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UNLEARNING AMERICAN PATRIOTISM

In the United States, as in every country, civic education seeks to instill patriotism. Should moral sensitivity to the wrongs of American foreign policy lead a teacher in the United States to educate in ways that undermine this project? I believe it should. I will begin by sketching the assessment of foreign affairs that underlies this judgment, one in which the excesses of the American empire are vast and deep-rooted and a global movement for global social democracy is a vital resource in reducing those excesses.

Empire and Excess

By "the American empire," I mean the global superiority of the U.S. government in three mutually reinforcing types of domineering influence. In the first place, the United States far exceeds other countries in the global impact of prerogatives, i.e., capacities to pursue interests regardless of costs to others on account of America's importance in joint arrangements which, as a whole, answer to shared needs. The prime examples are U.S. prerogatives due to the pervasive use of the dollar and American financial instruments. In the second place, helped by these prerogatives, the United States influences lives abroad through threat power, influencing choices because people have reason to fear what the U.S. will do if it does not get its way, in American conduct partly motivated by an interest in maintaining such fears. For example, in the Uruguay Round, the thirteen years of negotiations that gave birth to the current regime in world commerce, the United States government frequently, successfully resorted to threats of punitive tariffs, aggressive

export subsidies, and withdrawal into independent blocs of favored trading partners. The third element in imperial power, namely, the exercise of destructive power, makes threats credible, and does more besides. As in Iraq, it also serves as a means of destroying resources on which others' contrary threat power depends and forcibly gaining access to resources at others' expense.

In part, the phrase "the American empire" labels the global fact that each type of American domineering influence has substantial impact throughout the world, much more so than any other power's. In part, it labels a fact of territorial dominance: American domineering influence is especially deep, asymmetrical and superior to competing outside influences in many developing countries.

For reasons of space, I must largely presuppose that immoral excesses in the use of these powers are vast and ongoing. (I make the case at length in Miller, forthcoming). But it may take some of the edge off of this dogmatism to sketch one example -- a half-century of strikingly continuous, bipartisan and deadly American activity in the Persian Gulf region.

In 1953, the United States organized a coup in Iran that overthrew a democratically elected, constitutionalist and secular nationalist regime, which, with pervasive popular support, had embarked on nationalization of the oil industry. The coup invested dictatorial power in Reza Pahlevi, who reorganized the oil industry on terms favorable to the United States, and, for a quarter century, used U.S. aid, arms purchased in the United States and American training teams to sustain control requiring brutal repression, including what Amnesty International called "a history of torture beyond

belief" (Amnesty International, 1975: 8; see also Kinzer, 2003: 202; Gasiorowski, 1991: 94, 112, 116-118).

In 1972, the United States initiated a project in collaboration with Pahlevi, which, as Henry Kissinger later put it, aimed to "keep Iraq occupied by supporting the Kurdish rebellion within Iraq" (Kissinger, 1982: 675). By 1975, the rebellion was so far advanced that it threatened to succeed in establishing Kurdish autonomy that no local power in the region wanted. The United States cut off support, guaranteeing defeat of the insurgency it had stoked, an insurgency that resulted in about 20,000 deaths and the displacement of as many as 250,000 Kurds (Helms, 1984: 148; Cleveland, 2004: 411).

Starting in 1980, U.S. efforts to prevent a decisive victory of either side in the Iraq-Iran War included the sharing of "deliberately distorted or inaccurate intelligence data ... to prevent either Iraq or Iran from prevailing," according to a 1987 *New York Times* report (Engelberg, 1987: A1). Half a million died in that prolonged war, eight years of agony that exceeded the time-span of any conventional war in the twentieth century. When the numerical superiority of Iran and a second Kurdish insurgency threatened to turn the tide, the United States facilitated Saddam Hussein's resort to weapons of mass destruction. As the *Washington Post* reported, over ten years later, "The administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush authorized the sale to Iraq of numerous items that had both military and civilian applications, including poisonous chemicals and deadly biological viruses, such as anthrax and bubonic plague" (Dobbs, 2002: A01).

