

Universal Proxy Re-Encryption

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Abstract

We put forward the notion of universal proxy re-encryption (UPRE). A UPRE scheme enables us to convert a ciphertext under a (delegator) public key of *any existing public-key encryption (PKE) scheme* into another ciphertext under a (delegatee) public key of *any existing PKE scheme (possibly different from the delegator one)*. Such a conversion is executed by a third party called proxy that has a re-encryption key generated from the delegator's secret key and the delegatee public key. Proxy re-encryption is a related notion, but it can neither convert ciphertexts into ones of *possibly different PKE schemes* nor treat general PKE schemes.

Our contributions are twofold. One is a definitional work. We define the syntax and security of UPRE. The other is showing the feasibility of UPRE. More precisely, we present three generic constructions of UPRE. One is a UPRE based on probabilistic indistinguishability obfuscation (PIO). It can re-encrypt ciphertexts polynomially many times. Another is a relaxed variant of UPRE based on function secret sharing (FSS). It can re-encryption ciphertexts constant times. The relaxed variant means that decryption algorithms for re-encrypted ciphertext are slightly modified though we use only original delegatee secret keys for decryption. The other is the relaxed variant of UPRE based on oblivious transfer and garbled circuits. It can re-encryption ciphertexts polynomially many times.

The supported PKE schemes by the first and second generic constructions vary in the underlying hard problems or cryptographic tools. The third generic construction supports any CPA-secure PKE. The security levels of our UPRE schemes vary in the underlying hard problems or cryptographic tools that they rely on.

Keywords: universal proxy re-encryption, public-key encryption, secret sharing.

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1 Introduction

1.1 Background

Constructing a cryptographic system from scratch is a challenging task. We would like to recycle existing secure cryptographic systems and public-key infrastructure (PKI) as possible when we design a new cryptosystem. Moreover, deploying a new cryptographic system is much challenging. Many users are reluctant to migrate from a currently used cryptographic system to a new one even if the new one is more secure and useful since the working and financial cost of migration are extremely high. Thus, we would like to explore a *universal* methodology to construct a new and easily deployable cryptographic system from existing cryptographic systems and PKI. Such methodology also saves generating and certifying new public-keys.

As a particular example of cryptographic systems, we consider proxy re-encryption (PRE) [BBS98] in this study. PRE enables us to convert a ciphertext under public key pk_f (we call delegator public key and f denotes “from”) into another ciphertext under public key pk_t (we call delegatee public key and t denotes “to”) by using a re-encryption key $rk_{f \rightarrow t}$ without decrypting the original ciphertext by sk_f (we call delegator secret key). A third party called proxy owns the re-encryption key $rk_{f \rightarrow t}$. The proxy executes the re-encryption procedure. PRE is one of the useful cryptographic systems and has various applications since it enables delegation. It can be used to achieve encrypted email forwarding [BBS98, Jak99], key escrow [ID03], encrypted file storage [AFGH05], and secure publish-subscribe operation [PRSV17].

However, all known PRE schemes only support conversions from ciphertexts under a public key generated by *their key generation algorithm* into other ones under another key generated by *the same key generation algorithm with the same parameter*. They *cannot* convert ciphertexts into ones under another key generated by *another key generation algorithm of another encryption scheme*. Moreover, almost all known PRE schemes were constructed from scratch by using cryptographic assumptions such as the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption, the learning with errors (LWE) assumption. The formats of their keys and ciphertexts are fixed in advance at the setup and would never be changed. Only a few PRE schemes use public-key encryption (PKE) schemes generically [HKK⁺12]. However, in such schemes, we cannot use a PKE scheme as it is (we need some additional conversion). Moreover, only delegatees (receivers of converted ciphertexts) can select any PKE scheme and delegators (senders of original ciphertexts) cannot. This is unsatisfactory from the practical point of view because we need to build a new system using a PRE scheme from scratch if we would like to use applications of PRE described above. When we use a PRE scheme, we cannot use existing and widely used public-key cryptosystems to achieve applications of PRE. Ideally, we would like to achieve a re-encryption mechanism that recycles existing PKE schemes without any modification and setup and does not rely on any particular construction of PKE schemes.

Universal Proxy Re-Encryption. To resolve the problems above, we put forward the concepts of *universal proxy re-encryption (UPRE)* in this study. UPRE enables us to convert ciphertexts under a public key of a scheme Σ_f (delegator scheme) into ciphertexts under another public key of *another scheme* Σ_t (delegatee scheme). *We can select arbitrary secure PKE schemes for Σ_f, Σ_t* . For example, we can use Goldwasser-Micali PKE as Σ_f and ElGamal PKE as Σ_t . If a delegator and delegatee have key pairs (pk_f, sk_f) and (pk_t, sk_t) of schemes Σ_f and Σ_t , respectively, then a re-encryption key generation algorithm of UPRE can output a re-encryption key $rk_{f \rightarrow t}$ from $(\Sigma_f, \Sigma_t, sk_f, pk_t)$. A proxy can generate a re-encrypted ciphertext rct from $rk_{f \rightarrow t}$ and $Enc_f(pk_f, m)$ where Enc_f is the encryption algorithm of Σ_f . Of course, the re-encrypted ciphertext rct can be correctly decrypted to m by using sk_t .

Ideally, a re-encrypted ciphertext should be decrypted by the original decryption algorithm of the delegatee scheme (i.e., $Dec_t(sk_t, \cdot)$). However, we can also consider a relaxed variant where a re-encrypted ciphertext can be decrypted via a slightly modified decryption algorithm *with the original delegatee decryption key* sk_t . We call this variant *relaxed UPRE*. We define both types of UPRE in this study. Here, we emphasize that the delegator uses only pk_f and Enc_f to encrypt a message and the delegatee uses only sk_t to decrypt a re-encrypted ciphertext (they do not need any additional keys) even if its decryption procedure is slightly modified. The relaxed variant is also meaningful. Such a universal methodology for proxy re-encryption has never explored before.

UPRE enables us to build a re-encryption mechanism dynamically by using currently deployed cryptosystems. Users who have already used PKE schemes can convert ciphertexts into other ones by using a UPRE scheme. They do not need to setup a proxy re-encryption system from scratch. Therefore, UPRE is a very flexible tool to build application systems of PRE. Moreover, UPRE has an application that PRE does not have as follows. UPRE enables us to delegate migration of encryption systems to a third party such as cloud-servers with many computational

resources when an encryption scheme with some parameter settings becomes obsolete, or vulnerability is found in an encryption system. That is, we can outsource renewing encrypted storages to a third party.

UPRE can be seen as a generalized notion of PRE. Therefore, we can consider several analogies of notions used in PRE. They are the notions of “direction” and “the number of hops”. For directions, there are unidirectional and bidirectional, which mean that a re-encryption key between pk_f and pk_t can be used for only one-way from f to t and both ways, respectively. For the number of hops, there are single-hop and multi-hop, which mean a re-encrypted ciphertext cannot be converted anymore and can be converted polynomially-many times, respectively. In particular, when the constant number of conversions is possible, we say constant-hop. In this study, we consider unidirectional single/constant/multi-hop but do not focus on bidirectional since a bidirectional re-encryption key is simulated by two unidirectional re-encryption keys.

The question is how to achieve UPRE. One might think it is not difficult to achieve a UPRE scheme by using indistinguishability obfuscation (IO) [BGI⁺12, GGH⁺16] or multilinear maps [GGH13, CLT13, GGH15]¹. This might not be false and, in fact, we present a construction based on IO as an initial step (we emphasize that formally proving security is not an easy task even if we use IO). Thus, the following question is natural.

Is it possible to achieve a UPRE scheme without IO and multilinear maps?

The most challenging task is resolving this question. We give an affirmative answer to this question in this study.

1.2 Our Contributions

The main contributions of this study are as follows.

1. We introduce the notion of UPRE and formally define its security.
2. We present a generic construction of multi-hop UPRE for some class of PKE by using probabilistic IO (PIO).
3. We present a generic construction of constant-hop relaxed UPRE for any PKE by using function secret sharing (FSS).
4. We present a generic construction of multi-hop relaxed UPRE for any PKE by using garbled circuit (GC) and two-message oblivious transfer (OT).
5. By using our generic constructions and known instantiations of tools above, we can obtain single/constant/multi-hop (relaxed) UPRE schemes from IO, or many standard assumptions.

We explain more details (tools, security levels and so on) of these contributions below.

For UPRE, we can consider a natural analog of security against chosen plaintext attacks (CPA) for PRE (PRE-CPA), where adversaries execute CPA attacks with oracles that give re-encryption keys and re-encrypted ciphertexts. However, we do not focus on the definition of CPA-security for UPRE (UPRE-CPA) because Cohen introduced a better security notion called security against honest re-encryption attacks (HRA) for PRE [Coh17a]². Thus, we define security against honest re-encryption attacks for UPRE (UPRE-HRA), which implies UPRE-CPA, instead of CPA-security. Roughly speaking, in the setting of HRA, adversaries are allowed to obtain an honestly encrypted ciphertext *via the honest encryption oracle* and convert it into a re-encrypted ciphertext under a key of a *corrupted user* via the re-encryption oracle. In PRE-CPA security, adversaries cannot obtain such a re-encrypted ciphertext because it is *not allowed* to obtain a re-encryption key query *from an honest user to a corrupted user* via the re-encryption key oracle to prevent trivial attacks³. Cohen observes that PRE-CPA security is not sufficient for many applications of PRE. Therefore, we define HRA-security for UPRE (in fact, we also define a selective variant). We also define security against corrupted-delegator re-encryption attacks (CRA) to consider the setting of migration of encryption system explained in Section 1.1. See Section 3 for details.

We present three generic constructions of UPRE. One is UPRE for some class of PKE based on PIO. PIO was introduced by Canetti, Lin, Tessaro, and Vaikuntanathan [CLTV15]. Another is relaxed UPRE for any PKE based on FSS, which was introduced by Boyle, Gilboa, and Ishai [BG15]. The other is relaxed UPRE for any PKE based on GC and OT. We emphasize that our relaxed UPRE is based on standard assumptions without relying on heavy tools. We look closer at what kind of (relaxed) UPRE is achieved below.

Our UPRE scheme based on PIO is a unidirectional multi-hop UPRE scheme. PIO is IO for randomized circuits. There are several security levels for PIO. Our UPRE schemes based on PIO can support a limited class of PKE.

¹A.k.a. “heavy hammers”.

²Derler, Krenn, Lorünser, Ramacher, Slamanig, and Striecks also proposed a similar security notion in the forward secret setting as (fs)-RIND-CPA [DKL⁺18].

³Of course, a re-encryption query from an honest user to a corrupted user is also prohibited in PRE-CPA security.

The required properties for PKE schemes depend on the security level of PIO. If we use a mild security level of PIO, then we can achieve UPRE by using sub-exponentially secure IO (sub-exp IO) for deterministic circuits and sub-exponentially secure OWF (sub-exp OWF). However, supported PKE schemes are trapdoor encryption schemes that satisfy a particular security level (See Section 4.1 for details). Such trapdoor encryption is achieved by several well-known CPA-secure PKE schemes such as ElGamal, Goldwasser-Micali PKE schemes. If we assume that there exists PIO with the strongest security for specific circuits (it might be possible [CLTV15]), then we can use any CPA-secure PKE scheme. The advantage of the scheme based on PIO is that it is a multi-hop UPRE scheme and easy to understand. See Section 4 for more details.

Our relaxed UPRE scheme based on FSS is a unidirectional constant-hop relaxed UPRE scheme. Dodis, Halevi, Rothblum, and Wichs proved that if we use the LWE assumption, then we can obtain FSS for general circuits [DHRW16, BGI⁺18]. Boyle, Gilboa, and Ishai proved that if we use the DDH assumption, then we can obtain FSS for NC^1 with relaxed correctness. The same authors proved that FSS for general circuits is achieved by sub-exp IO and OWF [BGI15]. Thus, we can instantiate our unidirectional constant-hop relaxed UPRE scheme for any PKE scheme by the LWE assumption or sub-exp IO and OWF. If we consider a UPRE scheme for PKE schemes whose decryption circuits are in NC^1 (such PKE schemes are achieved by the LWE assumption), then it is achieved by the DDH assumption. As we will see in Sections 1.3 and 5, an FSS scheme with relaxed correctness is not sufficient for HRA-security but CPA-security. Note that message spaces of PKE schemes should be Abelian groups since ranges of FSS schemes are so. See Sections 2.3 and 5 for details.

Our relaxed UPRE scheme based on GC and OT is a unidirectional multi-hop relaxed UPRE scheme for any PKE scheme. This is the most significant contribution since GC and OT are common and light cryptographic tools. This GC-OT-based scheme is instantiated by the DDH, LWE, quadratic residuosity (QR), or decisional composite residuosity (DCR) assumptions [AIR01, NP01, HK12, BD18]. One might think that the scheme based on GC and OT supersede the scheme based on FSS since both of them are relaxed UPRE schemes, and GC and OT are weaker assumptions than FSS. However, in the scheme based on GC and OT, some history information (all garbled circuits from the first delegator to the last delegatee) is directly preserved in all re-encrypted ciphertexts. Therefore, the number of hops cannot be hidden in the scheme based on GC and OT unlike that based on FSS. In particular, when a delegator is corrupted, we cannot prove that a re-encrypted ciphertext does not reveal information about the plaintext. On the other hand, the scheme based on FSS satisfies such security.

In the FSS-based and GC-OT-based schemes, we must use a slightly modified decryption algorithm (i.e., not ideal UPRE) though we can use the original delegatee decryption key as it is. It is a small disadvantage of the FSS-based and GC-OT-based constructions. However, we would like to emphasize that these are the first constructions of relaxed UPRE and achieved by the well-studied and standard assumptions such as the DDH, LWE, QR, DCR.

1.3 Technical Overview

In this section, we give a high-level overview of our UPRE schemes and techniques. To achieve the re-encryption mechanism, we use a circuit that a secret key of a delegator PKE scheme is hard-wired in to generate a re-encryption key. This is because UPRE supports *general PKE schemes* and we need to decrypt ciphertexts once to re-encrypt them. However, such a circuit should not be directly revealed to a proxy to guarantee security. Therefore, we must hide information about a secret-key in a re-encryption key. That is, to use CPA security of the delegator PKE scheme, we must erase information about the secret key embedded in a re-encryption key in security proofs. This is the most notable issue to prove the security of UPRE. When we succeed in erasing secret keys from re-encryption keys in reductions, we can directly use the CPA-security of delegators to prove the security of a UPRE scheme.

Based on IO. IO is a promising tool to hide information about delegator secret keys since IO is a kind of compiler that outputs a functionally equivalent program that does not reveal information about the original program. We define a re-encryption circuit C_{re} that a delegator secret key sk_f and a delegatee public key pk_t are hard-wired in and takes a delegator ciphertext ct_f as an input. The re-encryption circuit decrypts ct_f by using sk_f , obtains a plaintext m , and generates a ciphertext of m under pk_t . We can hide information about sk_f by using PIO (note that C_{re} is a randomized circuit). That is, a re-encryption key from delegator f to delegatee t is $pio(C_{re})$ where pio is a PIO algorithm. A re-encrypted ciphertext is a fresh ciphertext under pk_t . Thus, we can achieve multi-hop UPRE. This construction is similar to the FHE scheme based on PIO presented by Canetti et al. [CLTV15]. However, we cannot directly use the result by Canetti et al. since the setting of unidirectional multi-hop UPRE is different from that of FHE.

The security proof proceeds as follows. To erase sk_f , we use a dummy re-encryption circuit that does not run the decryption algorithm of Σ_f with sk_f and just outputs a dummy ciphertext under pk_t (does not need plaintext m). We expect that adversaries cannot distinguish this change. This intuition is not false. However, to formally prove it, we cannot directly use the standard CPA-security of PKE since an obfuscated circuit of the re-encryption circuit generates ciphertexts under *hard-wired* pk_t . It means that we cannot use a target ciphertext of the CPA-security game and the common “punctured programming” approach unless the scheme has a kind of “puncturable” property for its secret key [CHN⁺16]. Therefore, we use trapdoor encryption introduced by Canetti et al. [CLTV15]. In trapdoor encryption, there are two modes for key generation. One is the standard key generation, and the other is the trapdoor key generation, which does not output a secret key for decryption. Two modes are computationally indistinguishable. Ciphertexts under a trapdoor key are computationally/statistically/perfectly indistinguishable (See Section 4.1 for more details). Thus, we proceed as follows. First, we change the hard-wired public key pk_t into a trapdoor key tk_t . Second, we use the security of PIO. The indistinguishability under tk_t is used to satisfy the condition of PIO.

In the multi-hop setting, we can consider the relationships among keys as a directed acyclic graph (DAG). Each vertex is a user who has a key pair, and each edge means that a re-encryption key was generated between two vertices. To prove ciphertext indistinguishability under a target public-key, we repeat the two processes above from the farthest vertex connected to the target vertex to the target vertex. We gradually erase information about secret keys of vertices connected to the target vertex. At the final step, information about the target secret key is also deleted, and we can use security under the target public-key of the target PKE scheme.

Types of indistinguishability under trapdoor keys affect what kind of PIO can be used. The weakest indistinguishability under a trapdoor key, which is equivalent to the standard IND-CPA security, requires stronger security of PIO. If we use perfect indistinguishability under a trapdoor key, which is achieved by re-randomizable PKE schemes such as ElGamal PKE scheme, then we can use weaker PIO for circuits that are implied by sub-exp IO for circuits and sub-exp OWF.

Based on FSS. The most challenging task is achieving a (relaxed) UPRE scheme without IO. Surprisingly, we can achieve a relaxed UPRE scheme for any CPA-secure PKE scheme by using FSS based on the LWE assumption. This is a new application of FSS and of independent interest. A FSS scheme for function class \mathcal{F} is an extension of secret sharing [Sha79]. The notion and instantiations were given by Boyle et al. [BG15]. A FSS scheme for \mathcal{F} can split a function $f \in \mathcal{F}$ into m shares f_1, \dots, f_m such that f_i represents a key k_i that enables us to efficiently evaluate at input x in the domain of f . Regarding correctness (we call δ -correctness), it holds that $f(x) = \sum_{i=1}^m \text{Eval}(k_i, x)$ with probability at least $1 - \delta$ where δ is a parameter⁴ and Eval is the evaluation algorithm to compute $f_i(x)$ by using key k_i . We call $\text{Eval}(k_i, x)$ a partially evaluated value or a share of an output. Regarding security, any subset of size at most t of (k_1, \dots, k_m) where $t < m$ does not reveal information about f (m -out-of- m FSS).

We find that the secret sharing mechanism is well-suited for relaxed UPRE. The point is that a proxy and a delegatee are different entities and can separately use each share of FSS. Our re-encryption mechanism is as follows. We define a decryption function C_{de} that a delegator secret key sk_f is hard-wired in and compute $\text{Dec}_f(sk_f, ct_f)$ for input ct_f . Now, we split $C_{\text{de}}[sk_f]$ (we explicitly write information hard-wired in the function in bracket $[\]$) into two shares k_1 and k_2 by a (2-out-of-2) FSS scheme. To generate a re-encryption key $rk_{f \rightarrow t}$ from delegator f to delegatee t , we encrypt k_2 by using pk_t . The re-encryption key $rk_{f \rightarrow t}$ consists of k_1 and the encryption of k_2 . Roughly speaking, information about k_2 is hidden by CPA-security of Σ_t and k_1 does not reveal information about $C_{\text{de}}[sk_f]$ by security of FSS. Thus, we can erase information about sk_f . Our re-encryption algorithm generates a re-encrypted ciphertext from $rk_{f \rightarrow t} = (k_1, \text{Enc}_t(pk_t, k_2))$ and $ct_f \leftarrow \text{Enc}_f(pk_f, m)$ as follows. It computes $y_1 := \text{Eval}(k_1, ct_f)$ and sets a re-encrypted ciphertext $\text{rct} := (ct_f, y_1, \text{Enc}_t(pk_t, k_2))$. The delegatee t can obtain the plaintext m as follows. It obtains $k_2 \leftarrow \text{Dec}_t(sk_t, \text{Enc}(pk_t, k_2))$ by its secret key sk_t and computes $y := y_1 + \text{Eval}(k_2, ct_f)$. By the functionality of FSS, it holds that $y = C_{\text{de}}[sk_f](ct_f) = m$. Thus, this construction works as relaxed UPRE for any PKE scheme if there exists an FSS scheme for \mathcal{F} such that $C_{\text{re}}[sk_f]$ is supported in \mathcal{F} . The point is the two-tier reconstruction step.

In the construction above, a delegator can decrypt a re-encrypted ciphertext under $rk_{f \rightarrow t}$ by using sk_f . This is a problem when we use a (relaxed) UPRE scheme for migration of encryption systems explained in Section 1.1. However, this problem is easily solved by an extension used to achieve a constant-hop scheme explained later.

For UPRE-CPA security, security of FSS is sufficient (that is, δ -correctness is not an issue in the security proof) since re-encrypted ciphertexts under an honest user public key do not reveal k_2 to adversaries and y_1 is a value

⁴Precisely speaking, the probability should be at least $1 - \epsilon - \delta$ where ϵ is a negligible function. We ignore this here for simplicity. See Section 2.1 for the formal definition and negligible functions.

computed from k_1 . That is, in the security proof, we erase information about k_2 by CPA-security of Σ_t . Then, we can simulate k_1 by using the FSS security without sk_f since k_2 is not needed for the CPA-setting.

However, when we consider UPRE-HRA security, there is a subtle issue since adversaries can obtain a re-encrypted ciphertext under a corrupted user key. That is, adversaries can obtain both k_2 and $y_1 = \text{Eval}(k_1, ct_f)$ where $ct_f = \text{Enc}_f(pk_f, m)$. This prevents us erasing sk_f in the security proof since we need to erase either k_1 or k_2 to use the security of FSS. We can resolve this problem as follows. Fortunately, the FSS scheme based on the LWE assumption by Dodis et al. [DHRW16] satisfies ν -correctness where ν is a negligible function. Besides, we have the plaintext m that is queried to the honest encryption oracle in this setting. Therefore, we can simulate $y_1 = m - y_2 = m - \text{Eval}(k_2, ct_f)$ without k_1 . Thus, we do not need k_1 and can use the security of FSS. Here, we rely on ν -correctness where ν is negligible to ensure that $y_1 = m - \text{Eval}(k_2, ct_f)$ holds except negligible probability. This is why the δ -correctness where $\delta = 1/\text{poly}(\lambda)$ is not sufficient for HRA-security. Note that in the case that adversaries can obtain a re-encrypted ciphertext under a corrupted user public key, adversaries cannot obtain k_1 due to the restriction to the re-encryption key oracle (this is different from the case where a delegatee is honest). We can observe that the FSS scheme based on IO by Boyle et al. [BGI15] also satisfies that property. However, the FSS scheme based on the DDH assumption by Boyle et al. [BGI16] does not satisfy the stronger correctness. Thus, if we instantiate with the DDH assumption, our construction only satisfies UPRE-CPA security.

This FSS-based relaxed UPRE construction is a single-hop UPRE scheme, but it is easy to extend it to a constant-hop UPRE scheme. To achieve this, we slightly modify the UPRE scheme above as follows. Instead of outputting $\text{rct} = (ct_f, y_1, \text{Enc}_t(pk_t, k_2))$, a modified re-encryption algorithm outputs $\text{rct} = (\text{Enc}_t(pk_t, (ct_f, y_1)), \text{Enc}_t(pk_t, k_2))$. That is, (ct_f, y_1) is also encrypted under pk_t . Then, rct consists of two ciphertexts in the ciphertext space of Σ_t . Therefore, we can apply decryption function $C_{\text{de}}[sk_t]$ to the modified rct too. This extension also resolves the issue explained before since a delegator cannot decrypt a re-encrypted ciphertext under $rk_{f \rightarrow t}$ by using sk_f . However, this extension incurs polynomial blow-up of ciphertext size. Thus, we can apply the re-encryption procedure only constant times.

Based on GC and OT. We can improve the idea of FSS-based construction. Again, the secret sharing mechanism is well-suited for relaxed UPRE. We directly generate *shares of a decryption key* instead of generating shares of a decryption function, and use a garbled circuit where one of the shares is hardwired to hide information about the decryption key.

