

# A Distinguisher on PRESENT-Like Permutations with Application to SPONGENT

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**Abstract.** At Crypto 2015, Blondeau *et al.* showed a known-key analysis on the full PRESENT lightweight block cipher. Based on some of the best differential distinguishers, they introduced a meet in the middle (MitM) layer to pre-add the differential distinguisher, which extends the number of attacked rounds on PRESENT from 26 rounds to full rounds without reducing differential probability.

In this paper, we generalize their method and present a generic distinguisher on a kind of permutations called PRESENT-like permutations. This generic distinguisher is divided into two phases. The first phase is a truncated differential distinguisher with strong bias, which describes the unbalancedness of the output collision on some fixed bits, given the fixed input in some bits, and we take advantage of the strong relation between truncated differential probability and capacity of multidimensional linear approximation to derive the best differential distinguishers. The second phase is the meet-in-the-middle layer, which is pre-added to the truncated differential to propagate the differential properties as far as possible. Different with Blondeau *et al.*'s work, we extend the MitM layers on a 64-bit internal state to states with any size, and we also give a concrete bound to estimate the attacked rounds of the MitM layer.

As an illustration, we apply our technique to all versions of SPONGENT permutations. In the truncated differential phase, as a result we reach one, two or three rounds more than the results shown by the designers. In the meet-in-the-middle phase, we get up to 11 rounds to pre-add to the differential distinguishers. Totally, we improve the previous distinguishers on all versions of SPONGENT permutations by up to 13 rounds.

**Keywords:** symmetric ciphers, PRESENT, SPONGENT, truncated differential, meet-in-the-middle, multidimensional linear approximation.

## 1 Introduction

The design goal of cryptographic scheme is to meet the secure requirements, and the need of resource restricted applications such as RFID and sensor networks makes the research of lightweight cryptography naturally attract a lot of attention. Many lightweight cryptography including stream ciphers like Trivium [1] and Grain [2], blockciphers like KATAN/KTANTAN [3], PRESENT [4] and LED [5] *etc.* and hash functions like QUARK [6], SPONGENT [7,8] and PHOTON [9] have been proposed in the past few years. The aim to correctly evaluate the security of these proposals has become a primordial task. This has been proved by the big number of security analyses of the previous primitives that has appeared in [10,11,12,13,14,15].

The block cipher PRESENT has become ISO/IEC standard [16] because of its impressive hardware performance and strong security assurance. Inspired by the design of PRESENT, there are a series of ciphers, e.g. SPONGENT [7,8], Puffin [17], PRINTcipher [18], MAYA [19], EPCBC [20], and RECTANGLE [21]. The core parts of these PRESENT-like ciphers include three layers: a key addition layer, a substitution layer realized by many parallel small scale Sboxes and a bit-wise permutation layer. Recently, the SPONGENT family of hash functions has also become ISO/IEC standard [22].

In the context of lightweight cryptanalysis, quite a few security analyses are developed for PRESENT-like ciphers, and the influence of differential and linear cryptanalysis are obvious. Borghoff *et al.* [10] focused on the analysis of PRESENT-like ciphers with secret Sboxes and gave a novel differential-style attack on MAYA which enabled us to find Sboxes in the first round one by one. Cho [23] showed an attack on 26-round PRESENT using the easy-to-trace linear trails with large correlations. Bulygin [13] found an efficient method to compute the capacities of EPCBC to get the attack on the full round EPCBC-96, and also presented an attack on 26 rounds of PRESENT-128 with more high success probability than Cho's. For PRESENT, linear cryptanalysis-based attacks were much more powerful against differential cryptanalysis-based attacks with 19 rounds attack, until Blondeau and Nyberg [24] presented a link between differential probability and linear correlation, which converted a multidimensional linear distinguisher into a truncated differential one which made truncated differential attacks up to 26 rounds of PRESENT. Combining their 26-round truncated differential attack, Blondeau *et al.* [15] gave a full-round known-key distinguisher valid for both PRESENT-80 and PRESENT-128. Firstly, they got one of the best truncated differential distinguisher from [24] which showed a statistical bias of the number of collisions on a few predetermined output bits under the fixed input bits. Secondly, they extended the round number of the differential attack by prepending a meet-in-the-middle (MitM) layer under the constraints that the output bits of the MitM layer must be exactly the same with those set on the input bits of the truncated differential layer. Then enough number of plaintexts are provided to make the distinguish attack succeed with high probability, where the plaintexts satisfied the constraints on both input and output of the MitM layer.

## 1.1 Our Contribution

We firstly define a kind of permutations called PRESENT-like permutations, which capture various cryptographic primitives such as PRESENT and SPONGENT. Then we propose a distinguisher for such PRESENT-like permutations. Similar to Blondeau *et al.*'s distinguisher, it includes two layers, that is, the MitM layer and the truncated differential distinguisher. The former is prepended to the latter, and provides enough number of plaintexts to ensure the distinguisher succeed with non-negligible probability.

In the MitM layer of Blondeau *et al.*'s distinguisher on PRESENT, the bits of internal state are divided into four groups. One of our observations on this MitM layer is that the bits of internal state can simply be divided into two groups. Noting that the internal state of PRESENT has 64 bits, one can easily generalize their method to obtain a similar MitM layer on any internal state with power-of-2 bits. Nevertheless, it is not trivial to generalize the MitM layer for the other cases. Our another observation on the MitM layer is that the number of its rounds is conducted by two factors, one of which is related to the size  $n$  of the internal state and the other of which is related to the factorization of the size  $n$ . Based on these observations, and according to the characteristic of PRESENT-like permutations, we construct the MitM layer and show a lower bound on the number of rounds extended by the MitM layer, for PRESENT-like permutations with any sizes. This bound is explicitly formulated by the size of the permutations.