In a National Security Council meeting right after Saddam's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, there was much support for a strategy of public denunciation, diplomatic

pressure and economic sanctions. At a second meeting the next day, the administration decided, instead, on a policy of forcing Iraq out by military means, to prevent Saddam's being (as the initial briefing put it) "in an inequitable position, since he would control the second- and third-largest proven oil reserves with the fourth-largest army in the world."[1] Five months later, when Saddam offered a basis for negotiation that held great promise of avoiding war through negotiated withdrawal, James Baker and Colin Powell, the Secretary of State and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, took this to be an adequate ending, but, according to Bob Woodward's reconstruction of the crucial exchange, Bush and Scowcroft would not accept an outcome preserving Iraq's regional power. "Looking squarely at his advisers [Baker and Powell], the president said plainly, 'We have to have a war'. His words hung in the air as heavily as any he had ever spoken" (Woodward, 1999: 185).

In that war, precision-guided weapons destroyed the power stations on which refrigeration, water supply and sewage treatment depend and bombs destroyed the main Baghdad sewage treatment plant (Cockburn and Cockburn, 1999: 131). Planners of these attacks explained to a *Washington Post* reporter that they were a deliberate effort to strike "against 'all those things that allow a nation to sustain itself' … to let people know, 'Get rid of this guy and we'll be more than happy to assist in rebuilding'."[2] Toward the end of this war, President Bush repeatedly appealed to "the Iraqi military and the Iraqi people to take matters into their own hands -- to force Saddam Hussein the dictator to step aside,"[3] and then, when the call produced a popular uprising rather than the desired military coup, abandoned tens of thousands of rebellious Iraqis to a bloodbath for fear that they were too sympathetic to Iran or apt to provoke Turkey through excessive Kurdish independence.

The war, the suppression of the uprising at its end and the first year of suffering from destruction and sanctions resulted in the deaths of about 150,000 Iraqis, only one third of them soldiers killed in combat (Ginsberg, 2003: A05).

The subsequent relay from a Republican to a Democratic administration was flawless. Because of vigorous defense of the sanctions by the Clinton administration, which made it impossible to restore sanitation and health care in Iraq, the sanctions ultimately led to over 100,000 excess deaths among Iraqi children under five.[4]

After the next transition between the two political parties, an invasion and occupation added to the toll. Mobilizing overwhelming firepower to reduce American casualties, the invasion killed about 5000 Iraqi soldiers[5] and about as many civilians.[6]. There were about half a million excess Iraqi deaths due to the first three years of invasion and occupation, according to Burnham et al. (2006), a study carefully applying standard epidemiological techniques.[7]

Extremely deadly, long-drawn-out destruction in bipartisan pursuit of American power has also been the fate of every other region in the developing world. These episodes reflect a strong and enduring tendency of American institutions, powers, and interests to produce foreign conduct promoting U.S. power unconstrained by severe costs to foreigners in developing countries.

However powerfully they are affected by U.S. foreign policy, foreigners do not get to vote in American elections. They influence the opinions of only a tiny minority of those who do.

Economic elites in the United States now vitally depend on American world power for the growth and independence of their firms. They provide cadres and

interpersonal networks of information and influence essential to the management of government.

The political elites of the United States are no more inclined than the political elites of any great power to accept its weakening: the strength of this power seems to be part of their own vitality, and dominates their deliberations over foreign policy. In the 2899 closely printed pages of the published version of *The Pentagon Papers*, our widest window onto American foreign policy making, the detailed, deeply argued and contentious memoranda, records of deliberations, internal policy statements and rationales, and erudite narratives of decision-making never once mention the deaths of Vietnamese as an independent reason to choose a less lethal option.

In the public political culture of the United States, the doctrine that what strengthens American world power is good is the common property of both political parties and the presupposition of American schooling and the mass media. This milieu reflects not just elite interests but a long cultural history and a general tendency to gain a sense of vitality from collective success in national goals long pursued.

