

No-signaling Linear PCPs

Susumu Kiyoshima

NTT Secure Platform Laboratories
kiyoshima.susumu@lab.ntt.co.jp

Abstract. In this paper, we give a no-signaling linear probabilistically checkable proof (PCP) system for \mathcal{P} , i.e., a PCP system such that (1) the PCP oracle is a linear function and (2) the soundness holds against any (computational) no-signaling cheating prover, who answers each query according to a distribution that depends on the entire query set in a certain way. To the best of our knowledge, our construction is the first PCP system that satisfies these two properties simultaneously.

As an application of our PCP system, we obtain a 2-message scheme for delegating computation by using a known transformation. Compared with existing 2-message delegation schemes based on standard cryptographic assumptions, our scheme requires preprocessing (which can be reused multiple times) but has a simpler structure and makes use of cheaper cryptographic primitives such as additive/multiplicative homomorphic encryption schemes.

1 Introduction

(Linear) PCP. *Probabilistically checkable proofs*, or PCPs, are proof systems with which one can probabilistically verify the correctness of statements with bounded soundness error by reading only a few bits of proof strings. A central result about PCPs are the *PCP theorem* [AS98, ALM⁺98], which states that every \mathcal{NP} statement has a PCP system such that the proof string is polynomially long and the verification requires only a constant number of bits of the proof string (the soundness error is a small constant, and can be reduced by repetition).

An important application of PCPs to Cryptography is *succinct argument systems*, i.e., argument systems that have very small communication complexity and fast verification time. A famous example of such argument systems is that of Kilian [Kil92], which uses PCPs as follows.

1. To prove an \mathcal{NP} statement, the prover first generates a polynomially long PCP proof (which is guaranteed to exist by the PCP theorem), and makes a succinct commitment to it by using Merkle’s tree-hashing technique (so that later each bit of the committed proof can be opened individually).
2. The verifier queries a few bits of the PCP proof just like the PCP verifier, and the prover reveals those bits by appropriately opening the commitment.

This argument system of Kilian has communication complexity and verification time that depend on the classical \mathcal{NP} verification time only logarithmically; that is, a proof for the membership of an instance x in an \mathcal{NP} language L has communication complexity and verification time $\text{poly}(\lambda + |x| + \log t)$, where λ is the security parameter, t is the time to evaluate the \mathcal{NP} relation of L on x , and poly is a polynomial that is independent of L . Subsequently, Kilian’s technique was extended to obtain succinct non-interactive argument systems (SNARGs) for \mathcal{NP} in the random oracle model [Mic00] as well as in the standard model with non-falsifiable assumptions (such as the existence of extractable hash functions), e.g., [BCC⁺17, DFH12].¹

¹ Actually, SNARGs in the standard model require the existence of common reference strings, and some constructions of them further require that the verifier has some private information about the common reference strings.

Recently, the studies of succinct argument systems have been boosted by the use of a specific type of PCPs called *linear PCPs*, which are PCPs such that the honest proofs are linear functions (i.e., the honest proof strings are the truth tables of linear functions).² (The proof strings of linear PCPs are exponentially long in general, but each bit of the proof strings can be computed efficiently by evaluating the underlying linear functions.) A nice property of linear PCPs is that they often have much simpler structures than the polynomially long PCPs that are obtained from the PCP theorem; as a result, the use of linear PCPs lead to simpler constructions of succinct argument systems. Concretely, the use of linear PCPs in the context of succinct argument systems was initiated by Ishai, Kushilevitz, and Ostrovsky [IKO07], who used them for constructing an argument system for \mathcal{NP} with a laconic prover (i.e., a prover that sends to the verifier only short messages). Subsequently, several works obtain practical implementations of the argument system of Ishai et al. [SBW11, SMBW12, SVP⁺12, SBV⁺13, VSBW13], whereas others extended the technique of Ishai et al. for the use for SNARGs and obtained practical implementations of *preprocessing SNARGs* (i.e., SNARGs that require expensive (but reusable) preprocessing setups) [BCI⁺13, BCG⁺13, BCTV14].

No-signaling PCP. Very recently, Kalai, Raz, Rothblum [KRR13, KRR14] found that PCPs with a stronger soundness guarantee called *soundness against no-signaling provers* is useful for constructing 2-message succinct argument systems under standard assumptions. Roughly speaking, a PCP system is sound against no-signaling provers if no proof can fool the verifier even when the proof is chosen from a distribution that depends on the verifier queries in a certain way. (The standard soundness does not guarantee soundness in this situation since it requires the proof string to be fixed before the verifier makes queries.)

Concretely, Kalai et al. [KRR13, KRR14] showed that (polynomially long) PCPs that are sound against no-signaling provers, or *no-signaling PCPs* in short, can be used to obtain 2-message succinct argument systems for \mathcal{P} under standard assumptions, namely the existence of quasi-polynomially secure fully homomorphic encryption schemes or private information retrieval schemes. The succinct argument systems of Kalai et al. differ from the prior ones in that, although the argument systems of Kalai et al. work only for deterministic computation, they require only two messages and is proven secure under standard assumptions. (In contrast, the argument system of Kilian requires four messages and prior SNARG systems are proven secure only in ideal models such as the random oracle model or under non-falsifiable knowledge-type assumptions.)

As observed in [KRR13, KRR14], 2-message succinct argument systems for \mathcal{P} have a direct application in *delegating computation* [GKR08] (or *verifiable computation* [GGP10]). Consider a setting where there exist a computationally weak client and a computationally powerful server, and the client wants to delegate a heavy computation to the server. Given a 2-message succinct argument system, the client can delegate the computation to the server in such a way that it can verify the correctness of the server’s computation very efficiently (i.e., much faster than doing the computation from scratch).

After the results of Kalai et al. [KRR13, KRR14], delegation schemes based on no-signaling PCPs have been extensively studied. Kalai and Paneth [KP16] extend the results of Kalai et al. [KRR14] to deterministic RAM computation, and Brakerski et al. [BHK17] further extend it so that the scheme is adaptively sound (i.e., sound even when the statement is chosen after the verifier’s message) and in addition can be based on polynomially hard standard cryptographic assumptions. Paneth and Rothblum [PR17] give an adaptively sound delegation scheme for deterministic RAM computation with

² In general, soundness is required to hold against any (possibly non-linear) functions; linear PCPs with this notion of soundness is sometimes called “strong linear PCPs” [BCI⁺13].

public verifiability (i.e., with a property that not only the verifier but also anyone can verify proofs) albeit with the use of a new cryptographic assumption. Badrinarayanan et al. [BKK⁺17] give an adaptively sound delegation scheme for low-space non-deterministic computation (i.e., non-deterministic computation whose space complexity is much smaller than time complexity) under sub-exponentially hard cryptographic assumptions.

All of these works use no-signaling PCPs with polynomial length; as a result, their delegation schemes have more complex structures than those that can be obtained from, e.g., the preprocessing SNARGs based on linear PCPs [BCI⁺13, BCG⁺13, BCTV14].

1.1 Our Results

In this paper, we study the problem of constructing *no-signaling linear PCPs*, i.e., linear PCPs that are sound against no-signaling provers. Our main motivation is to obtain a PCP that inherits good properties from both of linear PCPs and no-signaling PCPs. Therefore, our goal is to obtain a no-signaling linear PCP that can be used to obtain a 2-message delegation scheme that is secure under standard cryptographic assumptions (like those that are based on no-signaling PCPs) and has a simple structure (like those that are based on linear PCPs).

Main Result: No-signaling linear PCP for \mathcal{P} . The main result of this paper is an unconditional construction of no-signaling linear PCPs. We focus our attention on PCPs that proves correctness of arithmetic circuit computation, so our construction handles statements of the form $(C, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})$, where C is a polynomial-size arithmetic circuit and the statement to be proven is “ $C(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{y}$ holds.”

Theorem (informal). *There exists a no-signaling linear PCP for the correctness of polynomial-size arithmetic circuit computation. The proof generation algorithm runs in time $\text{poly}(|C|)$, the verifier query algorithm runs in time $\text{poly}(\lambda + |C|)$, and the verifier decision algorithm runs in time $\text{poly}(\lambda + |\mathbf{x}| + |\mathbf{y}|)$.*

(A formal statement of this theorem is given as [Theorem 1](#) in [Section 5](#).) To the best of our knowledge, our construction is the first linear PCP that is sound against no-signaling provers.

Our no-signaling linear PCP inherits simplicity from existing linear PCPs. Indeed, the proof string of our PCP is identical with that of the well-known linear PCP of Arora et al. [ALM⁺98]. Regarding the verifier, we added slight modifications to that of Arora et al. to simplify the analysis; however, we do not think that these modifications are fundamental.

The analysis of our PCP is, at a high level, a combination of the analysis of the linear PCP of Arora et al. [ALM⁺98] and that of the no-signaling PCP of Kalai et al. [KRR14], but there is an important modification in the analysis of no-signaling soundness. Specifically, unlike the analysis of Kalai et al., our analysis does not require that the statement is represented by an “augmented layered circuit,” and only requires that it is represented by a layered circuit,³ so our PCP can work on much smaller and simpler circuits. (The downside of this modification is that the analysis of no-signaling soundness becomes a little more complex. Specifically, we cannot use the notion of *local-assignment generators* [PR17] to analyze no-signaling soundness in a modular way.) We think that this modification may be of independent interest; for more details, see [Section 3.4](#).

³ Our analysis does not require the space complexity of the computation to be bounded either.

Application: Delegation scheme for \mathcal{P} in the preprocessing model. As an application of our no-signaling linear PCP, we construct a 2-message delegation scheme for \mathcal{P} under standard cryptographic assumptions. Just like previous linear-PCP-based delegation schemes and succinct arguments (such as that of [BCI⁺13]), our delegation scheme works in the *preprocessing model*, so our scheme uses expensive offline setups that can be used for proving multiple statements. When the statement is $(C, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})$, the running time of the client is $\text{poly}(\lambda + |C|)$ in the offline phase and is $\text{poly}(\lambda + |\mathbf{x}| + |\mathbf{y}|)$ in the online phase. Our delegation scheme is adaptively secure in the sense that the input \mathbf{x} can be chosen in the online phase, and is “designated-verifier type” in the sense that the verification requires a secret key. We obtain our delegation scheme by applying the transformation of Kalai et al. [KRR13, KRR14] on our no-signaling linear PCP. (The transformation of Kalai et al. transform a no-signaling PCP to a 2-message delegation scheme for \mathcal{P} .)