We use the truncated differential distinguisher built based on [24,23]. The truncated differential distinguishing property is a statistical bias of the number of collisions on a few predetermined output bits when some predetermined input bits are fixed, which is related to the capacity of a multidimensional linear approximation [24]. For PRESENT-like permutations, this capacity can be obtained from the 1-bit linear trails, which benefits from the bit-permutation linear layer of the permutations.

Finally, we apply our distinguisher on all the versions of SPONGENT permutations and summarize our results compared with the previous distinguishers in Table 1. As shown in this table, we can distinguish up to 13 more rounds than the analysis [7,8] provided by the designers on

all versions, and 7 more rounds than the result [12] which shows a distinguisher on the special version SPONGENT-88/80/8.

**Table 1.** Summary of Distinguishers of SPONGENT Permutations

Version	$b$	$R$	$r_0$	$r_1$	$r$	[7,8]	[12]	$d$
SPONGENT-88/80/8	88	45	7	23	30	22	23	7
SPONGENT-88/176/88	264	135	9	68	77	66		11
SPONGENT-128/128/8	136	70	7	36	43	34		9
SPONGENT-128/256/128	384	195	11	98	109	96		13
SPONGENT-160/160/16	176	90	7	46	53	44		9
SPONGENT-160/160/80	240	120	7	62	69	60		9
SPONGENT-160/320/160	480	240	9	123	132	122		10
SPONGENT-224/224/16	240	120	7	62	69	60		9
SPONGENT-224/224/112	336	170	9	86	95	84		11
SPONGENT-224/448/224	672	340	9	172	181	169		12
SPONGENT-256/256/16	272	140	9	69	78	68		10
SPONGENT-256/256/128	384	195	11	98	109	96		13
SPONGENT-256/512/256	768	385	11	194	205	192		13

$b$ : the size of internal state

$R$ : the number of full rounds

$r_0$ : the number of rounds of the MitM layer

$r_1$ : the number of rounds of truncated differential distinguisher

$r$ : the total number of rounds of our distinguisher

$d$ : the number of rounds we improve on the previous best distinguisher

## 1.2 Organization

This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the structures of PRESENT-like permutations and SPONGENT are briefly described. The framework of our generic attack, including the truncated differential distinguisher and the meet-in-the-middle layer, is shown in Section 3. The Section 4 presents the detailed distinguisher on all versions of SPONGENT. Section 5 concludes this paper.

## 2 Research Background

In this section, we start by briefly describing a generic view of a PRESENT-like permutation to capture various cryptographic primitives such as PRESENT [4] and SPONGENT [7,8].

### 2.1 Brief Description of PRESENT-Like Permutations

We define a PRESENT-like permutation as a permutation that applies  $R$  rounds of a round function to update an internal state consisting of  $n$  cells, where each of the cells has a size of  $c$  bits. In this paper, we focus on the case  $c = 4$ , while our technique can also be adapted to the other cases, e.g. for PRINTcipher [18],  $c = 3$ .

The round function uses a substitution-permutation network (SPN). It starts by xoring a round-dependent constant to the state. Then, it applies a substitution layer which relies on a  $c \times c$  nonlinear bijective Sbox. Finally, the round function performs a bit-permutation linear layer  $L$ , where

$$L(i) = \begin{cases} i \cdot n \bmod (c \cdot n - 1), & \text{if } i \in \{0, \dots, c \cdot n - 2\}, \\ c \cdot n - 1, & \text{if } i = c \cdot n - 1. \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

Note that our distinguisher can also be adapted to other ciphers, such as `PRINTcipher`, which use the inverse of  $L$  as their linear layer.

In the case of `PRESENT`-like block ciphers analyzed in the known/chosen-key model, the subkeys generated by the key schedule are incorporated into the known constant addition layer. We state here that for `PRESENT`-like block ciphers the generic distinguisher presented in this paper is suitable in the known-key model.

## 2.2 Brief Description of SPONGENT

`SPONGENT` [7,8] is a sponge-based hash function family with 13 versions. Its various parameterizations are referred to as `SPONGENT- $n/c/r$`  for different hash sizes  $n$ , capacities  $c$ , and rates  $r$ , as depicted in Table 1. All variants with the same output size of  $n$  bits are referred to as `SPONGENT- $n$` , and there are five different output: `SPONGENT-88`, `SPONGENT-128`, `SPONGENT-160`, `SPONGENT-224` and `SPONGENT-256`. In this section, we denote by  $b, n, c, r$  separately the size of the internal state, hash size, capacity and rate.

`SPONGENT` construction is an iterated design with three phases: the initialization phase is to pad the message into a multiple of  $r$  bits, and the absorbing phase is to xor the  $r$ -bit input message blocks into the first  $r$  bits of the state, and the squeezing phase is to get the  $n$ -bit output.


As a lightweight hash function, it does not use the lightweight block cipher as its core part, and it introduces the `PRESENT`-like permutation as its core permutation. The permutation layer operates linearly on the  $b$  bits as follows: the  $b$  bit state  $STATE_i$  is firstly xored with round constant  $C_b(i)$  at its leftmost bits and with round constant  $IC_b(i)$  at its rightmost bits, where  $C_b(i)$  is the state of an LFSR, and  $IC_b(i)$  is the value of  $C_b(i)$  with its bits in reversed order. Secondly, the 4-bit Sbox is described as follows:

$$S[\cdot] = \{0xE, 0xD, 0xB, 0x0, 0x2, 0x1, 0x4, 0xF, 0x7, 0xA, 0x8, 0x5, 0x9, 0xC, 0x3, 0x6\}.$$

Finally, the bit  $i$  of the state is moved to the bit position  $P_b(i)$ , where

$$P_b(i) = \begin{cases} i \cdot b/4 \bmod (b-1), & \text{if } i \in \{0, \dots, b-2\}, \\ b-1, & \text{if } i = b-1. \end{cases} \quad (2)$$

It can be seen in Figure 1, which takes `SPONGENT-88/80/8` as an example.



