跨文化、百科知识与文化模式

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[摘　要] 在跨文化交际中，跨文化现象由会话参与者共同构建，百科知识和文化模式的关系在跨文化交际中非常重要。跨文化是在情景中临场涌现的共建现象，既依赖于相对确定的文化模式和规范，也依赖于会话情景展开的各项特征。在"社会—认知方法"理论视角下，在临场涌现的跨文化中，百科知识代表基于会话者的先前经验、由会话者带入交际情景的相对确定的文化模式和规范，这种个体先验知识与实际情境中临场涌现的知识和信息进行整合，创建出一个跨文化的第三空间。根据这一理论，跨文化性既具有相对规范的成分，也具有临场涌现的成分。这一观点与以话语建构主义为主要代表的其他研究者的观点略为不同。

[关键词] 跨文化；跨文化交际；百科知识；文化模式；社会—认知方法

Intercultures，Encyclopaedic Knowledge，and Cultural Models

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Abstract：The aim of this paper is to discuss the relationship of encyclopaedic knowledge and cultural models to intercultures that are co-constructed by interlocutors in intercultural communication. Intercultures as defined by are situationally emergent and co-constructed phenomena that rely both on relatively definable cultural models and norms as well as situationally evolving features. In the socio-cognitive approach that provides the theoretical framework for this paper，within the emerging intercultures encyclopaedic knowledge represents the relatively definable cultural models and norms that the interlocutors bring into the communicative situation based on their prior experience. This individual prior knowledge blends with the knowledge and information emerging from the actual situational context. This blend creates a third space that I call intercultures. According to this approach interculturality has both

relatively normative and emergent components. This approach somewhat differs from other researchers' views that are dominated by a discursive-constructivist perspective.

Key words：intercultures；intercultural communication；encyclopaedic knowledge；cultural models；socio-cognitive approach

一、引　言

本文讨论交际中跨文化的本质、临场涌现（emergence）与应用，以及它们与百科知识和文化模式在交际和语用学的社会认知方法框架下的关系[1-3]。Kecskes 认为，跨文化是一种在情景中临场涌现与合作的共建现象，它不仅依赖于相对确定的文化模式和规范，还依赖于情景，具有情景引发的特征。根据这一定义，跨文化性既具有相对的规范性，也具有临场涌现性[4]。这一研究方法与其他研究者的观点[5-6]有所不同。Nishizaka 曾经指出，跨文化性具有情景临场涌现性，而非规范固定现象[5]。诠释的社会—认知方法比上述定义更进了一步，不仅将跨文化性视为一种在交际过程中互动构建与社会构建的现象，而且将其视为一种相对依赖于会话者所属的言语共同体确定的文化模式和规范的现象[1-3]。

跨文化现象通常是临时创造的现象，它们是在交际过程中生成的。在这一过程中，从对话者以往经验导入的互动文化规范和模式与在互动中产生的特征及协作的方式整合在一起。整合的结果便是跨文化会话，在会话中知识和交际行为相互转化，而非相互传输。

百科知识指的是世界知识，它有别于语言系统知识。百科知识代表了语言意义所基于的概念知识系统模型，这一系统在人类如何从交际中领会意义方面起到了深刻的作用。传统上，本体意义与词典意义之间的区分可用以解释百科知识与词典知识之间的区别。词典知识应涵盖具体词汇的特质，而百科知识涵盖的则是所有与基本概念有关的知识。然而，在认知语言学中，语言应用中意义的临场涌现是受语境引导的概念知识结构的激活所致。到目前为止，语义学与语用学之间仍无原则性的区别[7-8]。在认知方法中几乎没有一个句子可以给出完整的思想编码，仅当特定语境加入后命题特征才会临场涌现[9]。

百科知识主要体现在文化模式中，文化模式为个体提供了在特定情境中理解与应对这些情景，以及理解他人在不同情景中的行为的规范情节与行动计划。在社会—认知范式（socio-cognitive approach，SCA，见本文第二部分）下，当关联情景允许、能够而且通常是鼓励个体借助各种知识结构进行认知时，文化被看成是一种个体可求助的、由社会构建并由各种不同的知识结构组成的知识集。

在新兴的跨文化中，百科知识代表了对话者基于他们以往的经验带入交际情景的相对确定的文化模式和规范。对话者将以往的知识与实际语境中临场涌现的知识和信息进行整合，从而创造出我们所称的跨文化的第三空间。

二、社会—认知方法

社会—认知方法统一了互动中的社会与个体特征，把交际看成一种动态过程。在这一过程中，个体既受限于社会条件，同时又形成自己个人的条件。说话者与听话者是交际过程中平等的参与者，他们的话语产出和理解依赖于他们话语产出与理解的个人语境中表达出来的、各自最可及的和

临场涌现的知识。因此，只有从说话者和听话者的视角对话语进行全面理解，才能对语言交际进行足够的描述。

用于解释交际与知识转移的社会—认知方法强调了文化模式与个体心智模式的复杂功能，以及这些模式是怎样帮助个体按类别和情景应对社会文化环境下的反馈机制的，以及怎样用这一方法去解释不同的意义产出和知识转移的[1-3]。在意义构建和理解中，个体不仅依赖于已有的百科知识，而且还依赖于互动过程中所创造的知识。

（一）实证主义与社会建构主义的综合

社会—认知方法试图辩证地综合实证主义与社会建构主义。根据实证主义认识论，知识由客观事实构成，这些客观事实可以通过询问、解释和创造性思维被独立地衡量。Bernstein 指出："在确定理性、知识、真理、现实、美德、正义等本质时，存在着某种我们可以诉诸的、永恒的和无关历史的矩阵或框架。"[10]8 在这一范式中，研究聚焦于程序性措施而非解释性方法。实证主义者通常认为，储存的知识为思维和行为提供了样板[11]。意义嵌入文字和符号之中，而非植入理解它们的心智之中。与实证主义相反，社会建构主义者认为，知识和意义是在社会中构建的，它们是通过语言应用与当下的活动构建和转移的[12-15]。根据 Vygotsky 的观点，只有当我们创造它们时，社会现实和意义才得以存在[16]。社会建构主义者们把语言应用看成是社会文化建构过程，他们强调的是应用，重视人们当下应用语言的方法。他们追求的是各路专家应用语言的共识，而非盲从某个自称权威所声称的正确用法。概括而言，实证主义者将文字和文本视为客观意义的载体，而社会建构主义者则认为起作用的是语言应用（行为和活动）。

社会—认知方法认为，将实际应用等同于固化知识等于忽视了说话者和听话者必须共有的大量先存知识，而这些知识可帮助听话者对说话者意图表达的实际意义进行推断和分类。然而，如果没有相关的文化思维模式，单靠语言应用很难实现意义的推断和分类，人们通过相关的文化思维模式加工所观察到的语言应用，或利用这些文化思维模式去实际创造语言应用。在实践中，甚至当我们在共享的文化思维模式中传递简单的语言应用时（比如怎样做一道菜），我们也依赖大量的已有知识。除此之外，语言实际应用并不为本身的解码（即意义建构）提供语义码，这些语义码应该已存在于阐释者的头脑中[17]。然而，语义的建构不是静态的，而是动态的，这一过程可以随真实的情景语境要求灵活剪裁。意义是根据人们预设的社会文化模式而调整的，如果不考虑这一点，基于语言应用的研究就不能解释创造力、创新及在对话者之间的意义转移等概念和过程。交际的社会特性和知识转移不应将语言应用共同体理论（community-of-practice theory）与个体的知识积累方法对立。毕竟，语言的社会应用需"经由人们的头脑，正是这些头脑在进行感受、感知、思维以及诸如此类的活动"[18]303。尽管存在着语言应用共同体，这些共同体的成员仍可以不同地解释共享的语言应用。共同的文化模式以个人化的方式分散在个体身上。为了使共同体的成员分享特殊语言应用的意义，我们必须有大量的共享知识作为公共背景。Levinthal 和 Rerup 认为，语言应用类似于文本中的句子，除了被接受者确认的意义外，其语法或结构是没有意义的[19]。

将实证主义与社会建构主义综合的观点是一种社会—认知的方法，它既承认社会因素也承认个体因素在意义创建和理解及知识转移方面的重要性。共享的文化模式通过个体经验和先前的知识，与实际的情景语境在文化互动与语言应用的互相作用下变成个人化了的模式[1]。

（二）社会—认知范式下的交际

在社会—认知范式下，交际在合作与自我中心主义两者互相作用的驱动下进行，前者是社会条件的要求，而后者则根植于个体的先前经验。因此，自我中心主义与合作并非相互排斥。它们不同

程度地存在于交际的各个阶段,因为它们代表交际的动态过程中的个体特性与社会特性[2]。一方面,说话者和听话者都受限于社会条件,另一方面,作为个体,他们均有自己在互动过程中自由表达和组织的目标、意图、欲望等。

在用意义的动态模型建构起来的社会—认知方法下,交际表现为两个紧密相连的特征之间的相互影响,这两个特性相互支持,相互作用[1-2]:

个体特征:	社会特征:
注意	意图
先前经验	实际情景体验
自我中心主义	合作
突显	关联

交际是由对话者个人化了的社会文化背景所激发的意图与注意相互影响的结果。社会文化背景由对话者的百科知识构成,他们的百科知识源于他们用语言表达的先前经验,以及用这些语言表达来创建意义与传达意义时的当下体验。个人化的过程导致了意义建构的动态过程:通过个人化的过程,个体将先前经验与实际情景(当下的)体验整合在一起;在意义建构的过程中,一切都是动态的,双方(先前经验与当下体验)一直在变化并相互影响。以上跨文化的定义强调,意义建构依赖于相对确定的文化模式和规范,同时还依赖于情景展开时的各种特征。先前经验在相对确定的文化模式和规范与实际情景体验相互联系或相互整合中表现出来。