We explain our re-encryption mechanism by two steps. We start with the following idea. First, we generate shares (s_1, s_2) of a delegator secret key sk_f by a secret sharing scheme. We encrypt share s_1 by using pk_t and obtain $\tilde{ct}_t \leftarrow \text{Enc}(pk_t, s_1)$. A re-encryption key from f to t is $rk_{f \rightarrow t} := (s_2, \tilde{ct}_t)$. Roughly speaking, s_1 is hidden by the CPA-security of PKE, and s_2 does not reveal information about sk_f by the property of secret sharing. We define a circuit $C_{\text{de}}^{\text{re}}$ where s_2 and the delegator ciphertext ct_f are hard-wired. The circuit $C_{\text{de}}^{\text{re}}$ takes as input s_1 , reconstructs sk_f from (s_1, s_2) , and computes $\text{Dec}_f(sk_f, ct_f)$. Now, we garble $C_{\text{de}}^{\text{re}}[s_2, ct_f]$ and obtain a garbled circuit $\tilde{C}_{\text{de}}^{\text{re}}$ and labels $\{\text{labels}_{i,b}\}_{i \in [|s_1|], b \in \{0,1\}}$. We would like to set a re-encrypted ciphertext $\text{rct} := (\tilde{ct}_t, \tilde{C}_{\text{de}}^{\text{re}}, \{\text{labels}_{i,b}\})$ (we omit $\{i \in [|s_1|], b \in \{0,1\}\}$ if it is clear from the context). The delegatee t can evaluate the garbled circuit and obtain decrypted value since the delegatee can obtain s_1 from \tilde{ct}_t . However, this apparently does not work since sending $\{\text{labels}_{i,b}\}$ breaks the security of GC and sk_f is revealed.

Now, we move to the second step. To send only $\{\text{labels}_{i,s_1[i]}\}_{i \in |s_1|}$ to the delegatee t , we use two-message OT. That is, we let s_1 be choice bits of an OT receiver and $\{\text{labels}_{i,b}\}$ be messages of an OT sender. To achieve re-encryption mechanism with this idea, at the re-encryption key generation phase, we generate the first OT message ot.m_1 by $(\text{ot.st}, \text{ot.m}_1) \leftarrow \text{OT.Slct}_1(s_1)$ where ot.st is the state information. Moreover, we encrypt not only s_1 but also state information ot.st under pk_t . That is, we set $rk_{f \rightarrow t} := (\text{ot.m}_1, s_2, \text{Enc}(pk_t, (s_1, \text{ot.st})))$. At the re-encryption phase, we generate not only the garbled circuit $\tilde{C}_{\text{de}}^{\text{re}}$ of $C_{\text{de}}^{\text{re}}[s_2, ct_f]$ and $\{\text{labels}_{i,b}\}_{i,b}$ but also the second OT message $\text{ot.m}_2 \leftarrow \text{OT.Send}_2(\text{ot.m}_1, \{\text{labels}_{i,b}\}_{i,b})$. That is, a re-encrypted ciphertext is $\text{rct} := (\text{ot.m}_2, \tilde{ct}_t, \tilde{C}_{\text{de}}^{\text{re}})$.

The delegatee t can obtain the plaintext m as follows. It obtains $(s_2, \text{ot.st}) \leftarrow \text{Dec}_t(sk_t, \tilde{ct}_t)$ by its secret key sk_t , recover selected messages $\{\text{labels}_{i,s_1[i]}\}_i \leftarrow \text{OT.Dec}(\text{ot.m}_2, s_1, \text{ot.st})$, and $m' \leftarrow \text{Eval}(\tilde{C}_{\text{de}}^{\text{re}}, \{\text{labels}_{i,s_1[i]}\}_i)$. By the functionality of GC, it holds that $m' = C_{\text{de}}^{\text{re}}[s_2, ct_f](s_1) = m$. Thus, this construction works as relaxed UPRE for any PKE scheme if there exists GC and OT.

Intuitively, the re-encryption key $rk_{f \rightarrow t}$ does not reveal information about sk_f since the CPA-security of PKE and the receiver privacy of OT hide information about s_1 . Adversaries cannot obtain any information about sk_f

from the other share s_2 by the property of secret sharing. That is, we can erase information about sk_f and can use the CPA-security of pk_f .

We explain only the single-hop case. However, we can easily extend the idea above to a multi-hop construction. See Section 6 for the detail.

Summary of Our Results. We give a summary of our concrete instantiations in Table 1.

Table 1: Summary of our UPRE schemes. In “Type” column, rUPRE means relaxed UPRE. In “#Hop” column, const/multi means constant/multi-hop, respectively. In “Security” column, CPA, HRA, and CRA means security against chosen-plaintext/honest-re-encryption/corrupted-delegator-re-encryption attacks, respectively. In “Supported PKE” column, 0-hiding trapdoor means trapdoor encryption that satisfies 0-hiding security (see Section 4.1) and NC^1 decryption means that PKE schemes whose decryption circuits are computable in NC^1 .

Instantiation	Type	#Hop	Security	Supported PKE	Assumptions
Ours in Sec. 4 + [CLTV15]	UPRE	multi	HRA	0-hiding trapdoor	sub-exp IO and OWF
Ours in Sec. 4 + [CLTV15]	UPRE	multi	HRA	any IND-CPA	di-PIO and OWF
Ours in Sec. 5 + [DHRW16]	rUPRE	const	HRA/CRA	any IND-CPA ^a	LWE
Ours in Sec. 5 + [BGH16]	rUPRE	const	CPA	NC^1 decryption ^a	DDH
Ours in Sec. 5 + [BGH15]	rUPRE	const	HRA/CRA	any IND-CPA ^a	sub-exp IO and OWF
Ours in Sec. 6	rUPRE	multi	HRA	any IND-CPA	OT

^a More precisely, message spaces of these PKE schemes should be Abelian groups.

1.4 Related Works

There is a universal methodology to construct a new cryptographic system from existing *signature* schemes. Hohenberger, Koppula, and Waters introduce the notion of universal signature aggregator (USA) [HKW15], which enables us to aggregate signatures under different secret keys of *different* signature schemes. Standard aggregate signatures enable us to compress multiple signatures under different secret keys of *the same* scheme into one compact signature that is verified by a set of multiple verification keys [BGLS03]. Thus, USA is a generalization of aggregate signatures. Koppula et al. [HKW15] constructed selectively (resp. adaptively) secure USA scheme from sub-exp IO, sub-exp OWF, and additive homomorphic encryption (resp. IO, OWF, homomorphic encryption, and universal samplers [HJK⁺16]) in the standard (resp. random oracle) model.

Reconfigurable cryptography was introduced by Hesse, Hofheinz, and Rupp [HHR16]. It makes updating PKI easier by using long-term keys, short-term keys, and common reference strings. Reconfigurable encryption can update keys, but cannot update ciphertexts.

There is a long series of works on proxy re-encryption. After the introduction of proxy cryptography by Blaze, Bleumer, and Strauss [BBS98], improved constructions [ID03, AFGH05], CCA-secure constructions [CH07, LV08, HKK⁺12], key-private constructions [ABH09, ABPW13, NX15], obfuscation-based definition and constructions [HRSV11, CCV12, CCL⁺14] have been proposed. Note that this is not an exhaustive list.

Organization. The main body of this paper consists of the following parts. In Section 2, we provide preliminaries and basic definitions. In Section 3, we introduce the syntax and security definitions of UPRE. In Section 4, we present our UPRE scheme based on PIO and prove its security. In Section 5, we present our relaxed UPRE scheme based on FSS, prove its security, and explain concrete instantiations. In Section 6, we present our relaxed UPRE scheme based on GC and OT, and prove its security.

2 Preliminaries

We define some notations and introduce cryptographic primitives in this section.

2.1 Notations and Basic Concepts

In this paper, $x \leftarrow X$ denotes selecting an element from a finite set X uniformly at random, and $y \leftarrow A(x)$ denotes assigning to y the output of a probabilistic or deterministic algorithm A on an input x . When we explicitly show

that A uses randomness r , we write $y \leftarrow A(x; r)$. For strings x and y , $x||y$ denotes the concatenation of x and y . Let $[\ell]$ denote the set of integers $\{1, \dots, \ell\}$, λ denote a security parameter, and $y := z$ denote that y is set, defined, or substituted by z . PPT stands for probabilistic polynomial time.

- A function $f : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is a negligible function if for any constant c , there exists $\lambda_0 \in \mathbb{N}$ such that for any $\lambda > \lambda_0$, $f(\lambda) < \lambda^{-c}$. We write $f(\lambda) \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$ to denote $f(\lambda)$ being a negligible function.
- If $\mathcal{X}^{(b)} = \{X_\lambda^{(b)}\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ for $b \in \{0, 1\}$ are two ensembles of random variables indexed by $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, we say that $\mathcal{X}^{(0)}$ and $\mathcal{X}^{(1)}$ are computationally indistinguishable if for any PPT distinguisher \mathcal{D} , there exists a negligible function $\text{negl}(\lambda)$, such that

$$\Delta := |\Pr[\mathcal{D}(X_\lambda^{(0)}) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{D}(X_\lambda^{(1)}) = 1]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

We write $\mathcal{X}^{(0)} \stackrel{c}{\approx}_\delta \mathcal{X}^{(1)}$ and $\mathcal{X}^{(0)} \stackrel{c}{\approx} \mathcal{X}^{(1)}$ to denote that the advantage Δ is bounded by δ and δ is negligible, respectively and call the former δ -indistinguishability.

- The statistical distance between $\mathcal{X}^{(0)}$ and $\mathcal{X}^{(1)}$ over a countable set S is defined as $\Delta_S(\mathcal{X}^{(0)}, \mathcal{X}^{(1)}) := \frac{1}{2} \sum_{\alpha \in S} |\Pr[X_\lambda^{(0)} = \alpha] - \Pr[X_\lambda^{(1)} = \alpha]|$. We say that $\mathcal{X}^{(0)}$ and $\mathcal{X}^{(1)}$ are statistically indistinguishable (denoted by $\mathcal{X}^{(0)} \stackrel{s}{\approx} \mathcal{X}^{(1)}$) if $\Delta_S(\mathcal{X}^{(0)}, \mathcal{X}^{(1)}) \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$. We also say that $\mathcal{X}^{(0)}$ is ϵ -close to $\mathcal{X}^{(1)}$ if $\Delta_S(\mathcal{X}^{(0)}, \mathcal{X}^{(1)}) = \epsilon$.

2.2 Basic Cryptographic Tools

We say that a PPT algorithm \mathcal{G} is a *group generator*, if it takes a security parameter 1^λ as input and outputs a group description $\Lambda := (\mathbb{G}, p)$ where \mathbb{G} is a group with prime order $p = \Omega(2^\lambda)$, from which one can efficiently sample a generator uniformly at random.

Definition 2.1 (Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption). Let \mathcal{G} be a group generator. We say that the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption holds with respect to \mathcal{G} , if for all PPT adversaries \mathcal{A} , the advantage $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ddh}}(\lambda)$ defined below is negligible:

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ddh}}(\lambda) := |\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\Lambda, g, g^x, g^y, g^{xy}) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\Lambda, g, g^x, g^y, g^z) = 1]|,$$

where $\Lambda = (\mathbb{G}, p) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^\lambda)$, $g \leftarrow \mathbb{G}$, and $x, y, z \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$.

Definition 2.2 (The LWE problem and assumption). For a vector $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ and a distribution χ over \mathbb{Z}_q , let $\mathcal{O}(\mathbf{s}, \chi)$ be a distribution over $\mathbb{Z}_q^n \times \mathbb{Z}_q$ defined by taking samples $\mathbf{a} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ and $e \leftarrow \chi$, and outputting $(\mathbf{a}, \langle \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{s} \rangle + e)$. For an integer $q = q(n)$, and distributions χ over \mathbb{Z}_q and ψ over \mathbb{Z}_q^n , the learning with errors problem, $\text{LWE}(n, q, \chi)$ for the distribution ψ , is distinguishing oracle $\mathcal{O}(\mathbf{s}, \chi)$ from oracle $\mathcal{O}(\mathbf{s}, \mathcal{U}(\mathbb{Z}_q))$, where $\mathbf{s} \leftarrow \psi$. We say the $\text{LWE}(n, q, \chi)$ assumption holds for ψ if for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , its advantage

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}, \psi}^{\text{LWE}(n, q, \chi)}(n) = |\Pr[\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}(\mathbf{s}, \chi)}(1^n) = 1 \mid \mathbf{s} \leftarrow \psi] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}(\mathbf{s}, \mathcal{U}(\mathbb{Z}_q))}(1^n) = 1 \mid \mathbf{s} \leftarrow \psi]|$$

is negligible in n where $\mathbf{s} \leftarrow \psi$. We note that $\mathcal{O}(\mathbf{s}, \mathcal{U}(\mathbb{Z}_q)) = \mathcal{U}(\mathbb{Z}_q^n \times \mathbb{Z}_q)$ for any $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$. For $\alpha := \alpha(n) \in (0, 1)$, the α -LWE assumption says that $\text{LWE}(n, q, \chi)$ assumption holds and there exists parameter n, q, χ such that $|e| < \alpha q$ for $e \leftarrow \chi$ except with negligible probability.

Definition 2.3 (Public-key Encryption). Let \mathcal{M} be a message space. A PKE scheme for \mathcal{M} is a tuple of algorithms $(\text{KeyGen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ where:

- $\text{KeyGen}(1^\lambda)$ takes as input the security parameter and outputs a public key pk and secret key sk .
- $\text{Enc}(\text{pk}, m)$ takes as input pk and a message $m \in \mathcal{M}$ and outputs a ciphertext ct .
- $\text{Dec}(\text{sk}, \text{ct})$ takes as input sk and ct , and outputs some $m' \in \mathcal{M}$, or \perp .

Correctness: For any $m \in \mathcal{M}$ and $(\text{sk}, \text{pk}) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(1^\lambda)$, we have that $\text{Dec}(\text{sk}, \text{Enc}(\text{pk}, m)) = m$.

CPA-security: We define the experiment $\text{Expt}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{pke}}(1^\lambda, b)$ between an adversary \mathcal{A} and challenger as follows.

1. The challenger runs $(sk, pk) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(1^\lambda)$, and gives pk to \mathcal{A} .
2. At some point, \mathcal{A} sends two messages m_0^*, m_1^* as the challenge messages to the challenger.
3. The challenger generates ciphertext $ct^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}(pk, m_b^*)$ and sends ct^* to \mathcal{A} .
4. \mathcal{A} outputs a guess b' for b . The experiment outputs b' .

We say PKE is CPA-secure if, for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , it holds that

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{pke}}(\lambda) := |\Pr[\text{Expt}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{pke}}(1^\lambda, 0) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{pke}}(1^\lambda, 1) = 1]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

Definition 2.4 (Pseudorandom functions). For sets \mathcal{D} and \mathcal{R} , let $\{F_K(\cdot) : \mathcal{D} \rightarrow \mathcal{R} \mid K \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda\}$ be a family of polynomially computable functions. We say that F is pseudorandom if for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , it holds that

$$\text{Adv}_{F, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) := |\Pr[\mathcal{A}^{F_K(\cdot)}(1^\lambda) = 1 \mid K \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}^{R(\cdot)}(1^\lambda) = 1 \mid R \leftarrow \mathcal{F}_U]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda),$$

where \mathcal{F}_U is the set of all functions from \mathcal{D} to \mathcal{R} .

Theorem 2.5 ([GGM86]). If one-way functions exist, then for all efficiently computable functions $n(\lambda)$ and $m(\lambda)$, there exists a pseudorandom function that maps $n(\lambda)$ bits to $m(\lambda)$ bits (i.e., $\mathcal{D} := \{0, 1\}^{n(\lambda)}$ and $\mathcal{R} := \{0, 1\}^{m(\lambda)}$).

Definition 2.6 (Puncturable pseudorandom function). For sets \mathcal{D} and \mathcal{R} , a puncturable pseudorandom function PPRF consists of a tuple of algorithms (F, Punc) that satisfies the following two conditions.

Functionality preserving under puncturing: For all polynomial size subset $\{x_i\}_{i \in [k]}$ of \mathcal{D} , and for all $x \in \mathcal{D} \setminus \{x_i\}_{i \in [k]}$, we have $\Pr[F_K(x) = F_{K^*}(x) : K \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda, K^* \leftarrow \text{Punc}(K, \{x_i\}_{i \in [k]})] = 1$.

Pseudorandomness at punctured points: For all polynomial size subset $\{x_i\}_{i \in [k]}$ of \mathcal{D} , and any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , it holds that

$$\Pr[\mathcal{A}(K^*, \{F_K(x_i)\}_{i \in [k]}) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(K^*, \mathcal{U}^k) = 1] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda),$$

where $K \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$, $K^* \leftarrow \text{Punc}(K, \{x_i\}_{i \in [k]})$, and \mathcal{U} denotes the uniform distribution over \mathcal{R} .

Theorem 2.7 ([GGM86, BW13, BGI14, KPTZ13]). If one-way functions exist, then for all efficiently computable functions $n(\lambda)$ and $m(\lambda)$, there exists a puncturable pseudorandom function that maps $n(\lambda)$ bits to $m(\lambda)$ bits (i.e., $\mathcal{D} := \{0, 1\}^{n(\lambda)}$ and $\mathcal{R} := \{0, 1\}^{m(\lambda)}$).

Definition 2.8 (Garbling Scheme (Garbled Circuit)). A garbling scheme GC is a two tuple $(\text{Grbl}, \text{Eval})$ of PPT algorithms.

- The garbling algorithm Grbl , given a security parameter 1^λ and a circuit C with n -bit input, outputs a garbled circuit \tilde{C} , together with $2n$ labels $\{\text{labels}_{k,b}\}_{k \in [n], b \in \{0,1\}}$.
- The evaluation algorithm Eval , given a garbled circuit \tilde{C} and n labels $\{\text{labels}_k\}_{k \in [n]}$, outputs y .

Correctness: We require $\text{Eval}(\tilde{C}, \{\text{labels}_{k,x_k}\}_{k \in [n]}) = C(x)$ for every $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, a circuit C with n -bit input, and $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$, where $(\tilde{C}, \{\text{labels}_{k,b}\}_{k \in [n], b \in \{0,1\}}) \leftarrow \text{Grbl}(1^\lambda, C)$ and x_k is the k -th bit of x for every $k \in [n]$.

Security: Let Sim be a PPT algorithm. We define the following game $\text{Expt}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{GC}}(1^\lambda, \beta)$ between a challenger and an adversary \mathcal{A} as follows.

1. The challenger sends the security parameter 1^λ to \mathcal{A} .
2. \mathcal{A} sends a circuit C with n -bit input and an input $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ to the challenger.
 - If $\beta = 0$, then the challenger computes $(\tilde{C}, \{\text{labels}_{k,b}\}_{k \in [n], b \in \{0,1\}}) \leftarrow \text{Grbl}(1^\lambda, C)$ and returns $(\tilde{C}, \{\text{labels}_{k,x_k}\}_{k \in [n]})$ to \mathcal{A} .
 - If $\beta = 1$, then it computes $(\tilde{C}, \{\text{labels}_k\}_{k \in [n]}) \leftarrow \text{Sim}(1^\lambda, 1^{|C|}, C(x))$, and returns $(\tilde{C}, \{\text{labels}_k\}_{k \in [n]})$ to \mathcal{A} .

3. \mathcal{A} outputs $\beta' \in \{0,1\}$.

We say that a garbling scheme is selectively secure if there exists PPT Sim such that for any PPT \mathcal{A} , we have

$$|\Pr[\text{Expt}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{gc}}(1^\lambda, 0) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{gc}}(1^\lambda, 1) = 1]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

Definition 2.9 (Two-Message Oblivious Transfer). Let \mathcal{M} be a message space. A two-message oblivious transfer protocol is a tuple of algorithms (OT.Slct, OT.Send, OT.Dec) where:

- OT.Slct($1^\lambda, s$) takes as input the security parameter and the selection bits $s \in \{0,1\}^\lambda$, and outputs a message ot.m_1 and secret state ot.st .
- OT.Send($1^\lambda, \{(m_{i,0}, m_{i,1})\}_{i \in [\lambda]}, \text{ot.m}_1$) takes as input 1^λ , λ -pairs of messages $\{(m_{i,0}, m_{i,1})\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$ where $m_{i,b} \in \mathcal{M}$, the first message ot.m_1 , and outputs a message ot.m_2 .
- OT.Dec($1^\lambda, (s, \text{ot.st}), \text{ot.m}_2$) takes as input 1^λ , $(s, \text{ot.st})$, and the second message ot.m_2 , and outputs $\{m'_i\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$, or \perp .

We sometimes omit 1^λ from the inputs if it is clear from the context.

Correctness: For any $\lambda, s \in \{0,1\}^\lambda, m_{i,b} \in \mathcal{M}$, we have that

$$\Pr \left[\forall i \ m'_i = m_{i,s[i]} \mid \begin{array}{l} (\text{ot.st}, \text{ot.m}_1) \leftarrow \text{OT.Slct}(s), \\ \text{ot.m}_2 \leftarrow \text{OT.Send}(\{(m_{i,0}, m_{i,1})\}_{i \in [\lambda]}, \text{ot.m}_1), \\ \{m'_i\}_{i \in [\lambda]} \leftarrow \text{OT.Dec}((s, \text{ot.st}), \text{ot.m}_2) \end{array} \right] = 1$$

where $s[i]$ denotes i -th bit of s .

Receiver Privacy [NP01, AIR01] We define the experiment $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{ot-rec}}(1^\lambda, \beta)$ between an adversary \mathcal{A} and challenger as follows.

1. The challenger chooses $s_0, s_1 \in \{0,1\}^\lambda$ and generates $(\text{ot.st}, \text{ot.m}_1) \leftarrow \text{OT.Slct}(s_\beta)$.
2. The challenger sends ot.m_1 to \mathcal{A} .
3. \mathcal{A} outputs a guess β' for β . The experiment outputs β' .

We say OT is receiver private if for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , it holds that

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{ot-rec}}(\lambda) := |\Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{ot-rec}}(1^\lambda, 0) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{ot-rec}}(1^\lambda, 1) = 1]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

For security against semi-honest receivers, we use a variant of the definition of [Gol04] for semi-honest secure two-party computation.

Sender Privacy against Semi-Honest Receiver: Let OT.Sim a PPT simulator. We define the experiment $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{ot-send}}(1^\lambda, \beta)$ between an adversary \mathcal{A} and challenger as follows.

1. \mathcal{A} chooses $s \in \{0,1\}^\lambda$ and $\{(m_{i,0}, m_{i,1})\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$ and send them to the challenger.
2. The challenger computes $(\text{ot.st}, \text{ot.m}_1) \leftarrow \text{OT.Slct}(s)$ and:
 - If $\beta = 0$, the challenger computes $\text{ot.m}_2 \leftarrow \text{OT.Send}(\{(m_{i,0}, m_{i,1})\}, \text{ot.m}_1)$.
 - Else if $\beta = 1$, the challenger computes $\text{ot.m}_2 \leftarrow \text{OT.Sim}(\{m_{i,s[i]}\}, \text{ot.m}_1)$.
3. The challenger sends $(\text{ot.st}, \text{ot.m}_1, \text{ot.m}_2)$ to \mathcal{A} .
4. \mathcal{A} outputs a guess β' for β . The experiment outputs β' .

We say OT is sender private against semi-honest receiver if, there exists a PPT OT.Sim such that for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , it holds that

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{ot-send}}(\lambda) := |\Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{ot-send}}(1^\lambda, 0) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{ot-send}}(1^\lambda, 1) = 1]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

Definition 2.10 (Secret Sharing). A t -out-of- n secret sharing scheme over message space \mathcal{M} is a pair of algorithms (Share, Reconstruct) where:

- Share($1^\lambda, m$) takes as input the security parameter and a message $m \in \mathcal{M}$, and outputs an n -tuple of shares (s_1, \dots, s_n) .
- Reconstruct(s_{i_1}, \dots, s_{i_t}) takes as input t shares $(s_{i_1}, \dots, s_{i_t})$ where $i_k \in [n]$ and $k \in [t]$ outputs a message $m' \in \mathcal{M}$ or \perp .