**Fig. 1.** The bit permutation layer of `SPONGENT-88/80/8`

## 2.3 Previous Results on SPONGENT

As claimed in [25,26], the sponge construction can get the preimage security of  $2^r$  as well as the second preimage and collision securities of  $2^{c/2}$ , if this core permutation does not have any structural distinguishers. As far as we know, there are very few outside attacks on `SPONGENT`.

Many analyses on the core permutation were considered. The designers [7,8] considered input and output linear masks with hamming weight one, and showed that there were at most  $(R/2)$ -round linear trail with correlation  $c_w \geq 2^{-b/2}$  (except that SPONGENT-160/320/160 allows  $2 + R/2$  rounds). They also estimated longest differential characteristics holding with probability in the range of  $2^{-b}$ . Different with block cipher PRESENT, SPONGENT permutations have at most one linear trails with one active S-box in each round, so they cannot get the same high probability linear approximations as PRESENT. Abdelraheem [12] and Bao [27] estimated the probabilities of differential and linear approximations for SPONGENT. Abdelraheem [12] considered input and output masks with Hamming weight  $\leq 4$  with large but sparse correlation matrix, which overcame the memory and time problems, and improved the linear cryptanalysis on a special variant, SPONGENT-88/80/8, by one more round than the result provided by the designers.

### 3 A Distinguisher for PRESENT-like Permutations

In this section, we present a generic distinguisher on PRESENT-like permutations that are defined in Section 2.1. This distinguisher include two phases, the truncated differential distinguisher and the meet-in-the-middle layer. The truncated differential phase describes the collision bias on the predetermined bits of the ciphertexts whose plaintexts are the same on some bits, while the meet-in-the-middle phase is prepended to the truncated differential to extend the distinguisher to more rounds without reducing the success probability. The following two subsections give the details of these two phases.

#### 3.1 Truncated Differential Distinguisher

**Definition of Truncated Differential Distinguisher.** The technique of truncated differential attack was introduced by Knudsen [28]. Whereas ordinary differential cryptanalysis analyzes the full difference between two texts, the truncated variant considers differences that are only partially determined. That is, the attack makes predictions of only some of the bits instead of the full block. Assuming that the permutation is  $F : \mathcal{F}_2^n \rightarrow \mathcal{F}_2^n, x = (x_s, x_t) \mapsto y = (y_q, y_r)$ , we consider a truncated differential composed of  $2^t$  input differences  $(0, \delta_t)$  and  $2^r$  output differences  $(0, \Delta_r)$ . The truncated differential distinguisher describes the unbalance of the collisions on the  $q$  bits of the output under the condition that the  $s$  bits of the input are fixed. The distinguishing attack model is described as in Algorithm 1, see also [15,24].

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#### Algorithm 1 Truncate differential distinguisher

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**Input:** Given a plaintext set  $P$  including  $N$  plaintexts with the same value on the  $s$  bits and the truncated differential  $(0, \delta_t) \rightarrow (0, \Delta_r)$  with probability  $p$ .

- 1: Set a counter  $D$  to 0 and a table  $T$  with size  $2^q$  to 0.
  - 2: For each plaintext  $x = (x_s, x_t)$ :
    - Compute  $(y_q, y_r) = E_K(x_s, x_t)$ ,
    - $T[y_q] = T[y_q] + 1$ .
  - 3: Compute scoring function  $D = \sum_{0 \leq l \leq 2^q - 1} T[l](T[l] - 1)/2$ .
  - 4: For threshold function  $\tau$ , if  $D > \tau$ , conclude that this is the cipher.
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The success probability  $P_S$  of the distinguisher is defined by the following equation:

$$P_S(N^2/2) = \Phi\left(\frac{\mu_R + \mu_W}{\sigma_R - \sigma_W}\right),$$

where  $\mu_R = N^2/2 \cdot p$ ,  $\sigma_R^2 \approx N^2/2 \cdot 2^{-q}$ ,  $\mu_W = N^2/2 \cdot 2^{-q}$ ,  $\sigma_W^2 = N^2/2 \cdot 2^{-q}$ , and  $\tau$  is the threshold function satisfying  $\tau = \mu_R - \sigma_R \phi^{-1}(N^2/2)$ .

Of course, as claimed in [15], the bias is usually small, so we cannot pre- or post-add other differential characteristic to extend the attacked rounds number, which will cause lower differential probability.

**Truncated Differential for PRESENT-Like Permutations.** In order to get a truncated differential with more strong bias, as more number of high differential characteristics as possible are considered to improve the bias, especially for those ciphers with bad differential characteristics and good linear approximation. But due to the limitation of time and memory complexity, only few differentials are involved, which usually causes the truncated differential with low probability. Blondeau and Nyberg [24] provided a link between truncated differential and multidimensional linear properties to convert a multidimensional linear distinguisher into a truncated differential distinguisher, which greatly balanced the differential-based attack and linear-based attack on the same ciphers. For example, the link made it possible for the truncated differential attack up to 26 rounds of PRESENT [24]. The following is the strong relation of the truncated differential probability with the capacity of the multidimensional linear approximation.