社会—认知方法综合了合作的语用观点与个人中心主义的认知观点,着重指出合作与个人中心主义以不同的程度表现在交际的各个阶段。合作是一种意图导向的语言应用,它取决于关联;而个人中心主义以注意导向为特征,它取决于突显。结果,交际中的个体同时表现出这两种特性。我们通过生成和阐述意图进行合作,而意图与所处的真实情景语境关联。与此同时,所谓的个人中心主义是指在话语建构(说话者)和话语理解(听话者)中,我们被自己的注意激活的最突显的信息。语言加工基于这样的假设:对自己突显和易理解的东西也容易被对话者接受[20-23]。

三、百科知识

"核心(词典)"的意义与语用、社会或文化意义之间是有区别的,认知语义学家通常不同意这一观点。根据社会—认知方法,含有与其他(语言的或非语言的)知识分离的语义知识的自发性心理词汇是不存在的。因此,与传统观点相反,在认知范式下,词典知识与百科知识之间没有什么区别,人们有的只是语言知识与非语言知识混合在一起的百科知识。

在认知语言学里,百科知识被看成是一个结构化的知识体系,以网状形式组织起来。而且,不是知识的所有方面都具相同地位,原则上百科知识不是只用一个词就可以表述的。要表述结构化的知识体系,可以用以下几种术语来表述,这些术语之间只有细微的区别:框架(frames)被预设成对一种新情景的理解(例如:我们有一个教师会议);脚本(scripts)是我们结合具体情景的活动顺序(例如:我们有开教师会议时遵循的程序);情节(scenarios)是在认知过程中一套套组织好的单元,是我们对任何新情景所期待的基本构成部件,这些新情景已经被附上了我们能够理解的标签(例如:我们知道了谁会出席教师会议和会上要讲什么);图式(schemata)是帮助我们理解情景的高层次知识(例如:在教师会议上我们的知识实践),心理模式或文化模式是解释情景和赋予情景意义时思维的逻辑顺序。这些术语之间有重叠的地方,但每个术语都给我们带来特定的视角,我们可从这些特定视角去分析信息。

百科意义在语言应用的语境中产生，真正的情景意义的选择是通过语境因素获得或确立的。根据意义的词典观，核心意义（语义学）与非核心的真正意义（语用学）是分离的。然而，根据百科知识观，百科知识涵括在语义学里，而意义则通过语境来确立。依据这一方法，确定的、已有的词汇意义是不存在的，因为语境中的词汇意义是通过百科知识来选择和形成的。

在认知语言学中有几种理论采纳了百科知识，如框架语义学（Frame Semantics）[24-26]、认知语法中的认知域方法（the approach to domains in Cognitive Grammar）[26]、动态识解方法（the approach to Dynamic Construal）[27]以及词汇概念与认知模型理论（the Theory of Lexical Concepts and Cognitive Models，或称 LCCM 理论）[7]。认知语言学对百科知识的核心假设与社会—认知方法不完全吻合，这一点可从下文中见到。

四、文化模式和社会—文化与个体的交集

（一）文化模式的本质

文化模式是帮助个体阐释和理解信息与事件的认知框架或已有的知识（隐性知识）模板。百科知识包括文化模式，这些文化模式通常被定义为"由某个社会群体在主体间共享的认知图式"[28]99。确实存在着一些特定的心理图式，当个体亲历相似的新情景或执行相似的语言任务时，这些心理图式就会被激活。"图式"的概念由康德首次引入学界，用来解释逻辑概念与感觉信息之间的中介概念，这一概念给我们的心理表征赋予了重要意义。探索文化与个体交集的研究声称，认知由共享文化模式的子集构成，这些文化模式使人们绝大多数对客观世界的理解更有条理[29-31]。D'Andrade认为，文化模式可以被理解成"一种高频的、条理清楚的、容易记牢的阐释，这种阐释可以从最少的线索中获取，它包含一个或多个不易改变的原型示例"[28]29。在认知语言学里，基于推理和论证的文化模式在某种程度上被认为是理想化的实体（Lakoff 1987 年介绍的"理想认知模型"，即Idealized Cognitive Models)[31]。Geeraerts认为，真正发生的现象和真正的情景通常或多或少地不同于那些作为认知参考点的模型。模型本身显得有些抽象、笼统甚至过分简单，因为我们可参照这些模型来解释那些通常比较复杂的现象[32]274。在社会—认知方法中，文化模式是基于先前经验的核心抽象概念，个体根据真正的情景语境将它们"个人化"了。

个体通过日常共享的体验过程将文化模式内化[29]，这些体验过程是从不同类型的输入（诸如教学、活动、交际、观察、实践等等）发展而来的认知模式。每个人接触社会—文化生活的各个不同方面，由此使这一个体成为某一社会—文化言语共同体子集中的成员[30]。每一言语共同体以占主导地位的文化模式为他人识别，这些文化模式为其成员提供认识客观世界所需的特定假设与观点。因为文化模式是个人认知资源的一部分，影响他/她的世界观和行为模式，同时也影响他/她对他人的行为、信息、情景作出的解释和反应。

但必须注意，尽管文化模式通常会创造出协调的效果（指大家可遵守），但人们并不是文化的认知克隆。集体的文化模式被个体通过自己的体验内化与个人化，并发展成为个人的心理模式。然而，个人化与集体文化模式之间的任何明显区别都可完全靠分析得到。在现实生活中，这样的区别是逐步的、平缓的，在很大程度上依赖于个体认知倾向和生活经验。请看以下例子：

（1）汽车租赁

办事员：先生，您需要什么？（What can I do for you, sir?）

顾客：我已经预定了。（I have a reservation.）

办事员：我可以看看你的驾照吗？（May I see your driver's license?）

　　　顾客：当然可以。给你。（Sure. Here you are. ）

大多数人都熟悉租车的文化框架，人们期待在这一框架中使用诸如"先生，您需要什么"、"我已经预定了"、"我可以看看你的驾照吗"等特定的情景制约型话语[33-35]。然而，这一框架究竟如何被精确地使用要依赖于参与激活框架的个体的先前经验。

　　　当人们使用语言时，语言独有的特性以两种方式被激活。当人们说话或写字时，他们会精心思考要表达的内容，以符合他们所处的交际情景或语境。而当人们说出或写出自己运用的词汇、措辞、话语时又创造了那一特定交际发生的情景、语境和社会－文化框架。结果，两者似乎在同一时间发生了：人们企图使自己的语言符合情景或语境，反过来，他们的语言又在第一时间创造了情景或语境[36]。人类这种动态的言语行为和语言与语境之间的互动过程从最根本上消除了以下循环问题：先有语言还是先有语境？先有说话者所处的语境（如教师会议、租车、点菜等），还是先有说话者在特定语境下所用的特定语言（能够代表说话者的谈话和反应特点的表达与措辞）？是参与者的说话和举止方式构成了"租车"的会话方式，还是"租车"的语境导致了说话者用这种方式来会话？特定的行为方式和话语构建了各种社会情境，即社会—文化框架，而这些框架反过来又要求人们运用特定的说话方式。"先有语言还是先有语境"似乎是一个与共时不相关的问题。社会与文化规范导致了循环和常规的活动，然而，这些规范和常规活动必须不断地根据当下的情况重建。问题在于：文化模式、常规和框架是否存在于语言之外？社会建构主义者坚持认为，模型和框架必须一次次地重建，因此，认为它们存在于语言之外只是我们的印象而已。然而，社会—认知方法认为，这些文化心理模式在个体心理中具有心理现实性，当某一具体情境发生时，恰当的模式就会被想起，触发了思想和活动所需的恰当的语言表达。当然，创建和重建我们的世界不仅需要通过语言，还需要通过语言与其他诸如非语言符号系统、物体、工具、技术等真实生活现象的互动才能实现。

　　　个体不仅在某种程度上受集体文化模式的制约，而且也参与到这些集体文化模式的创建之中。个人化模式不仅源于个人对现存的文化模式创造性的（甚至是无意的）合并，还源于其独特的认知倾向（自我反思、批判性思维等）。有些个人化模式总是保持自己的特质（即个人的特质），而另一些个人化模式可以进入社会—文化框架，并建立新的文化趋势[37]。个人化与文化模式共同帮助人们在思维中有条理地组织事件，在行为上轻松地行事，长此以往可以释放那些可应对不太熟悉的问题和经历的认知资源。

（二）文化模式的"现实性"

　　　人们通常认为，语言与文化是"集体表征"，即社会建构系统[38-40]。有两种方法可用来论证这些系统是否存在。其中一种方法认为，这些系统只是附带现象，即它们并非实际存在[40]。然而，当它们作为一群具有相似思维方式的人面临相似语境时作出相似反应的副产品时，就似乎实际存在了。这一方法的问题在于人类通常谈论语言和文化，并且相信语言和文化，似乎它们实际存在于个体之外。对语言与文化的个体理解在不同个体之间是具有一致性的，一般而言，这种一致性超越了我们自己所感受到的个体模式。我们具有高度共享的集体模式感，每个人都能够描述我们在何处偏离了模式，或者在何处与众不同。

　　　与"不存在"观点对立的观点认为，这些系统是某种个体之外的客观存在[1,42-43]。文化是"真的"，用来处理个体与其所在的共同体之间的关系问题。这种方法把一个小孩的社会化或文化化看成是一个过程，通过这一过程，基本文化结构和图式在个体心灵深处"内在化"。然而，这些文化模式和图式在历时和共时地不断变化着。显然，一百年前的文化模式与我们现在的文化模式差别很大。而且，内在化过程并非机械的，文化化过程是在个体与社会环境的双向互动中发生的。