Empires always face challenges, in the face of which the mobilization of destructive power is indispensable. The challenges currently faced by the American empire include the growth of the European Union to a point that threatens American economic prerogatives; the growth of the major developing countries, especially China, India, and Brazil, to a point that threatens American governance of the course of globalization; the movement of Europe and Japan to the innovative edge of manufacturing and information-processing; and the threat posed by declining North American and Saudi oil reserves and sky-rocketing Chinese consumption to the stable,

reasonably cheap access to oil that has been the keystone of American energy policy. Since America's only qualitative superiority is now military and threats and destruction based on this power are a means of advantageous influence which help to meet these competitive challenges, deadly uses of military power are part of any rational response to these challenges.

Specific strategies will be at issue in the ongoing debate between those who favor the bold, direct and unilateral exercise of destructive power and those who strongly prefer prior acquiescence of European powers and Japan, and seek to avoid open, large-scale, direct military engagement unconnected with international aggression by another country. Still, over the last quarter-century, the less bold strategy has caused at least as many deaths of innocents as the bolder one (for example, through the sanctions regime in Iraq and the sponsorship of violence by such groups as the Afghan mujahedeen.) In any case, since both strategies are rational, each will play a role in U.S. foreign policy. And once the United States has openly engaged in war on a large scale, all thoughtful strategists of empire agree on the need to defend the salient bloodily enough to protect future credibility.

Unpatriotic Hope

Where else but in the corridors of power and the regimented disputes of electoral competition might means of reducing the global injustices of the United States be found? The Vietnam era suggests an answer. At crossroads that could have led to vaster destruction, the taking of a much less lethal path was due, in significant part, to extra-electoral attacks on the morality of the war that inspired doubts as to the goodness of the pursuit of American power. A great wave of anti-war demonstrations and campus

protests was a major force when the "Wise Men" of Lyndon Johnson's Senior Advisory Group made their crucial recommendation of rapid de-escalation. Recalling the arguments that changed this nest of hawks into doves, George Ball wrote that he "emphasized, as I had done many times, that the war was demoralizing the country and that we had to get out" (Ball, 1982: 409). Above all, he mourned "the poisoning of the minds of some Americans toward their own government" (Ball, 1982: 433). Subsequently, in Nixon's own mixed and macabre metaphor, his hope in announcing the first major withdrawal of American troops was to "drop a bombshell on the gathering storm of antiwar protest" (Nixon, 1978: 448).

A new version of the movement to hem in the American empire is already taking shape. It is much more international and many-sided. Its demonstrations, sources of information, forums, talks, petitions, leaflets, advertisements and disruptions are, increasingly, transnational cooperative activities, in terms of both allegiance and actual coordination. Two paradigms of this globalization are the simultaneous demonstrations in many countries against the onset of the Iraq War and routine international reliance on information from websites, of Iraq Body Count, Human Rights Watch, Oxfam, and the like, whose national source is essentially irrelevant. Participants may be primarily concerned with inequitable burdens of globalization, the invasion and occupation of Iraq, developed countries' neglect of global poverty, or American irresponsibility in the face of global climate change, but they see their activity in their primary cause as a contribution to a larger movement pursuing all those and other causes, in which opposition to injustices of the American empire is the unifying negative theme. Since their unifying ultimate goal is a world in which peoples collaborate without internal oppression,

external domination, or destitution, one might regard this as a global movement for global social democracy.

For all of its limitations, this movement has already helped a great deal to convert the harms of globalization from a non-issue in developed countries to a leading topic. In the United States, during the first two years of carnage after the invasion of Iraq, this movement kept the option of immediate withdrawal on the public agenda when it was dismissed or ignored in all respectable quarters. Massive and demonstrated foreign opposition to the occupation assured American opponents that they were not isolated, but squarely in the mainstream of world opinion. Demonstrated U.S. opposition made it clear that this resistance to excesses of American empire was not an anti-American movement. This global movement has done much to convert opposition to U.S. and Israeli treatment of Palestinians from the activity of a fringe to a widespread, enduring concern in the non-Muslim world.

Americans who share the view of events, tendencies and prospects at which I have gestured will wish this movement well and seek to invest their political energies in advancing it. They will be a minority among Americans, so long as there is an American empire. To be productive, they must, ultimately, influence American institutions and processes unalterably committed to American world power. So there is a division of labor in which people in the corridors of power, the electorate at large and people in unruly movements disdainful of American world power interact to hem in the American empire.