**Theorem 1 ([24])** *Let  $F : \mathcal{F}_2^s \times \mathcal{F}_2^t \rightarrow \mathcal{F}_2^q \times \mathcal{F}_2^r$  denote a vectorial Boolean function satisfying  $s + t = q + r = n$ . Given a multidimensional approximation  $[(a_s, 0), (b_q, 0)]_{a_s \in \mathcal{F}_2^s, b_q \in \mathcal{F}_2^q}$  with capacity  $C$  and a truncated differential composed of  $2^t$  input differences  $(0, \delta_t) \in \{0\} \times \mathcal{F}_2^t$  and  $2^r$  output differences  $(0, \gamma_r) \in \{0\} \times \mathcal{F}_2^r$  with probability  $p$ , then*

$$p = 2^{-q}(C + 1).$$

Note that the above result applies to PRESENT-like permutations. Thus their truncated differential with strong bias can be converted from multidimensional linear approximation. For PRESENT-like permutations, their constructions are similar to the core part of PRESENT, then we can find the multidimensional linear approximation for PRESENT-like permutations according to the analysis on PRESENT presented by Cho [23]. We consider  $r_1 = r_1^* + 2$  rounds linear characteristic as follows. In the first round, we consider that the  $c$ -bit ( $c$  is the size of the cell) input mask  $\alpha$  of the active Sbox can take arbitrary value from 1 to  $2^c$  and the output mask takes a single-bit value. In the last round, we require that each input mask of the active Sbox takes a single-bit value and the output mask  $\beta$  can take arbitrary value from 1 to  $2^c$ . Furthermore, we limit that both the two rounds have only one active Sbox. In the middle  $r_1^*$  rounds, linear trails satisfying input mask and output mask with hamming weight 1 in each round are considered. We can set up the correlation matrix of one round to get the correlation of the middle  $r_1^*$  rounds. The probability of truncated differential is computed as  $P = 2^{-q}(1 + C)$  by the computation of the correlation of multidimensional linear approximation.

### 3.2 Generic Meet-in-the-Middle Layer for PRESENT-Like Ciphers

In Blondeau *et al.*'s known-key attack on PRESENT [15], the key step was the MitM layer which propagated the differential properties up to 26 rounds by prepending the extra 7 rounds to the truncated differential distinguisher. In order to make the truncated differential distinguisher valid, a set of plaintexts satisfying the input constraints of the truncated differential must be identified. Namely, the internal states of these plaintexts after several rounds as the output of the MitM layer should satisfy the input constraints of the truncated differential. In order to efficiently identify such a set of plaintexts, after separately fixing the few bits of the input and output of the plaintexts, their MitM layer carried out a forward computation to get partial internal state bits after few rounds of the MitM layer by guessing just few bits and carried out an independent backward computation to get partial internal state bits for the last one and half

round of the MitM layer. Finally the set of plaintext was identified by carrying out a gradually matching process. Because of the small Sbox and the bit-permutation linear layer of PRESENT, partial output bits can be determined by guessing few bits. Benefitting from the 64-bit internal states, the internal state can be divided into few groups, and gradually matching process can be easily carrying out.

In the MitM layer of Blondeau *et al.*'s distinguisher on PRESENT, the bits of internal state are divided into four groups. One of our observations on this MitM layer is that the bits of internal state can simply be divided into two groups. Noting that the internal state of PRESENT has 64 bits, one can easily generalize their method to obtain a similar MitM layer on any internal state with power-of-2 bits. Nevertheless, it is not trivial to generalize the MitM layer for the other cases. Our another observation on the MitM layer is that the number of its rounds is conducted by two factors, one of which is related to the size  $n$  of the internal state and the other of which is related to the factorization of the size  $n$ . Based on these observations and according to the characteristic of PRESENT-like permutations, we show a generic MitM layer for PRESENT-like permutations with any sizes, and we also give a lower bound on the number of rounds extended by this MitM layer.

Hereinafter, we assume that a PRESENT-like permutation uses an internal state of  $4n$  bits, that is, it consists of  $n$  4-bit cells, for even  $n$ . We first provide the details of the procedure, then discuss the number of rounds the generic MitM layer consists of and the complexity of this procedure.

**The Procedure.** As in [15], we denote by  $X_i$  the internal state after  $i$ -th round of a PRESENT-like permutation, and by  $Y_i$  the internal state after applying Sbox layer to  $X_i$ . The detailed procedure for generic MitM layer is described as below.

1. Set four bits input to a single Sbox of plaintexts to a randomly chosen 4-bit value, and compute the corresponding bits of  $X_1$  in the forward direction. These bits are input to four different Sboxes in the second round. Then we guess the other 12 bits input to these Sboxes, and compute in the forward direction to get 16 bits of  $X_2$ . Iteratively, we guess the other  $4^i - 4^{i-1}$  bits input to the  $4^{i-1}$  active Sboxes of  $X_{i-1}$  and compute in the forward direction to get  $4^i$  bits of  $X_i$ , for  $i = 3, \dots, \mu_n$ . In total we get a set of  $2^{4^{\mu_n}-4}$  such values of  $X_{\mu_n}$  and each value has  $4^{\mu_n}$  bits determined.
2. Similarly, set the four bits at expected positions of  $Y_{r_0}$  to a randomly chosen 4-bit value, and compute the corresponding bits of  $Y_{r_0-1}$  in the backward direction. These bits are input to the inversion of four different Sboxes in the  $(r_0 - 1)$ -th round. Then we guess the other 12 bits input to the inversion of these Sboxes of  $Y_{r_0-1}$ , and compute in the backward direction to get 16 bits of  $Y_{r_0-2}$ . Iteratively, we guess the other  $4^i - 4^{i-1}$  bits input to the inversion of the  $4^{i-1}$  active Sboxes of  $Y_{r_0-i+1}$  and compute in the backward direction to get  $4^i$  bits of  $Y_{r_0-i}$ , for  $i = 3, \dots, \mu_n$ . In total we get a set of  $2^{4^{\mu_n}-4}$  such values of  $Y_{r_0-\mu_n}$  and each value has  $4^{\mu_n}$  bits determined.
3. For each partially determined value of  $X_{\mu_n}$  and  $Y_{r_0-\mu_n}$ , repeat the following:
  - (a) Divide the bits of  $X_{\mu_n}$  into two disjoint groups, each of which contains half of determined bits and half of undetermined bits. Each group consists of  $2n$  bits which are input to neighbouring  $\frac{1}{2}n$  Sboxes. Then for each group, we guess the  $2n - \frac{1}{2}4^{\mu_n}$  undetermined bits of  $X_{\mu_n}$ , and compute in the forward direction to get  $2n$  bits of  $X_{\mu_n+t_n}$ . We store in a table  $T_{X,i}$  the values of partially determined  $X_{\mu_n+t_n}$  computed from the  $i$ -th group,  $i = 0, 1$ .
  - (b) Similarly, divide the bits of  $Y_{r_0-\mu_n}$  into two disjoint groups, each of which contains half of determined bits and half of undetermined bits. Each group consists of  $2n$  bits which are input to the inversion of  $\frac{1}{2}n$  Sboxes at carefully chosen positions. Then for each group, we