当我们谈论文化时,通常指的是"主观文化"(subjective culture)[42],这种文化是一种具有共同体特征的感知社会环境的方法。然而,文化通常可通过两个基本方面进行区分,当这种区分界限不清时,我们就无法搞清文化是否存在于"主观之外"。文化的一个方面是主观文化,文化的心理特征包括假设、价值、信仰和思维方式;另一个方面是客观文化,包括文化情景与文化物品,如与之相关的经济制度、社会习俗、政治结构与进程、艺术、工艺、文学等。客观文化常常是主观文化具体化了的外在形式。这意味着,那些被看做人类活动延伸的体系获得了作为外在实体的独立地位,它们似乎存在于"主观之外",而它们持续发展的人类起源通常被遗忘。客观文化的研究已得到广泛的确立,因为体系和行为的外在形式更容易被观察和考量。主观文化通常被当做一种影响感知、思维和记忆的无意识过程,或被当做老师或教育者无法获得的个人知识。

Simmel 也以社会现实的文化水平区分了主观文化与客观文化。根据他的观点,人们创建文化,但由于他们具有使社会现实具体化的能力,文化世界和社会世界逐渐有了自己的生命,而且逐渐控制了创造它们的演员[41]。我们也可以像这样来思考语言,语言被人们创造出来并一直被人们创造着,但语言似乎也有了自己作为"主观之外"的一种体系的生命形式。Simmel 识别了很多客观文化的组成成分,包括工具、交通、技术、艺术、语言、知识产权领域、传统智慧、宗教教义、哲学体系、法律体系、道德准则、理想等。客观文化的规模随着现代化而增长,文化领域各种不同成分的数量也在增长。

Simmel 关注的是客观文化对个体主观存在的影响,后现代主义者关注的则是另一个层面。过去,大多数文化是由居住在现实社会群体中的人们创建的,他们针对实际问题进行互动。这种接地文化(grounded culture)创建了真正的意义,并从道义上注入了规范、价值标准和信仰。在后现代时代,大多数文化由运用广告与媒体的企业创建与开拓。这一重要的历史转折暗示着文化已经从对社会现实的表征转向了对商品形象的表征。在我们的时代,文化是被生产出来而非创建出来的,人们从文化创建者变成文化消费者。

五、文化模式所起的作用

（一）文化模式的发展

无论是否用语言来编码,我们每个人都有丰富的个人阅历,因此与之有关的认知构架就可能存在差异。当我们通过语言或其他方式与他人交际时,我们需要将自己的个人经历与认知框架相联系。当我们按惯例重复地与他人交往时,通常会形成某种标准化的办事方式。这些共享的行动计划(指标准化了的办事方式)会作为文化形式出现。Kronenfeld 认为,我们需要用言辞来交际时才涉及语言,而且只涉及那些在记忆中用来讨论、谈论或编码该行动计划的相关语言。他强调,语言是一种社会建构的工具,对思维帮助极大,但它绝不是形成个体思维的基础,也无须为(大多数)共享或协作的、用以构建文化的思想提供基础[40]。笔者认为,语言在文化中发挥的作用比Kronenfeld 所论述的还要大。事实上,语言(主要是惯用表达或套话)对文化模式的发展和巩固作出了贡献,而惯用表达是地道语言应用的核心与灵魂。一般而言,惯用表达在言语共同体中充当语言应用的核心,因为预制的(prefabricated)(即惯用的)语言表达对于言语共同体中的每一个成员通常表示同一意义。语言及其语言使用者(说话人)有表达的首选方式[23,43],说英语的本族人会说"shoot a film"(照相),"dust the furniture"(搞卫生),"make love"(做爱),请你在餐桌上"help yourself"(自便)。这些表达的应用创造了情节,并为语言应用提供了某种习惯用法。例如:

（2）Jim：我告诉你一件事。(Let me tell you something.)

Bob：出什么事了？（Is something wrong?）

在此例中，"Let me tell you something"的表达通常含有贬义，它创造了人们期待麻烦的情节（scenario）。

我们的日常交际充满了预制的语言表达和说话方式，因为我们喜欢一直遵循自己的首选方式说话。为什么会这样呢？Kecskes 认为有以下三个原因[23]：

第一，公式减少了加工负荷。心理语言学的证据表明，固定表达和公式在言语产出中起到了重要的省力作用[43-44]。Sinclair 的习语原则（idiom principle）认为，预制语块"……可以……用来解释省力的自然趋势"[45]110。这就意味着在交际中我们想以较少的话语获取较多的认知结果。惯用表达减轻了加工负荷不仅因为它们"触手可及"，不需要任何从说话者到听话者的组装过程，而且因为它们的突显意义在在线语言产出与加工中很容易获得。

第二，短语的话语形式有强大的构建框架的能力。框架即文化模式，是基本的认知结构，引导人们对现实的感知和表征[46]。框架帮助人们确定现实中哪些部分受到关注。人们并非有意识地制造框架，而是在交际过程中无意识地使用。惯用表达通常带有框架，大多数固定表达被定义为与概念框架相关。如果一位警察拦住了一辆汽车并对司机说"请下车"，这样的表达会创建一个特殊框架，在这一框架中，所运用的话语角色和表达是很容易预测的。

第三，所有语言公式化单元为在共同的交际行为协作中的公共背景知识创建了共享基础。运用惯用表达要求有共享的经验（shared experience）和概念的流畅（conceptual fluency）。Tannen 和 Öztek 指出："具有固定公式的文化为其成员提供了知识稳定性，即他们知道，他们所说的话会让受话人以预期的同样的方式得到理解，毕竟，这是交际的最终目的。"[47]54

文化模式为人们可能的行动计划提供了一种参考库（reference library）或为他人提供了对这些行动可能的解释。人们无法直接习得这些模式，而是通过与周围的人打交道一次次地重新推断所得。然而，我们的所见所闻并非是模式本身。我们从经验中推断出来的是整合情节所需的片段信息、形象和特征。我们推断出的结论直接依赖于在我们信息体验中突显的、重复出现的特定情节，我们依赖这些信息去寻找规律性，基于这些规律再进一步地构建情节。因此，一代人在言语或文化行为中的系统性重复变化会被下一代人作为固定的语言与文化所习得。

我们真正体验的文化模式（即文化模式的形式）通过它们在具体实现的情境中的实例化过程获得特殊性。很多文化模式的应用（实例化和具体实现）都是在代表某种从原型无标记的默认情景所延伸出来的情境之中实现的。人们在同一言语共同体中共享的文化模式的核心通过系统的、反复的转变历时地变化着，这些转变可能来自社会—政治变化、技术变化、环境变化等。然而，核心的应用本身是共时变化的，没有一个情景会以我们从前经历过的、完全同样的方式重现。

在社会—认知范式下，行为总是由个体表现的，个体总是遵循文化形式以适应他本身的需要。人们将文化模式当成装备，以便在他们所属的各种共同体中与他人进行有效的互动。个体既以这种方式塑造文化模式，又受这些文化模式制约。大多数的文化模式来自人们过去的经验，但人们在运用中又不断地对它们进行改造，这是一个社会与个体相互缠绕的过程。重要的是，应该注意到并没有人要求我们（是否运用文化模式或运用其他方式）去遵循文化习俗。在任何给定的时间里，当人们处于某种典型的情境之中，他们可以忽视或改变头脑中已有的文化模式。特定的文化模式在不同的群体之间能够显示（也经常显示）出细微的变化，我们都隶属于某个群体，这些群体可以是正式的或非正式的，长久的或短暂的，强迫的或自愿的，等等。

（二）文化模式的实例化

文化模式是具有不同程度特殊性的抽象规约，它们将知识、目标、价值、感知、情绪状态等因素

与不同语境中的行为关联在一起。Kronenfeld 认为，这些概念化模式并非直接、自动地用于任何具体情境[40]。首先，它们必须通过将有关情景的具体细节代替一般类属细节来实例化。实例化的文化模式仍然只是一个概念结构，对于任何给定的情景，也许可以考虑一些不同的（甚至相互矛盾的）文化模式。最后，一个特定的实例化模式在真正具体的情境中得以"实现"，这可能是为某人自己的行为制定的行动计划，或是解释他人行为的策略。重要的是，在任何给定的时刻，只有一个特定的实例化模式可以实现，但我们可以迅速在不同的模式实现之间来回变换。

抽象的集体文化模式与具体情境中由对话者对模式的个人化实现之间的关系，相当于语言学领域音素（phonemes）与音位（phones），或者词素（morphemes）与词素形式（morphs）之间的关系。我们把音位看成是音素真正的语音实现，把词素形式看成是用来实现词素的真正形式。Mey 在语用行为理论中也谈到语用素（pragmeme），它们在言语情境的语用行为中被实例化[48]。一个特定的语用素可以通过个体的语用行为被实体化，被实现。换言之，一个语用行为是一个使自己适应语境的实例，也是一个让语境适应自己的实例。请看以下实例：

> （3）她在追求我的钱。（She is after my money.）
>
> 　　好像我真的在乎似的。或：我才不在乎呢！（Like I care.）

"Like I care"是一种用来表达语用素"我不在乎"的语用行为，这一表达也可用其他具体的语用行为，如"我不在乎"、"我不介意"、"不关我的事"等来实体化。根据 Mey 的观点，语用行为是被情景导出的，也是受情景制约的。在言语行为与语用行为之间不存在一一对应的关系，因为后者不必然包含言语的具体行为。请看以下实例：