Construing American Patriotism

If someone committed to global social democracy on the grounds that I have sketched is a teacher, should she try to undermine American patriotism? Not if

"patriotism" is understood in the way that currently appeals to many philosophers, as any departure from impartiality which reflects one's special relationship to compatriots. It can, I think, be shown that special political duties of concern for compatriots derive from one's participation in imposing laws on them. Admittedly, the coercive impositions of the American empire produce demanding transnational duties as well. But they do not cancel a special political duty of concern by Americans for needy Americans: there is still a duty of concern for a needy American compatriot out of proportion to his neediness on a global scale.

But politicians are better than philosophers at understanding the word "patriotism", even if they use it in appalling causes. Patriotism is love of country, not just acceptance of special political responsibility toward compatriots. (I have all sorts of special responsibilities towards my classes, but I do not love them.)

Since our loves make our world valuable to us and are not changeable at will, it sometimes makes sense to preserve the residue of a morally burdensome love. In this spirit, white Southerners in the 1960's who sincerely opposed Southern racism sometimes said that they still loved a white Southern way of life whose gentility and grace were bred in slavery and depended on cheap black labor. Even when it responded to genuine values and was cognizant of the horrors underlying them, this nostalgic attachment tugged attention and affection in directions that made it harder to honor the demands of the South's great moral crisis. I would suggest that American patriotism is similarly burdensome. One should try to get beyond it (if the personal cost is not too great) and to help students to unlearn it.

To love someone or something is to be lovingly engrossed in what is characteristic of the beloved. One is drawn to being preoccupied with the wellbeing of the beloved. One identifies with the beloved's success in life as part of one's own success, gladly making sacrifices for the beloved which would only constitute obedience to stern commands of duty toward others. One tenaciously enjoys or longs for reciprocation of this desire for merging.

Because one opens one's self to the beloved, a self-respecting person has to think --or, in any case, be powerfully drawn to thinking -- that the beloved is (really, if fully appreciated) worthy of love. So the self-respecting lover is spontaneously, powerfully drawn to seeing misdeeds that betray love as departures from the beloved's true nature, interfering with a relationship that deserves to be restored. Nor is this just a tendency in judgment. The lover of a hard love yearns to restore the beloved to his or her good-enough true self or true potential, takes insufficient goodness to be her own failure as well, and responds to betrayal by seeking to repair the damaged relationship.

These dispositions of attention, affection and effort are, I think, characteristic of patriotic Americans who agree that vast immoral imperial excess has been part of America's presence in the world. They are at least strongly drawn to thoughts, acts and feelings that presuppose that the role of the United States in the world is, nonetheless, worthy of love. Thus, they believe (or are strongly drawn to believe) that the currently most vivid imperial excesses depart from America's underlying tendencies, hijacking a basically sensible and humane disposition. In the latest episode of amnesiac nostalgia, George W. Bush is demonized for his great departure from good sense or global decency, even though the Clintonian sanctions regime was a similarly lethal attack on Iraqi lives,

the statemanlike George H.'s war was far more deadly for civilians and soldiers and about as needless, and Carter's conduct of foreign policy was an eminent example of the pursuit of American power regardless of costs in foreign lives (for example, the costs that Brzezinski ignored in his later boasts about the successful provocation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.)[8] While an American patriot can certainly count deaths of foreigners as a severe cost and strong dissuasive reason, her patriotism draws her toward preoccupation with American deaths. For example, she is spontaneously drawn to great relief at the very low mortality among U.S. troops in the invasion overthrowing Saddam Hussein (138 in all, 109 in combat) and not to anxious inquiries as to the Iraqi costs (about 10,000 deaths, half civilian.) Finally, an American patriot is drawn to using American political institutions, above all, electoral competition, as the tools for restoring the moral wellbeing of the country she loves. Acknowledging the incapacity of this system to eliminate vast immoral excesses would make it hard to maintain the view that imperial excess departs from the true nature of the United States.