Correctness: For any $m \in \mathcal{M}$ and $(i_1, \dots, i_t) \subseteq [n]$ of size t , we have that

$$\Pr[\text{Reconstruct}(s_{i_1}, \dots, s_{i_t}) = m \mid (s_1, \dots, s_n) \leftarrow \text{Share}(m)] = 1.$$

Security: For any $m, m' \in \mathcal{M}$, $S \subseteq [n]$ such that $|S| < t$, we have that

$$\left\{ \{s_i\}_{i \in S} \mid (s_1, \dots, s_n) \leftarrow \text{Share}(m) \right\} \stackrel{s}{\approx} \left\{ \{s'_i\}_{i \in S} \mid (s'_1, \dots, s'_n) \leftarrow \text{Share}(m') \right\}.$$

2.3 Function Secret Sharing

We review the notion of function secret sharing (FSS) [BGI15]. We follow the notation of the paper by Boyle et al. [BGI15, BGI16]. We focus on FSS with the additive reconstruction procedure. Functions are represented by an infinite collection \mathcal{F} of bit strings f . Each collection specifies an input length n and an output length m with an efficient evaluation algorithm Eval such that Eval(f, x) computes the output of f on input x .

Definition 2.11 (FSS: Syntax). An m -party FSS scheme for \mathcal{F} consists of two algorithms (Gen, Eval).

Gen($1^\lambda, f$): This is a PPT key generation algorithm that takes as input the security parameter 1^λ and function description $f \in \mathcal{F}$ and outputs m keys (k_1, \dots, k_m) . We assume that each key includes the description of the input and output domains $\mathcal{D}_f, \mathcal{R}_f$.

Eval(i, k_i, x): This is a polynomial-time evaluation algorithm that takes as input index $i \in [m]$, key k_i , and $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ and outputs y_i , which is i -th share $f_i(x)$ of $f(x)$.

Definition 2.12 (FSS: Security). Secure (m, t) - δ -FSS for \mathcal{F} is required to satisfy the following.

δ -Correctness: For all $f \in \mathcal{F}$, $x \in \mathcal{D}_f$, it holds that

$$\Pr \left[\sum_{i=1}^m \text{Eval}(i, k_i, x) = f(x) \mid (k_1, \dots, k_m) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\lambda, f) \right] > 1 - \delta - \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

Secrecy: We define the experiments $\text{Expt}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{fss}}(1^\lambda, b)$ between a challenger and an adversary \mathcal{A} as follows.

1. The challenger sends security parameter 1^λ to \mathcal{A} .
2. \mathcal{A} sends function descriptions $f_0, f_1 \in \mathcal{F}$ such that $\mathcal{D}_{f_0} = \mathcal{D}_{f_1}$ and set $S \subseteq [m]$ of size at most t .
3. The challenger computes $(k_1, \dots, k_m) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\lambda, f_b)$ and sets $v := \{k_i\}_{i \in S}$.
4. The challenger gives v to \mathcal{A} .
5. \mathcal{A} outputs a guess $b' \in \{0, 1\}$. The experiment outputs b' .

We say that FSS is t -secure if for any PPT \mathcal{A} , it holds that

$$|\Pr[\text{Expt}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{fss}}(1^\lambda, 0) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{fss}}(1^\lambda, 1) = 1]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

When $\delta \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$, then we write just (m, t) -FSS.

2.4 (Probabilistic) Indistinguishability Obfuscation

Definition 2.13 (Indistinguishability Obfuscator). A PPT algorithm $i\mathcal{O}$ is an IO for a circuit class $\{\mathcal{C}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ if it satisfies the following two conditions.

Functionality: For any security parameter $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, circuit $C \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$, and input x , we have that

$$\Pr[C'(x) = C(x) \mid C' \leftarrow i\mathcal{O}(C)] = 1 .$$

Indistinguishability: For any PPT distinguisher \mathcal{D} and for any pair of circuits $C_0, C_1 \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$ such that for any input x , $C_0(x) = C_1(x)$ and $|C_0| = |C_1|$, it holds that

$$|\Pr[\mathcal{D}(i\mathcal{O}(C_0)) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{D}(i\mathcal{O}(C_1)) = 1]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) .$$

We further say that $i\mathcal{O}$ is sub-exponentially secure if for any PPT \mathcal{D} the above advantage is smaller than $2^{-\lambda^\epsilon}$ for some $0 < \epsilon < 1$.

Next, we consider a family of sets of randomized polynomial-size circuits, $\mathcal{C} := \{\mathcal{C}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$. A circuit sampler for \mathcal{C} is a distribution ensemble $\text{Samp} := \{\text{Samp}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$, where the distribution of Samp_λ is (C_0, C_1, z) with $C_0, C_1 \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$ such that C_0 and C_1 take inputs of the same length, and $z \in \{0, 1\}^{\text{poly}(\lambda)}$. A class \mathcal{S} of samplers for \mathcal{C} is a set of circuit samplers for \mathcal{C} .

Definition 2.14 (PIO for a Class of Samplers [CLTV15]). A PPT algorithm $pi\mathcal{O}$ is a probabilistic indistinguishability obfuscator for a class of samplers \mathcal{S} over the randomized circuit family $\mathcal{C} = \{\mathcal{C}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ if it satisfies the following.

Alternative Correctness [DHRW16]: For any $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, any $C \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$, any $\hat{C} \leftarrow pi\mathcal{O}(C)$ and any individual input x , the distribution of $\hat{C}(x)$ and $C(x)$ are identical.

Security with respect to \mathcal{S} : We define the following experiments $\text{Expt}_{\mathcal{D}}^{\text{pio}}(1^\lambda, b)$ between a challenger and a distinguisher \mathcal{D} as follows.

1. The challenger samples $(C_0, C_1, z) \leftarrow \text{Samp}_\lambda$.
2. The challenger computes $\hat{C}_b \leftarrow pi\mathcal{O}(C_b)$ and sends $(1^\lambda, C_0, C_1, \hat{C}_b, z)$ to \mathcal{D} .
3. \mathcal{D} outputs a guess $b' \in \{0, 1\}$. The experiment outputs b' .

We say that $pi\mathcal{O}$ is secure PIO for \mathcal{S} if for any sampler $\text{Samp} = \{\text{Samp}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}} \in \mathcal{S}$, and for any PPT \mathcal{D} , it holds that

$$|\Pr[\text{Expt}_{\mathcal{D}}^{\text{pio}}(1^\lambda, 0) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\mathcal{D}}^{\text{pio}}(1^\lambda, 1) = 1]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

As noted by Dodis et al. [DHRW16], the PIO construction by Canetti et al. [CLTV15] can be easily modified to satisfy the alternative correctness above, so we use it. Canetti et al. [CLTV15] introduced a few types of samplers. We review static-input X -indistinguishable and dynamic-input indistinguishable samplers.

Definition 2.15 (Static-input X -Indistinguishable-Samplers). Let $X(\lambda)$ be a function bounded by 2^λ . The class $\mathcal{S}^{X\text{-ind}}$ of static-input X -IND-samplers for a circuit family \mathcal{C} contains all circuit samplers $\text{Samp} = \{\text{Samp}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ for \mathcal{C} satisfying the following. For any $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, there exists a set $\mathcal{X} = \mathcal{X}_\lambda \subseteq \{0, 1\}^*$ of size at most $X(\lambda)$ such that the following two conditions hold.

X differing inputs: For any input $x' \notin \mathcal{X}$, for any random coin r , it holds that

$$\Pr[C_0(x'; r) = C_1(x'; r) \mid (C_0, C_1, z) \leftarrow \text{Samp}_\lambda] > 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

X -indistinguishability: For any PPT \mathcal{A} , $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{Samp}}^{\text{si-ind}}(\lambda) \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) \cdot X^{-1}$ holds, where $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{Samp}}^{\text{si-ind}}(\lambda)$ is defined as below.

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{Samp}}^{\text{si-ind}}(\lambda) := |\Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{Samp}}^{\text{si-ind}}(1^\lambda, 0) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{Samp}}^{\text{si-ind}}(1^\lambda, 1) = 1]|,$$

where experiments $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{Samp}}^{\text{si-ind}}(1^\lambda, b)$ between a challenger and an adversary \mathcal{A} are as follows.

1. The adversary \mathcal{A} sends x to the challenger.

2. The challenger samples $(C_0, C_1, z) \leftarrow \text{Samp}_\lambda$.
3. The challenger computes $y \leftarrow C_b(x)$ and sends (C_0, C_1, z, y) to \mathcal{A} .
4. \mathcal{A} outputs a guess $b' \in \{0, 1\}$. The experiment outputs b' .

Definition 2.16 (X-IND PIO for Randomized Circuits). Let $X(\lambda)$ be any function bounded by 2^λ . A PPT algorithm piO ($X\text{-piO}$) is an X -PIO for randomized circuits if it is a PIO for the class of X -IND samplers $\mathcal{S}^{X\text{-ind}}$ over \mathcal{C} that includes all randomized circuits of size at most λ .

Theorem 2.17 ([CLTV15, DHRW16]). If there exists sub-exponentially secure IO for circuits and sub-exponentially secure puncturable PRF, then there exists an X -IND PIO with alternative correctness for randomized circuits.

Definition 2.18 (Dynamic-input Indistinguishable Sampler). We define the experiments $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{Samp}}^{\text{di-ind}}(1^\lambda, b)$ between a challenger and an adversary \mathcal{A} as follows.

1. The challenger samples $(C_0, C_1, z) \leftarrow \text{Samp}_\lambda$ and sends it to \mathcal{A} .
2. The adversary \mathcal{A} outputs x and sends it to the challenger.
3. The challenger computes $y \leftarrow C_b(x)$ and sends (C_0, C_1, z, y) to \mathcal{A} .
4. \mathcal{A} outputs a guess $b' \in \{0, 1\}$. The experiment outputs b' .

The class $\mathcal{S}^{\text{di-ind}}$ of dynamic-input indistinguishable sampler for a circuit family \mathcal{C} contains all circuit samplers $\text{Samp} = \{\text{Samp}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ for \mathcal{C} satisfies the following. If for any PPT \mathcal{A} , it holds that

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{Samp}}^{\text{di-ind}}(\lambda) := |\Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{Samp}}^{\text{di-ind}}(1^\lambda, 0) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{Samp}}^{\text{di-ind}}(1^\lambda, 1) = 1]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

Definition 2.19 (Dynamic-input PIO for Randomized Circuits). A PPT algorithm piO (di-piO) is a dynamic-input PIO for randomized circuits if it is a PIO for the class of dynamic-input indistinguishable samplers $\mathcal{S}^{\text{di-ind}}$ over \mathcal{C} that includes all randomized circuits of size at most λ .

Canetti et al. [CLTV15] wrote that a construction of dynamic-input PIO for *specific* classes of samplers is possible as in the case of differing-input obfuscation [ABG⁺13, BCPI4] for specific circuits.

3 Definition of Universal Proxy Re-Encryption

In this section, we present the definitions of universal proxy re-encryption (UPRE). In particular, we present the definition of UPRE for PKE and its security notions. A UPRE scheme enables us to convert ciphertexts of a PKE scheme Σ_f into ciphertexts of a (possibly) different PKE scheme Σ_t . A UPRE scheme does not need a setup for a system. That is, it can use existing PKE schemes with different parameters. UPRE can be seen as a generalization proxy re-encryption [BBS98]. Therefore, we borrow many terms of proxy re-encryption [AFGH05, CH07].

Notations. We consider multiple PKE schemes and key pairs, so we assume that every known PKE scheme is named by a number in $[N]$ (say, 1 is for Goldwasser-Micali PKE, 2 is for ElGamal PKE etc). We also put a number in $[U]$ for a generated key pair. When we write $(\text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\sigma_i}(1^\lambda)$, we mean that i -th key pair is generated by PKE scheme $\Sigma_{\sigma_i} = (\text{Gen}_{\sigma_i}, \text{Enc}_{\sigma_i}, \text{Dec}_{\sigma_i})$ where $\sigma_i \in [N]$. In this paper, when we emphasize which user is a delegator or delegatee, we denote delegator and delegatee key pairs by $(\text{pk}_f, \text{sk}_f)$ and $(\text{pk}_t, \text{sk}_t)$, respectively (f and t mean “from” and “to”, respectively). That is, a ciphertext under pk_f will be converted into a ciphertext pk_t . We assume that in the description of Σ_{σ_i} , ciphertext space \mathcal{C}_{σ_i} and message space \mathcal{M}_{σ_i} are also included.

3.1 Unidirectional UPRE

Definition 3.1 (Universal Proxy Re-Encryption for PKE: Syntax). A universal re-encryption scheme UPRE consists of two algorithms $(\text{ReKeyGen}, \text{ReEnc})$.

- $\text{ReKeyGen}(1^\lambda, \Sigma_{\sigma_f}, \Sigma_{\sigma_t}, \text{sk}_f, \text{pk}_t)$ takes the security parameter, a pair of PKE scheme $(\Sigma_{\sigma_f}, \Sigma_{\sigma_t})$, a secret-key sk_f of Σ_{σ_f} , and a public-key pk_t of Σ_{σ_t} and outputs a re-encryption key $\text{rk}_{f \rightarrow t}$ for ciphertexts under pk_f . The security parameter is often omitted.

- $\text{ReEnc}(\Sigma_{\sigma_f}, \Sigma_{\sigma_t}, \text{rk}_{f \rightarrow t}, \text{ct}_f)$ takes a pair of PKE schemes $(\Sigma_{\sigma_f}, \Sigma_{\sigma_t})$, a re-encryption key $\text{rk}_{f \rightarrow t}$, and a ciphertext ct_f under pk_f of Σ_{σ_f} , and outputs a re-encrypted ciphertext ct_t under pk_t .

Definition 3.2 (Relaxed Universal Proxy Re-Encryption for PKE: Syntax). A relaxed universal re-encryption scheme UPRE consists of three algorithms $(\text{ReKeyGen}, \text{ReEnc}, \text{mDec})$.

- $\text{ReKeyGen}(1^\lambda, \Sigma_{\sigma_f}, \Sigma_{\sigma_t}, \text{sk}_f, \text{pk}_t)$ is the same as in Definition 3.1.
- $\text{ReEnc}(\Sigma_{\sigma_f}, \Sigma_{\sigma_t}, \text{rk}_{f \rightarrow t}, \text{ct}_f)$ takes a pair of PKE schemes $(\Sigma_{\sigma_f}, \Sigma_{\sigma_t})$, a re-encryption key $\text{rk}_{f \rightarrow t}$, and a ciphertext ct_f under pk_f of Σ_{σ_f} , and outputs a re-encrypted ciphertext rct . We implicitly assume that rct includes index ℓ which indicates how many times ReEnc was applied so far. When we write $\text{rct}^{(\ell)}$, it means that $\text{rct}^{(\ell)}$ was obtained by applying ReEnc ℓ times.
- $\text{mDec}(\Sigma_{\sigma_t}, \text{sk}_t, \text{rct}^{(\ell)}, \ell)$ takes a PKE scheme Σ_{σ_t} , a secret key sk_t , a re-encrypted ciphertext $\text{rct}^{(\ell)}$ under $\text{rk}_{f \rightarrow t}$, and index ℓ and outputs a message m . When $\ell = 1$, we omit the index.

The difference between UPRE and relaxed UPRE is that we can use the decryption algorithm of Σ_{σ_t} as it is in UPRE. In relaxed UPRE, we need use a modified decryption algorithm though what we need for decryption is the original secret key sk_t . Note that re-encrypted ciphertext space $\mathcal{C}_{\sigma_f \rightarrow \sigma_t}$ potentially depends on \mathcal{C}_{σ_f} and \mathcal{C}_{σ_t} and possibly $\text{rct} \notin \mathcal{C}_{\sigma_t}$ happens.

Hereafter, we focus only on the relaxed notion since we can easily replace $\text{mDec}(\Sigma_{\sigma_t}, \text{sk}_t, \text{rct}^{(\ell)}, \ell)$ with $\text{Dec}(\text{sk}_t, \text{ct}_t)$.

Bidirectional UPRE. We can consider bidirectional UPRE, where a re-encryption key generated from key pairs $(\text{pk}_f, \text{sk}_f)$ and $(\text{pk}_t, \text{sk}_t)$ can convert ciphertexts under pk_f (resp. pk_t) into ciphertexts that can be decrypted by sk_t (resp. sk_f). Unidirectional UPRE is stronger than bidirectional UPRE since unidirectional one can support bidirectional one by generating two re-encryption keys $\text{rk}_{f \rightarrow t}$ and $\text{rk}_{t \rightarrow f}$. Thus, we focus on unidirectional UPRE in this study.

Functionality and Security. We introduce the correctness and a security notion of UPRE that we call security against *honest re-encryption attacks (HRA)* for UPRE. This notion is based on security against HRA of PRE introduced by Cohen [Coh17a]. Correctness is easy to understand. First, we consider *single-hop* UPRE, where if a ciphertext is converted into another ciphertext, then we cannot convert the re-encrypted one anymore.

Definition 3.3 (UPRE for PKE: Single-Hop Correctness). A relaxed UPRE scheme UPRE for PKE is correct if for all pairs of PKE schemes $(\Sigma_{\sigma_f}, \Sigma_{\sigma_t})$, $(\text{pk}_f, \text{sk}_f) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\sigma_f}(1^{\lambda_f})$, $(\text{pk}_t, \text{sk}_t) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\sigma_t}(1^{\lambda_t})$, $m \in \mathcal{M}_f$, $\text{ct}_f \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\sigma_f}(\text{pk}_f, m)$, it holds that

$$\Pr[\text{mDec}(\Sigma_{\sigma_t}, \text{sk}_t, \text{ReEnc}(\Sigma', \text{ReKeyGen}(\Sigma', \text{sk}_f, \text{pk}_t), \text{ct}_f)) = m] = 1,$$

where $\Sigma' := (\Sigma_{\sigma_f}, \Sigma_{\sigma_t})$. In the case of UPRE, $\text{mDec}(\Sigma_{\sigma_t}, \cdot, \cdot) = \text{Dec}_{\sigma_t}(\cdot, \cdot)$.

Before we present the definition of the HRA security for UPRE, we give an informal explanation about it. Readers who are familiar with PRE-HRA security [Coh17a] may be able to skip explanations below and jump into the formal definition. Readers who are familiar with PRE-CPA security [ABH09, Coh17a] may be able to skip explanations below except “Honest encryption and re-encryption query” part.

Challenge query: Basically, we consider a natural extension of the CPA security of PKE. The adversary selects a target public-key pk_{i^*} indexed by i^* and tries to distinguish whether a target ciphertext ct_{i^*} is an encryption of m_0 or m_1 that it selects. This will be modeled by the challenge oracle \mathcal{O}_{cha} .

Key query: The adversary can be given public keys pk_i or key pairs $(\text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i)$ by specifying a user and a PKE scheme at the setup phase since we consider multiple keys and schemes. When a secret key is given, it means its owner is corrupted.

Re-encryption key query: The most notable feature is that the adversary is given re-encryption keys by the re-encryption key oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{rekey}}$. If the adversary specifies existing indices of keys, say (i, j) , then it is given a corresponding re-encryption key from i to j . Here, we must restrict queries for some indices to prevent trivial attacks. If j is a corrupted user and i is the target user (queried to \mathcal{O}_{cha}), then the adversary trivially wins the security game by converting the target ciphertext and decrypting with the corrupted key sk_j . Therefore, such queries must be prohibited.

Honest encryption and re-encryption query: If the adversary specifies keys and a ciphertext to the re-encryption oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{reenc}}$, then it is given a re-encrypted ciphertext generated from queried values. One might think this oracle is redundant since it is simulatable by $\mathcal{O}_{\text{rekey}}$. However, there is a subtle issue here since a re-encryption key query with a corrupted delegatee is prohibited as explained above. As Cohen observed [Coh17a] in the setting of PRE, simply prohibiting such a query is not sufficient and considering re-encryption queries is meaningful.

Re-encrypted ciphertexts may leak information about a delegator key pair and help to attack a delegator ciphertext. As Cohen observed [Coh17a], if a re-encryption key is $\text{Enc}(\text{pk}_t, \text{sk}_f)$ and it is included in a re-encrypted ciphertext, then the delegatee easily breaks security. This is unsatisfactory when we consider applications of PRE and UPRE. However, in the setting of PRE, such a construction is secure under the standard CPA-security model since it prohibits queries (i, j) (resp. (i, j, ct_i)) to the re-encryption key generation (resp. re-encryption) oracle [Coh17a]. Thus, we introduce the notion of derivative and the honest encryption oracle \mathcal{O}_{enc} in UPRE as Cohen did.

We say that a (re-encrypted) ciphertext is a derivative if it is the target ciphertext generated by the challenge oracle or a re-encrypted ciphertext from the target ciphertext. This is managed by a set Drv . The honest encryption oracle allows the adversary to obtain a re-encrypted ciphertext under a corrupted key from honest encryption. The re-encryption oracle does not accept queries whose delegatee is a corrupted user j and ciphertext is a derivative to prevent trivial attacks. Moreover, the re-encryption oracle does not accept ciphertexts that are not generated via the honest encryption oracle.

Definition 3.4 (Derivative). We say that a (re-encrypted) ciphertext is a derivative when the (re-encrypted) ciphertext is a target ciphertext itself or obtained from a target ciphertext given by \mathcal{O}_{cha} by applying re-encryption.

Definition 3.5 (UPRE for PKE: Single-Hop HRA Security). We define the experiment $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{upre-hra}}(1^\lambda, b)$ between an adversary \mathcal{A} and a challenger. The experiment consists of three phases.

Phase 1 (Setup): This is the setup phase. All security parameters are chosen by the challenger.

- The challenger initializes $\#\text{Keys} := 0$, $\text{HList} := \emptyset$, $\text{CList} := \emptyset$, $\#\text{CT} := 0$, $\text{KeyCTList} := \emptyset$, $\text{Drv} := \emptyset$. Note that we assume that all indices are recorded with keys and corresponding schemes though we do not explicitly write for simplicity.
- For an honest key query (i, σ_i) , the challenger generates uncorrupted keys $(\text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\sigma_i}(1^{\lambda_i})$, sends $(\Sigma_{\sigma_i}, \text{pk}_i)$ to \mathcal{A} , and sets $\text{HList} := \text{HList} \cup i$ and $\#\text{Keys} := \#\text{Keys} + 1$.
- For a corrupted key query (i, σ_i) , the challenger generates corrupted keys $(\text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\sigma_i}(1^{\lambda_i})$, sends $(\Sigma_{\sigma_i}, \text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i)$ to \mathcal{A} , and sets $\text{CList} := \text{CList} \cup i$ and $\#\text{Keys} := \#\text{Keys} + 1$.

Phase 2 (Oracle query): This is the oracle query phase.

$\mathcal{O}_{\text{enc}}(i, m)$: For an honest encryption query (i, m) where $i \leq \#\text{Keys}$, the challenger generates $\text{ct}_i \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\sigma_i}(\text{pk}_i, m)$, sets $\#\text{CT} := \#\text{CT} + 1$, records $(\text{ct}_i, \Sigma_{\sigma_i}, i, \#\text{CT})$ in KeyCTList , and gives $(\text{ct}_i, \#\text{CT})$ to \mathcal{A} .

$\mathcal{O}_{\text{rekey}}(i, j)$: For a re-encryption key query (i, j) where $i, j \leq \#\text{Keys}$, the challenger outputs \perp if $i = j$ or $i \in \text{HList} \wedge j \in \text{CList}$. If a re-encryption key $\text{rk}_{i \rightarrow j}$ for (i, j) is already stored, the challenger just retrieves and returns it. Otherwise, the challenger generates $\text{rk}_{i \rightarrow j} \leftarrow \text{ReKeyGen}(\Sigma_{\sigma_i}, \Sigma_{\sigma_j}, \text{sk}_i, \text{pk}_j)$ and gives $\text{rk}_{i \rightarrow j}$ to \mathcal{A} and stores it.

$\mathcal{O}_{\text{reenc}}(i, j, k)$: For a re-encryption query (i, j, k) where $i, j \leq \#\text{Keys}$ and $k \leq \#\text{CT}$, the challenger does the following.

1. If $j \in \text{CList} \wedge k \in \text{Drv}$, then returns \perp .
2. If there is no value $(*, *, i, k)$ in KeyCTList , returns \perp .
3. Otherwise, retrieves $\text{rk}_{i \rightarrow j}$ for (i, j) (if it does not exist, generates $\text{rk}_{i \rightarrow j} \leftarrow \text{ReKeyGen}(\Sigma_{\sigma_i}, \Sigma_{\sigma_j}, \text{sk}_i, \text{pk}_j)$ and stores it), generates $\text{rct} \leftarrow \text{ReEnc}(\Sigma_{\sigma_i}, \Sigma_{\sigma_j}, \text{rk}_{i \rightarrow j}, \text{ct}_i)$ from ct_i in KeyCTList , sets $\#\text{CT} := \#\text{CT} + 1$, records $(\text{rct}, \Sigma_{\sigma_j}, j, \#\text{CT})$ in KeyCTList , and gives $(\text{rct}, \#\text{CT})$ to \mathcal{A} .