> （4）母亲：Joshua，你在干什么？（Joshua，what are you doing?）
>
> 　　Joshua：没干什么。（Nothing.）
>
> 　　母亲：你马上给我停下来。（Will you stop it immediately.）[48]216

此例中以语用行为"没干什么"为代表的语用素也可描述成"试图逃离（退出）"没完没了的"会话"。

但就 Mey 所指的语用素的意义而言，这一表达不是文化模式，而更像文化模式中的情节。然而，实例化过程在语用素和文化模式的案例中都会发生。

（三）文化规范

文化包括很多规范或惯例。Feldman 和 Pentland 认为，规范（即惯例）由两个因素组成：明示（ostensive）与行事（performative）。明示因素构成个体对加工过程的认知理解，而行事因素由在真实情景语境中的实际行为构成[49]。从社会—认知视角看，这两种过程都应该引起我们的注意。认知理解既依赖于文化模式和个人模式，也依赖于这些模式怎样为认知加工过程所应用，这一过程贯穿从过度的自动思维（如分类）到自我反省思维（如反思）[17]。当分类思维被应用时，人们基于现有的文化模式和个人模式，通过自动整合所输入的刺激来建立意义。笔者曾指出，在交际过程中，说话者将由意图激发的个人语境以词汇单位编码，以话语形式（实际语言语境）由说话者在某个情境（实际情景语境）中说（或写）到"主观之外"的世界里，然后与听话者头脑"内"的个人认知语境（先验知识）相匹配（"内化"）[1]。意义是在实际情景语境中的说话者的个人语境与听话者的个人语境交互作用的产物，它为会话者所理解。

社会认知研究表明，有几种认知因素可以影响分类思维的适应性[17]。举例来说，人们通常在日常工作中应用分类思维，如当他们有高认知负荷时、被催逼迅速作出决策时、认知能力有限时以及注意力分散时。分类思维一般可以使人们高效地处理有规律的社会—文化的交互和刺激。环境刺激作为依赖分类思维的结果被"推"入现有的心智模式，这可以避免个体为适应与心智模式有分

歧的输入和特殊情况而进行调整。在交际中，这种现象在预制（惯用）语言单位和情景制约型话语的应用中是可观察到的。请看以下实例：

（5）店员：您要买什么，夫人？（Can I help you，Madame?）

　　顾客：谢谢！我只是随便看看。（Thank you. I'm just looking.）

在这一会话中，"您要买什么"和"我只是随便看看"两句话作为非常明显的情景制约型话语在使用[34-35]。顾客是心不在焉的，因为她在忙着看服装，想打发掉店员。

反省思维过程以不同的方式运行。这种思维要求人们具有维持高层认知的响应能力，用考虑周详的和创造性的方式联合，或拓展内化的文化模式与个人模式，以改进他们的意义建构。对分类思维与反省思维的应用程度随情景语境的不同而变化，生活阅历和总体敏锐性也是重要的变量。Ringberg 和 Reihlen 指出，反省思维是一种前摄性过程，当一个人对于蓄意认知（deliberate cognition）有认知能力和需要去应对那些通过应用个人模式和/或文化模式分类仍不能理解意义或对意义理解帮助不大时，人们便应用反省思维[17]923。类别不一致的信息可以激活某些人的反省思维过程，通过这种方式，他们将文化模式与个人模式故意重组在一起，以改进在特定情境中意义建构的关联度[50-51]。这一点可以从以下对话中得到证明：

（6）Jill：我今天遇到了一个人。（I met someone today.）

　　Jane：祝贺你。（Good for you.）

　　Jill：他是个警官。（He is a police officer.）

　　Jane：你有麻烦了？（Are you in trouble?）

　　Jill：哦，没有，我喜欢那个人。我们在一家咖啡馆见面，他很友好，也很有礼貌。（Oh, no，I liked the man. We met in a cafe. He was nice and polite.）

　　Jane：不是所有的警官都……（Not all of them are...）

在这段会话中，两个妇女之间与"警官"这一词汇关联的个人化语境是明显不同的。由于 Jill 与警官接触的正向经验使附在"警官"身上的集体文化模式在她的个人模式中改变了，而 Jane 没有这样的正向经验，她的个人模式似乎与集体文化模式比较接近。

社会—认知方法将文化模式和个人模式融入分类思维与反省思维的加工过程，这就意味着在大多数情况下，一个认知系统时常既非完全封闭也非完全开放，既非完全规约也非独立于外部感觉输入之外，人们既非自动加工处理器也非文化白痴。因此，意义创建和知识转移被定位在完全自动到完全特殊的连续统的某一点上。这一过程依赖于包括个人模式与文化模式的特征、分类思维与反省思维的水平以及环境反馈机制等几个变量。社会—认知方法通过确立人们头脑（与身体）中的意义建构过程来拓宽传统实证主义与社会建构语义的研究领域，这一过程也许受到环境反馈机制的影响，但一般不由环境反馈机制来决定[18,52]。社会—认知模型为我们更好地认识认知因素和环境反馈机制的作用提供了一个更加全面、系统的思路。

六、百科知识在创建跨文化中的作用

跨文化性既有先验的一面，也有临场涌现的一面，两者在交际过程中同时发生并起作用。因此，跨文化现象不是固定的现象，而是在交际过程中创建的现象。交际双方分属不同第一语言的言语共同体，尽管他们说同一种语言，但代表的却是各自言语共同体所限定的不同的文化准则和模

式。以下一位巴西姑娘和波兰妇女的对话①能够说明这一点：

　　（7）巴西人：你是做什么的？（And what do you do?）
　　　　波兰人：我在大学里做清洁工。（I work at the university as a cleaner.）
　　　　巴西人：是门卫吗？（As a janitor?）
　　　　波兰人：不，还不是。门卫比清洁工地位高。（No, not yet. Janitor is after the cleaner.）
　　　　巴西人：你想当门卫吗？（You want to be a janitor?）
　　　　波兰人：当然啦。（Of course.）

在这一对话中，对话者代表两种（巴西和波兰）不同的语言和文化，但用英语作为通用语交际，这时交际参与者带入互动的先验知识。她们创建了一个跨文化现象，这一现象不属于任何一方，但在她们的会话过程中临场涌现。在这一跨文化过程中，两位说话者围绕波兰妇女的工作进行了非常流畅的交谈。然而，双方对于波兰妇女的工作应该用什么英语词汇来表达都不是很确定。在交流中，双方都没有产生误解，因为每个参与者都小心翼翼地用语义明晰的词汇来交流，以便尽可能清楚地表达自己的意思。波兰妇女在"cleaner"与"janitor"之间建立了一个在目标语文化中不存在的等级（"cleaner"就是"janitor"），然而，这里就有一个由说话者创建的临场涌现的文化因素。此刻，说话者基于第一语言的百科知识就显得非常重要。说话者提出了一些特定的方式来创建公共背景知识，这些特定的方式依赖于由她们的第一语言文化决定的先验知识。

　　跨文化现象此起彼伏，因而它们并不稳固，也不永久，只是常常发生。跨文化现象之间可以协作，也可以整合。跨文化性是参与交谈的会话者当场建构的，但这是不是一种在同一文化内交际也会发生的现象呢？我们为什么要区分跨文化交际与内文化交际？应该怎样区分？目前对于这些问题基本占主导地位的观点是：在内部文化和跨文化之间没有原则的区分[53-54]。就交际过程机制而言，这是对的。然而，内部文化与跨文化的本质和内容方面存在质的差别。内文化交际中的说话者依赖相对确定的言语共同体的先验知识和文化，这种先验知识和文化被属于同一言语共同体的个体个人化。尽管没有需要跨越的语言边界，但人们也需要依赖亚文化群体，表征被个人化了。临时创造的东西不仅丰富了特定的文化，为该文化作出了贡献，而且还被保持在那种语言和文化模糊不清的但仍旧可辨的界限之内。然而，在跨文化交际中，带入交际过程的个人化了的先验知识分属于不同的文化和语言，参与者临时创造的东西会消失，不会丰富任何特定的文化或语言，也不会为任何一种文化或语言增添任何东西。跨文化现象是一种临时的创造，这种创造也许可以增进个体化过程和全球化过程，但很难被说成是对任何特定文化有所贡献。这正是我们在以上例 7 中所见到的。说话者在"cleaner"与"janitor"之间创建了一个层级，目的是为了创建一个公共背景，以确保她们在给定情景下以个人化的方式相互理解。当她们停止谈话之后，这一跨文化现象随即消失。然而，也有例外的情况。跨文化现象也可能在特定的案例中重现一段时间，例如：国际谈判小组、国际课堂、国际旅游团等等。Kasper 和 Blum-Kulka 谈到"跨文化类型"时指出，两种语言的说话者完全有可能创建一种谈话的跨文化类型，这种类型既与两种文化基础相联系又截然不同，无论他们使用哪种语言，这都是他们依赖的一种类型[55]。Kasper 和 Blum-Kulka 还声称，这一假设受到了很多跨文化交际研究的支持，特别是那些针对互动社会语言学所做的研究[56-57]，以及那些针对移民人口代际之间语用行为的研究[58]。

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① 语料来源：美国纽约大学奥尔巴尼分校由博士生收集的奥尔巴尼通用语数据库。

七、结　论

本文结论部分聚焦于与跨文化相关的百科知识的本质和作用。社会—认知方法在本文被用来解释和讨论与主题相关的问题，这一理论帮助我们理解百科知识是怎样通过其文化模式不仅作为历时变化的储存知识，而且还作为在交际过程中实时创建的临场涌现的知识时而起作用的。百科知识的一个重要作用是为个体在特定情节、脚本和行动计划的文化模式中解释和应对特定情境，或为他们在脑中加工和解释他人在各种生活情境中的举止行为时提供样本。

