]_p)$. On the other hand, according to [GH11], we have $\left[\vec{c}\times Rot(v)/p\right]=\left[\vec{a}\times Rot(v)/p\right]=\vec{a}\times Rot(v)/p$, where $\left[\bullet\right]$ is fractional part, and $\vec{a}=2\vec{r}+b\bullet\vec{e}_1$ with small vector $\vec{r}$ and $\vec{e}_1=(1,0,...,0)$. So, $\left[\vec{c}\times Rot(v)\right]_p=\vec{a}\times Rot(v)=2\vec{r}\times Rot(v)+b\bullet\vec{v}$. Thus, for any decryptable ciphertext c, we have an equation $(\left[cv_0\right]_p,\left[cv_1\right]_p,...,\left[cv_{n-1}\right]_p)=b\bullet\vec{v} \bmod 2$.
Therefore, we can use the same method as Section 3 above which evaluates a small multiple $w(x)$ of the secret key $v(x)$ such that $w(x)=\delta(x)\times v(x)$. When all the entries in $\vec{a}\times Rot(w(x))$ are less than $p/2$, we may recover the message bit in a ciphertext c as follows: if $(\left[cw_0\right]_p,\left[cw_1\right]_p,...,\left[cw_{n-1}\right]_p)=\vec{w} \bmod 2$ then $b=1$, otherwise $b=0$. Thus, we also merely need to present an efficient algorithm which finds $w(x)=\delta(x)\times v(x)$ over $\mathbb{Z}[x]$ with $\left\|\delta(x)\right\|_\infty \le \sqrt{\gamma_k}(4/3)^{(3k-1)/4}\beta_k^{n/2k-1}$ by applying same method in Theorem 3.1.
So, we can recover the message bit in an encrypted ciphertext by using $k=16$ for the parameters $n=2048$, $\eta=380$ in [GH11]. Furthermore, if we use the sampling reduction

algorithm in [Sch03] under their same assumption, we can further attack the scheme for the parameters $n = 8196$, $\eta = 380$ in [GH11].

Example 4.1 Let $n = 4$, $u(x) = 127 + 11x + 121x^2 + 12x^3 = [127\ 11\ 121\ 12]$, $p = 949062553 = 17*55827209$, $v(x) = [3944101\ \ -388356\ \ -3694147\ \ 317303]$. We evaluate $\alpha = 836836133$, $\alpha^2 \bmod p = 317979309$, $\alpha^3 \bmod p = 692833054$. It is not difficult to verify that the above attack method works. □

5. The Smallest Generator of a Principal Ideal Lattice

In the above cryptanalysis, we merely obtain the message bit in an encrypted ciphertext. In this section, we solve the polynomials $u(x), v(x)$ in the scheme of [SV10, GH11].

According to KeyGen in [SV10, GH11], α is selected to be the root of $f_n(x) \bmod p$ which corresponds to the prime ideal $I = \gamma \bullet \mathbb{Z}[x] = p \bullet \mathbb{Z}[x] + (x - \alpha) \bullet \mathbb{Z}[x]$. Thus, $C(x) - c \in I$ and $C(x) - c = q(x) \bullet \gamma$ with $q(x) \in \mathbb{Z}[x]$. We know that $\gamma^{-1} = v(x) / p$ since $u(x) \times v(x) = p \bmod f_n(x)$. So, we get the following equality

$$C(x) \times v(x) / p - c \times v(x) / p = q(x) \qquad (5\text{-}1)$$

Although we do not know $v(x)$, we can find an approximate multiple $w(x) = \delta(x) \times v(x)$ of $v(x)$ by using Theorem 3.1. Thus, the equation (1) becomes

$$C(x) \times w(x) / p - c \times w(x) / p = q(x) \times \delta(x) \qquad (5\text{-}2)$$

Now, if $\left\| C(x) \times w(x) / p \right\|_\infty < 1/2$, then $q'(x) = q(x) \times \delta(x)$ can be evaluated by rounding the coefficient of $-c \times w(x) / p$. For single $q'(x)$, we can not obtain information of $\delta(x)$. But, each different polynomial $C(x)$ generates different polynomial $q'(x)$. Thus, we can select at random a list small polynomials $C_i(x)$, and compute their corresponding values $c_i = C(\alpha) \bmod p$. According to $C_i(x)$, c_i and equation (2), we get a list polynomials $q_i'(x) = q_i(x) \times \delta(x) \in R$. Without loss of generality, we assume there is a pair of coprime

polynomials among $q_i(x)$. Now, we call the standard ideal GCD algorithm to find $\delta(x)$ [GS02, Coh93].

6. Conclusion and Open Problems

We have analyzed the security of the schemes in [SV10, GH11]. In fact, we mainly show that their schemes are not secure for concrete practical parameter values (such as *n*=2048, 8192) in [SV10, GH11]. Furthermore, for lattice dimension $n = 4,16$, we have implemented the above attack method for their schemes. It is not difficult to verify that our attack works for $n = 2048$ by using the 2*k*-block Rankin reduction algorithm in [GHKN06]. For $n = 8196$, we need to call the random sampling reduction algorithm [Sch03] under the randomness assumption (RA) and the geometric series assumption (GSA) or the LLL algorithm according to the average-case approximation factor of LLL [NS06].

An interesting open problem in this paper is whether or not our method can be extended to solve the smallest generator of an arbitrary principal ideal lattice. Another open problem is to construct a new FHE by hiding a principal ideal lattice to resist the lattice reduction attack.

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