

Motion

Abstract

This article is about orientation in the conceptual construction and exploration of the world. Orientations that fail to include a satisfactory definition of self as a vital component in ideas of explanation, compulsively leaning towards excessive analytical description(partism)) and resulting in increased numbers of empirically found exceptions to theoretical ideas, also fail to include adequate notions of motion and change. In the science of cognition a three part picture usually results, rather than a two component one in which the extraneous component functions as a compensation from the initial vagueness in ideas. Though this can seem to be a reasonable approach, to proceed from vagueness, to conjecture, empirical test/comparison, a false order in all components of a final theory will continuously result, and ultimately, in one to one correspondence, equate with a separate topic and not with the original. A compulsive and strict adherence to common sense, though not seeming to supply adequate explanation and strained for lingual description/expression, is the only possible route to adequate explanation.

In cognition, the perennial stumbling is always at the division between the ethereal and the tangible. It is such an inhibitory obstacle, that in the construction of ideas, language falters to result in the continual construction of new words to “describe” rather than to connect. Though I believe “describe” is also the real ultimate goal, a real connection is never established.

Discussion

One might begin to search for a suitable concept from either of two orientations :

- 1) Self –what am I –there does not seem to be a scientific explanation yet arrived at, or conceivably arriveable at.
- 2) The physical world: Has energy, space, solid objects, mass, weight, and time passes in it

To describe all things, the simplest words are that the world possess motion. All things, external or internal in the living, or in the inert are described to possess motion. To traverse from self to the physical world seems possible with the word motion. ‘I am something moving’. The distance from yesterday to today can be described as the consequence of motion. Tomorrow can be(is) intuitively conceived of in these terms, as a matter of movement from one time to another as the primary perception. Prediction, reduction to scientific terms though taken very seriously, seeming intuitively construable from the motion we perceive and the dissection into parts accomplished scientifically to understand the present and past. Yet, as a Shakespeare play, we always include an extra party-a Puck in the Garden. Two agents, and a third(agent), equals 2 (1/3) theory rather than one, and dispute, conjecture, hypothesis branches and spiral to a size almost able to fill the pages of an infinite encyclopedia-as any real intellectual effort would be expected to remain open, but the topic(a theory of 2 (1/3) parts or even a theory about 2 (1/3 parts), as is this comment) does not correspond to a theory of mind. Mind is relation, self-relation and comes about from relation in whatever manner. It is good to see, at least a beginning, with primary reference to (motion)/("motor"-“psychomotor”). It is good to try to not only escape from our introspections sometimes, but to question the orientation of those that seem sound-especially with appearing scientific validity and predictability attached along-they maybe

slanted unconsciously with the inclusion of a third party, in the name of almost any agent of relation, a Puck that probably does exist in all of our communications and hence learning, but still another fact/variable of a world(containing ourselves, others, our bodies and thoughts, and whatever living, animal or inert materials) in motion.

When one tries to envision the, all but theoretically symmetrical, asymmetrical topics of physical anatomy/neuroanatomy and relate structure and physics to mind, self, consciousness, thought, he is

always in the $2\frac{1}{3}$ topic with the same tree growing towards infinity, and a new Puck, nearly defined as so, in frustration to find a unity, at each branch point. What can be the relation of a globular, oblong, physical shape to the circular symmetry of logical thought/science? In attempts at understanding it, recipes for all kinds of obtuse concoctions have been created, and throughout history. It would be a very difficult feat to connect structure with function, with mind and body, without an understanding as to whether a connection can, does, or must exist. To be science minded implies that it can and must. I think it is very important not to regard physical aspects-understandings and enigmas with high priority, as questions for the purpose of explanation, relating to scientific findings may produce concepts whose components do not correlate well in a one to one comparison of meaning with whole moving integrations - a whole concept plus parts plus evolution(motion) is a three part act.

In this article in this article I hope to suggest, that suitable, universal explanation, is not only not a deviation from a common three part construction (e.g. a Puck in the Garden) but is a separate, of itself two part notion in which the Puck, a variable, falls from the description as a universal common element. In a case where one considers motion and change, motion is not substitutable with mathematical mechanics of moving bodies, and is only a stateable (declarable) constant to all. It is important to maintain it (motion) as a separate present component in all compositions and as separate from analytical descriptions, e.g. in it's own private compartment. In reference to Russell's Paradox, motion and not motion cannot be arrived at from any/all substitutions, as it is possessed by all things, is common. The chain of analytical dissection can potentially exceed this fact, failing at approach to include it, and cannot avoid, for any practical endeavor of any kind to be successful, to adhere close to it, regardless of the inadequacy of extracted/extractable explanation, as the chosen paths of logic in the two cases are mandatorily exclusive of one another.

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