$\mathcal{O}_{\text{cha}}(i^*, m_0, m_1)$: This oracle is invoked only once. For a challenge query (i^*, m_0, m_1) where $i^* \in \text{HList}$ and $m_0, m_1 \in \mathcal{M}_{\sigma_{i^*}}$, the challenger generates $\text{ct}^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\sigma_{i^*}}(\text{pk}_{i^*}, m_b)$, gives it to \mathcal{A} , and sets $\#\text{CT} := \#\text{CT} + 1$, $\text{Drv} := \text{Drv} \cup \{\#\text{CT}\}$, $\text{KeyCTList} := \text{KeyCTList} \cup \{(\text{ct}^*, \Sigma_{\sigma_{i^*}}, i^*, \#\text{CT})\}$.

Phase 3 (Decision) : *This is the decision phase. \mathcal{A} outputs a guess b' for b . The experiment outputs b' .*

We say the UPRE is single-hop UPRE-HRA secure if, for any PPT \mathcal{A} , it holds that

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{upre-hra}}(\lambda) := |\Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{upre-hra}}(1^\lambda, 0) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{upre-hra}}(1^\lambda, 1) = 1]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

Discussion on Definition 3.5. We can simply set $\forall i \lambda_i := \lambda$. Some λ_j may be longer than other λ_i (say, $\lambda_j = \text{poly}(\lambda_i)$). The adversary is not allowed to adaptively corrupt users during the experiment. This is because, in general, it is difficult to achieve security against adaptive corruption. In particular, in our setting, $\mathcal{O}_{\text{rekey}}$ cannot decide whether it should return \perp or a valid re-encryption key if j may be corrupted later. This static security is standard in the PRE setting [AFGH05, CH07, LV08, ABH09]. One exception is the work by Fuchsbauer, Kamath, Klein, and Pietrzak [FKKP18]. The honest and corrupted key generation queries could be moved to the oracle query phase, but it does not incur a significant difference. Thus, we select a simpler model as most works on re-encryption did [AFGH05, LV08, ABH09, Coh17a].

3.2 Unidirectional Multi-Hop UPRE

In this section, we introduce multi-hop UPRE, which is an extension of single-hop UPRE, where a re-encrypted ciphertext rct generated by $\text{rk}_{f \rightarrow t}$ could be re-encrypted many times. Let $L = L(\lambda)$ be the maximum number of hops that a UPRE scheme can support.

Definition 3.6 (UPRE for PKE: L -hop Correctness). *A multi-hop UPRE scheme mUPRE for PKE is L -hop correct if for all PKE schemes $(\Sigma_{\sigma_0}, \Sigma_{\sigma_1}, \dots, \Sigma_{\sigma_L})$ that satisfy correctness, $(\text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\sigma_i}(1^{\lambda_i})$ (for all $i = 0, \dots, L$), $m \in \mathcal{M}_{\sigma_0}$, $\text{ct}_0 \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\sigma_0}(\text{pk}_0, m)$, it holds that*

$$\Pr[\text{mDec}(\Sigma_{\sigma_j}, \text{sk}_j, \text{rct}^{(j)}, j) = m] = 1$$

where $\text{rct}^{(j)} \leftarrow \text{ReEnc}(\Sigma'_j, \text{ReKeyGen}(\Sigma'_j, \text{sk}_{j-1}, \text{pk}_j), \text{rct}^{(j-1)})$, $\text{rct}^{(0)} = \text{ct}_0$, $\Sigma'_j := (\Sigma_{\sigma_{j-1}}, \Sigma_{\sigma_j})$ and $j \in [1, L]$.

The reason why mDec is indexed by j is that the decryption procedure for j -times re-encrypted ciphertexts might be different. See Section 5.3 as a concrete example.

The security notion of multi-hop UPRE is similar to that of single-hop one, but slightly more complex since we consider many intermediate keys from a delegator to a delegatee. In particular, we use a directed acyclic graph (DAG) to reflect the relationships among keys. A user is modeled as a vertex in a graph and if there exists a re-encryption key from vertex (user) i to vertex (user) j , then a directed edge (i, j) is assigned between the vertices (note that edge (i, j) is not equal to (j, i) since we consider DAGs). That is, a DAG $G = (V, E)$ denotes that V is a set of users and E is a set of index pairs whose re-encryption key was issued. We do not consider cyclic graphs in this study since it incurs an issue of circular security in our constructions⁵.

We introduce the notion of *admissible edges* to exclude trivial attacks by using oracles. Roughly speaking, an admissible edge means that ciphertexts under a target public key will not be converted into ciphertexts under *corrupted* public keys in CList.

Definition 3.7 (Admissible edge). *We say that (i, j) is an admissible edge with respect to $G = (V, E)$ if, in $E \cup (i, j)$, there does not exist a path from any vertex $i^* \in \text{HList}$ (honest user set fixed at the setup phase) to $j^* \in \text{CList}$ such that the path includes edge (i, j) as an intermediate edge (this includes the case $j = j^*$). That is, no edge sets $\{(i^*, i'_x), (i'_x, i'_{x+1}), \dots, (i'_{y-1}, i'_y), (i'_y, i), (j, j'_z), (j'_z, j'_{z+1}), \dots, (j'_{w-1}, j'_w), (j'_w, j^*)\}$ in E .*

We also introduce the notion of the *selective graph model* as a weaker attack model. In the selective graph model, the adversary must commit a DAG $G^* = (V^*, E^*)$ at the beginning of an experiment. To formally define this model, we define a *deviating edge with respect to $G^* = (V^*, E^*)$* .

Definition 3.8 (deviating edge). *We say that (i, j) is a deviating edge with respect to G^* in the selective graph model if $i \in V^* \wedge j \notin V^*$ or $j \in V^* \wedge i \notin V^*$.*

⁵The circular security issue arises in constructions that use general PKE schemes. If there exists a cycle, any re-encryption key in the cycle depends on all secret keys in the cycle. Thus, we have no way to erase secret keys in security proofs. This does not happen in concrete constructions based on some hard problems such as the DDH.

In the selective graph model, the adversary must select $i^* \in V^*$ as the target vertex that will be queried to \mathcal{O}_{cha} . Moreover, the adversary is not given re-encryption keys from $\mathcal{O}_{\text{rekey}}$ if queried (i, j) is a deviating edge. That is, the structure of DAG that is connected to the target vertex must be fixed in advance. This DAG also describes which re-encryption keys are queried since it fixes the edge set. The structure of DAG outside of G^* is dynamically determined according to queries to $\mathcal{O}_{\text{rekey}}$. We call selective multi-hop HRA security if we consider the selective graph attack model. The description of the multi-hop selective HRA security overlaps most of that of the multi-hop HRA security, so we use boxes to show that the conditions in boxes are only for the selective security.

Definition 3.9 (UPRE for PKE: Multi-Hop (selective) HRA Security). We define the experiment $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{m-upre-hra}}(1^\lambda, b)$ between an adversary \mathcal{A} and a challenger. The experiment consists of three phases.

Phase 1 (Setup): This is the setup phase. All security parameters are chosen by the challenger.

- The challenger initializes $\#\text{Keys} := 0, \text{HList} := \emptyset, \text{CList} := \emptyset, \#\text{CT} := 0, \text{KeyCTList} := \emptyset, \text{Drv} := \emptyset, V := \emptyset, E := \emptyset$.
- This item is only for the selective graph model. At the beginning of this phase, \mathcal{A} must commit a DAG $G^* = (V^*, E^*)$. We assume that \mathcal{A} selects σ_i for all $i \in V^*$. The challenger generates uncorrupted keys $(\text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\sigma_i}(1^{\lambda_i})$ for all $i \in V^*$. The challenger sends $(\Sigma_{\sigma_i}, \text{pk}_i)$ for all $i \in V^*$ to \mathcal{A} . The challenger sets $\text{HList} := \text{HList} \cup V^*, \#\text{Keys} := \#\text{Keys} + |V^*|, V := V^*,$ and $E := E^*$.
- For an honest key generation query (i, σ_i) , the challenger generates uncorrupted keys $(\text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\sigma_i}(1^{\lambda_i})$, sends $(\Sigma_{\sigma_i}, \text{pk}_i)$ to \mathcal{A} , and sets $\text{HList} := \text{HList} \cup i, \#\text{Keys} := \#\text{Keys} + 1,$ and $V := V \cup \{i\}$.
- For a corrupted key generation query (i, σ) , the challenger generates corrupted keys $(\text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\sigma_i}(1^{\lambda_i})$, sends $(\Sigma_{\sigma_i}, \text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i)$ to \mathcal{A} , and sets $\text{CList} := \text{CList} \cup i, \#\text{Keys} := \#\text{Keys} + 1,$ and $V := V \cup \{i\}$.
- The challenger maintains graph $G := (V, E)$ during the experiment. Note that we assume that all keys and schemes are recorded with vertices and edges though we do not explicitly write for simplicity.

Phase 2 (Oracle query): This is the oracle query phase.

$\mathcal{O}_{\text{enc}}(i, m)$: For an honest encryption query (i, m) where $i \leq \#\text{Keys}$, the challenger generates $\text{ct}_i \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\sigma_i}(\text{pk}_i, m)$, sets $\#\text{CT} := \#\text{CT} + 1$, record $(\text{ct}_i, \Sigma_{\sigma_i}, i, \#\text{CT})$ in KeyCTList , and gives $(\text{ct}_i, \#\text{CT})$ to \mathcal{A} .

$\mathcal{O}_{\text{rekey}}(i, j)$: For a re-encryption key query (i, j) where $i, j \leq \#\text{Keys}$, the challenger does the following.

1. If (i, j) is a deviating edge with respect to G^* , $i = j$, or (i, j) is not an admissible edge with respect to $G = (V, E)$, then output \perp . See Definitions 3.7 and 3.8 for admissible edge and deviating edge.
2. Otherwise, the challenger generates $\text{rk}_{i \rightarrow j} \leftarrow \text{ReKeyGen}(\Sigma_{\sigma_i}, \Sigma_{\sigma_j}, \text{sk}_i, \text{pk}_j)$ and updates $E := E \cup (i, j)$ (if $\text{rk}_{i \rightarrow j}$ is already recorded, then the challenger just retrieves it) and gives $\text{rk}_{i \rightarrow j}$ to \mathcal{A} .

$\mathcal{O}_{\text{reenc}}(i, j, k)$: For a re-encryption query (i, j, k) where $i, j \leq \#\text{Keys}$ and $k \leq \#\text{CT}$, the challenger does the following.

1. If (i, j) is not an admissible with respect to $G = (V, E)$ and $k \in \text{Drv}$, then returns \perp .
2. If there is no $(*, *, i, k)$ in KeyCTList , then outputs \perp .
3. Otherwise, retrieves $\text{rk}_{i \rightarrow j}$ for (i, j) (if it does not exist, generates $\text{rk}_{i \rightarrow j} \leftarrow \text{ReKeyGen}(\Sigma_{\sigma_i}, \Sigma_{\sigma_j}, \text{sk}_i, \text{pk}_j)$ and stores it), generates $\text{rct}_j \leftarrow \text{ReEnc}(\Sigma_{\sigma_i}, \Sigma_{\sigma_j}, \text{rk}_{i \rightarrow j}, \text{rct}_i)$ from rct_i in KeyCTList , sets $\#\text{CT} := \#\text{CT} + 1$, records $(\text{rct}_j, \Sigma_{\sigma_j}, j, \#\text{CT})$ in KeyCTList , and gives $(\#\text{CT}, \text{rct}_j)$ to \mathcal{A} . If $k \in \text{Drv}$, then also sets $\text{Drv} := \text{Drv} \cup \{\#\text{CT}\}$.

$\mathcal{O}_{\text{cha}}(i^*, m_0, m_1)$: This oracle is invoked only once. For a challenge query (i^*, m_0, m_1) where $i^* \in \text{HList}$ and $m_0, m_1 \in \mathcal{M}_{\sigma_{i^*}}$, and $i^* \in V^*$, the challenger generates $\text{ct}^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\sigma_{i^*}}(\text{pk}_{i^*}, m_b)$ and gives it to \mathcal{A} . The challenger also sets $\#\text{CT} := \#\text{CT} + 1, \text{Drv} := \text{Drv} \cup \{\#\text{CT}\}, \text{KeyCTList} := \text{KeyCTList} \cup \{(\text{ct}^*, \Sigma_{\sigma_{i^*}}, i^*, \#\text{CT})\}$.

Phase 3 (Decision) : This is the decision phase. \mathcal{A} outputs a guess b' for b . The experiment outputs b' .

We say the UPRE is multi-hop selectively UPRE-HRA secure if, for any PPT \mathcal{A} , it holds that

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{m-upre-hra}}(\lambda) := |\Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{m-upre-hra}}(1^\lambda, 0) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{m-upre-hra}}(1^\lambda, 1) = 1]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

We use $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{ms-upre-hra}}(\lambda)$ and $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{ms-upre-hra}}(1^\lambda, b)$ for the selective security.

In fact, the single-hop HRA security is a special case of the multi-hop HRA security. However, we separately write them since the single-hop one is easier to understand. We can also consider single-hop selective HRA security. We use $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{s-upre-hra}}(\lambda)$ and $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{s-upre-hra}}(1^\lambda, b)$ for their experiment and advantage.

UPRE-CPA Security. We can easily consider the CPA-security of UPRE. We can obtain the security experiment of the CPA-security if we employ the following items in the experiment of the HRA security.

1. The honest encryption oracle \mathcal{O}_{enc} is not used.
2. Neither the set Drv nor number $\#\text{CT}$ is used.
3. The condition that $\mathcal{O}_{\text{reenc}}$ outputs \perp for a query (i, j) such that $i \in \text{HList} \wedge j \in \text{CList}$ (or (i, j) is not an admissible edge) is used instead of the first and second conditions of $\mathcal{O}_{\text{reenc}}$ in the experiment of the HRA security.

3.3 On Re-Encryption Simulatability

Cohen introduced the notion of re-encryption simulatability for PRE to prove PRE-HRA security in a modular way [Coh17a]. He proved that if a PRE scheme is PRE-CPA secure and satisfies re-encryption simulatability⁶, then the scheme is PRE-HRA secure. See Definition A.1 in Appendix A for the definition.

The re-encryption simulatability is sufficient to prove PRE-HRA security (if a PRE is PRE-CPA secure scheme) and useful. Thus, one might think it is better to use re-encryption simulatability for UPRE. However, it is a slightly stronger security notation. Our relaxed UPRE schemes in Sections 5 and 6 are *UPRE-HRA secure*, yet *does not* satisfy re-encryption simulatability. Thus, we do not use re-encryption simulatability to prove UPRE-HRA security in this study⁷. See Appendix A.1 for the reason why our schemes in Sections 5 and 6 does not satisfies re-encryption simulatability.

3.4 UPRE for More Advanced Encryption

We give the basic definitions of UPRE for PKE in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. We can consider more definitions for advanced encryption since UPRE is a general concept.

CCA-security. First, we can consider CCA-security of UPRE for PKE. The definition of CCA-security of UPRE for PKE could be defined in a similar way to that of PRE [CH07, LV08, HKK⁺12] though it will be more complex. We leave giving a formal definition of CCA-security and concrete constructions as an open problem since they are not in the scope of this paper. The focus of this study is that we initiate the study of UPRE, present the basic definition, and construct concrete schemes from well-known cryptographic assumptions.

Beyond PKE. We can also consider not only UPRE for PKE but also UPRE for identity-based encryption (IBE), attribute-based encryption (ABE), and functional encryption (FE). Moreover, we can even consider UPRE from a primitive to another primitive such as from IBE to FE. It is easier to consider UPRE between the same primitive since additional inputs to encryption algorithms such as an attribute in a delegator ciphertext can be recycled in a re-encrypted ciphertext. Defining UPRE between different primitives is much challenging since we have issues about how to set such additional inputs at re-encryption phase and define security between different primitives. We leave these as open problems since they are not in the scope of this paper.

⁶Note that Cohen *does not* use key-privacy of PRE [ABH09] to prove PRE-HRA security.

⁷For our UPRE scheme in Section 4, we might be able to use re-encryption simulatability to prove UPRE-HRA security since Our UPRE scheme in Section 4 satisfies re-encryption simulatability for UPRE defined in Appendix A. Moreover, we define a weaker variant of re-encryption simulatability for UPRE (and PRE) that still implies HRA security in Appendix A.2. However, such a definition is not simple, and proofs are not simplified. Proving such a weak re-encryption simulatability takes almost the same efforts to prove HRA security directly. Thus, we do not use re-encryption simulatability in the main body.

3.5 Security against Corrupted-Delegator Re-Encryption Attacks

Re-encrypted ciphertexts of relaxed UPRE schemes might include values that leak information about a plaintext to a delegator (that is, an entity that has a secret key for the original ciphertext). This is an important issue to use UPRE in migration of encryption systems explained in Section 1.1. We will see a concrete example in Section 5. To capture attacks on re-encrypted ciphertext by corrupted delegator, we define a new security notion for UPRE (and PRE), security against corrupted-delegator re-encryption attacks (CRA). We write the definition of the UPRE case. The PRE case is similarly defined as PRE-CRA security. We can also similarly define a single-hop variant. Note that this is meaningful for relaxed UPRE since, in UPRE, a re-encrypted ciphertext is a ciphertext of a delegatee.

Definition 3.10 ((Selective) UPRE-CRA security). *The experiment $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{m-upre-cra}}(1^\lambda, b)$ of this security notion is the same as that of multi-hop UPRE-HRA security except that the challenge oracle \mathcal{O}_{cha} is modified as follows. Contents in boxes are only applied to the selective security.*

$\mathcal{O}_{\text{cha}}(i_c, i^*, m_0, m_1)$: *This oracle is invoked only once. For a challenge query (i_c, i^*, m_0, m_1) where $i_c \in \text{CList} \wedge i^* \in \text{HList}$ and $m_0, m_1 \in \mathcal{M}_{\sigma_{i_c}}$, and $i^* \in V^*$, the challenger does the following.*

1. *Generates $\text{ct}_{i_c} \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\sigma_{i_c}}(\text{pk}_{i_c}, m_b)$.*
2. *Retrieves $\text{rk}_{i_c \rightarrow i^*} = \text{ReKeyGen}(\Sigma_{\sigma_{i_c}}, \Sigma_{\sigma_{i^*}}, \text{sk}_{i_c}, \text{pk}_{i^*})$ (if there does not exist, generates it).*
3. *Generates $\text{rct}^* \leftarrow \text{ReEnc}(\Sigma_{\sigma_{i_c}}, \Sigma_{\sigma_{i^*}}, \text{rk}_{i_c \rightarrow i^*}, \text{ct}_{i_c})$ and gives $(\text{rct}^*, \text{rk}_{i_c \rightarrow i^*})$ to \mathcal{A} .*

The challenger also sets $\#\text{CT} := \#\text{CT} + 1$, $\text{Drv} := \text{Drv} \cup \{\#\text{CT}\}$, $\text{KeyCTList} := \text{KeyCTList} \cup \{(\text{ct}^, \Sigma_{\sigma_{i^*}}, i^*, \#\text{CT})\}$.*

We say the UPRE is multi-hop selectively UPRE-CRA secure if, for any PPT \mathcal{A} , it holds that

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{m-upre-cra}}(\lambda) := |\Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{m-upre-cra}}(1^\lambda, 0) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{m-upre-cra}}(1^\lambda, 1) = 1]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

We use $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{ms-upre-cra}}(\lambda)$ and $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{ms-upre-cra}}(1^\lambda, b)$ for the selective security.

This definition means that adversaries that have secret key sk_{i_c} cannot break the security of the re-encrypted ciphertext rct^* generated from the ciphertext ct_{i_c} under pk_{i_c} if they are not given the original ciphertext ct_{i_c} (even if re-encryption key $\text{rk}_{i_c \rightarrow i^*}$ is given). The point is that \mathcal{A} cannot trivially break the security since ct_{i_c} is not given.

4 Multi-Hop Construction based on Indistinguishability Obfuscation

In this section, we present a UPRE scheme for PKE based on PIO as the first step. To prove the security of our UPRE scheme by using sub-exponentially secure IO, we need to assume that PKE schemes are (0-hiding) trapdoor encryption (explained in Section 4.1). Several well-known CPA-secure PKE schemes could be transformed into (0-hiding) trapdoor encryption [ElG85, Pai99, GM84, DJ01]. If we use a stronger obfuscation, called dynamic-input PIO for randomized circuits [CLTV15], then we can use any standard CPA-secure PKE scheme. There is a possibility to construct dynamic-input PIO for specific dynamic-input indistinguishable samplers [CLTV15].

We can describe our UPRE scheme based on PIO in a unified way by the language of trapdoor encryption as Canetti et al. did [CLTV15].

4.1 Trapdoor Encryption

Before we proceed to present our UPRE scheme and prove the security, we present the notion of trapdoor encryption.

Definition 4.1 (Trapdoor Encryption [CLTV15]). *We say that $\Sigma = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}, \text{TrapGen})$ with message space \mathcal{M} is a trapdoor encryption scheme if $(\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ with message space \mathcal{M} is a CPA-secure PKE scheme and the trapdoor key generation algorithm TrapGen satisfies the following.*

Trapdoor Public Key Indistinguishability: *It holds that*

$$\left\{ \text{pk} \mid (\text{pk}, \text{sk}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\lambda) \right\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}} \stackrel{\approx}{\sim} \left\{ \text{tpk} \mid \text{tpk} \leftarrow \text{TrapGen}(1^\lambda) \right\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}.$$

Computational/Statistical/ δ -Hiding: We define ensembles of random variables, $\text{view}_{\text{tpke}}(b)$, which are all view from an adversary \mathcal{A} during experiments between \mathcal{A} and challenger defined as follows.

1. The challenger runs $\text{tpk} \leftarrow \text{TrapGen}(1^\lambda)$ and gives tpk to \mathcal{A} .
2. \mathcal{A} sends two messages $m_0, m_1 \in \mathcal{M}$ as the challenge messages to the challenger.
3. The challenger generates ciphertext $\text{ct}^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{tpk}, m_b)$ and sends ct^* to \mathcal{A} .
4. We set $\text{view}_{\text{tpke}}(b) := (\text{tpk}, m_0, m_1, \text{ct}^*)$.

We say Σ is computational/statistical/ δ -hiding if, for any PPT/unbounded/PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , it holds that

$$\text{view}_{\text{tpke}}(0) \stackrel{x}{\approx} \text{view}_{\text{tpke}}(1),$$

where $\stackrel{x}{\approx}$ is $\stackrel{c}{\approx}$ / $\stackrel{s}{\approx}$ / $\stackrel{c}{\approx}_\delta$, respectively.

In particular, 0-hiding is important for our constructions. It is easy to see that a standard CPA-secure PKE is trapdoor encryption with computational-hiding [CLTV15].

Theorem 4.2 ([CLTV15]). Any IND-CPA secure PKE schemes are computational-hiding trapdoor encryption.

Definition 4.3 (δ -Rerandomizable Encryption [CLTV15]). We say that $\Sigma = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}, \text{reRand})$ is a δ -rerandomizable encryption scheme if $(\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ is a CPA-secure PKE scheme and the additional algorithm reRand satisfies the following.

δ -Rerandomizability: We define the following experiments $\text{Expt}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{rerand}}(1^\lambda, b)$ between a challenger and an adversary \mathcal{A} as follows.

1. The challenger chooses a bit $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$, generates $(\text{pk}, \text{sk}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\lambda)$, and sends pk to \mathcal{A} .
2. \mathcal{A} sends $m \in \mathcal{M}$ where \mathcal{M} is the message space of Σ to the challenger.
3. The challenger generates $\text{ct}_0 \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{pk}, m)$ and $\text{ct}_1 \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{pk}, m)$.
4. If $b = 0$, the challenger computes $\hat{\text{ct}} \leftarrow \text{reRand}(\text{pk}, \text{ct}_0)$. Otherwise, the challenger computes $\hat{\text{ct}} \leftarrow \text{reRand}(\text{pk}, \text{ct}_1)$.
5. The challenger returns $(\text{ct}_0, \text{ct}_1, \hat{\text{ct}})$ to \mathcal{A} .
6. \mathcal{A} outputs a guess $b' \in \{0, 1\}$. The experiment outputs b' .