社会—认知方法将跨文化性定义为一种不仅需要在交际过程中以互动、社交的方式构建的现象，而且需要依赖于相对确定的、代表会话者所属的言语共同体的文化模式和规范的现象。因此，跨文化性既具有相对的规范因素，也具有相对的临场涌现因素。为了理解跨文化碰撞的动态性和时刻变化的本质，我们需要辩证地看待跨文化性。文化建构与文化模式在历时地变化，而文化表征与个体的言语产出却在共时地变化。跨文化现象是一种临时的创造，它们是在交际过程中创建的。在创建过程中，作为百科知识代表的文化规范和文化模式从会话者的先验知识中被带入互动，并以协作的方式与互动中临时的创造特性进行整合。结果是，在跨文化话语中知识与交际行为相互转化，而非相互传输，其重点是转化而非传输。

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Intercultures，Encyclopaedic Knowledge，
and Cultural Models

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Ⅰ. Introduction

This paper discusses the nature，emergence and use of intercultures and their relation to encyclopaedic knowledge and cultural models in the framework of a socio-cognitive approach to communication and pragmatics (Kecskes 2008；Kecskes & Zhang 2009；Kecskes 2010b)[1-3]. Intercultures as defined by (Kecskes 2011)[4] are situationally emergent and co-constructed phenomena that rely both on relatively definable cultural models and norms as well as situationally evolving features. According to this definition interculturality has both relatively normative and emergent components. This approach somewhat differs from what other researchers' views (e. g. Nishizaka 1995；Blum-Kulka et al. 2008)[5-6] in which it was pointed out (cf. Nishizaka 1995)[5] pointed out that interculturality is a situationally emergent rather than a normatively fixed phenomenon. However，the socio-cognitive approach (Kecskes 2008；Kecskes & Zhang 2009；Kecskes 2010b)[1-3] to be explained later goes one step forward and defines interculturality as a phenomenon that is not only interactionally and socially constructed in the course of communication but also relies on relatively definable cultural models and norms that represent the speech communities to which the interlocutors belong.

Intercultures are usually ad hoc creations. They are generated in a communicative process in which cultural norms and models brought into the interaction from prior experience of interlocutors blend with features created ad hoc in the interaction in a synergetic way. The result is intercultural discourse in which there is mutual transformation of knowledge and communicative behavior rather than transmission.

Encyclopaedic knowledge refers to the knowledge of the world as distinguished from knowledge of the language system. The encyclopaedic view represents a model of the system of conceptual knowledge that underlies linguistic meaning. This system plays a profound role in how human beings make sense in communication. Traditionally the division between the ontology and the lexicon illustrates the distinction between encyclopedic and dictionary knowledge. Dictionary knowledge is supposed to cover the idiosyncracies of particular words，whereas encyclopedic knowledge covers everything regarding the underlying concepts. In cognitive linguistics，however，meaning，emerging from language use，is a function of the activation of conceptual knowledge structures as guided by context. Consequently，there is no principled distinction between semantics and pragmatics (e. g. Evans 2006；Fauconnier 1997)[7-8]. In cognitive approaches practically no sentence encodes a complete thought. Certain processes of

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contextual filling-in are required before anything of a propositional nature emerges at all (Carston, 1998)[9].

Encyclopaedic knowledge is mostly represented in cultural models that provide scenarios or action plans for individuals of how to interpret and behave in a particular situation or how to interpret the behavior of others in one or another situation. In the socio-cognitive paradigm (to be introduced below) culture is seen as a socially constituted set of various kinds of knowledge structures that individuals turn to as relevant situations permit, enable, and usually encourage.

In emerging intercultures encyclopaedic knowledge represents the relatively definable cultural models and norms that the interlocutors bring into the communicative situation based on their prior experience. This individual prior knowledge blends with the knowledge and information emerging from the actual situational context, and this blend creates a third space that we call intercultures.

Ⅱ. The Socio-cognitive Approach (SCA)

The socio-cognitive approach unites the societal and individual features of interaction and considers communication a dynamic process in which individuals are not only constrained by societal conditions but they also shape them at the same time. Speaker and hearer are equal participants of the communicative process. They both produce and comprehend speech relying on their most accessible and salient knowledge expressed in their private contexts in production and comprehension. Consequently, only a holistic interpretation of utterances from both the perspective of the speaker and the perspective of the hearer can give us an adequate account of language communication.

The socio-cognitive approach to communication and knowledge transfer (Kecskes 2008; Kecskes and Zhang 2009; Kecskes 2010b)[1-3] emphasizes the complex role of cultural and private mental models, and how these are applied categorically and/or reflectively by individuals in response to socio-cultural environmental feedback mechanisms, and how this leads to and explains different meaning outcomes and knowledge transfer. In meaning construction and comprehension individuals rely both on pre-existing encyclopaedic knowledge and knowledge created in the process of interaction.

1. A Synthesis of Positivist and Social Constructivist Perspectives

The socio-cognitive approach tries to make a dialectical synthesis of positivism and social constructivism. According to the positivist epistemology knowledge consists of objective facts that can be measured independently of the inquiring, interpreting, and creative mind. Bernstein (1983)[10]8 argued that "there is some permanent, ahistorical matrix or framework to which we can ultimately appeal in determining the nature of rationality, knowledge, truth, reality, goodness, or rightness". In this paradigm research focuses on procedural measures rather than interpretive perspectives. It is usually assumed that stored knowledge provides templates for thinking as well as acting (e. g. Alvesson and Kärreman 2001)[11]. Meaning is embedded in words and symbols rather than in the mind that perceives them. In contrast to the positivist approach the social constructivist perspective holds that knowledge and meaning are socially constructed. They are constituted and transferred through practices and activities (e. g. Wittgenstein 1953; Gherardi 2000, 2001; Brown and Duguid 2001)[12-15]. According to Vygotsky (1978) social reality and meaning only exist as we create them[16]. Social constructivists see language use as socio-cultural construction. They put an emphasis on usage, and value the ways people currently use the language. Instead of looking for one self-professed authority to pronounce correct usage, constructivists would take a consensus of expert users. In sum, positivists consider words and texts as carriers of objectified meaning while for social constructivists practice (action, doing) plays that role.

The socio-cognitive approach argues that to equate practice with knowledge is to ignore the huge amount of pre-existing knowledge that both speakers and hearers must have in common for the hearer to infer and categorize the intended meaning of a practice. Practice can hardly work without the presence of relevant cultural mental models with which people process the observed practice, or which they use to actually create practice. Even when we pass along simple routines by sharing them in practice (e. g. how to make a dish) we rely on the presence of a large amount of

pre-existing knowledge. Besides，practice does not provide semantic codes for its own decoding (i. e. sense making). Those codes must already exist in the mind of the interpreter (Ringberg and Reihlen 2008)[17]. However，they are dynamic rather than static constructs that can flexibly tailored as actual situational context requires. Without taking into account that meaning is mediated by people's mental predisposed socio-cultural models，practice-based research is unable to explain creativity，innovation，and the transfer of meaning among interlocutors. The social character of communication and knowledge transfer should not put community-of-practice theory at odds with individualistic approaches to knowledge. After all，social practices pass 'through the heads of people，and it is such heads that do the feeling，perceiving，thinking，and the like' (Bunge，1996)[18]303. While communities of practice exist，members of those communities may still interpret shared practices differently. Collective cultural models are distributed to individuals in a privatized way. In order for members to share the meaning of a particular practice a huge amount of shared knowledge must already be present to assure common ground. Levinthal and Rerup (2006) argued that practice is similar to sentences in a text. Its grammar or structure is not meaningful apart from the meaning that is assigned by the receiver[19].

The synthesis of the positivist and social constructivist views is a socio-cognitive approach that acknowledges the importance of both societal and individual factors in meaning creation and comprehension as well as knowledge transfer. Shared cultural models privatized through individuals' private experience and prior knowledge interact with the actual situational context in social interaction and practices (Kecskes 2008)[1].

2. Communication in the Socio-cognitive Paradigm

In the socio-cognitive paradigm communication is driven by the interplay of *cooperation* required by societal conditions and *egocentrism* rooted in prior experience of the individual. Consequently，egocentrism and cooperation are not mutually exclusive phenomena. They are both present in all stages of communication to a different extent because they represent the individual and societal traits of the dynamic process of communication (Kecskes and Zhang 2009)[2]. On the one hand speakers and hearers are constrained by societal conditions but as individuals they all have their own goals，intention，desire，etc. that are freely expressed，and recognized in the flow of interaction.

In the socio-cognitive approach framed by the dynamic model of meaning (Kecskes 2008；Kecskes and Zhang 2009)[1-2] communication is characterized by the interplay of two traits that are inseparable，mutually supportive and interactive：

Individual trait：	*Social trait*：
attention	intention
prior experience	actual situational experience
egocentrism	*cooperation*
salience	relevance

Communication is the result of the interplay of intention and attention motivated by socio-cultural background that is privatized individually by interlocutors. The socio-cultural background is composed of encyclopaedic knowledge of interlocutors deriving from their *prior experience* tied to the linguistic expressions they use and *current experience* in which those expressions create and convey meaning. The process of privatalization through which the individual blends his prior experience with the actual situational (current) experience results in a dynamic process of meaning construction in which nothing is static. The two sides (prior and current) constantly change and affect each other. The definition of intercultures above emphasized that meaning construction relies both on relatively definable cultural models and norms as well as situationally evolving features. Prior experience is represented in relatively definable cultural models and norms that are related and/or blended with actual situational experience.