A love that must constantly be nursed along with amnesia, wishful thinking, and inattention to morally urgent interests is not steadfast and deep but obsessive and stultifying. In the face of an enduring foreign policy establishment who really are steadfast in pursuit of American power, the amnesia, wishful thinking and inattention guarantee that opposition congeals only after great damage is done

These are powerful reasons for unlearning American patriotism. But a forlorn hope is better than no hope at all, and the alienation from the love of country that unites most of one's compatriots is a burden of loneliness. Here, global social democracy makes

a difference. It connects an American participant with those who share deep and enriching aspirations and act in solidarity, throughout the world.

Anti-Patriotic Education

Suppose, then, that the advice, "Unlearn American patriotism" is good, informed moral advice to oneself and one's friends. Should one seek to promote the same lesson in the education of young people?

In many educational contexts, an all-out effort to undermine American patriotism at the weak points I have described would be personally risky, strategically unwise and, probably, morally inappropriate. This is especially true in public school education at the pre-college stage when love of country is mainly inculcated. In addition to the risk of job loss, global social democrats teaching at this level don't want to set up left-liberal enclaves that drive away patriotic families and students, or to open up an uncompromising competition to capture the public school curriculum for one view, when the uncompromising winner is apt to be fervently patriotic. Moreover, they ought to be constrained by a duty of civility. In return for placing their children in the public schools, parents are owed a morally adequate justification for education that departs from their deep convictions. An appeal to sound generic political values which public education upholds and protects is morally adequate. But it is a serious moral loss if fellow-citizens committed to those values are required to support public education applying these general values in a way that violates their deep convictions concerning the right direction for their country.

In between surrender to a patriotism that does not fit current circumstances and insistence on inculcating the right response to the great questions of public policy, a

teacher can appeal to a proper function of civic education that is a political value that nearly all Americans share: equipping students for civic responsibility. Students ought to become aware of enough relevant facts and arguments to choose intelligently among competing perspectives on what the United States should do. The case that American power is basically beneficent, for reasons deeply rooted in American values and institutions, should be (and is bound to be) accessible. But so should the case, warranted by readily available evidence and expert judgment and reasonable in light of ordinary humane values, there is a systematic tendency for American world power to be oppressive.

At present, global social democrats in the United States can, in good conscience, devote much energy to opening civic education to this perspective, which is otherwise closed. If the public school textbooks in my town (a liberal bastion once rated "America's most enlightened town") are an indication, special resourcefulness and courage are needed to create this space in elementary school. In the main, fifth grade text, Houghton Mifflin's *Build Our Nation*, the descriptions of U.S. conduct in developing countries are brief and stupefying. U.S. involvement in Vietnam is described, without mention of a single civilian casualty, as a defense of "South Vietnam [which] like South Korea, opposed communism" against attack by communist North Vietnam. The brief narrative is followed by "*Lesson Review ... Critical Thinking: Compare.* How would helicopters be helpful during a war? When would planes be more useful?" (Bednarz et al., 2003: 573, 575). The Persian Gulf is wrapped in a comment that "regional conflicts -- such as the Persian Gulf War and the break-up of the former Yugoslavia -- have also forced nations to seek solutions together" (Bednarz et al., 2003: 582). That's it. It must be a daunting

task to shed light in this fog without encouraging cynical detachment in students or appropriate outrage from parents who give their young children to others' care.

The high school American history texts, Houghton Mifflin's *A People and a Nation* and Prentice-Hall's *America: Pathways to the Present* are much more informative and critical (at least in potential effect -- chapters on the last fifty years were assigned to my daughter's class in one indigestible mid-June lump.) The long chapters on the Vietnam War are poignant and emphatic on the civilian toll of American firepower. But otherwise, descriptions of lethal American conduct since the Korean War are few, sparse, and largely silent on their human cost. The typical residual impression must be of one horrific mistake in one's parents' childhood, with perhaps a few missteps by overzealous presidents before and since.