We say that FSS is δ -rerandomizable if for any PPT \mathcal{A} , it holds that

$$|\Pr[\text{Expt}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{rerand}}(1^\lambda, 0) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{rerand}}(1^\lambda, 1) = 1]| \leq \delta(\lambda).$$

Re-randomizable encryption can be transformed into trapdoor encryption [CLTV15]. This transformation only changes the format of public-keys. It does not change the format of ciphertexts at all. Therefore, decryption procedure in the transformed scheme is completely the same as the original one. This is important for construction of UPRE based on PIO since we would like to use a PKE scheme as it is. We review the theorem and construction by Canetti et al. [CLTV15].

Theorem 4.4 ([CLTV15]). If there exists δ -rerandomizable encryption, then $\Sigma = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}, \text{TrapGen})$ described below is δ -hiding trapdoor encryption scheme whose message space is $\{0, 1\}$.

Let $\Sigma' = (\text{Gen}', \text{Enc}', \text{Dec}', \text{reRand})$ be a δ -rerandomizable encryption scheme.

$\text{Gen}(1^\lambda)$: generates $(\text{pk}', \text{sk}') \leftarrow \text{Gen}'(1^\lambda)$ and $\text{ct}_b \leftarrow \text{Enc}'(\text{pk}', b)$ for $b = 0, 1$ and outputs $(\text{pk}, \text{sk}) := ((\text{pk}', \text{ct}_0, \text{ct}_1), \text{sk}')$.

$\text{Enc}(\text{pk}, b)$: parses $\text{pk} = (\text{pk}', \text{ct}_0, \text{ct}_1)$ and outputs $\text{ct} \leftarrow \text{reRand}(\text{pk}', \text{ct}_b)$.

$\text{Dec}(\text{sk}, \text{ct})$: outputs $b' \leftarrow \text{Dec}'(\text{sk}', \text{ct})$.

$\text{TrapGen}(1^\lambda)$: generates $(\text{pk}', \text{sk}') \leftarrow \text{Gen}'(1^\lambda)$ and $\text{ct}_b \leftarrow \text{Enc}'(\text{pk}', 0)$ for $b = 0, 1$ and outputs $\text{tpk} := (\text{pk}', \text{ct}_0, \text{ct}_1)$.

Theorem 4.5 ([CLTV15]). Goldwasser-Micali, ElGamal, Paillier, and Damgård-Jurik PKE schemes can be transformed into 0-hiding trapdoor encryption schemes by the transformation described in Theorem 4.4 in Section 4.1.

4.2 Our Multi-Hop Scheme from PIO

Now, we present our UPRE scheme based on PIO. In fact, the scheme is a modification of fully homomorphic encryption scheme from PIO and trapdoor encryption by Canetti et al. [CLTV15]. The scheme is simple and easy to understand. Hereafter, we overload the notation $\Sigma_{\sigma_i} = (\text{Gen}_{\sigma_i}, \text{Enc}_{\sigma_i}, \text{Dec}_{\sigma_i})$ by $\Sigma_i = (\text{Gen}_i, \text{Enc}_i, \text{Dec}_i)$ for ease of notation. That is, we think Σ_i is a scheme used by user i and it may happen $\Sigma_i = \Sigma_j$ since these were originally Σ_{σ_i} and Σ_{σ_j} ($\sigma_i, \sigma_j \in [N]$). Our scheme UPRE_{pio} is as follows.

- $\text{ReKeyGen}(\Sigma_f, \Sigma_t, \text{sk}_f, \text{pk}_t)$:
 - Define a probabilistic circuit $C_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}}$ described in Figure 1.
 - Output $\text{rk}_{f \rightarrow t} := \text{piO}(C_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}})$.
- $\text{ReEnc}(\Sigma_f, \Sigma_t, \text{rk}_{f \rightarrow t}, \text{ct}_f)$:
 - Parse $\text{rk}_{f \rightarrow t} = \text{piO}(C_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}})$.
 - Output $\text{rct} := \text{piO}(C_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}})(\text{ct}_f)$.




Figure 1: The description of $C_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}}$




Figure 2: The description of $dC_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}}$

Correctness. From the definition of $C_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}}$, for $\text{ct}_f \leftarrow \text{Enc}_f(\text{pk}_f, m)$, it holds that $C_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}}(\text{ct}_f) = \text{Enc}_t(\text{pk}_t, m) = \text{ct}_t$. From the alternative correctness of piO (See Definition 2.14) and the correctness of Σ_f , it holds that

$$\text{rct} = \text{piO}(C_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}})(\text{ct}_f) = \text{ct}_t.$$

$$\text{Dec}(\Sigma_j, \text{sk}_j, \text{ReEnc}(\Sigma'_j, \text{ReKeyGen}(\Sigma'_j, \text{sk}_{j-1}, \text{pk}_j), \text{rct}_{j-1})) = \text{Dec}(\Sigma_{j-1}, \text{sk}_{j-1}, \text{rct}_{j-1}),$$

where $\Sigma'_j = (\Sigma_{j-1}, \Sigma_j)$ and the correctness holds. Note that a re-encrypted ciphertext under delegatee public-key pk_j is exactly in \mathcal{C}_j .

Padding Parameter. To use PIO, we need pad the size of circuits to be obfuscated. We set $\text{pad}_{\top}(\lambda, \lambda_f, \lambda_t) := \max\{|C_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}}|, |dC_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}}|\}$, which is polynomial of $(\lambda, \lambda_f, \lambda_t)$ since an input of $C_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}}, dC_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}}$ is ciphertext under pk_f generated by $\text{Gen}_f(1^{\lambda_f})$ and all hard wired values are keys of Σ_f, Σ_t . We can think λ_f and λ_t are polynomials in λ , so we may omit λ_f and λ_t hereafter.

4.3 Security Proof

Theorem 4.6 (UPRE-HRA security). *If there exists PIO for the class of sampler $\mathcal{S}^{\Sigma_i, \Sigma_j}$ defined below and both Σ_f and Σ_t are trapdoor encryption schemes, then UPRE_{pio} is selectively UPRE-HRA secure. More specifically, if pio is a PIO for the class of dynamic-input sampler $\mathcal{S}^{\Sigma_i, \Sigma_j}$ and both Σ_f and Σ_t are IND-CPA secure PKE schemes, or if pio is a PIO for the class of X-IND sampler $\mathcal{S}^{\Sigma_i, \Sigma_j}$ and both Σ_f and Σ_t are 0-hiding trapdoor encryption schemes, then UPRE_{pio} is selectively UPRE-HRA secure.*

Before we proceed to prove Theorem 4.6, we define the class of sampler $\mathcal{S}^{\Sigma_i, \Sigma_j}$ defined by trapdoor encryption schemes Σ_i, Σ_j as follows.

Sampler Samp^{SK} : The distribution Samp^{SK} samples a trapdoor public key $\text{tpk}_j \leftarrow \text{TrapGen}_j(1^{\lambda_j})$ and outputs circuits $C_0 := C_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}}[\Sigma_i, \Sigma_j, \text{sk}_i, \text{tpk}_j]$ and $C_1 := dC_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}}[\Sigma_j, \text{tpk}_j]$, and $z := \text{tpk}_j$, where $\text{SK} = \{\text{sk}_{\lambda_i}\}$ is a sequence of strings of length $\rho_i(\lambda_i)$ and $\text{sk} := \text{sk}_{\lambda_i}$.

Class $\mathcal{S}^{\Sigma_i, \Sigma_j}$: Let $\mathcal{S}^{\Sigma_f, \Sigma_t}$ be the class of samplers with distribution Samp^{SK} for all sequence of strings SK of length $\rho_j(\lambda_j)$.

Now, we proceed to prove Theorem 4.6.

Proof. We define a sequence of hybrid experiments $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^x(b)$. We emphasize differences among hybrid experiments by using red underlines. Hereafter, $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^x(b) \approx \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^y(b)$ denotes $|\Pr[\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^x(b) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^y(b) = 1]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

$\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^0(b)$: The first experiment is the original security experiment for b , $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{ms-upre-hra}}(1^\lambda, b)$. That is, $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^0(b) = \text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{ms-upre-hra}}(1^\lambda, b)$. Note that in the successive experiments, we can easily simulate all keys outside of G^* since vertices in $V \setminus V^*$ are not connected to the target vertex and simulators can generate keys for them by itself.

$\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{0'}(b)$: This experiment is the same as $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^0(b)$ except that we guess the target vertex i^* that will be queried to challenge oracle \mathcal{O}_{cha} and abort if the guess is incorrect. The guess is correct with probability $1/|V^*|$, so $\Pr[\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{0'}(b) = 1] = \frac{1}{|V^*|} \cdot \Pr[\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^0(b) = 1]$.

$\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^1(b)$: This experiment is the same as $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{0'}$ except that

1. we record not only $(\text{rct}_i, \Sigma_i, i, \#\text{CT})$ but also m in KeyCTList for encryption query (i, m) and
2. for re-encryption query (i', j, k) such that (i', j) is not an admissible edge with respect to $G = (V, E)$ and $k \notin \text{Drv}$, the re-encrypted ciphertext is differently generated as follows. First, we retrieve $(\text{rct}_{i'}, \Sigma_{i'}, i', k, m)$ from KeyCTList (if there is not such an entry, just outputs \perp). Then, we compute $\text{rct}_j \leftarrow \text{Enc}_j(\text{pk}_j, m)$ instead of $\text{rk}_{i' \rightarrow j} \leftarrow \text{ReKeyGen}(\Sigma_{i'}, \Sigma_j, \text{sk}_{i'}, \text{pk}_j)$ and $\text{rct} \leftarrow \text{ReEnc}(\Sigma_{i'}, \Sigma_j, \text{rk}_{i' \rightarrow j}, \text{rct}_{i'})$.

That is, we do not need $\text{sk}_{i'}$ to generate rct_j . By the alternative correctness of pio in Definition 2.14, this perfectly simulates $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{0'}(b)$ since an output of $C_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}}$ for input $\text{rct}_{i'} = \text{Enc}_{i'}(\text{pk}_{i'}, m)$ is just a fresh ciphertext of m under pk_j .

Process for removing sk_{i^*} of the target vertex: Now, we focus on vertices in V^* connected via admissible edges. To use the security of Σ_{i^*} , we need remove information about sk_{i^*} from all re-encryption keys in $G^* = (V^*, E^*)$ possibly connected to i^* . For all (honest) vertex $j \in V^*$ that have incoming edge (i, j) such that $i \in V^*$ and do not have outgoing edge (j, j') for some j' , we repeat the processes below for $v = 1, \dots, Q$ where Q is the total number of admissible edges connected to target vertex i^* . We let Dlist be the list of vertices whose public key is replaced with a dummy key tpk . We initialize $\text{Dlist} := \emptyset$ and maintain Dlist during the repeated processes below.

$\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{2,v}(b)$: First, at this point, honest vertex j does not have any outgoing edge. This experiment is the same as $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,(v-1)}(b)$ except that for honest key generation query (j, Σ_j) , the challenger generates $\text{tpk}_j \leftarrow \text{TrapGen}_j(1^{\lambda_j})$ and for all query (i, j) to $\mathcal{O}_{\text{rekey}}$ such that $i \in V^*$, the challenger uses tpk_j to generate

$rk_{i \rightarrow j} = \text{piO}(\text{C}_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}}[\Sigma_i, \Sigma_j, sk_i, \text{tpk}_j])$ instead of pk_j and $rk_{i \rightarrow j} = \text{piO}(\text{C}_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}}[\Sigma_i, \Sigma_j, sk_i, pk_j])$. We renew $\text{Dlist} := \text{Dlist} \cup \{j\}$. In Lemma 4.7, we prove that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,v-1}(b) \stackrel{c}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{2,v}(b)$ holds due to the trapdoor public key indistinguishability property in Definition 4.1. Apparently, it holds that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,0}(b) = \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^1(b)$.

$\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,v}(b)$: This experiment is the same as $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{2,v}(b)$ except that for all query (i, j) to $\mathcal{O}_{\text{rekey}}$ such that $i \in V^*$, the challenger generates uses $\text{dC}_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}}$ instead of $\text{C}_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}}$. That is, $rk_{i \rightarrow j} = \text{piO}(\text{dC}_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}}[\Sigma_j, \text{tpk}_j])$ instead of $rk_{i \rightarrow j} = \text{piO}(\text{C}_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}}[\Sigma_i, \Sigma_j, sk_i, \text{tpk}_j])$. In Lemma 4.8, we prove that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{2,v}(b) \stackrel{c}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,v}(b)$ holds due to the security of PIO with respect to $\mathcal{S}^{\Sigma_i, \Sigma_j}$. The sampler Samp^{SK} generates the following distributions.

$$(C_0 = \text{hybC}_{\text{re}}[\Sigma_i, \Sigma_j, sk_i, \text{tpk}_j], C_1 = \text{dC}_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}}[\Sigma_j, \text{tpk}_j], z = \text{tpk}_j) \leftarrow \text{Samp}^{\text{SK}}.$$

In $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,Q}(b)$, sk_{i^*} is neither written in any re-encryption key nor used to generate a re-encrypted ciphertext. Thus, we can use the security of Σ_{i^*} . In Lemma 4.9, we prove that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,Q}(0) \stackrel{c}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,Q}(1)$ holds due to the CPA-security of Σ_{i^*} . Therefore, it holds that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^0(0) \stackrel{c}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^0(1)$ by Lemmata 4.7 to 4.9 since Q and $|V^*|$ are polynomials. ■

Lemma 4.7. *If Σ_j is a trapdoor encryption scheme, then it holds $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,v-1}(b) \stackrel{c}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{2,v}(b)$.*

Proof. We construct \mathcal{B} for the trapdoor public key indistinguishability property of Σ_j . First, \mathcal{B} is given a target key ek_j ($ek_j = pk_j$ or $ek_j = \text{tpk}_j$). To use \mathcal{A} , \mathcal{B} generates key pairs $(pk_{i'}, sk_{i'})$ for all $i' \in \text{HList} \setminus (\text{Dlist} \cup \{j\})$ and $i' \in \text{CList}$. Note that $\text{Dlist} \subseteq V^*$ by definition. For all $i' \in \text{Dlist}$, \mathcal{B} generates $\text{tpk}_{i'} \leftarrow \text{TrapGen}_{i'}(1^{\lambda_{i'}})$. For honest key generation query (j, Σ_j) , \mathcal{B} sets ek_j as the public-key of vertex j . For all queries (i, j) to $\mathcal{O}_{\text{rekey}}$ such that $i \in V^*$, \mathcal{B} generates $rk_{i \rightarrow j} = \text{piO}(\text{C}_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}}[\Sigma_i, \Sigma_j, sk_i, ek_j])$. If $ek_j = pk_j$, then the view is totally the same as $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,v-1}(b)$. If $ek_j = \text{tpk}_j$, then the view is totally the same as $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{2,v}(b)$. Therefore, if \mathcal{A} can distinguish two experiments, \mathcal{B} can break the trapdoor key indistinguishability property of Σ_j . ■

Lemma 4.8. *If piO is a PIO for the sampler $\mathcal{S}^{\Sigma_i, \Sigma_j}$, then it holds that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{2,v}(b) \stackrel{c}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,v}(b)$.*

Proof. We construct a distinguisher \mathcal{D} of PIO. To use \mathcal{A} of UPRE, \mathcal{D} generates key pairs $(pk_{i'}, sk_{i'})$ for all $i' \in \text{HList} \setminus \text{Dlist}$ and $i' \in \text{CList}$. For all $i' \in \text{Dlist}$, \mathcal{D} generates $\text{tpk}_{i'} \leftarrow \text{TrapGen}_{i'}(1^{\lambda_{i'}})$. At this point, we do not need $sk_{i'}$ for $i' \in \text{Dlist}$. Therefore, \mathcal{B} can simulate all oracles. However, to use \mathcal{A} , \mathcal{B} simulates $\mathcal{O}_{\text{rekey}}$ in a slightly different way. The simulation for query (i, j) such that (i, j) is an admissible but not deviating edge is different. When \mathcal{B} receives a re-encryption key query for such (i, j) , \mathcal{B} uses the challenger of PIO. The challenger samples $(C_0, C_1, z) \leftarrow \text{Samp}^{\text{sk}_i}$ where $C_0 = \text{C}_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}}[\Sigma_i, \Sigma_j, sk_i, \text{tpk}_j]$, $C_1 = \text{dC}_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}}[\Sigma_j, \text{tpk}_j]$, and $z = \text{tpk}_j$ and generates \widehat{C} (obfuscated circuit of C_0 or C_1). When \mathcal{B} is given \widehat{C} from the challenger of PIO, \mathcal{B} sends $rk_{i \rightarrow j} := \widehat{C}$ to \mathcal{A} . This completes the simulation. If \mathcal{B} is given $\widehat{C} = \text{piO}(\text{C}_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}}[\Sigma_i, \Sigma_j, sk_i, \text{tpk}_j])$, then the view is totally the same as $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{2,v}(b)$. If \mathcal{B} is given $\widehat{C} = \text{piO}(\text{dC}_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}}[\Sigma_j, \text{tpk}_j])$, then the view is totally the same as $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,v}(b)$. Therefore, if \mathcal{A} can distinguish two experiments, \mathcal{B} can break the security of PIO for sampler $\text{Samp}^{\text{sk}_i}$. ■

Lemma 4.9. *If Σ_{i^*} is a trapdoor encryption scheme, then it holds $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,Q}(0) \stackrel{c}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,Q}(1)$.*

Proof. We construct \mathcal{B} for (computational/statistical/ δ -) hiding of Σ_{i^*} . First, \mathcal{B} is given a target key pk_{i^*} . To use \mathcal{A} , \mathcal{B} generates all keys except for vertex i^* . When (i^*, Σ_{i^*}) is queried as an uncorrupted key generation query, \mathcal{B} sets pk_{i^*} as the public-key for user i^* . At this point, \mathcal{B} does not need sk_{i^*} since it is neither written in any re-encryption key nor used in $\mathcal{O}_{\text{reenc}}$. For the challenge query (i^*, m_0, m_1) to \mathcal{O}_{cha} , \mathcal{B} passes (m_0, m_1) to its challenger of Σ_{i^*} . When \mathcal{B} receives $ct_{i^*}^*$, then passes it to \mathcal{A} as the target ciphertext. If $ct_{i^*}^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{i^*}(pk_{i^*}, m_0)$, then the view is totally the same as $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,Q}(0)$. If $ct_{i^*}^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{i^*}(pk_{i^*}, m_1)$, then the view is totally the same as $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,Q}(1)$. Therefore, if \mathcal{A} can distinguish two experiments, \mathcal{B} can break the hiding property of Σ_{i^*} . ■

4.4 Instantiation of UPRE scheme based on PIO

Instantiation by 0-hiding trapdoor encryption and IO. To instantiate by sub-exponentially secure IO and OWF, we should prove that $\mathcal{S}^{\Sigma_i, \Sigma_j}$ is a static-input X -indistinguishable sampler for $\mathcal{X} := \mathcal{C}_i$ if Σ_i and Σ_j are δ -hiding trapdoor encryption schemes.

We let $\gamma(\lambda) := \log |\mathcal{C}_i| := \log X(\text{pad}_T(\lambda))$ and set $\delta := \text{negl}(\lambda) \cdot 2^{-\gamma(\lambda)}$. It is easy to see that X differing inputs holds since $\mathcal{X} = \mathcal{C}_i$ is the whole domain of circuits $C_0 = C_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}}[\Sigma_i, \Sigma_j, \text{sk}_i, \text{tpk}_j]$ and $C_1 = dC_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}}[\Sigma_j, \text{tpk}_j]$. It is also easy to see that X -indistinguishability holds since outputs of $C_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}}[\Sigma_i, \Sigma_j, \text{sk}_i, \text{tpk}_j](\text{ct}_i)$ and $dC_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}}[\Sigma_j, \text{tpk}_j](\text{ct}_i)$ are $\text{Enc}_j(\text{tpk}_j, m)$ and $\text{Enc}_j(\text{tpk}_j, 0^{\ell_j})$, respectively and these are $\text{negl}(\lambda) \cdot 2^{-\gamma(\lambda)}$ -indistinguishable due to the δ -hiding property. This means the outputs of C_0 and C_1 are $\text{negl}(\lambda) \cdot X^{-1}$ -indistinguishable since $X(\text{pad}_T(\lambda)) = 2^{\gamma(\lambda)}$. This parameter setting of δ is achievable by 0-hiding trapdoor encryption, which is instantiated by well-known IND-CPA PKE schemes such as ElGamal PKE (see Section 4.1). Note that as observed in Theorem 4.4, the message space of this instantiation is $\{0, 1\}$.

Corollary 4.10. *If there exists sub-exponentially secure IO and sub-exponentially secure OWF, then UPRE_{pio} is a multi-hop selectively UPRE-HRA secure UPRE scheme for 0-hiding trapdoor encryption schemes.*

Instantiation by IND-CPA PKE and dynamic-input PIO. If we can use a dynamic-input PIO (see Definitions 2.14 and 2.18 for the definition), then we can set $\delta = \text{negl}(\lambda)$ in the analysis above and it is achievable by standard IND-CPA PKE schemes (that is, trapdoor encryption with computational hiding). A dynamic-input PIO for the class of sampler $\mathcal{S}^{\Sigma_i, \Sigma_j}$ might exist (no impossibility result on PIO for a specific class) though it is not proved [CLTV15]. The PIO construction by Canetti et al. [CLTV15] is a candidate of dynamic-input PIO for the class of sampler $\mathcal{S}^{\Sigma_i, \Sigma_j}$.

Conjecture 4.11. A dynamic-input PIO for the class of sampler $\mathcal{S}^{\Sigma_i, \Sigma_j}$ exists.

Corollary 4.12. *If there exists dynamic-input PIO for the class of sampler $\mathcal{S}^{\Sigma_i, \Sigma_j}$ where Σ_i, Σ_j are IND-CPA PKE schemes, then UPRE_{pio} is a multi-hop selectively UPRE-HRA secure UPRE scheme for any IND-CPA PKE scheme.*

5 Single/Constant-Hop Construction based on Function Secret Sharing

In this section, we present single-hop and constant-hp UPRE schemes for PKE based on FSS. See Section 5.4 for instantiations of FSS.

5.1 Our Single-Hop Scheme from FSS

Our scheme UPRE_{fss} is based on a 2-party FSS scheme $\text{FSS} = (\text{FSS.Gen}, \text{FSS.Eval})$ where $\delta < \text{negl}(\lambda)$. As in Section 4, we overload the notation $\Sigma_{\sigma_i} = (\text{Gen}_{\sigma_i}, \text{Enc}_{\sigma_i}, \text{Dec}_{\sigma_i})$ by $\Sigma_i = (\text{Gen}_i, \text{Enc}_i, \text{Dec}_i)$ for ease of notation.

- $\text{ReKeyGen}(1^\lambda, \Sigma_f, \Sigma_t, \text{sk}_f, \text{pk}_t)$:
 - Define a function $C_{\text{de}}^{\text{fss}}$ described in Figure 3.
 - Generate $(k_1, k_2) \leftarrow \text{FSS.Gen}(1^\lambda, C_{\text{de}}^{\text{fss}}[\Sigma_f, \text{sk}_f])$ and $\tilde{\text{ct}}_t \leftarrow \text{Enc}_t(\text{pk}_t, k_2)$.
 - Output $\text{rk}_{f \rightarrow t} := (k_1, \tilde{\text{ct}}_t)$.
- $\text{ReEnc}(\Sigma_f, \Sigma_t, \text{rk}_{f \rightarrow t}, \text{ct}_f)$: Firstly, parse $\text{rk}_{f \rightarrow t} = (k_1, \tilde{\text{ct}}_t)$.
 - Compute $y_1 \leftarrow \text{FSS.Eval}(1, k_1, \text{ct}_f)$ and $\hat{\text{ct}}_t \leftarrow \text{Enc}_t(\text{pk}_t, (\text{ct}_f, y_1))$.
 - Output $\text{rct} := (\hat{\text{ct}}_t, \tilde{\text{ct}}_t)$.
- $\text{mDec}(\Sigma_t, \text{sk}_t, \text{rct})$: Firstly, parse $\text{rct} = (\hat{\text{ct}}_t, \tilde{\text{ct}}_t)$.
 - Compute $(\text{ct}'_f, y'_1) \leftarrow \text{Dec}_t(\text{sk}_t, \hat{\text{ct}}_t)$.
 - Compute $k'_2 \leftarrow \text{Dec}_t(\text{sk}_t, \tilde{\text{ct}}_t)$ and $y_2 \leftarrow \text{FSS.Eval}(2, k'_2, \text{ct}'_f)$.
 - Output $m' := y'_1 + y_2$.