The socio-cognitive approach integrates the pragmatic view of cooperation and the cognitive view of egocentrism，and emphasizes that both cooperation and egocentrism are manifested in all phases of communication to a varying extent. While cooperation is an intention-directed practice and governed by relevance，egocentrism is an attention-oriented trait and governed by salience. Consequently，in communication we show our two sides. We cooperate by generating and formulating intention that is relevant to the given actual situational context. At the same

time our egocentrism means that we activate the most salient information to our attention in the construction (speaker) and comprehension (hearer) of utterances. Language processing is anchored in the assumption that what is salient or accessible to oneself will also be accessible to one's interlocutors (Giora 2003;Barr & Keysar 2004;Colston 2004;Kecskes 2007)[20-23].

Ⅲ. Encyclopaedic knowledge

Cognitive semanticists usually reject the idea that there is a distinction between 'core' (dictionary) meaning on the one hand, and pragmatic, social or cultural meaning on the other. According to this approach there is no autonomous mental lexicon which contains semantic knowledge separately from other kinds of (linguistic or non-linguistic) knowledge. Consequently, opposed to the traditional view, in the cognitive paradigm there is no distinction between dictionary knowledge and encyclopaedic knowledge. There is only encyclopaedic knowledge, which incorporates both linguistic and extralinguistic knowledge.

In cognitive linguistics encyclopaedic knowledge is viewed as a structured system of knowledge, organized as a network. Moreover, not all aspects of the knowledge that is, in principle, accessible by a single word has equal standing (e. g. Evans 2002). Several terms have been used to denote the structured system of knowledge. These terms only slightly differ from each other. *Frames* are preconceived understandings of a new situation (e. g. we have a faculty meeting). *Scripts* are sequences of activities that we associate with a particular situation (we have procedures to follow when having a faculty meeting). *Scenarios* are sets of organized units in cognitive processes. They are components we anticipate for any new situation that has been given a label that we understand (we have an understanding of who and what should be present during faculty meeting). *Schemata* are higher level knowledge that helps us understand a situation (our knowledge of practice in a faculty meeting). Mental or cultural models are logical sequences of thought that explain a situation, and give sense to a situation. There is some overlap between these terms but they give us some perspective from which to analyze our data.

Encyclopaedic meaning arises in context(s) of use. The 'selection' of actual situational meaning is informed/determined by contextual factors. In the dictionary view of meaning, there is a separation of core meaning (semantics) from non-core actual meaning (pragmatics). The encyclopaedic view, however, claims that encyclopaedic knowledge is included in semantics, and meaning is determined by context. According to this approach there is no definable, pre-existing word meaning because the meaning of a word in context is selected and shaped by encyclopaedic knowledge.

There are several theories in cognitive linguistics which adopt the encyclopaedic view such as Frame Semantics (Fillmore 1982;Fillmore and Atkins 1992)[24CD*2][25], the approach to domains in Cognitive Grammar (Langacker 1987)[26], the approach to Dynamic Construal (Croft and Cruse 2004)[27], and the Theory of Lexical Concepts and Cognitive Models-LCCM Theory (Evans 2006)[7]. The core assumptions of cognitive linguistics about encyclopaedic knowledge are not always maintainable in the socio-cognitive approach as we will see in the following sections.

Ⅳ. Cultural Models and the Intersection of the Socio-cultural and Individual

1. The Nature of Cultural Models

Cultural models are cognitive frames or templates of assumed or implicit knowledge that assist individuals in interpreting and understanding information and events. Encyclopaedic knowledge includes cultural models that are usually defined as "a cognitive schema that is intersubjectively shared by a social group" (D'Andrade 1992)[28] 99. There exist certain mental schemas which are activated when an individual experiences similar new situations or linguistic tasks. The notion of *schema* was first introduced by Immanuel Kant to account for the mediation between logical concepts and sensory information, which gives significance to our mental representations. Research exploring the intersection of culture and the individual claims that cognition consists of subsets of shared *cultural models* that organize much of how people make sense of the world (e. g. D'Andrade 1992;DiMaggio 1997;Shore 1996)[28-30].

D'Andrade（1992）argued that a cultural model can be understood as "an interpretation which is frequent，well organized，memorable，which can be made from minimal cues，contains one or more prototypic instantiations，and is resistant to change"[28] 29. In cognitive linguistics the cultural models underlying reasoning and argumentation are considered to some extent idealized entities（see，for instance，the notion of *Idealized Cognitive Models* as introduced in Lakoff 1987）[31]. Geeraerts argued that actually occurring phenomena and actual situations usually differ to a smaller or greater extent from the models that act as cognitive reference points. The models themselves，appear to be somewhat abstract，general，or even simplistic，because we use them to make sense of phenomena that are oftentimes more complicated（Geeraerts 2006）[32] 274. In the socio-cognitive approach cultural models are core abstractions based on prior experience. They are "privatized" by the individual according to the actual situation context as we will see later.

Cultural models become internalized by individuals through everyday shared experiential processes（e. g. DiMaggio 1997）[29]. These experiential processes are cognitive patterns that develop from different types of inputs，such as instruction，activities，communication，observation，practices，etc. Each human being is exposed to various aspects of the socio-cultural life，which leads to membership of a subset of socio-cultural speech communities（Shore 1996）[30]. Each speech community is identified by a variety of dominant cultural models that provide certain assumptions and a certain outlook on the world. Because cultural models are a part of a person's cognitive resources，they influence his/her world view and behavior，as well as how s/he interprets and reacts to other people's behavior，information，and situations.

But we must be careful because although cultural models usually create a harmonizing effect，people are not cognitive clones of culture. Collective cultural models are internalized and privatized by individuals through their own experience and developed into private mental models. However，any sharp distinction between private and collective cultural models is purely analytical. In real life，such distinction is gradual and depends as much on an individual's cognitive dispositions as it does on life experience. Consider the following example：

> （1）Car rental
>   Clerk：- What can I do for you，sir?
>   Customer：- I have a reservation.
>   Clerk：- May I see your driver's license?
>   Customer：- Sure. Here you are.

Most people are familiar with the cultural frame of renting a car. Certain situation-bound utterances（see Kecskes 2000；2002；2010）[33-35] such as "what can I do for you?"，"I have a reservation"，"May I see your driver's license?" and the like are expected to be used in this frame. However，how exactly this frame is played off depends on the prior experience of the individuals who participate in its activation.

When language is used，its unique property is activated in two ways. When people speak or write，they craft what they need to express to fit the situation or context in which they are communicating. But，at the same time，the way people speak or write the words，expressions and utterances they use create that very situation，context and socio-cultural frame in which the given communication occurs. Consequently，two things seem to happen simultaneously：people attempt to fit their language to a situation or context that their language，in turn，helped to create in the first place（Gee 1999）[36]. This dynamic behavior of human speech and reciprocal process between language and context basically eliminates the need to ask the ever-returning question：Which comes first? The situation the speakers are in（e. g. faculty meeting，car renting，dinner ordering，etc. ），or the particular language that is used in the given situation（expressions and utterances representing ways of talking and interacting）? Is this a "car rental" because participants are acting and speaking that way，or are they acting and speaking that way because this is a "car rental"? Acting and speaking in a particular way constitutes social situations，socio-cultural frames，and these frames require the use of a particular language. "Which comes first" does not seem to be a relevant question synchronically. Social and cultural routines result in recurring activities and institutions. However，these institutions and routinized activities have to be rebuilt continuously in the here and now. The question is whether these cultural

models, institutions and frames exist outside language or not. The social constructivists insist that models and frames have to be rebuilt again and again so it is just our impression that they exist outside language. However, the socio-cognitive approach argues that these cultural mental models have psychological reality in the individual mind, and when a concrete situation occurs the appropriate model is recalled, which supports the appropriate verbalization of triggered thoughts and activities. Of course, building and rebuilding our world occurs not merely through language but through the interaction of language with other real-life phenomena such as non-linguistic symbol systems, objects, tools, technologies, etc.

The individual is not only constrained to some extent by collective cultural models but also participates in creating them. Private models may originate from a person's creative (and even unintended) combination of existing cultural models as well as unique cognitive dispositions (self reflection, critical thinking, etc.). Some private models always remain idiosyncratic (i. e. , private), while others may enter into the socio-cultural framework and establish new cultural trends (cf. , e. g. , Berger and Luckmann 1967)[37]. Both private and cultural models help people organize events, make actions easier, and, as such, free up cognitive resources that can be applied to less familiar issues and experiences.

2. The "Reality" of Cultural Models

Language and culture are usually considered "collective representations", i. e. , socially constituted systems (e. g. Saussure 2002; Durkheim 1947; Kronenfeld 2008)[38-40]. There are two main approaches to the debate about the actual existence of these systems. According to one of them these systems have been considered to be merely epiphenomenal, which means that they have no actual direct existence (cf. Kronenfeld 2008)[40]. However, they have the appearance of direct existence insofar as they are the byproducts of a group of individuals with similar minds confronting similar situations in similar contexts. The problem with this approach is that human beings usually talk about and rely upon language and culture as if they actually exist, as if they exist externally to them as individuals. Our individual understandings of language and culture are quite consistent across individuals. Generally it is more so than our sense of our own individual patterns. We have highly shared senses of the collective patterns, and each of us is capable of describing where we ourselves deviate, or are somewhat idiosyncratic.