guess the  $2n - \frac{1}{2}4^{\mu_n}$  undetermined bits of  $Y_{r_0-\mu_n}$ , and compute in the backward direction to get  $2n$  bits of  $X_{\mu_n+t_n}$ , which correspond to  $2n$  bits of  $Y_{r_0-\mu_n-t_n} = X_{\mu_n+t_n-1}$  up to a bit-permutation linear layer. We store in a table  $T_{Y,i}$  the values of partially determined  $X_{\mu_n+t_n}$  computed from the  $i$ -th group,  $i = 0, 1$ .

- (c) Then merge those tables to find a set of fully-determined values of  $X_{\mu_n+t_n}$ .
- i. Merge the tables  $T_{X,i}$  and  $T_{Y,i}$  to  $T_i$  respectively for  $i = 0, 1$ . By merging these two tables, we mean to merge every two partially-determined values of  $X_{\mu_n+t_n}$ , each from a table and sharing the same bit values at the common determined bit positions, into a new partially-determined value of  $X_{\mu_n+t_n}$  with all their determined bits, and then to include this new value of  $X_{\mu_n+t_n}$  in table  $T_i$ . Note that each value of  $T_{X,i}$  and each value of  $T_{Y,i}$  share  $n$  determined bit positions (if the positions of Sboxes of each group defined at Step 3b are carefully chosen). Hence table  $T_i$  has on average  $2^{2 \cdot (2n - \frac{1}{2}4^{\mu_n}) - n} = 2^{3n-4^{\mu_n}}$  values, each of which has  $2 \cdot 2n - n = 3n$  bits.
  - ii. Merge  $T_0$  and  $T_1$ . Notice that  $T_0$  and  $T_1$  share  $2n$  determined bit positions of  $X_{\mu_n+t_n}$ . Hence we obtain  $2^{2 \cdot (3n-4^{\mu_n}) - 2n} = 2^{4n-2 \cdot 4^{\mu_n}}$  values on average, each of which has  $2 \cdot 3n - 2n = 4n$  bits consisting of the full bits of  $X_{\mu_n+t_n}$ .

The algorithm is to find a set of internal state values of  $X_{\mu_n+t_n}$ , whose corresponding plaintexts can satisfy the constraints on the input and output of the MitM layer. Totally, we obtain on average  $2^{2 \cdot (4^{\mu_n}-4)} \cdot 2^{4n-2 \cdot 4^{\mu_n}} = 2^{4n-8}$  plaintexts by inversely computing from the fully-determined values of  $X_{\mu_n+t_n}$ , which satisfies the constraints on the input and output of the MitM layer.

**The Number of Rounds.** The number of rounds of the generic MitM layer is determined by Step 1, Step 2, Step 3a and Step 3b. Notice that Step 1 and Step 2 are symmetric and thus involve the same number of rounds. More exactly, they both involve  $\mu_n = \lfloor \log_4 n \rfloor$  rounds, where  $n$  is the total number of Sboxes. Also, Step 3a and Step 3b are symmetric and involve the same number of rounds. Denote by  $t_n$  the maximum integer such that  $4^{t_n} \mid 2n = \frac{4n}{2}$ . Since in Step 3 the bits of the internal state are divided into two groups, Step 3a and Step 3b both involve  $t_n$  rounds. Totally, the number of rounds of the generic MitM layer is

$$r_0 = 2(\mu_n + t_n) - 1 = 2\lfloor \log_4 n \rfloor + 2t_n - 1.$$

Taking PRESENT for example,  $n = 16$ ,  $\mu_n = 2$ ,  $t_n = 2$ , and thus  $r_0 = 7$ , which is exactly the number of rounds of the MitM layer for PRESENT presented in [15]. Taking SPONGENT-88/80/8 for example,  $n = 22$ ,  $\mu_n = 2$ ,  $t_n = 1$ , and thus  $r_0 = 5$ , which is two less than that proposed in Section 4.2. We will discuss later how to improve the generic MitM layer for some special cases like SPONGENT-88/80/8.

**Complexity.** The complexity of the algorithm is dominated by Step 3. Since there are  $2^{4^{\mu_n}-4}$  values of  $X_{\mu_n}$  from the forward computations and  $2^{4^{\mu_n}-4}$  values of  $Y_{r_0-\mu_n}$  from the backward computations, Step 3 is executed  $2^{2 \cdot (4^{\mu_n}-4)}$  times. The complexity of each execution is dominated by Step 3(c)ii, that is merging  $T_0$  and  $T_1$ , which needs  $2^{3n-4^{\mu_n}}$  table lookups. Hence the total complexity of Step 3 is  $2^{2 \cdot (4^{\mu_n}-4)} \cdot 2^{3n-4^{\mu_n}} = 2^{3n+4^{\mu_n}-8} \leq 2^{4n-8}$  table lookups. Once a match of the MitM layer has been found, we can encrypt this value  $X_{\mu_n+t_n}$  over the  $r_1 + \mu_n + t_n - 1$  rounds and increment the counter  $D$  given in the previous section. The memory complexity of this attack is dominated by the storage of the table  $T_0$  and  $T_1$  which is  $2 \cdot 2^{3n-4^{\mu_n}} \cdot 3n = 3n \cdot 2^{3n-4^{\mu_n}+1}$  bits. To sum up, the total time complexity of the distinguisher is  $2^{3n+4^{\mu_n}-8}$  table lookups and  $2^{4n-8}$  encryptions, and the memory complexity is  $3n \cdot 2^{3n-4^{\mu_n}+1}$  bits.