Figure 3: The description of C_{de}^{fss}

Correctness. From the correctness of Σ_t , it holds $ct'_f = ct_f = \text{Enc}(pk_f, m)$, $y'_1 = y_1 = \text{FSS.Eval}(1, k_1, ct_f)$, and $k_2 = k'_2 = \text{Dec}_t(sk_t, \tilde{ct}_t)$ since $\hat{ct}_t \leftarrow \text{Enc}_t(pk_t, (ct_f, y_1))$ and $\tilde{ct}_t \leftarrow \text{Enc}_t(pk_t, k_2)$. For $(k_1, k_2) \leftarrow \text{FSS.Gen}(1^\lambda, C_{de}^{fss}[\Sigma_f, sk_f])$, from the correctness of $(2, 1)$ -FSS, it holds that

$$C_{de}^{fss}[\Sigma_f, sk_f](ct_f) = \text{FSS.Eval}(1, k_1, ct_f) + \text{FSS.Eval}(2, k_2, ct_f) = y_1 + y_2 (= m').$$

Moreover, from the definition of C_{de}^{fss} , it holds that $C_{de}^{fss}[\Sigma_f, sk_f](ct_f) = m$ for $ct_f \leftarrow \text{Enc}_f(pk_f, m)$. Therefore, $m = m'$.

Remark 5.1. In UPRE_{fss} , we do not need encrypt (ct_f, y_1) by pk_t at the re-encryption phase if it is acceptable that a user that has sk_f can decrypt the re-encrypted ciphertext. If $rct = (ct_f, y_1, \tilde{ct}_t)$, then a delegator can obtain m from ct_f in a re-encrypted ciphertext. The reason why we put this safeguard is that it might cause an issue in some applications (in particular, migration of encryption systems explained in Section 1.1). We introduced the CRA-security in Section 3.5 for this issue. See Appendix B for a formal security proof. Moreover, we can achieve a constant-hop scheme by this extra encryption technique. See Section 5.3 for this constant-hop extension.

5.2 Security Proof

Theorem 5.2 (UPRE-HRA security). *Assume that FSS is secure $(2, 1)$ -FSS and both Σ_f and Σ_t are IND-CPA secure PKE, then UPRE_{fss} is selectively UPRE-HRA secure.*

Proof. We consider a DAG for consistency though UPRE_{fss} is a single-hop scheme. We define a sequence of hybrid experiments $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^x(b)$. As in Section 4, we use underlines and $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^x(b) \approx \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^y(b)$. Note that we do not need consider re-encryption key and re-encryption queries for pairs of indices (i', j') such that $i', j' \in \text{CList}$ since they are corrupted and easy to simulate.

$\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^0(b)$: The first experiment is the original security experiment for b , $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{s\text{-upre-hra}}(1^\lambda, b)$. That is, $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^0(b) = \text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{s\text{-upre-hra}}(1^\lambda, b)$. Note that in the successive experiments, we can easily simulate all keys outside of G^* since vertices in $V \setminus V^*$ are not connected to the target vertex and simulators can generate keys for them by itself.

$\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{0'}(b)$: This experiment is the same as $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^0(b)$ except that we guess the target index i^* that will be queried to challenge oracle \mathcal{O}_{cha} and abort if the guess is incorrect. The guess is correct with probability $1/|V^*|$, so $\Pr[\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{0'}(b) = 1] = \frac{1}{|V^*|} \cdot \Pr[\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^0(b) = 1]$.

$\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^1(b)$: This experiment is the same as $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{0'}(b)$ except that

1. we record not only $(ct_i, \Sigma_i, i, \#CT)$ but also m in KeyCTList for honest encryption query (i, m) and
2. for re-encryption query (i, j', k) such that $j' \in \text{CList} \wedge k \notin \text{Drv}$, the re-encrypted ciphertext is differently generated as follows. First, we retrieve $(ct_i, \Sigma_i, i, k, m)$ from KeyCTList (if there is no such an entry, just outputs \perp). Then, we compute the following values instead of computing $rk_{i \rightarrow j'}$.

- (a) $(k_1, k_2) \leftarrow \text{FSS.Gen}(1^\lambda, C_{de}^{fss}[\Sigma_i, sk_i])$.
- (b) $y_1 := m - y_2$ where $y_2 = \text{FSS.Eval}(2, k_2, ct_i)$.
- (c) $\tilde{ct}_{j'} \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{j'}(pk_{j'}, k_2)$.

Finally, we set $rct := (\hat{ct}_{j'}, \tilde{ct}_{j'})$ where $\hat{ct}_{j'} \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{j'}(pk_{j'}, (ct_i, y_1))$ and send it to \mathcal{A} as a re-encrypted ciphertext for user j' .

Note that for (i, j') such that $i \in \text{HList} \wedge j' \in \text{CList}$, we do not need k_1 since we just output \perp for such re-encryption key query (i, j') by definition. The change above is for ciphertexts that \mathcal{A} can decrypt. Here, \mathcal{A} can obtain k_2 since user j' is corrupted. However, it is not an issue since we define $y_1 := m - y_2$ and \mathcal{A} can correctly obtain m . In Lemma 5.3, we prove that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^1(b) \stackrel{s}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{0'}(b)$ holds due to the correctness of $(2, 1)$ -FSS.

$\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^2(b)$: This experiment is the same as $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^1(b)$ except that

1. for re-encryption query (i, j', k) such that $j' \in \text{CList} \wedge k \notin \text{Drv}$, the re-encrypted ciphertext is differently generated as follows. First, we retrieve $(\text{ct}_i, \Sigma_i, i, k, m)$ from KeyCTList (if there is no such an entry, just outputs \perp). Then, we compute the following values.

- (a) $k_2 \leftarrow \text{FSS.Gen}(1^\lambda, \text{C}_{\text{de}}^{\text{fss}}[\Sigma_i, \perp])$ (circuit $\text{C}_{\text{de}}^{\text{fss}}[\Sigma_i, \perp]$ outputs \perp for any input in \mathcal{C}_i).
- (b) $y_1 := m - y_2$ where $y_2 = \text{FSS.Eval}(2, k_2, \text{ct}_i)$.
- (c) $\tilde{\text{ct}}_{j'} \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{j'}(\text{pk}_{j'}, k_2)$.

Finally, we set $\text{rct} := (\hat{\text{ct}}_{j'}, \tilde{\text{ct}}_{j'})$ where $\hat{\text{ct}}_{j'} \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{j'}(\text{pk}_{j'}, (\text{ct}_i, y_1))$ and send it to \mathcal{A} as a re-encrypted ciphertext for user j' .

Again, note that for (i, j') such that $i \in \text{HList} \wedge j' \in \text{CList}$, we do not need k_1 since we just output \perp for such a re-encryption key query (i, j') as in the previous hybrid. In Lemma 5.4, we prove that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^2(b) \stackrel{c}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^1(b)$ holds due to the 1-security of 2-party FSS.

Process for removing sk_{i^*} of the target vertex: Now, we focus on vertices in V^* connected via admissible edges. To use the security of Σ_{i^*} , we need remove information about sk_{i^*} from all re-encryption keys in $G^* = (V^*, E^*)$ possibly connected to i^* . For all (honest) vertex $j \in V^*$ that have incoming edge (i, j) such that $i \in V^*$ and do not have outgoing edge (j, j') for some j' , we repeat the processes below for $v = 1, \dots, Q$ where Q is the total number of admissible edges connected to target vertex i^* . We let Dlist be the list of vertices whose re-encryption key consists of a simulated and dummy values. That is, if $j \in \text{Dlist}$, then $\text{rk}_{i \rightarrow j} = (k_1 = \text{FSS.Gen}(\text{C}_{\text{de}}^{\text{fss}}[\Sigma_i, \perp]), \tilde{\text{ct}}_j = \text{Enc}_j(\text{pk}_j, 0^{\ell_j}))$ for any i . We initialize $\text{Dlist} := \emptyset$ and maintain Dlist during the repeated processes below.

$\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,v}(b)$: First, at this point, honest vertex j does not have any outgoing edge. This experiment is the same as $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{4,(v-1)}(b)$ except that for all query (i, j) to $\mathcal{O}_{\text{rekey}}$ such that $(i, j) \in E^*$, ciphertext $\tilde{\text{ct}}_j$ in the re-encryption key $\text{rk}_{i \rightarrow j}$ is generated by $\text{Enc}_j(\text{pk}_j, 0^{\ell_j})$ instead of $\text{Enc}_j(\text{pk}_j, k_2)$. In Lemma 5.5, we prove that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{4,v-1}(b) \stackrel{c}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,v}(b)$ hold due to the CPA-security of Σ_j . Apparently, it holds that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,0}(b) = \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^2(b)$.

$\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{4,v}(b)$: This experiment is the same as $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,v}(b)$ except that for all query (i, j) to $\mathcal{O}_{\text{rekey}}$ such that $(i, j) \in E^*$, k_1 in $\text{rk}_{i \rightarrow j}$ is generated by $\text{FSS.Gen}(\text{C}_{\text{de}}^{\text{fss}}[\Sigma_i, \perp])$ instead of $\text{FSS.Gen}(\text{C}_{\text{de}}^{\text{fss}}[\Sigma_i, \text{sk}_i])$. We renew $\text{Dlist} := \text{Dlist} \cup \{j\}$. In Lemma 5.6, we prove that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^3(b) \stackrel{c}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^4(b)$ holds due to the 1-security of 2-party FSS.

In $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{4,Q}(b)$, sk_{i^*} is neither written in any re-encryption key nor used to generate a re-encrypted ciphertext. Thus, we can use the security of Σ_{i^*} . In Lemma 5.7, we prove that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{4,Q}(0) \stackrel{c}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{4,Q}(1)$ holds due to the CPA-security of Σ_{i^*} . Therefore, it holds that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^0(0) \stackrel{c}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^0(1)$ by Lemmata 5.3 to 5.7 since Q and $|V^*|$ are polynomials. ■

Lemma 5.3. *If FSS is secure $(2, 1)$ -FSS, then it holds $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^1(b) \stackrel{s}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{0'}(b)$.*

Proof. The difference between the two experiment is as follows. In $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{0'}(b)$, $y_1 = \text{FSS.Eval}(1, k_1, \text{ct}_i)$. In $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^1(b)$, $y_1 = m - y_2$ where $y_2 = \text{FSS.Eval}(2, k_2, \text{ct}_i)$. From the correctness of $(2, 1)$ -FSS (i.e., $\delta < \text{negl}(\lambda)$), y_1 in $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{0'}(b)$ is equal to y_1 in $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^1(b)$ except negligible probability. Therefore, distributions $(\text{ct}_i, y_1, \tilde{\text{ct}}_j)$ in $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^1(b)$ and $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{0'}(b)$ are statistically indistinguishable except negligible probability. ■

Lemma 5.4. *If FSS is $(2, 1)$ -FSS, then it holds $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^2(b) \stackrel{c}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^1(b)$.*

Proof. In fact, we use q' intermediate hybrids to prove this where q' is the number of uncorrupted key pk_i such that re-encryption query (i, j', k) is sent and $i \in \text{HList} \wedge j \in \text{CList} \wedge k \notin \text{Drv}$. For each hybrid, we use the security of $(2, 1)$ -FSS. Below, we write only the case for one pk_i since it simplifies the proof and the lemma holds via hybrid arguments.

We construct an adversary \mathcal{B} of FSS. To use \mathcal{A} of UPRE, \mathcal{B} generates key pairs $(pk_{i'}, sk_{i'})$ for all $i' \in \text{HList}$ and $i' \in \text{CList}$. Therefore, \mathcal{B} can simulate all oracles. However, to use \mathcal{A} , \mathcal{B} simulates $\mathcal{O}_{\text{reenc}}$ in a slightly different way. As we define $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^1(b)$, the simulation for query (i, j', k) to $\mathcal{O}_{\text{reenc}}$ such that $j' \in \text{CList} \wedge k \notin \text{Drv}$ and $(ct_i, \Sigma_i, i, \#CT, m) \in \text{KeyCTList}$ is different. When \mathcal{B} receives a re-encryption query for such (i, j', k) , \mathcal{B} defines $f_0 := C_{\text{de}}^{\text{fss}}[\Sigma_i, sk_i]$ and $f_1 := C_{\text{de}}^{\text{fss}}[\Sigma_i, \perp]$, sets $S := \{2\}$ as corrupted party, and sends (f_0, f_1) to the challenger of FSS. If \mathcal{B} is given $v = k_2$, then \mathcal{B} generates $\tilde{ct}_{j'} \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{j'}(pk_{j'}, k_2)$, $y_2 := \text{FSS.Eval}(2, k_2, ct_i)$, and $y_1 := m - y_2$. \mathcal{B} returns a re-encrypted ciphertext $\text{rct} := (ct_i, y_1, \tilde{ct}_{j'})$ to \mathcal{A} . Note that \mathcal{B} does not need k_1 for this query by definition since $i \in \text{HList} \wedge j' \in \text{CList}$. This completes the simulation. If $v = k_2$ is generated from f_0 , then the view is totally the same as $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^1(b)$. If $v = k_2$ is generated from f_1 , then the view is totally the same as $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^2(b)$. Therefore, if \mathcal{A} can distinguish two experiment, \mathcal{B} can break the security of FSS. ■

Lemma 5.5. *If Σ_j is IND-CPA secure PKE, then it holds that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,v}(b) \stackrel{c}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{4,v-1}(b)$.*

Proof. We construct an adversary \mathcal{B} of Σ_j , which is given pk_j as a target public key. \mathcal{B} generates key pairs $(pk_{i'}, sk_{i'})$ for all $i' \in \text{HList} \setminus (\{j\} \cup \text{Dlist})$ and $i' \in \text{CList}$. For honest key generation query (j, Σ_j) , \mathcal{B} sets pk_j as the public-key of user j . When (i, j) such that $(i, j) \in E^*$ is queried to $\mathcal{O}_{\text{rekey}}$, \mathcal{B} sends $(k_2, 0^{\ell_j})$ where $(k_1, k_2) \leftarrow \text{FSS.Gen}(1^\lambda, C_{\text{de}}^{\text{fss}}[\Sigma_i, sk_i])$ to the challenger of Σ_j and receives \tilde{ct}_j^* . We emphasize that (i, j) is an admissible edge for valid re-encryption key queries. Note that, at this point, sk_i is not erased yet. \mathcal{B} can generate (k_1, k_2) since we do not need sk_j for this. \mathcal{B} sets $rk_{i \rightarrow j} := (k_1, \tilde{ct}_j^*)$. If \mathcal{A} can distinguish two experiments, then \mathcal{B} can break the security of Σ_i since $\tilde{ct}_j = \text{Enc}_j(pk_j, k_2)$ and $\tilde{ct}_j^* = \text{Enc}_j(pk_j, 0^{\ell_j})$ perfectly simulate $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^2(b)$ and $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^3(b)$, respectively. In fact, we need a multi-challenge version of CPA-security. However, we use CPA-security for simplicity since it is implied by the standard CPA-security via hybrid arguments. ■

Lemma 5.6. *If FSS is $(2, 1)$ -FSS, then it holds $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{4,v}(b) \stackrel{c}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,v}(b)$.*

Proof. We construct an adversary \mathcal{B} of FSS. To use \mathcal{A} of UPRE, \mathcal{B} generates key pairs $(pk_{i'}, sk_{i'})$ for all $i' \in \text{HList} \setminus (\{j\} \cup \text{Dlist})$ where j is the index that we focus on in the previous hybrid and $i' \in \text{CList}$. Therefore, \mathcal{B} can simulate all oracles. However, to use \mathcal{A} , \mathcal{B} simulates $\mathcal{O}_{\text{rekey}}$ in a slightly different way. The simulation for query (i, j) such that $(i, j) \in E^*$ is different. When \mathcal{B} receives a re-encryption key query such (i, j) , \mathcal{B} defines $f_0 := C_{\text{de}}^{\text{fss}}[\Sigma_i, sk_i]$ and $f_1 := C_{\text{de}}^{\text{fss}}[\Sigma_i, \perp]$, sets $S := \{1\}$ as a corrupted party, and sends (f_0, f_1) to the challenger of FSS. Here, the target pair (f_0, f_1) is valid since those domains are the same. If \mathcal{B} is given $v = k_1$, then \mathcal{B} generates $\tilde{ct}_j \leftarrow \text{Enc}_j(pk_j, 0^{\ell_j})$. \mathcal{B} returns a re-encryption key $rk_{i \rightarrow j} := (k_1, \tilde{ct}_j)$ to \mathcal{A} . This completes the simulation. If $v = k_1$ is generated from f_0 , then the view is totally the same as $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,v}(b)$. If $v = k_1$ is generated from f_1 , then the view is totally the same as $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{4,v}(b)$. Therefore, if \mathcal{A} can distinguish two experiment, \mathcal{B} can break the security of FSS. In fact, we use the FSS-security many times since there could be multiple i such that $(i, j) \in E^*$. However, we only write the case for one since the extension to the multiple i case is straightforward by hybrid arguments. ■

Lemma 5.7. *If Σ_{i^*} is IND-CPA secure PKE, then it holds that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{4,Q}(0) \stackrel{c}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{4,Q}(1)$.*

Proof. We construct an adversary \mathcal{B} of Σ_{i^*} , which is given pk_{i^*} as a target public key. To use \mathcal{A} of UPRE, \mathcal{B} generates key pairs $(pk_{i'}, sk_{i'})$ for all $i' \in \text{HList} \setminus \{i^*\}$. \mathcal{B} sets pk_{i^*} as a public-key of user i^* . In experiments $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{4,Q}(b)$, sk_{i^*} is not used anywhere by the definition of the experiments. When (i^*, j) is queried to $\mathcal{O}_{\text{rekey}}$ such that $(i^*, j) \in E^*$, \mathcal{B} can generate a re-encryption key without sk_{i^*} . When (i^*, j, k) is queried to $\mathcal{O}_{\text{reenc}}$ such that $j \in \text{CList} \wedge k \notin \text{Drv}$ and $(ct_i, \Sigma_i, i, \#CT, m) \in \text{KeyCTList}$, \mathcal{B} can generate a re-encrypted ciphertext without sk_{i^*} as we see above. When (i^*, m_0, m_1) is queried to the challenge oracle \mathcal{O}_{cha} , then \mathcal{B} passes (m_0, m_1) to the challenger of IND-CPA game of Σ_{i^*} and receives a target ciphertext $ct_{i^*}^*$. \mathcal{B} returns $ct_{i^*}^*$ to \mathcal{A} . If \mathcal{A} can distinguish two experiments, then \mathcal{B} can break the security of Σ_{i^*} since $ct_{i^*}^* = \text{Enc}_{i^*}(pk_{i^*}, m_0)$ and $ct_{i^*}^* = \text{Enc}_{i^*}(pk_{i^*}, m_1)$ perfectly simulate $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^4(0)$ and $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^4(1)$, respectively. ■

On Relation between δ -correctness of FSS and CPA-security of UPRE_{fss} . If our goal is the CPA-security, then we can use the relaxed correctness of FSS (δ -correctness where $\delta = 1/\text{poly}(\lambda)$), which is achieved by the DDH-based construction. This is because we do not need the hybrid experiments $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^1(b)$ and $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^2(b)$ in Theorem 5.2 for the CPA-security (these hybrids are for HRA-security) and we do not use μ -correctness where $\mu < \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

5.3 Extension to Constant-Hop Scheme

The scheme UPRE_{fss} in Section 5.1 is, in fact, a constant multi-hop scheme. In UPRE_{fss} , $\text{rct} \in \mathcal{C}_t^2$ and we can re-encrypt this rct again to index t' by using $\text{rk}_{t \rightarrow t'}$. However, this incurs polynomial blow-up. Therefore, we can apply this only constant times. The decryption algorithm for L -times re-encrypted ciphertext is an easy extension of the 2-times case (i.e., UPRE_{fss} in Section 5.1). We can peel off the encryption layers one by one. Encrypting (ct_f, y_1) by pk_t does not degrade the security. We can prove the security of the constant multi-hop scheme similar to that of UPRE_{fss} by combining the proof strategy in Section 4. Thus, we omit the detail.

5.4 Instantiation of UPRE scheme based on FSS

We introduce known instantiations of FSS in this section. By combining those instantiations with our general construction of UPRE based on FSS, we can obtain various instantiations of UPRE.

From LWE. Dodis et al. [DHRW16] construct a spooky encryption scheme from the LWE assumption and present an FSS scheme for circuits by using spooky encryption.

Definition 5.8 (Spooky Encryption [DHRW16]). We say that $\text{SPK} = (\text{SPK.Gen}, \text{SPK.Enc}, \text{SPK.Dec}, \text{SPK.Eval})$ is an ϵ -additive-function-sharing-spooky (ϵ -AFS-spooky) encryption scheme if SPK satisfies the following.

1. $(\text{SPK.Gen}, \text{SPK.Enc}, \text{SPK.Dec})$ is a CPA-secure PKE scheme.
2. SPK is weak ϵ -AFS-spooky: For any Boolean circuit C computing an m -argument function $g : \{\{0, 1\}^*\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$, and any set of inputs (x_1, \dots, x_m) for C , it holds that

$$\Pr \left[\bigoplus_{i=1}^m y_i = C(x_1, \dots, x_m) \mid \begin{array}{l} (\text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\lambda), \text{ct}_i \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{pk}_i, x_i), \\ (\text{ct}'_1, \dots, \text{ct}'_m) \leftarrow \text{SPK.Eval}(C, \{(\text{pk}_i, \text{ct}_i)\}_{i \in [m]}), \\ y_i \leftarrow \text{Dec}(\text{sk}_i, \text{ct}'_i) \end{array} \right] \geq 1 - \epsilon(\lambda).$$

3. For any subset $S \subset [m]$ of size at most $(m - 1)$, $\{y_i\}_{i \in S}$ are ϵ -close to uniform.

If Gen takes a depth parameter 1^d as an additional input and the conditions above hold only for circuits of depth at most d , then SPK is ϵ -leveled-AFS-spooky encryption.

Dodis et al. [DHRW16] construct a (leveled) ϵ -AFS-spooky encryption scheme for $\epsilon = \alpha \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda)$ from multi-key homomorphic encryption based on the LWE assumption (if circular security is assumed, non-leveled) and additive secret sharing.

Theorem 5.9 ([DHRW16]). If we assume the hardness of α -LWE, then there exists a leveled ϵ -AFS-spooky encryption scheme for $\epsilon = \alpha \cdot d \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda)$. Moreover, if we also use a circular security assumption, then we obtain a (non-leveled) ϵ -AFS-spooky encryption scheme.

It is believed to be safe to set $\alpha \in n^{-\omega(1)}$ as long as $\alpha \notin 2^{-\Omega(n)}$ [Reg09, Pei09] (in general, n is a polynomial of λ), so we use AFS-spooky encryption hereafter.

For confirmation, we review the FSS scheme $\text{FSS}_{\text{spk}} := (\text{FSS}_{\text{spk}}.\text{Gen}, \text{FSS}_{\text{spk}}.\text{Eval})$ presented by Dodis et al. [DHRW16]. Let $\text{SPK} := (\text{SPK.Gen}, \text{SPK.Enc}, \text{SPK.Dec}, \text{SPK.Eval})$ be a leveled AFS-spooky encryption scheme.

$\text{FSS}_{\text{spk}}.\text{Gen}(1^\lambda, f)$:

1. Generate m shares f_1, \dots, f_m of f by using an m -out-of- m secret sharing scheme.
2. Generate m key pairs $(\text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i)_{i \in [m]}$ by $(\text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i) \leftarrow \text{SPK.Gen}(1^\lambda)$.
3. Generate $\text{ct}_{f_i} \leftarrow \text{SPK.Enc}(\text{pk}_i, f_i)$ for all $i \in [m]$.