The opposed view to non-existence has been that these systems have some sort of objective existence outside the individual (e. g. Simmel 1972; Triandis 2002; Kecskes 2010b)[1,41-42]. Culture is "real", and deals with the problem of the relationship between the individual and the given community. This approach sees a child's socialization or enculturation as a process by which basic cultural structures and schemata are "internalized" deeply into the individual psyche. However, these cultural models and schemata keep changing both diachronically and synchronically. Definitely there is a great difference of cultural models that existed a hundred years ago and the ones that we have in our time. Besides, the internalization process is not mechanical, i. e. , enculturation occurs as a bidirectional interaction between the individual and the social environment.

When we talk about culture we usually mean "subjective culture" (cf. Triandis 2002)[42], which is a community's characteristic way of perceiving its social environment. However, there are generally two basic aspects of culture distinguished. When this distinction is not clarified confusion may occur about whether culture exists "out there" or not. One aspect of culture is subjective culture — the psychological feature of culture including assumptions, values, beliefs and patterns of thinking. The other is objective culture which includes the institutions and artifacts of culture, such as its economic system, social customs, political structures and processes, arts, crafts and literature. Objective culture can be treated as an externalization of subjective culture which usually becomes reified. This means that those institutions which are properly seen as extension of human activity attain an independent status as external entities. They seem to exist "out there", and their ongoing human origins are usually forgotten. The study of objective culture is well established because institutions and external artifacts of behavior are more accessible to observation and examination. Subjective culture is usually treated as an unconscious process influencing perception, thinking and memory, or as personal knowledge which is inaccessible to trainers or educators.

Simmel (1972) also makes a difference between subjective culture and objective culture with the later referring to the cultural level of social reality[41]. In his view, people produce culture, but because of their ability to reify social

reality，the cultural world and the social world come to have lives of their own and increasingly dominate the actors who created them. We may also think about language like this. It has been created and is being created by people but appears to have a life of its own as an institution "out there". Simmel identified a number of components of objective culture，including tools，transportation，technology，the arts，language，the intellectual sphere，conventional wisdom，religious dogma，philosophical systems，legal systems，moral codes，and ideals. The size of objective culture increases with modernization. The number of different components of the cultural realm also grows.

Simmel was concerned about the effect of objective culture on the individual's subjective existence. Postmodernists have taken that concern to another level. In the past，most of the culture was produced by people situated in real social groups that interacted over real issues. This grounded culture created real meanings and morally infused norms，values，and beliefs. In the postmodern era，much of the culture is produced or colonized by business using advertising and mass media. This important historic shift implies that culture has changed from a representation of social reality to representations of commodified images. In our time culture is produced rather than created，and people have changed from culture creators to culture consumers.

Ⅴ．Cultural Models at Work

1．Development of Cultural Models

Each of us has rich individual experiences，and the cognitive structuring that pertains to them may differ，whether coded linguistically or not. When we communicate with other people through language or otherwise，we need to interrelate our separate experience and cognitive structures. When we routinely，repeatedly do things with other people we usually develop some standardized way of doing. These shared action plans may emerge as cultural models. Kronenfeld（2008）argued that language gets involved when we need to verbally communicate，and then only with regard to those aspects of the action plan that need to be discussed and talked about or coded in memory. He emphasized that language is a socially constructed tool that can be exceedingly helpful to thought，but in no sense does it form the basis for individual thought，and it need not provide the basis for（much of）the shared or coordinated thought that makes up culture[40]. I think language plays a more important role than the one Kronenfeld assigns to it in culture. In fact，language supports both the development and reinforcement of cultural models，mainly through formulaic language which is the heart and soul of native-like language use. Formulaic language generally serves as a core for language use in a speech community because prefabricated linguistic expressions usually mean the same for each member of the community. Languages and their speakers have preferred ways of saying things（cf. Wray 2002；Kecskes 2007）[23,43]. English native speakers *shoot a film*，*dust the furniture*，*make love* or ask you to *help yourself* at the table. The use of these expressions creates scenarios and gives a certain kind of idiomaticity to language use. For instance[23]：

> （2）Jim：- *Let me tell you something*.
> 　　Bob：- Is something wrong?

The expression *let me tell you something* usually has negative connotation，it creates a scenario that anticipates trouble.

Our everyday communication is full of prefabricated expressions and utterances because we like to stick to preferred ways of saying things. Why is this so? Kecskes（2007）argued that there are three important reasons：

— Formulas decrease the processing load

There is psycholinguistic evidence that fixed expressions and formulas have an important economizing role in speech production（cf. Miller and Weinert 1998；Wray 2002）[43-44]. Sinclair's *idiom principle* says that the use of prefabricated chunks "... may... illustrate a natural tendency to economy of effort" （Sinclair 1991）[45] 110. This means that in communication we want to achieve more cognitive effects with less processing effort. Formulaic expressions ease the processing overload not only because they are 'readymade' and do not require any 'putting together' from the speaker/hearer，but also because their salient meanings are easily accessible in online production and processing.

— Phrasal utterances have a strong framing power

Frames, cultural models are basic cognitive structures which guide the perception and representation of reality (Goffman 1974)[46]. Frames help determine which parts of reality become noticed. They are not consciously manufactured but are unconsciously adopted in the course of communicative processes. Formulaic expressions usually come with framing. Most fixed expressions are defined relative to a conceptual framework. If a policeman stops my car and says *Step out of the car, please*, this expression will create a particular frame in which the roles and expressions to be used are quite predictable.

— Formulaic units create shared bases for common ground in coordinating joint communicative actions.

The use of formulaic language requires shared experience and conceptual fluency. Tannen and Öztek (1981) argued that "cultures that have set formulas afford their members the tranquility of knowing that what they say will be interpreted by the addressee in the same way that it is intended, and that, after all, is the ultimate purpose of communication"[47]54.

Cultural models provide a kind of reference library for possible plans of action for oneself or possible interpretation of actions of others. These models are not learned directly as models, but are inferred anew by each of us from what we see and experience with those other people around us. But what we see and experience are never the models themselves. What we infer from experience is pieces of information, images, features that keep a scenario together. What we infer depends directly on what parts of the given scenario are saliently and repetitively present in the messages we experience for us to pull out the regularities on which we will base our construction of the scenario behind them. Thus systematic and repeated changes in speech or cultural behavior in one generation will be learned by the next generation as part of the givens of language or culture.

The cultural models that we actually experience (that is, cultural models, in the form in which we actually experience them) acquire specificity through the process of their instantiation in the concrete situations in which the models were realized. Much of our application of cultural models (instantiation and then realization) is in situations that represent some kind of extension from the prototypical, unmarked default situation. The core of cultural models shared by people in the same speech community changes diachronically through systematic and repeated shifts that can come from socio-political changes, technological changes, environmental changes and the like. The application of the core, however changes synchronically. No situation occurs exactly the same way as we have experienced it in any previous time.

In the socio-cognitive paradigm action is always by individuals, and individuals are always adapting cultural forms to fit their needs. People use cultural models as devices to facilitate effective interaction with others in the various communities to which they belong.

In this way individuals not only shape cultural models but also are constrained by them. Most of these cultural models come from people's past experience, but they are constantly recreated in use. This is how the societal and individual intertwine. It is important to note that people are not required to follow cultural conventions (whether in the use of cultural models or in other ways). In any given time they can ignore or modify cultural models that kick in their mind when they get into a typical situation. Given cultural models can (and often do) show slight variations across groups to which we all belong — groups that can be formal or informal, long-lived or evanescent, imposed or voluntary, and so forth.

2. Instantiating Cultural Models

Cultural models are abstract plans at varying degrees of specificity. They relate knowledge, goals, values, perceptions, emotional states, etc. to actions in different contexts. Kronenfeld (2008) argued that these conceptual models do not directly or automatically apply to any specific situation[40]. First they have to be "instantiated" by having their general generic details replaced with the specific details of the situation at issue. The instantiated cultural model is still only a conceptual structure, and several different (even, mutually contradictory) ones may be taken into consideration for any given situation. Finally one particular instantiated model is "realized" in the actual concrete situation. This can be an action plan for one's own behavior, or a device for interpreting the behavior of some other people. It is important to note that at any given moment only one instantiated model can be realized. But we can

quickly jump back and forth between different realizations.

The relationship between the abstract collective cultural model and the private realization of the model by interlocutors in a concrete situation is the same as in linguistics between ′phonemes′ and ′phones′ or between ′morphemes′ and ′morphs′. We consider ′phones′ as the actual phonetic realization of ′phonemes′，and morphs as the actual forms used to realize ′morphemes′. In his pragmatic acts theory，Mey（2001）also spoke about ″pragmemes″ that are instantiated in pragmatic acts in speech situations[48]. A particular pragmeme can be substantiated and realized through individual pragmatic acts. In other words，a pragmatic act is an instance of adapting oneself to a context，as well as adapting the context to oneself. Consider for instance：

> （3）- She is after my money.
>   - *Like I care*.

″*Like I care*″ is a pragmatic act that expresses the pragmeme ″I do not care″，which can be also substantiated by several other concrete pragmatic acts such as ″*I do not care*″，″*I do not mind*″，″*it's none of my business*″，etc. According to Mey，pragmatic acts are situation-derived and situation-constrained. There is no one-to-one relationship between speech acts and pragmatic acts because the latter does not necessarily include specific acts of speech. Consider for instance：

> （4）Mother：- Joshua，what are you doing?
>   Joshua：- Nothing.
>   Mother：- Will you stop it immediately. （Mey 2001）[48]216

The pragmeme represented by the pragmatic act ″Nothing″ can be described as ″trying to get out（opt out）of a conversation″ that may lead too far.