Compared with the existing 2-message delegation schemes based on polynomially long no-signaling PCPs (such as that of Kalai et al. [KRR14]), our scheme requires preprocessing, but has a simple structure and uses much cheap tools thanks to the use of linear PCPs. Concretely, thanks to the use of linear PCPs, we can avoid the use of expensive tools like fully homomorphic encryption schemes or 2-message private information retrieval schemes, and can instead use much cheap tools like additive homomorphic encryption schemes over prime-order fields (such as that of Goldwasser and Micali [GM84]) or multiplicative homomorphic encryption schemes over prime-order bilinear groups (such as the DLIN-based linear encryption scheme by Boneh et al. [BBS04]).

1.2 Related Work

No-signaling linear PCP. As noted above, to the best of our knowledge our PCP is the first no-signaling linear PCP. In a very recent independent work, Chiesa et al. [CMS18] analyze Linearity Test against no-signaling adversaries, where Linearity Test is an important component of existing linear PCPs.

Delegation scheme. Delegation schemes (and closely related verifiable computation schemes) have been extensively studied in literature. Other than those that we mentioned above, existing results that are related to ours are the following. (We focus our attention on non-interactive or 2-message delegation schemes for all deterministic or non-deterministic polynomial-time computation.)

DELEGATION SCHEMES FOR NON-DETERMINISTIC COMPUTATION. As mentioned above, the existing constructions of (preprocessing) SNARGs, such as [Gro10, Lip12, DFH12, BC12, GGPR13, BCI⁺13, BCCT13, Lip13, DFGK14, Gro16, BISW17, BCC⁺17], can be used to obtain delegation schemes for \mathcal{NP} , and some of them can be used even to obtain publicly verifiable ones. The security of these SNARG-based delegation schemes holds under non-standard assumptions (e.g., knowledge assumptions) or in non-standard models (e.g., the generic group model). Compared with these schemes, our scheme works only for \mathcal{P} and requires preprocessing, but can be proven secure in the standard model under a standard assumption (namely the existence of homomorphic encryption schemes).

DELEGATION SCHEMES FOR DETERMINISTIC COMPUTATION. As noted above, several recent works obtain delegation schemes for \mathcal{P} without preprocessing by using no-signaling PCPs. In addition to these works, there are plenty of works that obtain delegation schemes for \mathcal{P} without using PCPs. Concretely, some works obtain schemes with preprocessing by using fully homomorphic encryption or attribute-based encryption schemes [GGP10, CKV10, PRV12], and others obtain schemes without preprocessing by using multi-linear maps or indistinguishability obfuscators (e.g., [BGL⁺15, CHJV15, CH16,

CCHR16, K LW15, CCC⁺16, ACC⁺16]). Compared with these schemes, our scheme requires pre-processing but only uses relatively simple building blocks (namely a linear PCP and a homomorphic encryption scheme).

1.3 Outline

In Section 2, we introduce basic notations and definitions. In Section 3, we give an overview of our no-signaling linear PCP. In Section 4, we introduce additional notations and definitions that we use in the subsequent sections. In Section 5, we formally describe our no-signaling linear PCP. In Section 6 to Section 10, we analyze the no-signaling soundness of our PCP. In Section 11, we describe the application to delegation schemes.

2 Preliminaries (Part 1)

In this section, we introduce notations and definitions that we use in the technical overview in Section 3. (Additional preliminaries are given in Section 4.)

2.1 Basic Notations

We denote the security parameter by λ . Let \mathbb{N} be the set of all natural numbers. For any $k \in \mathbb{N}$, let $[k] \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{1, \dots, k\}$.

We denote a vector in a bold shape (e.g., \mathbf{v}). For a vector $\mathbf{v} = (v_1, \dots, v_\lambda)$ and a set $S \subseteq [\lambda]$, let $\mathbf{v}|_S \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{v_i\}_{i \in S}$. Similarly, for a function $f : D \rightarrow R$ and a set $S \subseteq D$, let $f|_S \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{f(i)\}_{i \in S}$. For two vectors $\mathbf{u} = (u_1, \dots, u_\lambda)$, $\mathbf{v} = (v_1, \dots, v_\lambda)$ of the same length (where each element is a field element), let $\langle \mathbf{u}, \mathbf{v} \rangle \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \sum_{i \in [\lambda]} u_i v_i$ denote their inner product and $\mathbf{u} \otimes \mathbf{v} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (u_i v_j)_{i, j \in [\lambda]}$ denote their tensor product.⁴

2.2 No-signaling PCPs (Informal Description)

In this subsection, we informally describe the definition of no-signaling PCPs [KRR14]; the formal definition is given in Section 4. We assume familiarity with the definition of standard PCPs in this subsection and Section 3; the definition of standard PCPs is given in Section 4. We remark that we only consider PCP systems with *non-adaptive verifiers* [BG09], i.e., those such that the verifier can be decomposed into two algorithms, V_0, V_1 , such that V_0 samples queries to the PCP proof and V_1 verifies the answers from the PCP proof. Additionally, we assume that for a statement $(C, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})$, V_0 can sample queries without knowing \mathbf{x} and \mathbf{y} . (This assumption is required since we focus on adaptive soundness against no-signaling cheating provers.)

No-signaling PCPs are the PCP systems that guarantee soundness against a stronger class of cheating provers called no-signaling cheating provers. The main difference between no-signaling cheating provers and normal cheating provers is that, while a normal cheating prover is required to output a PCP proof π^* before seeing verifier queries Q , a no-signaling cheating prover is allowed to output π^* after seeing Q . There is however an important restriction on the distribution of π^* ; roughly speaking, it is required that for any (not too large) sets Q, Q' such that $Q' \subset Q$, the distribution of $\pi^*|_{Q'}$ when the query set is Q should be indistinguishable from the distribution of it when the query set is Q' .

⁴ In this paper, the tensor product of two vectors are viewed as a vector (with an appropriate ordering of the elements) rather than a matrix.

A little more formally, no-signaling cheating prover is defined as follows. Let (P, V) be any PCP system and $\{C_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ be any circuit family, where when the statement is about C_λ , the honest PCP proofs of (P, V) are functions with domain D_{C_λ} and range Σ_{C_λ} . Now, consider a cheating prover P^* with the following syntax.

- Given the security parameter 1^λ , the circuit C_λ , and a set of queries $Q \subset D_{C_\lambda}$ as input, P^* outputs an input \mathbf{x} of C_λ , an output \mathbf{y} of C_λ , and a partial function $\pi^* : Q \rightarrow \Sigma_{C_\lambda}$. (Note that π^* can be viewed as a PCP proof whose domain is restricted to Q .)

Then, for any polynomial κ_{\max} , the cheating prover P^* is κ_{\max} -wise no-signaling if for any PPT distinguisher \mathcal{D} , there exists a negligible function negl such that for every $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ and every two sets $Q, Q' \subset D_{C_\lambda}$ such that $Q' \subset Q$ and $|Q| \leq \kappa_{\max}(\lambda)$, the distinguisher \mathcal{D} can distinguish the following two distributions with advantage at most $\text{negl}(\lambda)$.

- $\{(C_\lambda, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*|_{Q'}) \mid (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q)\}$
- $\{(C_\lambda, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) \mid (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q')\}$

Now, we define no-signaling PCPs as the PCP systems that satisfy soundness according to the following definition: A PCP system (P, V) is said to be *sound against κ_{\max} -wise no-signaling cheating provers* if for any circuit family $\{C_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ and any κ_{\max} -wise no-signaling cheating prover P^* , there exists a negligible function negl such that for every $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$,

$$\Pr \left[V_1(\text{st}_V, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) = 1 \wedge C_\lambda(\mathbf{x}) \neq \mathbf{y} \mid \begin{array}{l} (Q, \text{st}_V) \leftarrow V_0(1^\lambda, C_\lambda) \\ (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q) \end{array} \right] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) .$$

3 Technical Overview

In this section, we give an overview of our no-signaling linear PCP system.

Recall that our focus is on PCP systems for the correctness of arithmetic computation, which are PCP systems that take as input a tuple $(C, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})$ and prove that $C(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{y}$ holds. We focus on arithmetic circuits over prime-order fields. Given a circuit C , we use \mathbb{F} to denote the underlying finite field, N to denote the number of the wires,⁵ n to denote the number of the input gates, and m to denote the number of the output gates. We assume that the first n wires are the wires that takes the values of the input gates and the last m ones are those that takes the value of the output gates. In this overview we focus on circuits with output length 1 (i.e., $m = 1$).

3.1 Preliminary: Linear PCP of Arora et al. [ALM⁺98]

The construction and analysis of our PCP system is based on the linear PCP system of Arora et al. [ALM⁺98] (ALMSS linear PCP in short), so let us start by recalling it. We only describe the construction of ALMSS linear PCP in this subsection; good explanations of the analysis of ALMSS linear PCP can be found in, e.g., the textbook by Arora and Barak [AB09, Chapter 11.5].

⁵ We assume that for any gate with fan-out more than one, all the output wires from that gate share the same index $i \in [N]$.

Main tool: Walsh–Hadamard code. The main tool of ALMSS linear PCP system is Walsh–Hadamard code. Recall that Walsh–Hadamard code maps a string $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{F}^\ell$ to the linear function $\text{WH}_{\mathbf{v}} : \mathbf{x} \mapsto \langle \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{x} \rangle$. A useful property of Walsh–Hadamard code is that errors on codewords can be easily “self-corrected.” In particular, if a function f is $(1 - \delta)$ -close to a linear function \hat{f} (i.e., if there exists a linear function \hat{f} such that $\Pr[f(\mathbf{r}) = \hat{f}(\mathbf{r}) \mid \mathbf{r} \leftarrow \mathbb{F}^\ell] \geq 1 - \delta$), we can evaluate \hat{f} on any point $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{F}^\ell$ with error probability 2δ though the following simple probabilistic procedure.

Algorithm Self-Correct^f(x):

Choose random $\mathbf{r} \in \mathbb{F}^\ell$ and output $f(\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{r}) - f(\mathbf{r})$.