4. Set $k_i := (\text{sk}_i, \text{pk}_1, \dots, \text{pk}_m, \text{ct}_{f_1}, \dots, \text{ct}_{f_m})$ for all $i \in [m]$ and output (k_1, \dots, k_m) .

$\text{FSS}_{\text{SPK}}.\text{Eval}(i, k_i, x)$:

1. Parse $k_i = (\text{sk}_i, \text{pk}_1, \dots, \text{pk}_m, \text{ct}_{f_1}, \dots, \text{ct}_{f_m})$
2. Define a circuit $C[x]$ described in Figure 4.
3. $(\hat{\text{ct}}_1, \dots, \hat{\text{ct}}_m) \leftarrow \text{SPK}.\text{Eval}(C[x], (\text{pk}_i, \text{ct}_{f_i})_{i \in [m]})$.
4. Output $y_i := \text{SPK}.\text{Dec}(\text{sk}_i, \hat{\text{ct}}_i)$.




Figure 4: The description of $C[x]$

Theorem 5.10 ([DHRW16, BGI⁺18]). *If there exists a leveled ϵ -AFS-spooky encryption scheme, then there exists a secure $(m, m - 1)$ - ϵ -FSS scheme for circuits.*

By Theorems 5.9 and 5.10, the following holds.

Theorem 5.11 ([DHRW16, BGI⁺18]). *Under the hardness of α -LWE for $\alpha \in n^{-\omega(1)} \wedge \alpha \notin 2^{-\Omega(n)}$, then there exists a secure $(m, m - 1)$ -FSS (satisfies δ -correctness where $\delta < \text{negl}(\lambda)$) scheme for circuits.*

Corollary 5.12. *Our unidirectional single-hop (resp. constant-hop) UPRE scheme UPRE_{fss} in Section 5.1 (resp. Section 5.3) is UPRE-HRA secure for any IND-CPA secure PKE under the hardness of α -LWE for $\alpha \in n^{-\omega(1)} \wedge \alpha \notin 2^{-\Omega(n)}$.*

It is believed to be safe to set $\alpha \in n^{-\omega(1)}$ as long as $\alpha \notin 2^{-\Omega(n)}$ [Reg09, Pei09, DHRW16]

From DDH. Boyle et al. present a $(2, 1)$ - δ -FSS scheme for NC^1 based on the DDH assumption [BGI16].

Theorem 5.13 ([BGI16]). *Under the DDH assumption, then there exists a $(2, 1)$ - δ -FSS scheme for NC^1 where $\delta = 1/\text{poly}(\lambda)$.*

The FSS scheme for NC^1 by Boyle et al. [BGI16] *does not* satisfy δ -correctness where $\delta < \text{negl}(\lambda)$ since it uses a share conversion procedure that converts a multiplicative secret sharing of g^x (g is a generator of a group) to an additive secret sharing of x and incurs small correctness errors. See their paper [BGI16] for more details. Thus, if we assume the DDH assumption, we do not achieve UPRE-HRA security but UPRE-CPA security as we explain it at the last paragraph in Section 5.2.

Corollary 5.14. *Our unidirectional single-hop (resp. constant-hop) UPRE scheme UPRE_{fss} in Section 5.1 (resp. Section 5.3) is UPRE-CPA secure for PKE whose decryption circuit is in NC^1 under the hardness of DDH.*

From IO. Boyle et al. [BGI15] present a $(m, m - 1)$ -FSS scheme for \mathbf{P}/poly based on IO.

Theorem 5.15 ([BGI15]). *Assume that there exists sub-exponentially secure IO and sub-exponentially secure OWF, then there exists a secure $(2, 1)$ -FSS scheme (satisfies δ -correctness where $\delta < \text{negl}(\lambda)$) for \mathbf{P}/poly .*

Corollary 5.16. *Our unidirectional single-hop (resp. constant-hop) UPRE scheme UPRE_{fss} in Section 5.1 (resp. Section 5.3) is UPRE-HRA secure for any IND-CPA secure PKE under the existence of sub-exponentially secure IO and sub-exponentially secure OWF.*

6 Multi-Hop Construction based on Garbled Circuits and OT

In this section, we provide a UPRE scheme using garbled circuits and OT. The main idea of the construction provided here is that the re-encryptor delegates decryption to the target node via garbled circuits.

6.1 Our Multi-Hop Scheme from GC and OT

Our scheme $\text{UPRE}_{\text{otgc}}$ is based on a garbling scheme (Garble, Eval), a two-message oblivious transfer protocol (OT.Slct, OT.Send, OT.Dec) and a 2-player secret-sharing scheme (Share, Reconstruct). As in Section 4, we overload the notation $\Sigma_{\sigma_i} = (\text{Gen}_{\sigma_i}, \text{Enc}_{\sigma_i}, \text{Dec}_{\sigma_i})$ by $\Sigma_i = (\text{Gen}_i, \text{Enc}_i, \text{Dec}_i)$ for ease of notation. Moreover, we sometimes write labels instead of $\{\text{labels}_{k,b}\}_{k \in [n], b \in \{0,1\}}$ if it is clear from the context for ease of notation. We also denote by labels_s labels selected by s , that is, $\{\text{labels}_{i,s_i}\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$. Moreover, $\widetilde{\text{labels}}$ basically denotes selected labels output by OT.Dec.

- $\text{ReKeyGen}(1^\lambda, \Sigma_f, \Sigma_t, \text{sk}_f, \text{pk}_t)$:
 - Compute $(s_1, s_2) \leftarrow \text{Share}(\text{sk}_f)$
 - Compute $(\text{ot.st}, \text{ot.m}_1) \leftarrow \text{OT.Slct}(s_1)$.
 - Compute $\tilde{\text{ct}}_t \leftarrow \text{Enc}_t(\text{pk}_t, (s_1, \text{ot.st}))$
 - Output $\text{rk}_{f \rightarrow t} := (\text{ot.m}_1, s_2, \tilde{\text{ct}}_t)$.
- $\text{ReEnc}(\Sigma_f, \Sigma_t, \text{rk}_{f \rightarrow t}, \text{ct}_f)$:
 - Parse $\text{rk}_{f \rightarrow t} = (\text{ot.m}_1, s_2, \tilde{\text{ct}}_t)$.
 - Parse $\text{ct}_f = (\text{ot.m}'_2, \tilde{\text{ct}}_f, \tilde{\text{C}}_{i-1}, \dots, \tilde{\text{C}}_1)$.
 - If $i = 1$ set $\text{C} \leftarrow \text{P}[s_2, \text{ct}_f]$; Else if $i > 1$ set $\text{C} \leftarrow \text{Q}[s_2, \text{ot.m}'_2, \tilde{\text{ct}}_f]$
 - Compute $(\tilde{\text{C}}_i, \text{labels}) \leftarrow \text{Garble}(\text{C})$.
 - Compute $\text{ot.m}_2 \leftarrow \text{OT.Send}(\text{ot.m}_1, \text{labels})$.
 - Output $(\text{ot.m}_2, \tilde{\text{ct}}_t, \tilde{\text{C}}_i, \dots, \tilde{\text{C}}_1)$
- $\text{mDec}(\Sigma_t, \text{sk}_t, \text{rct})$: Parse $\text{rct} = (\text{ot.m}_2, \tilde{\text{ct}}_t, \tilde{\text{C}}_i, \dots, \tilde{\text{C}}_1)$.
 - Compute $(s'_1, \text{ot.st}') \leftarrow \text{Dec}(\text{sk}_t, \tilde{\text{ct}}_t)$.
 - Compute $\widetilde{\text{labels}}_i \leftarrow \text{OT.Dec}((s'_1, \text{ot.st}'), \text{ot.m}_2)$.
 - For $j = i, \dots, 2$ do: Compute $\widetilde{\text{labels}}_{j-1} \leftarrow \text{Eval}(\tilde{\text{C}}_j, \widetilde{\text{labels}}_j)$.
 - Compute and output $m' \leftarrow \text{Eval}(\tilde{\text{C}}_1, \widetilde{\text{labels}}_1)$.




Figure 5: The description of the first level re-encryption circuit P




Figure 6: The description of the higher level re-encryption circuit Q

Correctness. We now turn to the correctness of $(\text{ReKeyGen}, \text{ReEnc}, \text{mDec})$. We will show correctness via induction.

We will first show correctness for level 1 ciphertext. Let thus $\text{rct} = (\text{ot.m}_2, \tilde{\text{ct}}_t, \tilde{\text{C}}_1)$ be a level 1 ciphertext, where $(\tilde{\text{C}}_1, \widetilde{\text{labels}}) \leftarrow \text{Garble}(P[s_2, \text{ct}_f])$, $\text{ot.m}_2 = \text{OT.Send}(\text{ot.m}_1, \widetilde{\text{labels}})$ and $\tilde{\text{ct}}_t = \text{Enc}_t(\text{pk}_t, (s_1, \text{ot.st}))$. Consider the computation of $\text{mDec}(\Sigma_t, sk_t, \text{rct})$. By the correctness of Σ_t it holds that $(s'_1, \text{ot.st}') = \text{Dec}(sk_t, \tilde{\text{ct}}_t) = (s_1, \text{ot.st})$. Next, by the correctness of the two-message OT protocol $(\text{OT.Slct}, \text{OT.Send}, \text{OT.Dec})$ it holds that $\widetilde{\text{labels}} = \text{OT.Dec}((s_1, \text{ot.st}), \text{ot.m}_2) = \widetilde{\text{labels}}_{s_1}$. Thus, by the correctness of the garbling scheme $(\text{Garble}, \text{Eval})$ it holds that $\text{Eval}(\tilde{\text{C}}_1, \widetilde{\text{labels}}) = \text{Eval}(\tilde{\text{C}}_1, \widetilde{\text{labels}}_{s_1}) = P[s_2, \text{ct}_f](s_1)$. By the definition of P , $P[s_2, \text{ct}_f](s_1)$ computes $sk_f \leftarrow \text{Reconstruct}(s_1, s_2)$ and outputs $m' \leftarrow \text{Dec}_f(sk'_f, \text{ct}_f)$. Thus, by the correctness of $(\text{Share}, \text{Reconstruct})$ it holds that $sk'_f = sk_f$ and finally by the correctness of Σ_f we get that $m' = m$.

Now assume that decryption is correct for level $(i - 1)$ ciphertexts and consider a ciphertext $\text{rct} = (\text{ot.m}_2, \tilde{\text{ct}}_t, \tilde{\text{C}}_i, \dots, \tilde{\text{C}}_1)$ at level $i > 1$. As before, it holds that $(\tilde{\text{C}}_i, \widetilde{\text{labels}}) \leftarrow \text{Garble}(Q[s_2, \text{ot.m}'_2, \tilde{\text{ct}}_f])$, $\text{ot.m}_2 = \text{OT.Send}(\text{ot.m}_1, \widetilde{\text{labels}})$ and $\tilde{\text{ct}}_t = \text{Enc}_t(\text{pk}_t, (s_1, \text{ot.st}))$. Again consider the computation of $\text{mDec}(\Sigma_t, sk_t, \text{rct})$. By the correctness of Σ_t it holds that $(s'_1, \text{ot.st}') = \text{Dec}(sk_t, \tilde{\text{ct}}_t) = (s_1, \text{ot.st})$. Next, by the correctness of the OT protocol $(\text{OT.Slct}, \text{OT.Send}, \text{OT.Dec})$ it holds that $\widetilde{\text{labels}} = \text{OT.Dec}((s_1, \text{ot.st}), \text{ot.m}_2) = \widetilde{\text{labels}}_{s_1}$. Thus, by the correctness of the garbling scheme $(\text{Garble}, \text{Eval})$ it holds that $\text{Eval}(\tilde{\text{C}}_i, \widetilde{\text{labels}}_i) = \text{Eval}(\tilde{\text{C}}_i, \widetilde{\text{labels}}_{s_1}) = Q[s_2, \text{ot.m}'_2, \tilde{\text{ct}}_f](s_1)$.

Notice now that we can substitute $Q[s_2, \text{ot.m}'_2, \tilde{\text{ct}}_f](s_1)$ by

- Compute $sk'_f \leftarrow \text{Reconstruct}(s_1, s_2)$.
- Compute $(s'_1, \text{ot.st}') \leftarrow \text{Dec}(sk'_f, \tilde{\text{ct}}_f)$.
- Compute $\widetilde{\text{labels}} \leftarrow \text{OT.Dec}((s'_1, \text{ot.st}'), \text{ot.m}'_2)$.

By the correctness of $(\text{Share}, \text{Reconstruct})$ it holds that $sk'_f = \text{Reconstruct}(s_1, s_2) = sk_f$. By inspection we see that the remaining steps of the computation are identical to the decryption of a level $(i - 1)$ ciphertext. The induction hypothesis provides that decryption is correct for level $(i - 1)$ ciphertexts and we are done.

6.2 Security Proof

Theorem 6.1 (UPRE-HRA security). *Assume that $\text{gc} = (\text{Garble}, \text{Eval})$ is a selectively secure garbling scheme, $(\text{Share}, \text{Reconstruct})$ is a 2-out-of-2 secret sharing scheme and $(\text{OT.Slct}, \text{OT.Send}, \text{OT.Dec})$ is a 2-message oblivious transfer protocol in the sense of Definition 2.9, and both Σ_f and Σ_t are IND-CPA secure PKE, then $\text{UPRE}_{\text{otgc}}$ is selectively UPRE-HRA secure.*

Proof. We define a sequence of hybrid experiments $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^x(b)$. We emphasize differences among hybrid experiments by using red underlines. Hereafter, $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^x(b) \approx \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^y(b)$ denotes $|\Pr[\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^x(b) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^y(b) = 1]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

Say that a ciphertext ct is a level i re-encryption, if ct is of the form $\text{ct} = (\text{ot.m}_2, \tilde{\text{ct}}_t, \tilde{\text{C}}_i, \dots, \tilde{\text{C}}_1)$, i.e. ct is the result of i re-encryptions.

$\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^0(b)$: The first experiment is the original security experiment for b , $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{ms-upre-hra}}(1^\lambda, b)$. That is, $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^0(b) = \text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{ms-upre-hra}}(1^\lambda, b)$. Note that in the successive experiments, we can easily simulate all keys outside of G^*

since vertices in $V \setminus V^*$ are not connected to the target vertex and simulators can generate keys for them by itself.

$\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{0'}(b)$: This experiment is the same as $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^0(b)$ except that we guess the target vertex i^* that will be queried to challenge oracle \mathcal{O}_{cha} and abort if the guess is incorrect. The guess is correct with probability $1/|V^*|$, so $\Pr[\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{0'}(b) = 1] = \frac{1}{|V^*|} \cdot \Pr[\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^0(b) = 1]$.

$\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^1(b)$: In this hybrid we record not only $(\text{rct}_i, \Sigma_i, i, \#CT)$ but also m in KeyCTList for encryption query (i, m) .

Moreover, for each re-encryption query, store the value $\widetilde{\text{labels}} = \text{labels}_{s_1}$.

The modification between $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{0'}(b)$ and $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^1(b)$ is merely syntactic, thus it holds that $\Pr[\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{0'}(b) = 1] = \Pr[\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^1(b) = 1]$.

We will now replace re-encrypted ciphertexts by simulated re-encrypted ciphertexts. For re-encryption query (\hat{i}, j, k) such that (\hat{i}, j) is not an admissible edge with respect to $G = (V, E)$ and $k \notin \text{Drv}$, the re-encrypted ciphertext is differently generated by a modified re-encryption procedure. We can assume \hat{i} is honest since we do not need guarantee anything if \hat{i} is not honest. The goal of the processes below is erasing secret keys of honest vertices queried by re-encryption queries. We repeat the processes below for $u = 1, \dots, Q_{\text{reenc}}$ where Q_{reenc} is the total number of tuples (\hat{i}, j, k) such that (\hat{i}, j) is not an admissible edge with respect to $G = (V, E)$ and $k \notin \text{Drv}$. The changes in experiments below are for re-encryption query for u -th tuple (\hat{i}, j, k) such that (\hat{i}, j) is not an admissible edge with respect to $G = (V, E)$ and $k \notin \text{Drv}$.

$\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,u,1}(b)$: This is the same as $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,(u-1),3}$ except that: Retrieve s_1 of \hat{i} ,

- Parse $\text{rk}_{\hat{i} \rightarrow j} = (\text{ot}.m_1, s_2, \tilde{\text{ct}}_j)$ and $\text{ct}_{\hat{i}} = (\text{ot}.m'_2, \tilde{\text{ct}}_{\hat{i}}, \tilde{C}_{l-1}, \dots, \tilde{C}_1)$.
- If $l = 1$ set $C \leftarrow P[s_2, \text{ct}_{\hat{i}}]$; Else if $l > 1$ set $C \leftarrow Q[s_2, \text{ot}.m'_2, \tilde{\text{ct}}_{\hat{i}}]$
- Compute $(\tilde{C}_l, \text{labels}) \leftarrow \text{Garble}(C)$.
- Compute $\text{ot}.m_2 \leftarrow \text{OT.Sim}(\text{ot}.m_1, \text{labels}_{s_1})$.
- Output $(\text{ot}.m_2, \tilde{\text{ct}}_j, \tilde{C}_l, \dots, \tilde{C}_1)$

That is, we compute $\text{ot}.m_2$ via $\text{OT.Sim}(\text{ot}.m_1, \text{labels}_{s_1})$ instead of $\text{OT.Send}(\text{ot}.m_1, \text{labels})$.

$\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,u,2}(b)$: This is the same as $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,u,1}$ except that: Retrieve s_1 of \hat{i} ,

- Parse $\text{rk}_{\hat{i} \rightarrow j} = (\text{ot}.m_1, s_2, \tilde{\text{ct}}_j)$ and $\text{ct}_{\hat{i}} = (\text{ot}.m'_2, \tilde{\text{ct}}_{\hat{i}}, \tilde{C}_{l-1}, \dots, \tilde{C}_1)$.
- If $l = 1$ set $C \leftarrow P[s_2, \text{ct}_{\hat{i}}]$; Else if $l > 1$ set $C \leftarrow Q[s_2, \text{ot}.m'_2, \tilde{\text{ct}}_{\hat{i}}]$
- Compute $(\tilde{C}_l, \widetilde{\text{labels}}) \leftarrow \text{GCSim}(C(s_1))$
- Compute $\text{ot}.m_2 \leftarrow \text{OT.Sim}(\text{ot}.m_1, \widetilde{\text{labels}})$.
- Output $(\text{ot}.m_2, \tilde{\text{ct}}_j, \tilde{C}_l, \dots, \tilde{C}_1)$

$\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,u,3}(b)$: This is the same as $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,u,2}(b)$ except that: Retrieve m and labels $\widetilde{\text{labels}}'$ (corresponding to $\text{ot}.m'_2$),

- Parse $\text{rk}_{\hat{i} \rightarrow j} = (\text{ot}.m_1, s_2, \tilde{\text{ct}}_j)$ and $\text{ct}_{\hat{i}} = (\text{ot}.m'_2, \tilde{\text{ct}}_{\hat{i}}, \tilde{C}_{l-1}, \dots, \tilde{C}_1)$.
- If $l = 1$ compute $(\tilde{C}_l, \widetilde{\text{labels}}) \leftarrow \text{GCSim}(m)$; Else if $l > 1$ compute $(\tilde{C}_l, \widetilde{\text{labels}}) \leftarrow \text{GCSim}(\widetilde{\text{labels}}')$
- Compute $\text{ot}.m_2 \leftarrow \text{OT.Sim}(\text{ot}.m_1, \widetilde{\text{labels}})$.
- Output $(\text{ot}.m_2, \tilde{\text{ct}}_j, \tilde{C}_l, \dots, \tilde{C}_1)$

For syntactic convention, we let $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,0,3}(b) := \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^1(b)$. Moreover, notice that at hybrid $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1, Q_{\text{reenc}}, 3}(b)$ all re-encryption queries are simulated without using secret keys (or more specifically, without values that depend on secret keys).

Process for removing sk_{i^*} of the target vertex. Now, we focus on vertices in V^* connected via admissible edges. To use the security of Σ_{i^*} , we need remove information about sk_{i^*} from all re-encryption keys in $G^* = (V^*, E^*)$ possibly connected to i^* . For all (honest) vertex $j \in V^*$ that have incoming edge (i, j) such that $i \in V^*$ and do not have outgoing edge (j, j') for some j' , we repeat the processes below for $v = 1, \dots, Q$ where Q is the total number of admissible edges connected to target vertex i^* . We let Dlist be the list of vertices whose re-encryption key consists of a simulated and dummy values. That is, if $j \in \text{Dlist}$, then $rk_{i \rightarrow j} = (\text{ot.m}_1, s_2, \text{Enc}(\text{pk}_j, 0^n))$ where $(\text{ot.st}, \text{ot.m}_1) \leftarrow \text{OT.Slct}(0^n)$ and $(s_1, s_2) \leftarrow \text{Share}(0^n)$ for any i . We initialize $\text{Dlist} := \emptyset$ and maintain Dlist during the repeated processes below.

In the following hybrids we modify the key-generation for honest vertices. That is, all changes in the experiments are in the computation of $rk_{i \rightarrow j}$.

$\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{2,v,1}(b)$:

- Compute $(s_1, s_2) \leftarrow \text{Share}(sk_i)$
- Compute $(\text{ot.st}, \text{ot.m}_1) \leftarrow \text{OT.Slct}(s_1)$.
- Compute $\tilde{\text{ct}}_j \leftarrow \text{Enc}_j(\text{pk}_j, 0^n)$
- Output $rk_{i \rightarrow j} := (\text{ot.m}_1, s_2, \tilde{\text{ct}}_j)$.

That is, we compute $\tilde{\text{ct}}_j \leftarrow \text{Enc}_j(\text{pk}_j, 0^n)$ instead of $\tilde{\text{ct}}_j \leftarrow \text{Enc}_j(\text{pk}_j, (s_1, \text{ot.st}))$.

$\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{2,v,2}(b)$:

- Compute $(s_1, s_2) \leftarrow \text{Share}(sk_i)$
- Compute $(\text{ot.st}, \text{ot.m}_1) \leftarrow \text{OT.Slct}(0^n)$.
- Compute $\tilde{\text{ct}}_j \leftarrow \text{Enc}_j(\text{pk}_j, 0^n)$
- Output $rk_{i \rightarrow j} := (\text{ot.m}_1, s_2, \tilde{\text{ct}}_j)$.

$\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{2,v,3}(b)$:

- Compute $(s_1, s_2) \leftarrow \text{Share}(0^n)$
- Compute $(\text{ot.st}, \text{ot.m}_1) \leftarrow \text{OT.Slct}(0^n)$.
- Compute $\tilde{\text{ct}}_j \leftarrow \text{Enc}_j(\text{pk}_j, 0^n)$
- Output $rk_{i \rightarrow j} := (\text{ot.m}_1, s_2, \tilde{\text{ct}}_j)$ and renew $\text{Dlist} := \text{Dlist} \cup \{j\}$.

For syntactic convention, we let $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{2,0,3}(b) := \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1, Q_{\text{reenc}}, 3}(b)$.

Now, we prove indistinguishability of hybrid games. First notice that by correctness of (Share, Reconstruct) and (OT.Slct, OT.Send, OT.Dec) the modification between $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,u,2}(b)$ and $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,u,3}(b)$ is merely syntactic and the following lemma holds.

Lemma 6.2. *It holds $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,u,2}(b) = \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,u,3}(b)$.*

Indistinguishability of $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,(u-1),3}(b)$ and $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,u,1}(b)$ is shown in Lemma 6.3, whereas indistinguishability of $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,u,1}(b)$ and $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,u,2}(b)$ is shown in Lemma 6.4.