In describing the larger agenda of debate over U.S. interventions, the *Pathways* text, used in the least academically advanced class, presents the topic as whether America should bear the costs of involvement when its vital interests are not at stake. Expanding the range of alternative perspectives, *A People and a Nation* adds that the United States was interventionist in the Third World in part because "American leaders read threats to markets, investments and raw materials as deadly stabs at the high American standard of living" (Norton et al., 1998: 910).[9] Despite deft disdain for individual Presidents, neither text has room in its agenda of positions for a view of U.S. foreign policy as driven by elites, of both parties, whose commitment to U.S. wealth and power does not reflect most Americans' interests in wellbeing.

This is patriotism by omission, not at all patriotism by stupefaction. It challenges the global social democrat to fill in the gaps. Given the limited space for doing so in the

classroom, high school activism will be of crucial importance. Here, opportunities for civic education are often lost through shortsighted concessions to the general neglect of the costs of empire for foreigners in developing countries. For example, in my town, the high school allows leafleting and table-manning critical of military recruiters' efforts. The dedicated counter-recruiters, who are all moved by deep informed opposition to the Iraq war and occupation, hand out a leaflet devoted to a description of how much harder military life is than the slick blandishments of recruiting ads make it seem, beginning with the gripping adolescent question, "Do you enjoy being bossed around or having someone constantly tell you what to do ...?"

In American colleges and universities, those who challenge American patriotism have less to fear and have less reason to present points of view that they take to be unwarranted. Global social democratic tendencies are fairly common. There are enclave classes in which the American empire is subject to strong criticism in front of student audiences who largely accepted the criticism before enrolling. But the teaching and academic writing of American professors has had quite limited impact on American patriotism.

A morally stultifying division of labor contributes to this sheltering of patriotism. On the one hand, in the self-designated field of International Relations, in political science departments, the thesis that the United States, like all great powers, pursues interests in geopolitical power, unconstrained by moral goals, is a routine and orthodox background assumption. It is accompanied by inattention to the development of moral arguments and to the capacity of social movements to reduce excesses of empire. On the other hand, academic moral inquiry concerning international relations devises norms that

governments ought to follow in foreign policy, without much scrutiny of the actual impact of morality on the conduct of the United States and allied great powers. These inquiries offer little guidance (or bad, utopian guidance) for individuals' political choices in a world in which great powers ignore or abuse those norms.

Professors in my field, political philosophy, have special resources and, so, special responsibilities to resist such structural limits to political scrutiny. We are professionally committed to engaging in moral inquiry and are trained in ways that make us good consumers of work in other disciplines. We do not have to devote much energy to resisting the lure of big grants from powerful donors for expensive projects or the lure of entree into corridors of power. The challenge is to violate expectations that philosophical work will not engage with controversial questions concerning the actual tendencies and powers of the United States. Again, global social democracy is an emotional support in rising to the challenge of civic education in the American empire. An American global social democrat extending political philosophy can take heart that the view of U.S. foreign policy on which she relies is not very controversial beyond her country's borders.

Of course, the specific attitudes her students bring to classes should interest her as well, as making issues salient. Fear of China, for example, is a dangerous motivation to patriotism that she should not ignore. This isn't an invitation to hijack a public intellectual forum for sectarian purposes. What questions to debate and what claims to scrutinize is the basic curricular decision. It ought to be based on a principled judgment of importance. The principled basis properly includes assessments of dangers posed by the course of the American empire.