Construction of ALMSS linear PCP. On input (C, \mathbf{x}) , the prover P computes the PCP proof as follows. First, P computes $y := C(\mathbf{x})$ and then obtains the following system of quadratic equations over \mathbb{F} . Intuitively, the system has variables that represent the wire values of C , and the equations in the system guarantee that (1) the correct input values $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$ are assigned on the input gates, (2) each gate is correctly computed, and (3) the claimed output value y is assigned on the output gate. Formally, the system of equations is defined as follows.

- The variables are $\mathbf{z} = (z_1, \dots, z_N)$.
- For each $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$, the system has the equation $z_i = x_i$.
- For each $i, j, k \in [N]$, the system has $z_i + z_j - z_k = 0$ if C has an addition gate with input wire i, j and output wire k , and has $z_i \cdot z_j - z_k = 0$ if C has a multiplication gate with input wire i, j and output wire k .
- The system has the equation $z_N = y$.

Let us denote this system of quadratic equations by $\Psi = \{\Psi_i(\mathbf{z}) = c_i\}_{i \in [M]}$, where M is the number of the equations. Then, P obtains the satisfying assignment $\mathbf{w} = (w_1, \dots, w_N)$ of Ψ through the wire values of C on \mathbf{x} , and outputs the two linear functions $\pi_f(\mathbf{v}) := \langle \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{w} \rangle$ and $\pi_g(\mathbf{v}') := \langle \mathbf{v}', \mathbf{w} \otimes \mathbf{w} \rangle$ as the PCP proof.⁶ (In short, the PCP proof is Walsh–Hadamard encodings of \mathbf{w} and $\mathbf{w} \otimes \mathbf{w}$.)

Next, on input (C, \mathbf{x}, y) , the verifier V verifies the PCP proof as follows. First, V obtains the system of equations $\Psi = \{\Psi_i(\mathbf{z}) = c_i\}_{i \in [M]}$. Then, V applies the following three tests on the PCP proof λ times in parallel.

1. **(Linearity Test.)** Choose random points $\mathbf{r}_1, \mathbf{r}_2 \in \mathbb{F}^N$ and $\mathbf{r}'_1, \mathbf{r}'_2 \in \mathbb{F}^{N^2}$ and check $\pi_f(\mathbf{r}_1) + \pi_f(\mathbf{r}_2) \stackrel{?}{=} \pi_f(\mathbf{r}_1 + \mathbf{r}_2)$ and $\pi_g(\mathbf{r}'_1) + \pi_g(\mathbf{r}'_2) \stackrel{?}{=} \pi_g(\mathbf{r}'_1 + \mathbf{r}'_2)$.
2. **(Tensor-Product Test.)** Choose two random points $\mathbf{r}_1, \mathbf{r}_2 \in \mathbb{F}^N$, run $a_{\mathbf{r}_1} \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{\pi_f}(\mathbf{r}_1)$, $a_{\mathbf{r}_2} \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{\pi_f}(\mathbf{r}_2)$, $a_{\mathbf{r}_1 \otimes \mathbf{r}_2} \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{\pi_g}(\mathbf{r}_1 \otimes \mathbf{r}_2)$, and check $a_{\mathbf{r}_1} a_{\mathbf{r}_2} \stackrel{?}{=} a_{\mathbf{r}_1 \otimes \mathbf{r}_2}$.
3. **(SAT Test.)** Choose a random point $\sigma = (\sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_M) \in \mathbb{F}^M$, compute $\Psi_\sigma(\mathbf{z}) := \sum_{i=1}^M \sigma_i \Psi_i(\mathbf{z})$, run $a_{\Psi_\sigma} \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{\pi_f}(\Psi_\sigma)$, $a_{\Psi'_\sigma} \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{\pi_g}(\Psi'_\sigma)$ for the coefficient vectors $\Psi_\sigma, \Psi'_\sigma$ such that $\langle \Psi_\sigma, \mathbf{z} \rangle + \langle \Psi'_\sigma, \mathbf{z} \otimes \mathbf{z} \rangle = \Psi_\sigma(\mathbf{z})$, and check $a_{\Psi_\sigma} + a_{\Psi'_\sigma} \stackrel{?}{=} c_\sigma$, where $c_\sigma := \sum_{i=1}^M \sigma_i c_i$.

COMMENT: Roughly, *Linearity Test* guarantees that π_f, π_g are sufficiently close to some linear functions \hat{f}, \hat{g} , *Tensor-Product Test* guarantees that \hat{f}, \hat{g} are Walsh–Hadamard encodings of $\hat{\mathbf{w}}, \hat{\mathbf{w}} \otimes \hat{\mathbf{w}}$ for some $\hat{\mathbf{w}} \in \mathbb{F}^N$, and *SAT Test* guarantees that $\hat{\mathbf{w}}$ is the satisfying assignment of Ψ .

⁶ Formally, P outputs a single linear function (with which the verifier can evaluate both π_f and π_g) as the PCP proof, but in this overview we simply think that the prover outputs two linear function as the PCP proof.

V accepts the proof if it passes these three tests in all the λ parallel trials. It is easy to see that, as mentioned at the beginning of [Section 2.2](#), the verifier can be decomposed into V_0 and V_1 , where V_0 samples queries to the tests and V_1 verifies the answers from the PCP proof. (Note that V_0 can sample all queries before knowing \mathbf{x} and y since the coefficient vectors $\psi_\sigma, \psi'_\sigma$ in SAT Test can be computed from C .)

3.2 Construction of Our No-signaling Linear PCP

The construction of our PCP system, (P, V) , is essentially identical with that of ALMSS linear PCP. There is a slight difference in the verifier algorithm (in our PCP system, Self-Correct samples many candidates of the self-corrected values and takes the majority), but we ignore this difference in this overview. It is easy to see that the running time of P is $\text{poly}(|C|)$, the running time of V_0 is $\text{poly}(\lambda + |C|)$, and the running time of V_1 is $\text{poly}(\lambda + |\mathbf{x}| + |y|)$.

3.3 Analysis of Our PCP

Roughly speaking, our goal is to show that our PCP system (P, V) is sound against κ_{\max} -wise no-signaling cheating provers for sufficiently large polynomial κ_{\max} . That is, our goal is to show that for every circuit family $\{C_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ and every κ_{\max} -wise no-signaling cheating prover P^* , we have

$$\Pr \left[V_1(\text{st}_V, \mathbf{x}, y, \pi^*) = 1 \mid \begin{array}{l} (Q, \text{st}_V) \leftarrow V_0(1^\lambda, C_\lambda) \\ (\mathbf{x}, y, \pi^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q) \end{array} \right] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) \quad (1)$$

for every $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$.

Toward this goal, for any sufficiently large κ_{\max} and any κ_{\max} -wise no-signaling cheating prover P^* , we assume that we have

$$\Pr \left[V_1(\text{st}_V, \mathbf{x}, y, \pi^*) = 1 \mid \begin{array}{l} (Q, \text{st}_V) \leftarrow V_0(1^\lambda, C_\lambda) \\ (\mathbf{x}, y, \pi^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q) \end{array} \right] \geq \frac{1}{\text{poly}(\lambda)} \quad (2)$$

for infinitely many $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ (let Λ be the set of those λ 's), and show that we have

$$\Pr \left[C_\lambda(\mathbf{x}) \neq y \mid \begin{array}{l} (Q, \text{st}_V) \leftarrow V_0(1^\lambda, C_\lambda) \\ (\mathbf{x}, y, \pi^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q) \end{array} \right] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) \quad (3)$$

for every sufficiently large $\lambda \in \Lambda$. Clearly, showing Equation (3) while assuming Equation (2) is sufficient for showing Equation (1).

To explain the overall structure of our analysis, we first analyze no-signaling soundness under the following (very strong) simplifying assumptions.

Simplifying Assumption 1. P^* convinces the verifier V with overwhelming probability. That is, we have

$$\Pr \left[V_1(\text{st}_V, \mathbf{x}, y, \pi^*) = 1 \mid \begin{array}{l} (Q, \text{st}_V) \leftarrow V_0(1^\lambda, C_\lambda) \\ (\mathbf{x}, y, \pi^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q) \end{array} \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) \quad (4)$$

for infinitely many $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$. (In what follows, we override the definition of Λ so that it denotes the set of these λ 's). \diamond

Simplifying Assumption 2. P^* creates a proof that passes each of Linearity Test, Tensor-Product Test, and SAT Test *on any points* with overwhelming probability. That is, for every sufficiently large $\lambda \in \Lambda$, we have the following. (We assume without loss of generality that P^* always outputs a PCP proof $\pi^* = (\pi_f^*, \pi_g^*)$ that consists of two functions π_f^* and π_g^* .)

– **(Linearity of π_f^* .)** For every $\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{F}^N$,

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} \pi_f^*(\mathbf{u}) + \pi_f^*(\mathbf{v}) \\ = \pi_f^*(\mathbf{u} + \mathbf{v}) \end{array} \middle| (\mathbf{x}, y, \pi^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \{\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{u} + \mathbf{v}\}) \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) , \quad (5)$$

– **(Linearity of π_g^* .)** For every $\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{F}^{N^2}$,

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} \pi_g^*(\mathbf{u}) + \pi_g^*(\mathbf{v}) \\ = \pi_g^*(\mathbf{u} + \mathbf{v}) \end{array} \middle| (\mathbf{x}, y, \pi^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \{\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{u} + \mathbf{v}\}) \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) , \quad (6)$$

– **(Tensor-Product Consistency of π_f^*, π_g^* .)** For every $\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{F}^N$,

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} \pi_f^*(\mathbf{u})\pi_g^*(\mathbf{v}) \\ = \pi_g^*(\mathbf{u} \otimes \mathbf{v}) \end{array} \middle| (\mathbf{x}, y, \pi^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \{\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{u} \otimes \mathbf{v}\}) \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) , \quad (7)$$

– **(SAT Consistency of π_f^*, π_g^* .)** For every $\sigma \in \mathbb{F}^M$,

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} \pi_f^*(\psi_\sigma) + \pi_g^*(\psi'_\sigma) \\ = c_\sigma \end{array} \middle| (\mathbf{x}, y, \pi^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \{\psi_\sigma, \psi'_\sigma\}) \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) . \quad (8)$$

◇

At the end of this subsection, we explain how we remove these simplifying assumptions in the actual analysis. (We remark that the analysis is not trivial even under these very strong simplifying assumptions since no-signaling cheating provers produce PCP proofs after seeing verifier queries and therefore their answers are not necessarily consistent with a single fixed function.)