Lemma 6.3. *If (OT.Slct, OT.Send, OT.Dec) is sender private against semi-honest receiver, then it holds that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,u,1}(b) \approx \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,(u-1),3}(b)$.*

Proof (Sketch): We will construct a reduction \mathcal{B} which breaks the sender security of (OT.Slct, OT.Send, OT.Dec). The reduction \mathcal{B} guesses an index k of an edge in the graph and an index i of a query. All re-encryption queries for which either the index of the edge is smaller than k and the index of the query is smaller than i are handled as in $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^1(b)$, and all for which either the index of the edge is greater than k or the index of the query is greater than i are handled as in $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,1}(b)$. For the query with edge-index k and query-index i , \mathcal{B} embeds its own challenge. That is, \mathcal{B} sends s_1 and labels to the experiment and obtains $(\text{ot.st}, \text{ot.m}_1, \text{ot.m}_2)$. It then uses these values in its own simulation. Clearly, if $\text{ot.m}_2 = \text{OT.Send}(\text{ot.m}_1, \text{labels})$, then this query is handled as in $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^1(b)$. On the other hand, if $\text{ot.m}_2 = \text{OT.Sim}(\text{ot.m}_1, \text{labels}_{s_1})$, then the query is handled as in $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,1}(b)$. It follows via a standard argument that $\text{Adv}(\mathcal{B}) > \frac{1}{\text{poly}(\lambda)} \cdot |\Pr[\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,1}(b) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^1(b) = 1]|$. ■

Lemma 6.4. *If $gc = (\text{Garble}, \text{Eval})$ is a selectively secure garbling scheme, then it holds that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,u,2}(b) \approx \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,u,1}(b)$.*

Proof (Sketch): We will construct a reduction \mathcal{B} which breaks the security of $(\text{Garble}, \text{Eval})$. As in the proof of Lemma 6.3, \mathcal{B} will embed its challenge in edge k and query i . That is, \mathcal{B} sends (C, s_1) to the experiment and obtains $(\tilde{C}, \widetilde{\text{labels}})$. It then uses these values in its own simulation. Clearly, if $(\tilde{C}, \widetilde{\text{labels}}) = \text{Grbl}(C)$ and $\widetilde{\text{labels}} = \text{labels}_{s_1}$, then this query is handled as in $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,1}(b)$. On the other hand, if $(\tilde{C}, \widetilde{\text{labels}}) = \text{GCSim}(C(s_1))$, then the query is handled as in $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,2}(b)$. It follows via a standard argument that $\text{Adv}(\mathcal{B}) > \frac{1}{\text{poly}(\lambda)} \cdot |\Pr[\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,2}(b) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,1}(b) = 1]|$. ■

Lemma 6.5. *If Σ_j is CPA-secure, then it holds that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{2,(v-1),3} \stackrel{\mathcal{C}}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{2,v,1}$.*

Proof. This immediately follows from the CPA-security. ■

Lemma 6.6. *If OT is receiver private, then it holds that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{2,v,2}(b) \stackrel{\mathcal{C}}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{2,v,1}(b)$*

Proof. This immediately follows from the receiver privacy of $(\text{OT.Slct}, \text{OT.Send}, \text{OT.Dec})$ since s_1 is not used in $\tilde{c}t_j$ at this point. ■

Lemma 6.7. *If $(\text{Share}, \text{Reconstruct})$ is 2-out-of-2 secret sharing scheme, then it holds that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{2,v,2}(b) \stackrel{\mathcal{S}}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{2,v,3}(b)$.*

Proof. This immediately follows from the security of $(\text{Share}, \text{Reconstruct})$ since s_1 is not used anywhere at this point. ■

In $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{2,Q,3}(b)$, sk_{i^*} is neither written in any re-encryption key nor used to generate a re-encrypted ciphertext. Thus, we can use the security of Σ_{i^*} . As in Lemma 4.9, we can prove that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{2,Q,3}(0) \stackrel{\mathcal{C}}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{2,Q,3}(1)$ holds due to the CPA-security of Σ_{i^*} . Therefore, it holds that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^0(0) \stackrel{\mathcal{C}}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^0(1)$ since Q_{reenc} , Q and $|V^*|$ are polynomials. ■

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A Re-Encryption Simulatability

We review the notion of re-encryption simulatability of PRE by Cohen. For the syntax and standard CPA-security of PRE, see previous works [Coh17a, ABH09]. Roughly speaking, re-encryption simulatability means that a re-encrypted ciphertext generated from $rk_{i \rightarrow j}$ and ct_i under pk_i can be simulated without $rk_{i \rightarrow j}$ if pk_i , pk_j , ct_i , and m are given where ct_i is an encryption of m under pk_j . Moreover, the simulated re-encrypted ciphertext is *statistically* indistinguishable from the honestly generated re-encrypted ciphertext even if sk_i , sk_j , $rk_{i \rightarrow j}$ are given as auxiliary information. The definition below is found an older version of the paper by Choen [Coh17b, Definition 7].

Definition A.1 (Re-Encryption Simulatability). A proxy re-encryption scheme is re-encryption simulatable if there exists a PPT algorithm ReEncSim such that for all $m \in \mathcal{M}$

$$(\text{ReEncSim}(pk_i, pk_j, ct_i, m), z) \stackrel{s}{\approx} (\text{ReEnc}(rk_{i \rightarrow j}, ct_i), z),$$

where $pp \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$, $(pk_i, sk_i) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(pp)$, $(pk_j, sk_j) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(pp)$, $rk_{i \rightarrow j} \leftarrow \text{ReKeyGen}(sk_j, pk_i)$, $ct_i \leftarrow \text{Enc}(pk_j, m)$, $z := (pp, pk_i, sk_i, pk_j, sk_j, ct_i, rk_{i \rightarrow j})$.

Theorem A.2 ([Coh17b]). If a PRE scheme is PRE-CPA secure and re-encryption simulatable, then it is PRE-HRA secure.

We can consider re-encryption simulatability for UPRE as Definition A.3.

Definition A.3 (Re-encryption simulatability for UPRE). A UPRE scheme is re-encryption simulatable if there exists a PPT algorithm ReEncSim such that for all $m \in \mathcal{M}$

$$(\text{ReEncSim}(pk_f, pk_t, ct_f, m), z) \stackrel{s}{\approx} (\text{ReEnc}(rk_{f \rightarrow t}, ct_f), z),$$

where $(pk_f, sk_f) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\sigma_f}(1^{\lambda_f})$, $(pk_t, sk_t) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\sigma_t}(1^{\lambda_t})$, $rk_{f \rightarrow t} \leftarrow \text{ReKeyGen}(sk_f, pk_t)$, $ct_f \leftarrow \text{Enc}(pk_f, m)$, $z := (pk_f, sk_f, pk_t, sk_t, ct_f, rk_{f \rightarrow t})$.

Remark A.4. Cohen updated his paper and revised the re-encryption simulatability [Coh17a]. In the latest definition, ReEncSim takes sk_j as an input too, and $(sk_i, rk_{i \rightarrow j})$ are not given as auxiliary input. We leave the old version above and the next subsection as they are for consistency of this paper. See the latest version⁸ for the updated definition [Coh17a, Definition 7].

A.1 Our Relaxed UPRE schemes are not Re-Encryption Simulatable

A re-encrypted ciphertext of UPRE_{fss} is $\text{rct} = (\hat{ct}_t, \tilde{ct}_t)$ where $\hat{ct}_t \leftarrow \text{Enc}_t(pk_t, (ct_f, y_1))$, $y_1 = \text{FSS.Eval}(1, k_1, ct_f)$, $ct_f \leftarrow \text{Enc}_f(pk_f, m)$, and $\tilde{ct}_t \leftarrow \text{Enc}_t(pk_t, k_2)$. We can simulate ct_f since we have m . However, we do not know how to simulate y_1 and \tilde{ct}_t in a *statistically* indistinguishable way because a simulator ReEncSim does not have sk_f in the re-encryption simulatability setting. Due to a similar reason, $\text{UPRE}_{\text{otgc}}$ does not satisfy Definition A.3.

However, as we see in the proof of Theorem 5.2 (in particular, Lemmata 5.3 and 5.4), we can simulate y_1 and \tilde{ct}_t in a *computationally* indistinguishable way by using the secrecy and ϵ -correctness where ϵ is negligible of FSS. The point is that sk_f (delegator's key) is not revealed to adversaries though sk_t (delegatee's key) is revealed when

⁸Version 20181016:203338 on eprint.

we consider honest re-encryption attacks. Moreover, in that case (delegator's key is corrupted), the re-encryption key $\text{rk}_{f \rightarrow t} = (k_1, \tilde{\text{ct}}_t)$ is not given to adversaries. That is, we do not need k_1 when delegator/delegatee are honest/corrupted, respectively. Therefore, we can simulate the honest encryption oracle in an indistinguishable way in the proof of Theorem 5.2 without re-encryption simulatability. We can observe a similar fact in the proof of Theorem 6.1 (in particular, hybrid games from $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,1}(b)$ to $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,3}(b)$).

Based on the observation above, it seems that giving sk_f and $\text{rk}_{f \rightarrow t}$ to adversaries makes the re-encryption simulatability stronger. Moreover, there is a possibility to weaken re-encryption simulatability, yet the weaker simulatability still implies the HRA security. We introduce such a weaker simulatability in the next section.

A.2 Weak Re-Encryption Simulatability

We can consider a weak re-encryption simulatability for UPRE (and PRE).

Definition A.5 (Weak Re-encryption simulatability for UPRE). Let ReEncSim be a PPT simulator. We define the following experiments $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{D}}^{\text{w-re-sim}}(1^\lambda, b)$ between a challenger and a distinguisher \mathcal{D} as follows.

1. The challenger chooses a bit $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ and generates $(\text{pk}_f, \text{sk}_f) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_f(1^{\lambda_f})$, $(\text{pk}_t, \text{sk}_t) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_t(1^{\lambda_t})$, and sends $(1^{\lambda_f}, \text{pk}_f, 1^{\lambda_t}, \text{pk}_t, \text{sk}_t)$ to \mathcal{D} .
2. The challenger and \mathcal{D} do the setup phase as in Definition 3.9 and set $\text{HList} := \text{HList} \cup \{f\}$ and $\text{CList} := \text{CList} \cup \{t\}$.
3. \mathcal{D} has the re-encryption key oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{rekey}}$ as in Definition 3.9.
4. \mathcal{D} chooses a message $m \in \mathcal{M}_f$, generates a ciphertext $\text{ct}_f \leftarrow \text{Enc}_f(\text{pk}_f, m)$ and sends (m, ct_f) to the challenger.
5. If $b = 0$, the challenger computes $\text{rk}_{f \rightarrow t} \leftarrow \text{ReKeyGen}(\text{sk}_f, \text{pk}_t)$ and $\text{ct}^* \leftarrow \text{ReEnc}(\text{rk}_{f \rightarrow t}, \text{ct}_f)$ and returns ct^* to \mathcal{D} . Otherwise, the challenger returns $\text{ct}^* \leftarrow \text{ReEncSim}(\text{pk}_f, \text{pk}_t, \text{ct}_f, m)$.
6. \mathcal{D} outputs $b' \in \{0, 1\}$. The experiment outputs b' .

We say that UPRE is weakly re-encryption simulatable if there exists a simulator ReEncSim , for any PPT \mathcal{D} , it holds that

$$|\Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{D}}^{\text{w-re-sim}}(1^\lambda, 0) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{D}}^{\text{w-re-sim}}(1^\lambda, 1) = 1]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

The difference between the re-encryption simulatability and a weak one is that sk_f and $\text{rk}_{f \rightarrow t}$ are not given as auxiliary inputs, and the indistinguishability is only computational. Moreover, the distinguisher is given oracle access to the re-encryption key oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{rekey}}$. Note that $\mathcal{O}_{\text{rekey}}$ does not give $\text{rk}_{f \rightarrow t}$ since $f \in \text{HList} \wedge t \in \text{CList}$. This weak variant is sufficient to prove UPRE-HRA security. That is, we can prove that if a UPRE scheme is UPRE-CPA secure and weakly re-encryption simulatable, then it is UPRE-HRA secure.

Theorem A.6. If a UPRE scheme UPRE is multi-hop selectively UPRE-CPA secure and satisfies weak re-encryption simulatability, then UPRE is multi-hop selectively UPRE-HRA secure.

Proof. We define hybrid games.

$\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^0(b)$: The first experiment is the original security experiment for b , $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{ms-upre-hra}}(1^\lambda, b)$. That is, $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^0(b) = \text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{ms-upre-hra}}(1^\lambda, b)$. Note that in the successive experiments, we can easily simulate all keys outside of G^* since vertices in $V \setminus V^*$ are not connected to the target vertex and simulators can generate keys for them by itself.

$\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^1(b)$: This experiment is the same as $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^0(b)$ except that

1. we record not only $(\text{ct}_i, \Sigma_i, i, \#CT)$ but also m in KeyCTList for honest encryption query (i, m) and
2. for re-encryption query (i, j', k) such that $j' \in \text{CList} \wedge k \notin \text{Drv}$, the re-encrypted ciphertext is differently generated as follows. First, we retrieve $(\text{ct}_i, \Sigma_i, i, \#CT = k, m)$ from KeyCTList (if there is no such an entry, just outputs \perp). Then, we compute the following value instead of computing $\text{rk}_{i \rightarrow j'}$.
 - (a) $\text{rct} \leftarrow \text{ReEncSim}(\text{pk}_i, \text{pk}_{j'}, \text{ct}_i, m)$.

Finally, we set rct as a re-encrypted ciphertext for user j' and send it to \mathcal{A} .

Note that for (i, j') such that $i \in \text{HList} \wedge j' \in \text{CList}$, we do not need sk_i and $\text{rk}_{i \rightarrow j'}$ since we just output \perp for such re-encryption key query (i, j') . The change above is for ciphertexts that \mathcal{A} can decrypt. Here, \mathcal{A} can obtain $\text{sk}_{j'}$ since user j' is corrupted. However, it is not an issue since a distinguisher is given $\text{sk}_{j'}$ as auxiliary input in the weak re-encryption simulatability game. In Lemma A.7, we prove that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^1(b) \stackrel{s}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^0(b)$ holds due to the weak re-encryption simulatability.

In Lemma A.8, we prove that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^1(0) \stackrel{c}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^1(1)$ holds due to the UPRE-CPA security of Σ_{i^*} . Therefore, it holds that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^0(0) \stackrel{c}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^0(1)$ by Lemmata A.7 and A.8 ■

Lemma A.7. *If UPRE is weakly re-encryption simulatable, then it holds $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^0(b) \stackrel{c}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^1(b)$.*

Proof. In fact, we use q' intermediate hybrids to prove this where q' is the number of uncorrupted key pk_i such that re-encryption query (i, j', k) is sent and $i \in \text{HList} \wedge j \in \text{CList} \wedge k \notin \text{Drv}$. For each hybrid, we use the weak re-encryption simulatability. Below, we write only the case for one pk_i for simplicity.

We construct a distinguisher \mathcal{D} of the weak re-encryption simulatability. To use \mathcal{A} of UPRE, \mathcal{D} generates key pairs $(\text{pk}_{i'}, \text{sk}_{i'})$ for all $i' \in \text{HList} \setminus \{i\}$ and $i' \in \text{CList} \setminus \{j'\}$. For $\text{pk}_i, \text{pk}_{j'}, \text{sk}_{j'}$, we use keys $(1^{\lambda_i}, \text{pk}_i, 1^{\lambda_{j'}} \text{pk}_{j'}, \text{sk}_{j'})$ from the challenger, which is given to \mathcal{D} . The only issue is that we do not have sk_i and $\text{rk}_{i \rightarrow j'}$. First, we do not need $\text{rk}_{i \rightarrow j'}$ since $i \in \text{HList} \wedge j' \in \text{CList}$. Second, for re-encryption keys (i, \hat{j}) such that $\hat{j} \in \text{HList}$, \mathcal{D} passes the query (i, \hat{j}) to the re-encryption key oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{rekey}}$ in the weak re-encryption simulatability game, receives $\text{rk}_{i \rightarrow \hat{j}}$, and returns it to \mathcal{A} . This is possible since $i, \hat{j} \in \text{HList}$. Therefore, \mathcal{B} can simulate all oracles.

However, to use \mathcal{A} , \mathcal{D} simulates $\mathcal{O}_{\text{reenc}}$ in a slightly different way. As we define $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^1(b)$, the simulation for query (i, j', k) to $\mathcal{O}_{\text{reenc}}$ such that $j' \in \text{CList} \wedge k \notin \text{Drv}$ and $(\text{ct}_i, \Sigma_i, i, \#\text{CT}, m) \in \text{KeyCTList}$ is different. When \mathcal{D} receives a re-encryption query for such (i, j', k) , \mathcal{D} generates $\text{ct}_i \leftarrow \text{Enc}_i(\text{pk}_i, m)$ and sends it to the challenger of the weak re-encryption simulatability game. If \mathcal{D} is given ct^* , then \mathcal{D} returns ct^* as a re-encrypted ciphertext for (i, j', k) . Note that \mathcal{B} does not need sk_i for this query. This completes the simulation. If $\text{ct}^* = \text{ReEnc}(\text{rk}_{i \rightarrow j'}, \text{ct}_i)$ where $\text{rk}_{i \rightarrow j'} \leftarrow \text{ReKeyGen}(\text{sk}_i, \text{pk}_{j'})$, then the view is totally the same as $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^1(b)$. If $\text{ct}^* \leftarrow \text{ReEncSim}(\text{pk}_i, \text{pk}_{j'}, \text{ct}_i, m)$, then the view is totally the same as $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^2(b)$. Therefore, if \mathcal{A} can distinguish two experiment, \mathcal{D} can break the weak re-encryption simulatability. ■

Lemma A.8. *If UPRE is UPRE-CPA secure, then it holds $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^1(0) \stackrel{c}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^1(1)$.*

Proof. We construct an adversary \mathcal{B} of UPRE-CPA, which is given oracle access to $\mathcal{O}_{\text{rekey}}, \mathcal{O}_{\text{reenc}}, \mathcal{O}_{\text{cha}}$ and can send honest/corrupted key queries. To use a distinguisher \mathcal{A} of these two hybrids, \mathcal{B} must simulate oracles of the HRA security. Basically, \mathcal{B} can easily simulate them by using its oracles except \mathcal{O}_{enc} and $\mathcal{O}_{\text{reenc}}$ (note that re-encryption key oracles in the CPA/HRA-security are the same). Moreover, it is easy to simulate \mathcal{O}_{enc} since all encryption keys are public. The only issue is the simulation of $\mathcal{O}_{\text{reenc}}$ in the case that re-encryption queries (i, j', k) such that $j' \in \text{CList} \wedge k \notin \text{Drv}$ are sent. This is already solved since we use ReEncSim in these hybrids. Thus, \mathcal{B} can simulate all oracles by using its oracles and ReEncSim .

When (i^*, m_0, m_1) is queried to the challenge oracle \mathcal{O}_{cha} , then \mathcal{B} passes (i^*, m_0, m_1) to the challenger of the CPA game and receives a target ciphertext $\text{ct}_{i^*}^*$. \mathcal{B} returns $\text{ct}_{i^*}^*$ to \mathcal{A} . If \mathcal{A} can distinguish two experiments, then \mathcal{B} can break the CPA security since $\text{ct}_{i^*}^* = \text{Enc}_{i^*}(\text{pk}_{i^*}, m_0)$ and $\text{ct}_{i^*}^* = \text{Enc}_{i^*}(\text{pk}_{i^*}, m_1)$ perfectly simulate $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^1(0)$ and $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^1(1)$, respectively. ■

B CRA Security of Our FSS-Based Relaxed UPRE

In Section 5, we introduce the extra encryption technique not only to achieve a constant-hop scheme but also to prevent a corrupted delegator from decrypting re-encrypted ciphertexts by using their secret key. In this section, we prove that UPRE_{fss} satisfies UPRE-CRA security defined in Section 3.5.

Theorem B.1 (UPRE-CRA security). *Assume that FSS is secure (2,1)-FSS and both Σ_f and Σ_t are IND-CPA secure PKE, then UPRE_{fss} in Section 5.1 is selectively UPRE-CRA secure.*

Proof. The proof is basically the same as that of Theorem 5.2 in Section 5.2 except that we need two more hybrids in addition to the hybrids in Theorem 5.2. Thus, we write only the new hybrids.

$\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^5(b)$: This experiment is the same as $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{4,Q}(b)$ except that for all query (i_{-1}, i^*) to $\mathcal{O}_{\text{rekey}}$ such that $i_{-1} \in \text{CList}$, ciphertext $\tilde{\text{ct}}_{i^*}$ in the re-encryption key $\text{rk}_{i_{-1} \rightarrow i^*}$ is generated by $\text{Enc}_{i^*}(\text{pk}_{i^*}, \underline{0^{\ell_{i^*}}})$ instead of $\text{Enc}_{i^*}(\text{pk}_{i^*}, k_2)$. We can prove that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^5(b) \stackrel{c}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{4,Q}(b)$ hold due to the CPA-security of Σ_{i^*} in a similar way to Lemma 5.5.

$\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^6(b)$: This experiment is the same as $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^6(b)$ except that for the challenge query (i_c, i^*, m_0, m_1) to \mathcal{O}_{cha} , $\widehat{\text{ct}}_{i^*}$ in the target ciphertext rct_{i^*} is generated by $\text{Enc}_{i^*}(\text{pk}_{i^*}, \underline{0^{\ell_{i^*}}})$ instead of $\text{Enc}_{i^*}(\text{pk}_{i^*}, (\text{ct}_{i_c}, y_1))$ where $\text{ct}_{i_c} \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{i_c}(\text{pk}_{i_c}, m_b)$. Note that we can easily simulate $\text{rk}_{i_{-1} \rightarrow i^*}$ for $i_{-1} \in \text{CList}$ since sk_{-1} is revealed. We prove that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^6(b) \stackrel{c}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^5(b)$ hold due to the CPA-security of Σ_{i^*} in Lemma B.2.

In $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^6(b)$, $\text{rct}_{i^*} = (\text{Enc}_{i^*}(\text{pk}_{i^*}, 0^{\ell_{i^*}}), \text{Enc}_{i^*}(\text{pk}_{i^*}, 0^{\ell_{i^*}}))$. Thus, it is easy to see that the advantage of \mathcal{A} is just $\frac{1}{2}$ since there is no information about b in these hybrids. Thus, $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^6(0) = \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^6(1) = \frac{1}{2}$ and the theorem follows. ■

Lemma B.2. *If Σ_{i^*} is IND-CPA secure PKE, then it holds that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^5(b) \stackrel{c}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{4,Q}(b)$.*

Proof. We can prove in a similar way to the proof of Lemma 5.5, so we omit this. ■

Lemma B.3. *If Σ_{i^*} is IND-CPA secure PKE, then it holds that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^6(b) \stackrel{c}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^5(b)$.*

Proof. We construct an adversary \mathcal{B} of Σ_{i^*} , which is given pk_{i^*} as a target public key. To use \mathcal{A} of UPRE, \mathcal{B} generates key pairs $(\text{pk}_{i'}, \text{sk}_{i'})$ for all $i' \in \text{HList} \setminus \{i^*\}$. \mathcal{B} sets pk_{i^*} as a public-key of user i^* . In experiments $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{4,Q}(b)$, sk_{i^*} is not used anywhere by the definition of the experiments. When (i^*, j) is queried to $\mathcal{O}_{\text{rekey}}$ such that $(i^*, j) \in E^*$, \mathcal{B} can generate a re-encryption key without sk_{i^*} . When (i^*, j, k) is queried to $\mathcal{O}_{\text{reenc}}$ such that $j \in \text{CList} \wedge k \notin \text{Drv}$ and $(\text{ct}_i, \Sigma_i, i, \#CT, m) \in \text{KeyCTList}$, \mathcal{B} can generate a re-encrypted ciphertext without sk_{i^*} as we see above. When (i_c, i^*, m_0, m_1) is queried to the challenge oracle \mathcal{O}_{cha} , then \mathcal{B} passes $((\text{ct}_{i_c}, y_1), 0^{\ell_{i^*}})$ where $\text{ct}_{i_c} \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{i_c}(\text{pk}_{i_c}, m_b)$ and $y_1 \leftarrow \text{FSS.Eval}(k_1, \text{ct}_{i_c})$ to the challenger of IND-CPA game of Σ_{i^*} and receives a target ciphertext $\widehat{\text{ct}}_{i^*}$. \mathcal{B} returns $(\widehat{\text{ct}}_{i^*}, \text{Enc}_{i^*}(\text{pk}_{i^*}, 0^{\ell_{i^*}}))$ to \mathcal{A} . If \mathcal{A} can distinguish two experiments, then \mathcal{B} can break the security of Σ_{i^*} since the case $\widehat{\text{ct}}_{i^*} = \text{Enc}_{i^*}(\text{pk}_{i^*}, (\text{ct}_{i_c}, y_1))$ and the case $\widehat{\text{ct}}_{i^*} = \text{Enc}_{i^*}(\text{pk}_{i^*}, 0^{\ell_{i^*}})$ perfectly simulate $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^5(b)$ and $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^6(b)$, respectively. ■