But pragmemes in the sense as Mey uses the term are not cultural models. They are more like scenarios within cultural models. However，the process of instantiation happens similarly both in the case of pragmemes and cultural models.

3. Practices

Culture includes many practices or routines. Feldman and Pentland（2003）argued that routines（i. e. practices）consist of two elements：the ostensive and the performative[49]. The ostensive element comprises individuals' cognitive understanding of the processes，while the performative element consists of actual behavior in the actual situational context. From a socio-cognitive perspective both of these processes should be of interest for us. Cognitive understanding relies both on cultural and private models，and on how these models are applied by cognitive processing，spanning from excessive automatic（as in categorical）thinking to self-reflective（as in reflective）thinking（see Ringberg and Reihlen 2008）[17]. When categorical thinking is applied，people establish meaning by automatically integrating incoming stimuli based on existing cultural and private models. Kecskes（2008）argued that in the process of communication speaker's private context generated by intention gets encoded in lexical units and formulated in an utterance（actual linguistic context）that is uttered（or written）″out there″ in the world by a speaker in a situation（actual situational context），and is matched（″internalized″）to the private cognitive contexts ″inside″ the head of the hearer（prior knowledge）[1]. Meaning is the result of interplay between the speaker's private context and the hearer's private context in the actual situational context as understood by the interlocutors.

Research in social cognition indicates that several epistemic factors can affect the applicability of categorical thinking（Ringberg and Reihlen 2008）[17]. For instance，people usually apply categorical thinking in everyday routines，when they have high cognitive load，are under pressure to make quick decisions，have limited cognitive capacity，and/or are distracted. Categorical thinking generally leads to efficient processing of regular socio-cultural interactions and stimuli. As a consequence of relying on categorical thinking，environmental stimuli are ′pushed′ into existing mental models. This may prevent the person from adjusting to divergent inputs and unusual circumstances. In communication this phenomenon is observable in the use of prefabricated linguistic units and situation-bound utterances. Consider for instance：

> （5）Assistant：- *Can I help you*，Madame?

> Customer：- Thank you. *I'm just looking*.

In this conversation "*Can I help you?*" and "*I'm just looking*" function as plain situation-bound utterances (Kecskes 2000；2002)[33-34]. The customer is distracted because she is busy looking at clothes and wants to get rid of the assistant.

Reflective processing works in a different way. It requires the ability of people to sustain a high level of cognitive responsiveness and combine,or broaden internalized cultural and private models in thoughtful and creative ways to improve their sense making. The degree of application of categorical versus reflective thinking varies across situational contexts,and life experience and general acumen are also important variables. In reflective thinking, cultural and private models are applied in non-automatic fashions. Ringberg and Reihlen (2008)[17]923 argued that reflective thinking is a proactive process that occurs when a person has the cognitive capacity and need for deliberate cognition to engage with stimuli that are not easily or usefully made sense of by a categorical application of private and/or cultural models. Category-inconsistent information may activate reflective thought processes among some people through which they recombine cultural and private models in deliberate ways to improve the relevance of their sense-making of a particular situation (e. g. Bodenhausen,Macrae and Garst 1998；Wilson and Sperber 2004)[50-51]. This can be demonstrated in the following conversation：

> (6)Jill：- I met someone today.
>
> 　　Jane：- Good for you.
>
> 　　Jill：- He is a police officer.
>
> 　　Jane：- Are you in trouble?
>
> 　　Jill：- Oh,no,I liked the man. We met in a cafe. He was nice and polite.
>
> 　　Jane：- Not all of them are...

In this conversation there is a clear difference between the two women's private context tied to the word "police officer". The collective cultural model attached to "police officer" has been changed in Jill's privatized model as a result of the positive experience while this is not the case with Jane. She appears to have a private model that is close to the collective cultural model.

The socio-cognitive approach incorporates cultural and private models into categorical and reflective processing. This means that most of the time a cognitive system is neither fully closed nor fully open,it is neither fully determined nor independent of external sensory inputs,and people are neither autonomous processors nor cultural dopes. Consequently,meaning creation and knowledge transfer are located somewhere on a continuum between fully automatic and fully idiosyncratic. This depends on several variables that include the nature of people's private and cultural models,level of categorical and reflective thinking,and environmental feedback mechanisms. The socio-cognitive approach broadens traditional positivist and social-constructionist positions by situating sense-making within the mind (and body) that may be influenced but rarely determined by environmental feedback mechanisms (Bandura 1986；Bunge 1996)[18,52]. The socio-cognitive model provides a more comprehensive and systemic understanding of the roles of cognitive factors and environmental feedback mechanisms.

Ⅶ. Role of Enyclopaedic Knowledge in Creating Intercultures

Interculturality has both an *a priori* side and an *emergent side* that occur and act simultaneously in the communicative process. Consequently,*intercultures* are not fixed phenomena but they are created in the course of communication in which participants belong to different L1 speech communities,speak a common language and represent different cultural norms and models that are defined by their respective L1 speech community. The following conversation (source Albany English Lingua Franca Dataset collected by PhD students) between a Brazilian girl and a Polish woman illustrates this point well.

> (7)Brazilian：- And what do you do?
>
> 　　Pole：- I work at the university as a cleaner.
>
> 　　B：- As a janitor?

P：- No，not yet. Janitor is after the cleaner.

B：- You want to be a janitor?

P：- Of course.

In this conversation interlocutors represent two different languages and cultures（Brazilian and Polish），and use English as a lingua franca. This is the prior knowledge that participants bring to the interaction. They create an interculture，which belongs to none of them but emerges in the course of conversation. Within this interculture the two speakers have a smooth conversation about the job of the Polish woman. Neither of them is sure what the right term is for the job the Polish woman has. There are no misunderstandings in the interaction because each participant is careful to use semantically transparent language in order to be as clear as possible. The Polish woman sets up a "hierarchy" that is non-existing in the target language culture（"cleaner → janitor"）. However，this is an emergent element of the interculture the speakers have been constructing. This is where the L1-based encyclopaedic knowledge of the speakers becomes very important. Speakers propose certain ways to create common ground. These particular ways rely on their prior experience governed by their first language culture.

Intercultures come and go，so they are neither stable nor permanent. They just occur. They are both synergetic and blended. Interculturality is constituted on the spot by interlocutors who participate in the conversation. But isn't this a phenomenon that also occurs in intracultural communication? Why and how should we distinguish intercultural communication from intracultural communication? Basically the currently dominant approach to this issue is that there is no *principled* difference between intracultural and intercultural communication（e. g. Winch 1997；Wittgenstein 2001）[53-54]. This is true as far as the mechanism of the communicative process is concerned. However，there is a qualitative difference in the nature and content of an intracultural interaction and an intercultural interaction. Speakers in intracultural communication rely on prior knowledge and culture of a relatively definable speech community，which is privatized by individuals belonging to that speech community. No language boundaries are crossed，however subcultures are relied upon and representations are individualized. What is created on the spot enriches the given culture，contributes to it and remains within the fuzzy but still recognizable confines of that language and culture. In the case of intercultural communication，however，prior knowledge that is brought into and privatized in the communicative process belongs to different cultures and languages，and what participants create on the spot will disappear and not become an enrichment and/or addition to any particular culture or language. Intercultures are ad hoc creations that may enhance the individual and the globalization process but can hardly be said to contribute to any particular culture. This is exactly what we see in example（7）above. Speakers created a hierarchy between "cleaner" and "janitor" just to create common ground and assure their own mutual private understanding of a given situation. This interculture disappears when they stop talking. However，this is not always the case. Intercultures can also be reoccurring for a while in certain cases such as international negotiating teams，international classroom，international tourist groups，etc. Kasper and Blum-Kulka，（1993）talked about "intercultural style" which means that speakers fully competent in two languages may create an intercultural style of speaking that is both related to and distinct from the styles prevalent in the two substrata，a style on which they rely regardless of the language being used[55]. Kasper and Blum-Kulka（1993）claimed that the hypothesis is supported by many studies of cross-cultural communication，especially those focusing on interactional sociolinguistics（e. g. Gumperz，1982；Tannen，1985）[56-57] and research into the pragmatic behavior of immigrant populations across generations（e. g. Clyne，Ball，and Neil，1991）[58].

Ⅷ. Conclusion

In this chapter the focus has been on the nature and role of encyclopaedic knowledge in relation to intercultures. A socio-cognitive approach was used to interpret and discuss the issues raised in connection with the subject matter. This theory helps us understand how encyclopaedic knowledge through its cultural models can function both as a repository of knowledge that changes diachronically and as synchronically changing emergent knowledge created in the process of communication. A significant part of encyclopaedic knowledge is instantiated in cultural models that

provide scenarios,scripts or action plans for individuals to interpret and behave in a particular situation,or process and interpret the behavior of others in various life situations.

The socio-cognitive approach (Kecskes 2008；Kecskes 2010b；Kecskes 2011)[1,3-4] defines interculturality as a phenomenon that is not only interactionally and socially constructed in the course of communication but also relies on relatively definable cultural models and norms that represent the speech communities to which the interlocutors belong. Consequently,interculturality has both relatively normative and emergent components. In order for us to understand the dynamism and ever-changing nature of intercultural encounters we need to approach interculturality dialectically. Cultural constructs and models change diachronically while cultural representation and speech production by individuals changes synchronically. Intercultures are ad hoc creations. They are created in a communicative process in which cultural norms and models as representatives of encyclopaedic knowledge are brought into the interaction from prior experience of interlocutors and blend with features created ad hoc in the interaction in a synergetic way. The result is intercultural discourse in which there is mutual transformation of knowledge and communicative behavior rather than transmission. The emphasis is on transformation rather than on transmission.

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