Under the above two simplifying assumptions, the analysis proceeds as follows. Notice that if the statement is true and the PCP proof is correctly generated, then the first part of PCP proof, $\pi_f(\mathbf{v}) = \langle \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{w} \rangle$, is the linear function whose coefficient vector is the satisfying assignment \mathbf{w} of the system of equations $\Psi = \{\Psi_i(z) = c_i\}_{i \in [M]}$, so we can recover the satisfying assignment on any variable z_i by appropriately evaluating π_f . (Concretely, given π_f , we can obtain the satisfying assignment on z_i by evaluating π_f on $\mathbf{e}_i = (0, \dots, 0, 1, 0, \dots, 0) \in \mathbb{F}^N$, where only the i -th element is 1). Now, we first observe that we can obtain Equation (3) by showing that the “cheating assignment” that we recover from the cheating prover P^* is “correct” in the following two ways.

1. The assignment on z_N (which represents the value of the output gate) is equal to the claimed output value. That is, for every sufficiently large $\lambda \in \Lambda$,

$$\Pr \left[\pi_f^*(\mathbf{e}_N) = y \middle| (\mathbf{x}, y, \pi^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \{\mathbf{e}_N\}) \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) . \quad (9)$$

2. The assignment on z_N is equal to the actual output value. That is, for every sufficiently large $\lambda \in \Lambda$,

$$\Pr \left[\pi_f^*(\mathbf{e}_N) = C_\lambda(\mathbf{x}) \middle| (\mathbf{x}, y, \pi^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \{\mathbf{e}_N\}) \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) . \quad (10)$$

Indeed, given Equations (9) and (10), we can easily obtain Equation (3) as follows: first, we obtain

$$\Pr \left[C_\lambda(\mathbf{x}) = y \mid (\mathbf{x}, y, \pi^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \{\mathbf{e}_N\}) \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

by applying the union bound on Equations (9) and (10); then, we obtain Equation (3) by using the no-signaling property of P^* to argue that the probability of $C_\lambda(\mathbf{x}) = y$ holding changes only negligibly when the queries to P^* are changed from $\{\mathbf{e}_N\}$ to $\{\mathbf{e}_N\} \cup Q$ and from $\{\mathbf{e}_N\} \cup Q$ to Q .⁷ (Notice that the distinguisher in the no-signaling game can check $C_\lambda(\mathbf{x}) \stackrel{?}{=} y$ efficiently.) Therefore, to conclude the analysis (under the simplifying assumptions), it remains to prove Equations (9) and (10).

Step 1. Showing consistency with the claimed computation. First, we explain how we obtain Equation (9) under the simplifying assumptions on P^* .

To obtain Equation (9), we prove a stronger claim on the cheating assignment. Recall that from the construction of $\Psi = \{\Psi_i(\mathbf{z}) = c_i\}_{i \in [M]}$, each equation of Ψ is defined with at most three variables, and in particular each equation $\Psi_i(\mathbf{z}) = c_i$ can be written as $\sum_{j \in \{\alpha, \beta, \gamma\}} d_j z_j + \sum_{j, k \in \{\alpha, \beta, \gamma\}} d_{j,k} z_j z_k = c_i$ for some $\alpha, \beta, \gamma \in [N]$ ($\alpha < \beta < \gamma$), $d_j \in \{-1, 0, 1\}$ ($j \in \{\alpha, \beta, \gamma\}$), and $d_{j,k} \in \{-1, 0, 1\}$ ($j, k \in \{\alpha, \beta, \gamma\}$). Then, we consider the following claim.

1'. **(Consistency with Claimed Computation)** For any equation $\Psi_i(\mathbf{z}) = c_i$ of Ψ , which can be written as

$$\sum_{j \in \{\alpha, \beta, \gamma\}} d_j z_j + \sum_{j, k \in \{\alpha, \beta, \gamma\}} d_{j,k} z_j z_k = c_i \ ,$$

the cheating assignment on $z_\alpha, z_\beta, z_\gamma$ is a satisfying assignment of this equation. That is, for every sufficiently large $\lambda \in \Lambda$ and every $i \in [M]$, we have

$$\Pr \left[\text{Consist}_i(C_\lambda, \mathbf{x}, y, \pi^*) \mid (\mathbf{x}, y, \pi^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \{\mathbf{e}_\alpha, \mathbf{e}_\beta, \mathbf{e}_\gamma\}) \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) \ , \quad (11)$$

where $\text{Consist}_i(C_\lambda, \mathbf{x}, y, \pi^*)$ is the event that we have

$$\sum_{j \in \{\alpha, \beta, \gamma\}} d_j \pi_f^*(\mathbf{e}_j) + \sum_{j, k \in \{\alpha, \beta, \gamma\}} d_{j,k} \pi_f^*(\mathbf{e}_j) \pi_f^*(\mathbf{e}_k) = c_i \ .$$

Clearly, this claim implies Equation (9) since Ψ has the equation $z_N = y$.

Hence, we focus on showing the stronger claim that Equation (11) holds. Fix any sufficiently large $\lambda \in \Lambda$ and any $i \in [M]$. First, since the cheating PCP proof passes SAT Test on any points (Equation (8) of [Simplifying Assumption 2](#)), we have

$$\Pr \left[\pi_f^*(\psi_{\mathbf{e}_i}) + \pi_g^*(\psi'_{\mathbf{e}_i}) = c_{\mathbf{e}_i} \mid (\mathbf{x}, y, \pi^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \{\psi_{\mathbf{e}_i}, \psi'_{\mathbf{e}_i}\}) \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) \ , \quad (12)$$

where $\mathbf{e}_i = (0, \dots, 0, 1, 0, \dots, 0) \in \mathbb{F}^M$. Second, since we have $\psi_{\mathbf{e}_i} = \sum_{j \in \{\alpha, \beta, \gamma\}} d_j \mathbf{e}_j$, $\psi'_{\mathbf{e}_i} = \sum_{j, k \in \{\alpha, \beta, \gamma\}} d_{j,k} \mathbf{e}_j \otimes \mathbf{e}_k$, and $c_{\mathbf{e}_i} = c_i$ from the definitions, Equation (12) implies Equation (11) if we have the following three items with overwhelming probability.⁸

⁷ We assume $\kappa_{\max}(\lambda) \geq \kappa_V(\lambda) + 1$ (where κ_V is the query complexity of V),

⁸ Formally, to use the union bound, we need to argue that every probability that we consider in this proof does not change non-negligibly when we obtain π^* by querying $\{\mathbf{e}_\alpha, \mathbf{e}_\beta, \mathbf{e}_\gamma\} \cup \{\mathbf{e}_j \otimes \mathbf{e}_k\}_{j, k \in \{\alpha, \beta, \gamma\}} \cup \{\psi_{\mathbf{e}_i}, \psi'_{\mathbf{e}_i}\}$ to P^* . Fortunately, every probability indeed does not change non-negligibly because of the no-signaling property of P^* .

- $\pi_f^*(\sum_{j \in \{\alpha, \beta, \gamma\}} d_j \mathbf{e}_j) = \sum_{j \in \{\alpha, \beta, \gamma\}} d_j \pi_f^*(\mathbf{e}_j)$.
- $\pi_g^*(\sum_{j, k \in \{\alpha, \beta, \gamma\}} d_{j,k} \mathbf{e}_j \otimes \mathbf{e}_k) = \sum_{j, k \in \{\alpha, \beta, \gamma\}} d_{j,k} \pi_g^*(\mathbf{e}_j \otimes \mathbf{e}_k)$.
- $\pi_g^*(\mathbf{e}_j \otimes \mathbf{e}_k) = \pi_f^*(\mathbf{e}_j) \pi_f^*(\mathbf{e}_k)$ for every $j, k \in \{\alpha, \beta, \gamma\}$.

Now, we obtain Equation (11) since these three items indeed hold with overwhelming probability due to [Simplifying Assumption 2](#). (We use generalized versions of Equations (5) and (6) for the first two, and use Equation (7) for the third one.)

Step 2. Showing consistency with the actual computation. Next, we explain how we obtain Equation (10) under the simplifying assumptions on P^* .

Without loss of generality, we assume that arithmetic circuits are “layered,” i.e., the gates in a circuit can be partitioned into layers such that (1) the first layer consists of the input gates and the last layer consists of the output gate, and (2) the gates in the i -th layer have children in the $(i - 1)$ -th layer.

The overall strategy is to prove Equation (10) by induction on the layers. For any circuit C_λ , let us use the following notations.

- ℓ_{\max} is the number of the layers, and N_i is the number of the wires in layer i (i.e., the number of the wires from the gates in layer i). We assume that the numbering of the wires are consistent with the numbering of the layers, i.e., the first N_1 wires are those that are in the first layer, the next N_2 wires are those that are in the second layer, etc.
- $D_1, \dots, D_{\ell_{\max}}$ are subset of \mathbb{F}^N such that for every $\ell \in [\ell_{\max}]$,

$$D_\ell := \{ \mathbf{v} = (v_1, \dots, v_N) \mid v_i = 0 \text{ for } \forall i \notin \{N_{\leq \ell-1} + 1, \dots, N_{\leq \ell-1} + N_\ell\} \} ,$$

where $N_{\leq \ell-1} := \sum_{i \in [\ell-1]} N_i$. Notice that when the first part of the correct PCP proof, $\pi_f(\mathbf{v}) = \langle \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{w} \rangle$, is evaluated on $v_\ell \in D_\ell$, it returns a linear combination of the correct wire values of layer ℓ .

Now, to prove Equation (10), we show that the following three claims holds for every sufficiently large $\lambda \in \Lambda$.

1. The cheating PCP proof is equal to the correct PCP proof on random λ points in D_1 . That is,

$$\Pr_{U_1, \pi^*} \left[\bigwedge_{\mathbf{u} \in U_1} \pi_f^*(\mathbf{u}) = \pi_f(\mathbf{u}) \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) , \quad (13)$$

where the probability is taken over $U_1 \leftarrow D_1^\lambda$ and $(\mathbf{x}, y, \pi^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, U_1)$, and π_f is the correct PCP proof that is generated by $\pi := P(C_\lambda, \mathbf{x})$.