NOTES

1. CIA Director Webster's words in a presentation starting the meeting, which, National Security Adviser Scowcroft reports (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998: 322), he and Bush stage managed to create "solidarity" in favor of the more aggressive response.
2. Descriptions of the objective (Gellman, 1991: A1) by a senior air force officer "who played a central role in the air campaign but declined to be named" and an unnamed "air force planner." Gellman attributes similar characterizations of this goal of "long-term leverage" in less pithy formulations to Colonel John A. Warden III, Deputy Director of Strategy, Doctrine and Plans for the US Air Force.
3. Bush's words in two widely-reported speeches of February 15, 1991 (Cockburn and Cockburn, 1999: 38).
4. The 1999 UNICEF survey of childhood mortality in Iraq concluded that if the 1980s trend of declining under-five mortality had continued through the 1990s, there would have been 500,000 fewer deaths than occurred from the start of the sanctions through 1998. In a recent re-analysis, Ali, Blacker and Jones (2003) consider the conservative assumption that under-five mortality rates would have remained the same in the absence of the sanctions and derive an excess deaths estimate of 400,000 on this basis. In another widely-cited study, Richard Garfield (1999) defended 227,000 as the most likely estimate based on all available data, with 106,000 as the outcome of quite conservative assumptions.
5. While the records which once would have provided a death toll of Iraqi soldiers have been destroyed, the U.S. military estimated that at least 2320 Iraqis were killed in one operation, the attack on troops near Baghdad preliminary to the taking of the city (*The Independent*, 2003: 7.) Reuters (2004) reports "unofficial think-tank estimates" of 4,895 to 6,370 Iraqi military deaths in the invasion.
6. Accorded to reports tabulated by Iraq Body Count (www.iraqbodycount.com.) On June 11, 2003, the Associated Press, Baghdad Bureau, reported a "fragmentary" account of civilian deaths during the month of war against Saddam, based solely on deaths recorded by 60 of Iraq's 124 hospitals. They further excluded records that did not distinguish between civilian and military deaths, a precaution which they took to exclude "hundreds, possibly thousands" of civilian victims. This death tally was 3,420 (Price, 2003).
7. Burnham et al. estimate the excess of deaths after the invasion over what would be expected on the basis of death rates in the three months immediately before (a baseline which itself reflected elevated death rates due to the sanctions regime.) The estimate is based on interviews with randomly selected households. Their sample is sufficiently large to entail a 95% confidence interval of between 392,979 and 942,636 excess deaths, i.e., it is 95% probable that the death tolls they report in a genuinely random sample of their size would reflect an Iraqi total in this range. The vast majority of the excess were violent deaths, steeply increasing over time. Coalition forces were the largest known cause of violent death (31%.) The interviewers asked for death certificates in response to 87% of the reports of deaths, which were presented 92% of the time. In the media, the

most frequently cited figures concerning Iraqi deaths are not estimates but tabulations, by Iraq Body Count, of reports of violent deaths of civilians by at least two well-established sources, i.e., civilian deaths in military actions, deaths from criminal violence in excess of what would be expected from the (tiny) rate of such deaths under Saddam, and deaths from terrorist attacks. Burnham et al. note that these reports involved from 43,491 to 88,283 deaths in the period of their survey. They also note the severe incompleteness of such tabulations (which Iraq Body Count has always emphasized), which generally provide a tenth or less of the toll in well-grounded epidemiological surveys in areas of prolonged violent conflict. One other extensive study was part of the *Iraqi Living Conditions Survey 2004* (available at www.iq.undp.org/ILCS), a collaboration between the UN Development Program and the Iraqi Ministry of Planning, which covered the first year after the invasion, and surveyed 21,688 households with about 140,000 people. The half-page on "war-related deaths ... in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion" buried late in the report in a section on "Maternal Mortality" (v. II, p. 54) excludes soldiers living on military bases and only includes deaths in episodes of war, such as combat operations, shelling, and the setting off of explosive devices (see the survey questionnaire, www.fafo.no/ILCS/.) Since interviewees were asked to name all victims, by representatives of the Iraqi Ministry of Planning, dead insurgents were, presumably, undercounted. The ILCS estimates 24,000 deaths in episodes of war from the start of the invasion until April/May 2004, about one year later. In both Iraq Body Count tabulations and Burnham et al.'s survey, the toll has doubled each year since.

8. In an interview in *Le Nouvel observateur* (1998, p.76), Zbigniew Brzezinski, the National Security Advisor at the time, noted that "aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul" was approved by Jimmy Carter in light of Brzezinski's opinion that "this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention." "That secret operation," he boasted, "was an excellent idea. It had the effect of drawing the Russians in the Afghan trap and you want me to regret it?" The death toll from that trap was over a million, mostly Afghan civilians. The interview did not appear in the edition sent to the United States. Brzezinski, 2001 is an English translation of the whole, and there are excerpts in Cooley, 2000: 19f.

9. Although textbooks are revised every few years, school districts continue to use older editions for financial reasons. This adds to the blurriness of the portrayal of U.S. conduct in developing countries after the Vietnam War.

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