**Improved Greneric Meet-in-the-Middle Layer.** For even  $n$ , we always have  $4 \mid 2n$  and thus  $t_n \geq 1$ . For the case that  $t_n = 1$  and  $4n > 32 = 2 \cdot 4^2$ , e.g.  $4n = 88$  for SPONGENT-88/80/8, it is possible to improve the greneric MitM layer by two more rounds, consisting of one round in forward direction and one round in backward direction, at the cost of increasing the complexity by using the strategy as shown in Section 4.2.

## 4 The Distinguishers on SPONGENT Permutations

As an application of our generic distinguisher shown in Section 3, we first analyse the internal permutation used in SPONGENT-88/80/8, and we obtain a 30-round truncated differential distinguisher including 7 rounds in MitM phase and 23 rounds in truncated differential phase. Then, we apply the similar method to get the distinguishers for the other versions of SPONGENT.

### 4.1 Truncated Differentials with Strong Bias for SPONGENT Permutations

**Truncated Differentials with Strong Bias for SPONGENT-88/80/8 Permutation.** As described in the previous section, the truncated differential with strong bias of SPONGENT-88/80/8 permutation can be converted from multidimensional linear approximation. According to Theorem 1, the greater the total correlation of multidimensional linear approximation, the stronger the bias of truncated differential. The Sbox in the SPONGENT permutation was chosen carefully to avoid many linear trails with one active Sbox in each round existing on PRESENT, see [7,8]. For instance in SPONGENT-88/80/8 permutation, there is only one trail that has one active Sbox at each round. For other versions, the number of the trails satisfying input and output mask with hamming weight 1 on each round is also less than five. So the designer claimed that there was linear distinguisher possible for not more than 22 rounds for SPONGENT-88/80/8 permutation when only input mask and output mask with hamming weight 1 were considered. Abdelraheem [12] increased the linear distinguisher to 23 rounds with capacity  $2^{-87.5}$  considering linear characteristic hamming weight at most 4. As shown in [12], however, the characteristics with Hamming weight 4 contributed negatively to the total correlation. Furthermore, from their analysis, we can see that correlation was not increased much more when linear characteristics with hamming weight 3 or 4 were considered.

Our experiments show that the best capacity of multidimensional linear approximation is  $2^{-84}$ , where the number of rounds is  $r_1^* = 21$  and the truncated differential characteristic is (20,19). That is, the inputs share the same values at bits {80, 81, 82, 83}, i.e. the input bits to  $S_{20}$ , and the outputs share the same values at bits {76, 77, 78, 79}, i.e. the input bits to  $S_{19}$  for the next round. In other words, bits {80, 81, 82, 83} of the input mask are non-zeros, and bits {76, 77, 78, 79} of the output mask are non-zeros.

The details of the procedure are given as follows.

1. Set up the correlation matrix of one round considering linear trails with input mask and output mask of hamming weight 1, and we get many 21-round linear approximation, where a linear layer is included before the first round. We choose linear approximation whose output mask reaches  $S_{19}$  after one round and input mask reaches  $S_{20}$  after one inversion round. The capacity of these linear approximation is  $2^{-84}$  and  $r_1^* = 21$ .
2. According to Parseval's theorem:  $\sum_{\alpha_i=0}^{15} \rho(\alpha_i, 2^u)^2 = \sum_{\beta_j=0}^{15} \rho(2^v, \beta_j)^2 = 1$  for any  $u, v \in \{0, 1, 2, 3\}$ , the input of  $S_{20}$  in the first round travel all the value from 0 to 15 and the output of  $S_{19}$  in the 23 round travel all the value from 0 to 15. The capacity of the  $r_1 = r_1^* + 2 = 23$  is the same with the capacity of the middle  $r_1^*$  round, and the capacity of 23 round is  $2^{-84}$ .

Then for instance such truncated differential distinguisher on 23 rounds, we can compute the probability of the distinguisher as  $p = 2^{-q}(C + 1) = 2^{-4}(2^{-84} + 1) = 2^{-4} + 2^{-88}$  according to

Theorem 1. Combining with a 7-round MitM layer, which will be shown in Section 4.2, we can get  $2^{80} \cdot (2^{80} - 1)/2 \approx 2^{159}$  pairs of messages which are under the constraint that their outputs are the same at bits (80,81,82,83). Then we can distinguish 30-round of SPONGENT-88/80/8 from a random permutation with success probability 50.22%.

**Applications to Other Versions of SPONGENT Permutations.** Similar, we apply the method to other versions of SPONGENT permutations for finding the best truncated differentials. The results are listed in Table 2, respectively for different versions, where  $b$  is the size of internal state,  $R$  is the number of full rounds,  $r_1$  is the number of rounds of the truncated differential,  $C$  is the capacity of the best multidimensional approximation which equals the probability of the corresponding truncated differential according to Theorem 1, and  $P_S$  is the success probability of the truncated differential distinguisher. We also compare our results with the previous distinguishers in Table 1. As shown in this table, we can reach one, two or three rounds more than the results shown by the designers.