2. For every $\ell \in [\ell_{\max}]$, if the cheating PCP proof is equal to the correct PCP proof on random λ points in D_ℓ , they are also equal on *any* point in D_ℓ . That is, for any $\mathbf{v} \in D_\ell$,

$$\Pr_{\mathbf{v}, U_\ell, \pi^*} \left[\pi_f^*(\mathbf{v}) = \pi_f(\mathbf{v}) \mid \bigwedge_{\mathbf{u} \in U_\ell} \pi_f^*(\mathbf{u}) = \pi_f(\mathbf{u}) \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) , \quad (14)$$

where the probability is taken over $U_\ell \leftarrow D_\ell^\lambda$ and $(\mathbf{x}, y, \pi^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \{\mathbf{v}\} \cup U_\ell)$.

3. For every $\ell \in [\ell_{\max} - 1]$, if the cheating PCP proof is equal to the correct PCP proof on random λ points in D_ℓ , they are also equal on random λ points in $D_{\ell+1}$. That is,

$$\Pr_{U_\ell, U_{\ell+1}, \pi^*} \left[\bigwedge_{\mathbf{u} \in U_{\ell+1}} \pi_f^*(\mathbf{u}) = \pi_f(\mathbf{u}) \mid \bigwedge_{\mathbf{u} \in U_\ell} \pi_f^*(\mathbf{u}) = \pi_f(\mathbf{u}) \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) , \quad (15)$$

where the probability is taken over $U_\ell \leftarrow D_\ell^\lambda, U_{\ell+1} \leftarrow D_{\ell+1}^\lambda$, and $(\mathbf{x}, y, \pi^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, U_\ell \cup U_{\ell+1})$.

Observe that we can indeed obtain Equation (10) from the above three claims since Equation (14) implies that we can obtain Equation (10) by just showing

$$\Pr_{U_{\ell_{\max}}, \pi^*} \left[\bigwedge_{\mathbf{u} \in U_{\ell_{\max}}} \pi_f^*(\mathbf{u}) = \pi_f(\mathbf{u}) \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

(this is because we have $\pi_f(\mathbf{e}_N) = w_N = C_\lambda(\mathbf{x})$ from the construction of our PCP), and we can obtain this inequation by repeatedly using Equation (15) on top of Equation (13).⁹ Thus, what remain to prove are Equations (13), (14), (15).

1. To obtain Equation (13), we first use the linearity of the cheating PCP proof (Equations (5) of [Simplifying Assumption 2](#)) to argue that, since any $v \in D_1$ can be written as a linear combination of $\mathbf{e}_1, \dots, \mathbf{e}_n \in \mathbb{F}^N$ (recall that we have $N_1 = n$), we can obtain Equation (13) by just showing that for every $i \in [n]$ we have $\pi_f^*(\mathbf{e}_i) = \pi_f(\mathbf{e}_i)$ with overwhelming probability. Then, we observe that, since we have $\pi_f(\mathbf{e}_i) = w_i = x_i$ for every $i \in [n]$ from the construction of our PCP, it suffices to show that for every $i \in [n]$ we have $\pi_f^*(\mathbf{e}_i) = x_i$ with overwhelming probability, which we already showed as the consistency with the claimed computation (Equation (11) in Step 1).
2. To obtain Equation (14), we consider a mental experiment where $U_\ell = \{\mathbf{u}_{\ell,i}\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$ is sampled as follows: for each $i \in [\lambda]$, choose random $\mathbf{r}_i \in D_\ell$ and $b_i \in \{0, 1\}$ and then define $\mathbf{u}_{\ell,i}$ by $\mathbf{u}_{\ell,i} := \mathbf{r}_i$ if $b_i = 0$ and by $\mathbf{u}_{\ell,i} := \mathbf{v} + \mathbf{r}_i$ if $b_i = 1$. Since each $\mathbf{u}_{\ell,i}$ is still uniformly distributed, it suffices to show Equation (14) w.r.t. this mental experiment; in addition, due to the no-signaling property of P^* , we can further change the experiment so that π^* is obtained by $(\mathbf{x}, y, \pi^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \{v\} \cup \{\mathbf{r}_i, \mathbf{v} + \mathbf{r}_i\}_{i \in [\lambda]})$. Now, we obtain Equation (14) by observing the following.
 - (a) Equation (14) is implied by

$$\Pr_{\mathbf{v}, U_\ell, \pi^*} \left[\pi_f^*(\mathbf{v}) \neq \pi_f(\mathbf{v}) \wedge \left(\bigwedge_{\mathbf{u} \in U_\ell} \pi_f^*(\mathbf{u}) = \pi_f(\mathbf{u}) \right) \right] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) . \quad (16)$$

(We assume that $\bigwedge_{\mathbf{u} \in U_\ell} \pi_f^*(\mathbf{u}) = \pi_f(\mathbf{u})$ holds with high probability, which is indeed the case in our situation.)

- (b) We can obtain Equation (16) by combining the following two observations. First, we have $\pi_f^*(\mathbf{v}) \neq \pi_f(\mathbf{v})$ only when we have $\pi_f^*(\mathbf{v} + \mathbf{r}_i) \neq \pi_f(\mathbf{v} + \mathbf{r}_i)$ or $\pi_f^*(\mathbf{r}_i) \neq \pi_f(\mathbf{r}_i)$ for every $i \in [\lambda]$ (this is because we have $\pi_f^*(\mathbf{v}) = \pi_f^*(\mathbf{v} + \mathbf{r}_i) - \pi_f^*(\mathbf{r}_i)$ for every $i \in [\lambda]$ from the linearity of the cheating PCP proof¹⁰ (Equation (5) of [Simplifying Assumption 2](#))). Second, when we have $\pi_f^*(\mathbf{v} + \mathbf{r}_i) \neq \pi_f(\mathbf{v} + \mathbf{r}_i)$ or $\pi_f^*(\mathbf{r}_i) \neq \pi_f(\mathbf{r}_i)$ for every $i \in [\lambda]$, we have $\bigwedge_{\mathbf{u} \in U_\ell} \pi_f^*(\mathbf{u}) = \pi_f(\mathbf{u})$ with probability at most $2^{-\lambda}$ since each $\mathbf{u}_{\ell,i}$ is defined by taking either \mathbf{r}_i or $\mathbf{v} + \mathbf{r}_i$ randomly.
3. To obtain Equation (15), we first use the linearity of the cheating PCP proof (Equations (5) of [Simplifying Assumption 2](#)) and the union bound to argue, just like when we show Equation (13), that we can obtain Equation (15) by just showing that for every $k \in \{N_{\leq \ell} + 1, \dots, N_{\leq \ell} + N_{\ell+1}\}$ we have $\pi_f^*(\mathbf{e}_k) = \pi_f(\mathbf{e}_k)$ with overwhelming probability (where the probability is conditioned on $\bigwedge_{\mathbf{u} \in U_\ell} \pi_f^*(\mathbf{u}) = \pi_f(\mathbf{u})$). Let us focus, for simplicity, on the case that k is the output wire of a

⁹ Formally, we need to argue that the probabilities in these inequations do not change non-negligibly when we change the queries to P^* , which we can show by relying on the no-signaling property of P^* . A key point is that the number of the queries to P^* can be bounded by a fixed polynomial in λ .

¹⁰ If we have $\pi_f^*(\mathbf{v} + \mathbf{r}_i) = \pi_f(\mathbf{v} + \mathbf{r}_i)$ and $\pi_f^*(\mathbf{r}_i) = \pi_f(\mathbf{r}_i)$, we have $\pi_f^*(\mathbf{v}) = \pi_f^*(\mathbf{v} + \mathbf{r}_i) - \pi_f^*(\mathbf{r}_i) = \pi_f(\mathbf{v} + \mathbf{r}_i) - \pi_f(\mathbf{r}_i) = \pi_f(\mathbf{v})$.

multiplication gate in the $(\ell + 1)$ -th layer, where the input wires are i and j in the ℓ -th layer. Then, we observe that we have $\pi_f^*(\mathbf{e}_k) = \pi_f(\mathbf{e}_k)$ if we have

$$\pi_f^*(\mathbf{e}_k) = \pi_f^*(\mathbf{e}_i)\pi_f^*(\mathbf{e}_j) \quad \text{and} \quad \pi_f^*(\mathbf{e}_i) = \pi_f(\mathbf{e}_i) \wedge \pi_f^*(\mathbf{e}_j) = \pi_f(\mathbf{e}_j)$$

(this is because these two items imply that $\pi_f^*(\mathbf{e}_k) = \pi_f^*(\mathbf{e}_i)\pi_f^*(\mathbf{e}_j) = \pi_f(\mathbf{e}_i)\pi_f(\mathbf{e}_j) = \pi_f(\mathbf{e}_k)$, where the last equality holds since $\pi_f(\mathbf{e}_i), \pi_f(\mathbf{e}_j), \pi_f(\mathbf{e}_k)$ are the satisfying assignment on z_i, z_j, z_k of Ψ , which has the equation $z_i z_j - z_k = 0$). Finally, we observe that the first item holds with overwhelming probability since the cheating proof is consistent with the claimed computation (Equation (11) in Step 1) and that the second item holds with overwhelming probability due to Equation (14) and the union bound (both probabilities are conditioned on $\bigwedge_{\mathbf{u} \in U_\ell} \pi_f^*(\mathbf{u}) = \pi_f(\mathbf{u})$).

How to remove the simplifying assumptions. In the actual analysis, we remove [Simplifying Assumption 1](#) in the same way as previous works (such as [\[KRR14, BHK17\]](#)), namely by considering a “relaxed verifier” that accepts a PCP proof even when the proof fails to pass a small number of the tests. (Concretely, we consider a verifier that accepts a proof as long as the proof passes the three tests in at least $\lambda - \mu$ trials, where $\mu = \Theta(\log^2 \lambda)$.) We use the same argument as the previous works to show that if a cheating prover fools the original verifier with non-negligible probability, there exists another cheating prover that fools the relaxed verifier with overwhelming probability.

As for [Simplifying Assumption 2](#), we remove it by considering the self-corrected version of the cheating proof, i.e., the proof that is obtained by applying Self-Correct on the cheating proof π^* . Our key observation is that an existing analysis of Linearity Test can be naturally extended so that it works even in the no-signaling PCP setting if we change the goal to showing that the self-corrected cheating proof passes Linearity Test on any points. (In the standard PCP setting, the goal of Linearity Test is to guarantee that the cheating proof is close to a linear function.) Once we show that the self-corrected cheating proof passes Linearity Test on any points, it is relatively easy to show that it also passes Tensor-Product Test and SAT Test on any points.

3.4 Comparison with Previous Analysis.

The high level structure of our analysis (under the above-mentioned simplifying assumptions) is the same as the analysis of previous non-linear no-signaling PCPs, namely those of Kalai et al. [\[KRR14\]](#) and its subsequent works. Specifically, like these works, we show $C_\lambda(\mathbf{x}) = y$ by showing that we have $\pi^*(\mathbf{e}_N) = y$ and $\pi^*(\mathbf{e}_N) = C_\lambda(\mathbf{x})$ simultaneously, and show $\pi^*(\mathbf{e}_N) = C_\lambda(\mathbf{x})$ by induction on layers of C_λ . (In the latter part, we in particular follow the presentation by Paneth and Rothblum [\[PR17\]](#).)

A notable difference between our analysis and the previous one (other than the differences due to the use of linear PCPs rather than polynomially long PCP) is that our analysis does not require that the statement is represented as an “augmented layered circuit,” and only requires that it is represented as a layered circuit. More concretely, while the previous analysis requires that each layer of the circuit is augmented with an additional circuit that computes a low-degree extension of the wire values of the layer and then applies low-degree tests on the low-degree extension, our analysis does not require such augmentation and only requires that the circuit is layered. At a high level, we do not require this augmentation since in the induction for showing $\pi^*(\mathbf{e}_N) = C_\lambda(\mathbf{x})$ (Step 2 in the previous subsection), we show that the cheating PCP proof is equal to the correct proof rather than just showing that the wire values that are recovered from the cheating PCP proof are equal to the correct ones. (That is, we do

not require the augmentation of the circuit since we consider a stronger claim in the induction, which allows us to use a stronger assumption in the inductive step).

Finally, we remark that the analysis in this paper is written in a self-contained way and does not directly rely on previous analysis of no-signaling PCPs. (In particular, we do not assume familiarity with the analysis of Kalai et al. [KRR14].)

4 Preliminaries (Part 2)

4.1 Additional Basic Notations

For a set S , we denote by $s \leftarrow S$ a process of obtaining an element $s \in S$ by a uniform sampling from S . Similarly, for any probabilistic algorithm Algo , we denote by $y \leftarrow \text{Algo}$ a process of obtaining an output y by an execution of Algo with uniform randomness. For an event E and a probabilistic process P , we denote $\Pr[E \mid P]$ the probability of E occurring over the randomness of P .

4.2 Circuits

All circuits in this paper are arithmetic circuits over finite fields of prime orders, and they have addition and multiplication gates with fan-in 2. We assume without loss of generality that they are “layered,” i.e., the gates in a circuit can be partitioned into layers such that (1) the first layer consists of the input gates and the last layer consists of the output gates, and (2) the gates in the i -th layer have children in the $(i - 1)$ -th layer.

Given a circuit C , we use \mathbb{F} to denote the underlying finite field, N to denote the number of the wires,¹¹ n to denote the number of the input gates, and m to denote the number of the output gates. We assume that the first n wires of C are those of the input gates and the last m ones are those of the output gates. (Formally, \mathbb{F}, N, n, m should be written as, e.g., $\mathbb{F}_C, N_C, n_C, m_C$ since they depend on the circuit C . However, to simplify the notations, we avoid expressing this dependence.) When we consider a circuit family $\{C_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$, it is implicitly assumed that the size of each C_λ is bounded by $\text{poly}(\lambda)$.

4.3 Probabilistically Checkable Proofs (PCPs)

Roughly speaking, probabilistically checkable proofs (PCPs) are proof systems with which one can probabilistically verify the correctness of statements by reading only a few bits of the proof strings. A formal definition is given below.

Remark 1 (On the definition that we use). For convenience, we give a definition that is tailored to our purpose. Specifically, our definition differs from the standard one in the following way.

1. We only consider proofs for the correctness of deterministic arithmetic circuit computation, i.e., membership proofs for the following language.

$$\{(C, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) \mid C \text{ is an arithmetic circuit s.t. } C(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{y}\} .$$

2. We implicitly require that PCP systems satisfy two auxiliary properties (which almost all existing constructions satisfy), namely *relatively efficient oracle construction* and *non-adaptive verifier* [BG09].

¹¹ We assume that for any gate with fan-out more than one, all the output wires from that gate share the same index $i \in [N]$.

3. We assume that the verifier's queries depend only on the circuit C and do not depend on the input \mathbf{x} and the output \mathbf{y} . (This assumption will be useful later when we define adaptive soundness against no-signaling cheating provers.) \diamond

Definition 1 (PCPs for correctness of arithmetic circuit computation). *A probabilistically checkable proof (PCP) system for the correctness of arithmetic circuit computation consists of a pair of PPT Turing machines $V = (V_0, V_1)$ (called verifier) and a PPT Turing machine P (called prover) that satisfy the following.*

- **Syntax.** *For every arithmetic circuit C , there exist*
 - *finite sets D_C and Σ_C (called proof domain and proof alphabet) and*
 - *a polynomial κ_V (called query complexity of V)**such that for every input \mathbf{x} of C , its output $\mathbf{y} := C(\mathbf{x})$, and every security parameter $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$,*
 - *$P(C, \mathbf{x})$ outputs a function $\pi : D_C \rightarrow \Sigma_C$ (called proof),*
 - *$V_0(1^\lambda, C)$ outputs a string $\text{st}_V \in \{0, 1\}^*$ (called state) and a set $Q \subset D_C$ of size $\kappa_V(\lambda)$ (called queries), and*
 - *$V_1(\text{st}_V, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi|_Q)$ outputs a bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$.*
- **Completeness.** *For every arithmetic circuit C , every input \mathbf{x} of C , its output $\mathbf{y} := C(\mathbf{x})$, and every security parameter $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$,*

$$\Pr \left[V_1(\text{st}_V, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi|_Q) = 1 \mid \begin{array}{l} \pi \leftarrow P(C, \mathbf{x}) \\ (Q, \text{st}_V) \leftarrow V_0(1^\lambda, C) \end{array} \right] = 1 .$$

- **Soundness.** *For any circuit family $\{C_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ and any probabilistic Turing machine P^* (called cheating prover), there exists a negligible function negl such that for every security parameter $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$,*

$$\Pr \left[V_1(\text{st}_V, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*|_Q) = 1 \wedge C_\lambda(\mathbf{x}) \neq \mathbf{y} \mid \begin{array}{l} (Q, \text{st}_V) \leftarrow V_0(1^\lambda, C_\lambda) \\ (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda) \end{array} \right] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) .$$

\diamond

A PCP system is said to be linear if it satisfies an additional property that the proof is a linear function.

Definition 2 (Linear PCPs). *Let (P, V) be any PCP system and $\{D_C\}_C$ be its proof domains. Then, (P, V) is said to be linear if for every arithmetic circuit C and input \mathbf{x} of C ,*

$$\Pr \left[\bigwedge_{u, v \in D_C} \pi(u) + \pi(v) = \pi(u + v) \mid \pi \leftarrow P(C, \mathbf{x}) \right] = 1 .$$

4.4 No-signaling PCPs

No-signaling PCPs [KRR13, KRR14] are the PCP systems that guarantee soundness against a stronger class of cheating provers called no-signaling cheating provers.

No-signaling cheating provers are defined as follows. The main difference between no-signaling cheating provers and normal cheating provers is that, while a normal cheating prover is required to output a PCP proof π^* before seeing queries Q , a no-signaling cheating prover is allowed to output π^* after seeing Q . There is however an important restriction on the distribution of π^* ; roughly speaking, it is required that for any (not too large) sets Q, Q' such that $Q' \subset Q$, the distribution of $\pi^*|_{Q'}$ when the queries are Q should be indistinguishable from the distribution of it when the queries are Q' . The formal definition is given below.

Definition 3 (No-signaling cheating prover). Let (P, V) be any PCP system, $\{D_C\}_C$ and $\{\Sigma_C\}_C$ be the proof domains and proof alphabets of (P, V) , $\{C_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ be any circuit family, and P^* be any probabilistic Turing machine with the following syntax.

- Given the security parameter $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, the circuit C_λ , and a set of queries $Q \subset D_{C_\lambda}$ as input, P^* outputs an input \mathbf{x} of C_λ , an output \mathbf{y} of C_λ , and a partial function $\pi^* : Q \rightarrow \Sigma_{C_\lambda}$.

Then, for any polynomial κ_{\max} , P^* is said to be a κ_{\max} -wise (computational) no-signaling cheating prover if for any PPT Turing machine \mathcal{D} , there exists a negligible function negl such that for every $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, every $Q, Q' \subset D_{C_\lambda}$ such that $Q' \subset Q$ and $|Q| \leq \kappa_{\max}(\lambda)$, and every $z \in \{0, 1\}^{\text{poly}(\lambda)}$,

$$\left| \Pr \left[\mathcal{D}(C_\lambda, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^* |_{Q'}, z) = 1 \mid (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q) \right] - \Pr \left[\mathcal{D}(C_\lambda, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*, z) = 1 \mid (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q') \right] \right| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) .$$

◇

Now, we define no-signaling PCPs as the PCP systems that satisfy soundness according to the following definition.

Definition 4 (Soundness against no-signaling cheating provers). Let (P, V) be any PCP system and κ_{\max} be any polynomial. Then, (P, V) is said to be sound against κ_{\max} -wise (computational) no-signaling cheating provers if for any circuit family $\{C_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ and κ_{\max} -wise no-signaling cheating prover P^* , there exists a negligible function negl such that for every $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$,

$$\Pr \left[V_1(\text{st}_V, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) = 1 \wedge C_\lambda(\mathbf{x}) \neq \mathbf{y} \mid \begin{array}{l} (Q, \text{st}_V) \leftarrow V_0(1^\lambda, C_\lambda) \\ (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q) \end{array} \right] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) .$$

◇

5 Construction of Our No-signaling Linear PCP for \mathcal{P}

In this section, we describe our no-signaling linear PCP system (P, V) for the correctness of arithmetic-circuit computation. Let $C : \mathbb{F}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{F}^m$ be an arithmetic circuit over a finite field \mathbb{F} of prime order, and $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_n) \in \mathbb{F}^n$ be an input to C . Recall that we use N to denote the number of wires in C and assume that the first n wires are the wires of the input gates and the last m ones are those of the output gates.