**Table 2.** Differential Distinguishers of SPONGENT

Version	$b$	$R$	$r_1$	$C$	$Charac$	$P_S$
SPONGENT-88/80/8	88	45	23	-84	(20,19)	50.22%
SPONGENT-88/176/88	264	135	67	-259	(44,65)	50.44%
SPONGENT-88/176/88	264	135	68	-263	(44,65)	50.03%
SPONGENT-128/128/8	136	70	35	-131	(22,31)	50.44%
SPONGENT-128/128/8	136	70	36	-135	(20,31)	50.03%
SPONGENT-128/256/128	384	195	97	-376.678	(64,95)	52.20%
SPONGENT-128/256/128	384	195	98	-380.678	(64,95)	50.14%
SPONGENT-160/160/16	176	90	45	-170.415	(20,31)	50.66%
SPONGENT-160/160/16	176	90	46	-174.415	(20,40)	50.04%
SPONGENT-160/160/80	240	120	61	-233.415	(58,58)	51.32%
SPONGENT-160/160/80	240	120	62	-238	(58,59)	50.06%
SPONGENT-160/320/160	480	240	122	-475.3	(80,118)	50.36%
SPONGENT-160/320/160	480	240	123	-478.83	(80,112)	50.03%
SPONGENT-224/224/16	240	120	61	-233.415	(58,58)	51.32%
SPONGENT-224/224/16	240	120	62	-238	(58,59)	50.06%
SPONGENT-224/224/112	336	170	85	-329.415	(28,83)	51.32%
SPONGENT-224/224/112	336	170	86	-335	(60,78)	50.03%
SPONGENT-224/448/224	672	340	171	-666.95	(56,146)	50.46%
SPONGENT-224/448/224	672	340	172	-670.947	(56,146)	50.03%
SPONGENT-256/256/16	272	140	69	-268	(44,66)	50.22%
SPONGENT-256/256/128	384	195	97	-376.678	(64,95)	52.20%
SPONGENT-256/256/128	384	195	98	-380.678	(64,95)	50.14%
SPONGENT-256/512/256	768	385	193	-762.415	(128,191)	50.66%
SPONGENT-256/512/256	768	385	194	-766.415	(128,191)	50.04%

## 4.2 The Meet-in-the-Middle Layer for SPONGENT Permutations

The family of SPONGENT hash functions has totally 13 variants, which use 11 different sizes of internal states. In this section, we first show an improved meet-in-the-middle approach on SPONGENT-88/80/8 and then apply it to other variants.

**The MitM Layer for SPONGENT-88/80/8.** Next we illustrate the MitM layer for SPONGENT-88/80/8. Notice that the size of its internal state is 88, which is not a power of 2 and makes the



**Fig. 2.** MitM over the first 7 rounds of SPONGENT-88/80/8

MitM layer more complex than PRESENT. The MitM layer consists of 7 rounds. The constraints on the inputs are that they share the same values at bits  $\{24, 25, 26, 27\}$ , i.e. the input bits to  $S_6$ . The constraints on the outputs are that they share the same values at bits  $\{80, 81, 82, 83\}$ , i.e. the input bits to  $S_{20}$  for the eighth round. As in [15], we denote by  $X_i$  the internal state after  $i$ -th round of SPONGENT-88/80/8, and by  $Y_i$  the internal state after applying Sbox layer to  $X_i$ . The detailed procedure is described as below.

1. Set the bits  $\{24, 25, 26, 27\}$  of plaintexts to a randomly chosen 4-bit value, and compute bits  $\{6, 28, 50, 72\}$  of  $X_1$  in the forward direction. These bits are input to Sboxes  $S_1, S_7, S_{12}, S_{18}$  in the second round. Then we guess the other 12 bits input to these Sboxes, i.e. bits  $\{4, 5, 7, 29, 30, 31, 48, 49, 51, 73, 74, 75\}$  of  $X_1$ , and compute in the forward direction to get 16 bits of  $X_2$ , i.e. bits  $\{1, 7, 12, 18, 23, 29, 34, 40, 45, 51, 56, 62, 67, 73, 78, 84\}$ . It is also depicted as the first two rounds in Figure 2. Further, we guess the 6 bits  $\{41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47\}$  of  $X_2$ , which are input to Sboxes  $S_{10}$  and  $S_{11}$ , as shown in Figure 2 in cyan color. In total we get a set of  $2^{18}$  such values of  $X_2$  and each value has 22 bits determined.
2. Similarly, set the bits  $\{80, 81, 82, 83\}$  of  $Y_7$  to a randomly chosen 4-bit value, and compute bits  $\{59, 63, 67, 71\}$  of  $Y_6$  in the backward direction. These bits are input to the inversion of Sboxes  $S_{14}, S_{15}, S_{16}, S_{17}$  in the sixth round. Then we guess the other 12 bits input to the inversion of these Sboxes, i.e. bits  $\{56, 57, 58, 60, 61, 62, 64, 65, 66, 68, 69, 70\}$  of  $Y_6$ , and compute in the backward direction to get 16 bits of  $Y_5$ , i.e. bits  $\{3, 7, 11, 15, 19, 23, 50, 54, 58, 62, 66, 70, 74, 78, 82, 86\}$ . It is also depicted as the last two round-

s in Figure 2. Further, we guess the 6 bits  $\{20, 21, 22, 64, 65, 67\}$  of  $Y_5$ , which are input to the inversion of Sboxes  $S_5$  and  $S_{16}$ , as shown in Figure 2 in cyan color. In total we get a set of  $2^{18}$  such values of  $Y_5$  and each value has 22 bits determined.

3. For each partially determined value of  $X_2$  and  $Y_5$ , repeat the following:
  - (a) Divide the bits of  $X_2$  into two overlapping groups, whose intersection is the 8 bits input to Sboxes  $S_{10}$  and  $S_{11}$ . Then for each group, we guess the 33 undetermined bits of  $X_2$  and 2 bits ( $\{10, 11\}$  or  $\{66, 67\}$ ) of  $X_3$ , and compute in the forward direction to get 44 bits of  $X_4$ . We store in a table  $T_{X,i}$ ,  $i = 0, 1$ , the values of partially determined  $X_4$  computed from the  $i$ -th group together with the 4 bits  $\{10, 11, 66, 67\}$  of  $X_3$ . See Figure 2 for an example group in orange color, where the guessed 2 bits of  $X_3$  are bits 10 and 11, which are input to Sbox  $S_5$ .
  - (b) Similarly, divide the bits of  $Y_5$  into two overlapping groups, whose common bits are the 8 bits input to the inversion of Sboxes  $S_5$  and  $S_{16}$ . Then for each group, we guess the 33 undetermined bits of  $Y_5$  and 2 bits ( $\{41, 43\}$  or  $\{44, 46\}$ ) of  $Y_4$ , and compute in the backward direction to get 44 bits of  $X_4$ . We store in a table  $T_{Y,i}$ ,  $i = 0, 1$ , the values of partially determined  $X_4$  computed from the  $i$ -th group together with the 4 bits  $\{41, 43, 44, 46\}$  of  $Y_4$ . See Figure 2 for an example group in orange color, where the guessed 2 bits of  $Y_4$  are bits 44 and 46, which are input to the inversion of Sbox  $S_{11}$ .
  - (c) Then merge those tables to find a set of fully-determined values of  $X_4$ .
    - i. Merge the tables  $T_{X,i}$  and  $T_{Y,i}$  to  $T_i$  respectively for  $i = 0, 1$ . By merging these two tables, we mean to merge every two partially-determined values of  $X_4$ , each from a table and sharing the same bit values at the common determined bit positions, into a new partially-determined value of  $X_4$  with all their determined bits, and then to include this new value of  $X_4$  in table  $T_i$ . Note that each value of  $T_{X,i}$  and each value of  $T_{Y,i}$  share 22 determined bit positions. Hence table  $T_i$  has on average  $2^{2 \cdot 35 - 22} = 2^{48}$  values, each of which has  $2 \cdot (44 + 4) - 22 = 74$  bits.
    - ii. Merge  $T_0$  and  $T_1$ . Notice that  $T_0$  and  $T_1$  share 44 determined bit positions of  $X_4$ , 4 determined bit positions of  $X_3$  and 4 determined bit positions of  $Y_4$ . Hence we obtain  $2^{2 \cdot 48 - 52} = 2^{44}$  values on average, each of which has  $2 \cdot 74 - 52 = 96$  bits consisting of the full 88 bits of  $X_4$ , 4 bits of  $X_3$  and 4 bits of  $Y_4$ .

The algorithm is to find a set of internal state values of  $X_4$ , whose corresponding plaintexts can satisfy the constraints on the input and output of the MitM layer. Totally, we obtain on average  $2^{2 \cdot 18} \cdot 2^{44} = 2^{80}$  plaintexts by inversely computing from the fully-determined values of  $X_4$ , which satisfies the constraints on the input and output of the MitM layer.

**Complexity.** The complexity of the algorithm is dominated by Step 3. Since there are  $2^{18}$   $X_2$  from the forward computations and  $2^{18}$   $Y_5$  from the backward computations, Step 3 is executed  $2^{36}$  times. The complexity of each execution is dominated by Step 3(c)ii, that is merging  $T_0$  and  $T_1$ , which needs  $2^{48}$  table lookups. Hence the total complexity of Step 3 is  $2^{84}$  table lookups. Once a match of the MitM layer has been found, we can encrypt this value  $X_4$  over the  $r_1 + 3$  rounds and increment the counter  $D$  given in the previous section. The memory complexity of this attack is dominated by the storage of the table  $T_0$  and  $T_1$  which is  $2 \cdot 2^{48} \cdot 74 \approx 2^{55.2}$  bits. To sum up, the total time complexity of the distinguisher is  $2^{84}$  table lookups and  $2^{80}$  permutation queries.

**The MitM Layer for All Versions of SPONGENT.** The 13 versions of SPONGENT hash functions use 11 different sizes of internal states. We have shown the MitM layer for SPONGENT-88/80/8. The approach also applies to the other versions. Due to the similarity of the idea, we directly

provide our results while omitting the details. These results are listed in Table 3, respectively for different sizes of internal states. The numbers of rounds for generic approach are directly derived from the results of Section 3.2, and the corresponding complexities can also be obtained. Notice that by the improved approach, besides the size 88 we also increase two more rounds for the sizes 136, 176, 240, 264, 272, 336, which are not divided by  $2 \cdot 4^2 = 32$ . The complexities of these cases are  $2^{n-4}$  table lookups and  $2^{n-8}$  permutation queries.

**Table 3.** The number of rounds of the MitM layer for SPONGENT

Size of internal state	88	136	176	240	264	272	336	384	480	672	768
#Rounds (generic)	5	5	5	5	7	7	7	11	9	9	11
#Rounds (improved)	7	7	7	7	9	9	9	11	9	9	11

### 4.3 Summary

We have shown the meet-in-the-middle layers and the truncated differential distinguishers for all versions of SPONGENT permutations. In the truncated differential phase, we take advantage of the strong relation between truncated differential probability and capacity of multidimensional linear approximation to derive the best differential distinguishers, and as a result we reach one, two or three rounds more than the results shown by the designers. In the meet-in-the-middle phase, we get up to 11 rounds to pre-add to the differential distinguishers. Totally, we improve the previous distinguishers on all versions of SPONGENT permutations by up to 13 rounds. The full results are summarized in Table 1, compared with the previous distinguishers.

## 5 Conclusion

In this paper, we present a general method to distinguish a PRESENT-like permutation with a random permutation. This generic method is a truncated differential distinguisher which includes two layers: a truncated differential layers for describing the collision bias on some predetermined output bits and a MitM layer for extending the number of the attacked rounds without changing the probability of truncated differential. We also estimated the number of attacked rounds of the MitM layer. For a concrete permutation, the estimated bound can possibly be further improved. For example, for SPONGENT-88/80/8 it can be improved to 7 rounds from 5 rounds. As an application, we further show the distinguishers for all the versions of SPONGENT permutations, which improve the previous results by up to 13 rounds.

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