5.1 PCP Prover P

Given (C, \mathbf{x}) as input, the PCP prover P first computes $\mathbf{y} := C(\mathbf{x})$ and then obtains the following system of quadratic equations over \mathbb{F} , which is designed so that it is satisfiable if and only if $C(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{y}$. Intuitively, the system has variables that represent the wire values of C , and the equations in the system guarantee that (1) the correct input values $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$ are assigned on the input gates, (2) each gate is correctly computed, and (3) the claimed output values $\mathbf{y} = (y_1, \dots, y_m)$ are assigned on the output gates. Formally, the system of equations is defined as follows.

- The variables are $\mathbf{z} = (z_1, \dots, z_N)$.
- For each $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$, the system has the equation $z_i = x_i$.

- For each $i, j, k \in [N]$, the system has $z_i + z_j - z_k = 0$ if the circuit C has an addition gate with input wire i, j and output wire k , and has $z_i z_j - z_k = 0$ if C has a multiplication gate with input wire i, j and output wire k .
- For each $i \in \{1, \dots, m\}$, the system has the equation $z_{N-m+i} = y_i$.

Let M denote the number of the equations in the system Ψ . Let the system be denoted by

$$\Psi = \begin{cases} \Psi_1(\mathbf{z}) = c_1 \\ \vdots \\ \Psi_M(\mathbf{z}) = c_M \end{cases},$$

where each c_i is an element in \mathbb{F} . For each $i \in [M]$, let $\psi_i \in \mathbb{F}^N$ and $\psi'_i \in \mathbb{F}^{N^2}$ be the coefficient vectors such that

$$\Psi_i(\mathbf{z}) = \langle \psi_i, \mathbf{z} \rangle + \langle \psi'_i, \mathbf{z} \otimes \mathbf{z} \rangle. \quad (17)$$

Let $\mathbf{w} = (w_1, \dots, w_N)$ be the satisfying assignment of Ψ . Let $f : \mathbb{F}^N \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$ and $g : \mathbb{F}^{N^2} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$ be the linear functions that are defined by $f(\mathbf{v}) := \langle \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{w} \rangle$ and $g(\mathbf{v}') := \langle \mathbf{v}', \mathbf{w} \otimes \mathbf{w} \rangle$. Then, the PCP prover P outputs the following linear function $\pi : \mathbb{F}^{N+N^2} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$ as the PCP proof.

$$\pi(\mathbf{v}) := f(\mathbf{v}_1) + g(\mathbf{v}_2) \text{ for } \forall \mathbf{v} = (\mathbf{v}_1, \mathbf{v}_2) \in \mathbb{F}^{N+N^2}, \text{ where } \mathbf{v}_1 \in \mathbb{F}^N, \mathbf{v}_2 \in \mathbb{F}^{N^2}.$$

Remark 2. For simplicity, in what follows we usually think that P outputs two linear functions $\pi_f := f$ and $\pi_g := g$ as the PCP proof. This is without loss of generality since the verifier can evaluate f and g given access to π . \diamond

5.2 PCP Verifier V

Given $(C, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})$ as input, the PCP verifier V first computes the system Ψ in the same way as the PCP prover P . Next, given oracle access to the PCP proof π_f and π_g , the PCP verifier does the following tests λ times in parallel, and accepts the proof if all the tests in all the λ trials are accepted.

- **Linearity Test.** Choose random points $\mathbf{r}_1, \mathbf{r}_2 \in \mathbb{F}^N$ and $\mathbf{r}'_1, \mathbf{r}'_2 \in \mathbb{F}^{N^2}$, and check the following.

$$\pi_f(\mathbf{r}_1) + \pi_f(\mathbf{r}_2) \stackrel{?}{=} \pi_f(\mathbf{r}_1 + \mathbf{r}_2) \quad \text{and} \quad \pi_g(\mathbf{r}'_1) + \pi_g(\mathbf{r}'_2) \stackrel{?}{=} \pi_g(\mathbf{r}'_1 + \mathbf{r}'_2).$$

- **Tensor-Product Test.** Let Self-Correct^π be the following algorithm.

Algorithm $\text{Self-Correct}^\pi(\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{F}^N \cup \mathbb{F}^{N^2})$.

1. Choose λ random points $\mathbf{r}_{\mathbf{v},1}, \dots, \mathbf{r}_{\mathbf{v},\lambda}$ from \mathbb{F}^N if $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{F}^N$ and choose them from \mathbb{F}^{N^2} if $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{F}^{N^2}$.
2. For each $i \in [\lambda]$, let

$$a_{\mathbf{v}}^{(i)} := \begin{cases} \pi_f(\mathbf{v} + \mathbf{r}_{\mathbf{v},i}) - \pi_f(\mathbf{r}_{\mathbf{v},i}) & \text{if } \mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{F}^N \\ \pi_g(\mathbf{v} + \mathbf{r}_{\mathbf{v},i}) - \pi_g(\mathbf{r}_{\mathbf{v},i}) & \text{if } \mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{F}^{N^2} \end{cases}.$$

3. Let

$$a_{\mathbf{v}} := \text{majority}(a_{\mathbf{v}}^{(1)}, \dots, a_{\mathbf{v}}^{(\lambda)}).$$

4. Output a_y .

Then, in Tensor-Product Test, choose two random points $\mathbf{r}_1, \mathbf{r}_2 \in \mathbb{F}^N$, run

$$\begin{aligned} a_{\mathbf{r}_1} &\leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^\pi(\mathbf{r}_1) , \\ a_{\mathbf{r}_2} &\leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^\pi(\mathbf{r}_2) , \\ a_{\mathbf{r}_1 \otimes \mathbf{r}_2} &\leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^\pi(\mathbf{r}_1 \otimes \mathbf{r}_2) , \end{aligned}$$

and check the following.

$$a_{\mathbf{r}_1} a_{\mathbf{r}_2} \stackrel{?}{=} a_{\mathbf{r}_1 \otimes \mathbf{r}_2} .$$

– **SAT Test.** Choose a random point $\sigma = (\sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_M) \in \mathbb{F}^M$ and define a quadratic function $\Psi_\sigma : \mathbb{F}^N \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$ as

$$\Psi_\sigma(\mathbf{z}) := \sum_{i=1}^M \sigma_i \Psi_i(\mathbf{z}) .$$

Let $\psi_\sigma \in \mathbb{F}^N$ and $\psi'_\sigma \in \mathbb{F}^{N^2}$ be the coefficient vectors such that

$$\Psi_\sigma(\mathbf{z}) = \langle \psi_\sigma, \mathbf{z} \rangle + \langle \psi'_\sigma, \mathbf{z} \otimes \mathbf{z} \rangle . \quad (18)$$

Let $c_\sigma := \sum_{i=1}^M \sigma_i c_i$.

Then, in SAT Test, run

$$\begin{aligned} a_{\psi_\sigma} &\leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^\pi(\psi_\sigma) , \\ a_{\psi'_\sigma} &\leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^\pi(\psi'_\sigma) \end{aligned}$$

and check the following.

$$a_{\psi_\sigma} + a_{\psi'_\sigma} \stackrel{?}{=} c_\sigma .$$

We remark that, formally, $V = (V_0, V_1)$ is a pair of two algorithms as required by [Definition 1](#), where $V_0(1^\lambda, C)$ outputs a set of queries Q for the above tests along with its internal state st_V , and $V_1(\text{st}_V, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi|_Q)$ performs the above tests given the answers $\pi|_Q$ from the PCP proof. The internal state st_V that V_0 outputs is $(\sigma_{\text{in}}, \sigma_{\text{out}})$, where

$$\sigma_{\text{in}} := (\sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_n) \in \mathbb{F}^n \quad \text{and} \quad \sigma_{\text{out}} := (\sigma_{M-m+1}, \dots, \sigma_M) \in \mathbb{F}^m ,$$

where it is assumed that the first n equations in Ψ (i.e., the equations $\{\Psi_i(\mathbf{z}) = c_i\}_{i \in [n]}$) are those that are associated with the input gates (i.e., $\{z_i = x_i\}_{i \in [n]}$) and the last m equations in Ψ (i.e. the equations $\{\Psi_{M-m+i}(\mathbf{z}) = c_{M-m+i}\}_{i \in [m]}$) are those that are associated with the output gates (i.e., $\{z_{M-m+i} = y_i\}_{i \in [n]}$). Note that $V_0(1^\lambda, C)$ can indeed choose all the queries in parallel (without knowing the input \mathbf{x} and the output \mathbf{y}) since each of the queries is chosen independently from the results of other queries and in addition the coefficient vectors of the equations of Ψ (i.e., $\{\psi_i, \psi'_i\}_{i \in M}$) can be computed from the circuit C in SAT Test. Also, note that $V_1(\text{st}_V, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi|_Q)$ can indeed perform the test (without knowing the circuit C) since $c_\sigma = \langle \sigma_{\text{in}}, \mathbf{x} \rangle + \langle \sigma_{\text{out}}, \mathbf{y} \rangle$ can be computed from st_V in SAT Test.

Remark 3 (Query Complexity). By inspection, one can see that the query complexity of V is $\kappa_V(\lambda) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \lambda(10\lambda + 6)$. \diamond

Remark 4 (Efficiency). By inspection, one can see that the running time of P is $\text{poly}(|C|)$, the running time of V_0 is $\text{poly}(\lambda + |C|)$, and the running time of V_1 is $\text{poly}(\lambda + |\mathbf{x}| + |\mathbf{y}|)$. \diamond

5.3 Security

In [Section 6](#) to [Section 10](#), we prove the following theorem, which states the no-signaling soundness of our PCP system.

Theorem 1 (No-signaling Soundness of (P, V)). *Let (P, V) be the PCP system in [Sections 5.1](#) and [5.2](#), $\{C_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ be any circuit family, and κ_{\max} be any polynomial such that $\kappa_{\max}(\lambda) \geq 2\lambda \cdot \max(8\lambda + 3, m_\lambda) + \kappa_V(\lambda)$, where m_λ is the output length of C_λ and κ_V is the query complexity of (P, V) . Then, for any κ_{\max} -wise (computational) no-signaling cheating prover P^* , there exists a negligible function negl such that for every $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$,*

$$\Pr \left[V_1(\text{st}_V, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) = 1 \wedge C_\lambda(\mathbf{x}) \neq \mathbf{y} \mid \begin{array}{l} (Q, \text{st}_V) \leftarrow V(1^\lambda, C_\lambda) \\ (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q) \end{array} \right] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) .$$

Outline of the proof of [Theorem 1](#). In [Section 6](#), we introduce a “relaxed verifier” such that if a cheating prover fools the original verifier with non-negligible probability, there exists another cheating prover that fools the relaxed verifier with overwhelming probability. In [Section 7](#), we show that if a cheating verifier convinces the relaxed verifier with overwhelming probability, we can obtain a “self-corrected PCP proof” from the cheating prover such that it satisfies several useful properties that we use in the rest of the proof (namely, the ability to pass Linearity Test, Tensor-Product Test, and SAT Test on any points). In [Section 8](#), we show that if a cheating verifier convinces the relaxed verifier with overwhelming probability, the self-corrected PCP proof matches the claimed computation, i.e., the assignment that we can obtain from the self-corrected PCP proof on any small number of variables of Ψ is a (locally) satisfying assignment. In [Section 9](#), we show that if a cheating verifier convinces the relaxed verifier with overwhelming probability, the self-corrected PCP proof matches the correct PCP proof. In [Section 10](#), we conclude the proof by combining what is shown in the preceding four sections.

6 Analysis of Our PCP: Step 1 (Relaxed Verifier)

In this section, we introduce a “relaxed verifier” \tilde{V} for our PCP system. The relaxed verifier has a property that, roughly speaking, if a no-signaling cheating prover fools the original verifier with non-negligible probability, there exists another no-signaling cheating prover that fools the relaxed verifier with overwhelming probability. Given this property, in later sections we show the no-signaling soundness of our PCP system by showing that any no-signaling cheating prover cannot fool the relaxed verifier with overwhelming probability.

6.1 Construction

Recall that the original PCP verifier V , described in [Section 5.2](#), makes λ sets of tests (where each set consists of Linearity Test, Tensor-Product Test, and SAT Test) and accepts the proof if all the tests in all the λ sets succeed.

The relaxed verifier \tilde{V} makes λ sets of tests in the same way as the real PCP verifier does, but accepts the proof even when the tests in at most μ sets fail (that is, accepts the proof if the tests in at least $\lambda - \mu$ sets succeed), where $\mu = \Theta(\log^2 \lambda)$ is a parameter.¹² We remark that, just like the real verifier $V = (V_0, V_1)$, the relaxed verifier \tilde{V} is actually a pair of algorithms, $(\tilde{V}_0, \tilde{V}_1)$, where \tilde{V}_0 makes queries and \tilde{V}_1 performs test. From the construction, \tilde{V}_0 is identical with V_0 .

¹² Actually, μ can be any function in $\omega(\log \lambda)$ as long as μ is sufficiently smaller than λ .

6.2 Analysis

Lemma 1. *Let κ_{\max} be any polynomial such that $\kappa_{\max}(\lambda) \geq 2\kappa_V(\lambda)$, where κ_V is the round complexity of (P, V) . Then, for any circuit family $\{C_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$, if there exists a κ_{\max} -wise no-signaling prover P^* and a constant $c > 0$ such that*

$$\Pr \left[V_1(\text{st}_V, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) = 1 \wedge C_\lambda(\mathbf{x}) \neq \mathbf{y} \mid \begin{array}{l} (Q, \text{st}_V) \leftarrow V_0(1^\lambda, C_\lambda) \\ (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q) \end{array} \right] \geq \lambda^{-c} \quad (19)$$

holds for infinitely many $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, there exists a $(\kappa_{\max} - \kappa_V)$ -wise no-signaling prover \tilde{P}^ and a negligible function negl such that*

$$\Pr \left[\tilde{V}_1(\text{st}_V, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) = 1 \wedge C_\lambda(\mathbf{x}) \neq \mathbf{y} \mid \begin{array}{l} (Q, \text{st}_V) \leftarrow V_0(1^\lambda, C_\lambda) \\ (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) \leftarrow \tilde{P}^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q) \end{array} \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) \quad (20)$$

holds for infinitely many $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$.

We remark that Brakerski et al. [BHK17] prove essentially the same lemma as Lemma 1 (see Lemma 1 of the full version of their paper [BHK16]). Below, we give a proof of Lemma 1 just for completeness. Since we only use the statement of Lemma 1 in the subsequent sections, the readers can skip the rest of this section if they believe that Lemma 1 holds.

Proof. Fix any polynomial κ_{\max} such that $\kappa_{\max}(\lambda) \geq 2\kappa_V(\lambda)$, any circuit family $\{C_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$, any κ_{\max} -wise no-signaling cheating prover P^* , and any constant $c > 0$, and assume that Equation (19) holds.

From P^* , we obtain the relaxed cheating prover \tilde{P}^* as follows.

- On input $(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q)$, the relaxed cheating prover \tilde{P}^* first samples

$$(Q_i, \text{st}_{V,i}) \leftarrow V_0(1^\lambda, C_\lambda) \quad \text{and} \quad (\mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{y}_i, \pi_i^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q \cup Q_i)$$

for $i = 1, \dots, \lambda^{c+1}$. Then, \tilde{P}^* finds the first $i^* \in \{1, \dots, \lambda^{c+1}\}$ such that $V_1(\text{st}_{V,i^*}, (\pi_{i^*}^*)|_{Q_{i^*}}) = 1 \wedge C_\lambda(\mathbf{x}_{i^*}) \neq \mathbf{y}_{i^*}$ and outputs $(\mathbf{x}_{i^*}, \mathbf{y}_{i^*}, (\pi_{i^*}^*)|_Q)$ if such i^* exists, and outputs \perp otherwise.

Claim 1 (Overwhelming success probability). *There exists a negligible function negl such that for infinitely many $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$,*

$$\Pr \left[\tilde{V}_1(\text{st}_V, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) = 1 \wedge C_\lambda(\mathbf{x}) \neq \mathbf{y} \mid \begin{array}{l} (Q, \text{st}_V) \leftarrow V_0(1^\lambda, C_\lambda) \\ (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) \leftarrow \tilde{P}^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q) \end{array} \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) . \quad (21)$$

Proof. First, we show that \tilde{P}^* outputs \perp with negligible probability. Recall that \tilde{P}^* outputs \perp if there does not exist i^* such that $V_1(\text{st}_{V,i^*}, (\pi_{i^*}^*)|_{Q_{i^*}}) = 1 \wedge C_\lambda(\mathbf{x}_{i^*}) \neq \mathbf{y}_{i^*}$. Since P^* is $2\kappa_V$ -wise no-signaling, it holds that for infinitely many $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ and every Q such that $|Q| = \kappa_V(\lambda)$,

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr \left[V_1(\text{st}_{V,i}, (\pi_i^*)|_{Q_i}) = 1 \wedge C_\lambda(\mathbf{x}_i) \neq \mathbf{y}_i \mid \begin{array}{l} (Q_i, \text{st}_{V,i}) \leftarrow V_0(1^\lambda, C_\lambda) \\ (\mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{y}_i, \pi_i^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q \cup Q_i) \end{array} \right] \\ & \geq \Pr \left[V_1(\text{st}_{V,i}, \pi_i^*) = 1 \wedge C_\lambda(\mathbf{x}_i) \neq \mathbf{y}_i \mid \begin{array}{l} (Q_i, \text{st}_{V,i}) \leftarrow V_0(1^\lambda, C_\lambda) \\ (\mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{y}_i, \pi_i^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q_i) \end{array} \right] - \frac{1}{2}\lambda^{-c} \\ & \geq \frac{1}{2}\lambda^{-c} \quad (\text{from Equation (19)}) \end{aligned} \quad (22)$$

Therefore, the probability that no i^* exists is bounded by $(1 - \lambda^{-c}/2)^{\lambda^{c+1}}$, which is negligible.

Next, we show that under the condition that \tilde{P}^* does not output \perp , \tilde{P}^* convinces \tilde{V} except with negligible probability. From the construction of \tilde{P}^* , it suffices to show that for any C_λ , we have

$$\Pr_{Q, Q', \pi^*} \left[\tilde{V}_1(\text{st}_V, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*|_Q) = 0 \wedge V_1(\text{st}'_V, \pi^*|_{Q'}) = 1 \right] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) , \quad (23)$$

where the probability is taken over the following sampling of Q, Q', π^* .

1. $(Q, \text{st}_V) \leftarrow V_0(1^\lambda, C_\lambda)$.
2. $(Q', \text{st}'_V) \leftarrow V_0(1^\lambda, C_\lambda)$.
3. $(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q \cup Q')$.

Hence, we focus on showing Equation (23). Recall that each of Q, Q' is queries for λ sets of the tests by V . We consider a mental experiment where, instead of sampling Q and Q' separately, we sample queries for 2λ sets of the tests simultaneously, denoted by \hat{Q} , and then define Q, Q' by randomly partitioning \hat{Q} into two after querying \hat{Q} to P^* . Clearly, the distributions of Q, Q' in this mental experiment is the same as those in the original experiment. Let BAD be the event that at least μ sets of queries in \hat{Q} are rejecting in the mental experiment, where we say a set of queries is rejecting if any test in the set of the tests that corresponds to those queries fails. (Recall that μ is the parameter of the relaxed verifier \tilde{V} and we have $\mu = \Theta(\log^2 \lambda)$.) Now, we have

$$\Pr_{\hat{Q}, Q, Q', \pi^*} \left[\tilde{V}_1(\text{st}_V, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*|_Q) = 0 \wedge V_1(\text{st}'_V, \pi^*|_{Q'}) = 1 \wedge \neg \text{BAD} \right] = 0$$

since $\tilde{V}_1(\text{st}_V, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*|_Q) = 0$ cannot occur unless BAD occurs. Therefore, we have

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr_{\hat{Q}, Q, Q', \pi^*} \left[\tilde{V}_1(\text{st}_V, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*|_Q) = 0 \wedge V_1(\text{st}'_V, \pi^*|_{Q'}) = 1 \right] \\ &= \Pr_{\hat{Q}, Q, Q', \pi^*} \left[\tilde{V}_1(\text{st}_V, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*|_Q) = 0 \wedge V_1(\text{st}'_V, \pi^*|_{Q'}) = 1 \wedge \text{BAD} \right] \\ &\leq \Pr_{\hat{Q}, Q, Q', \pi^*} \left[V_1(\text{st}'_V, \pi^*|_{Q'}) = 1 \wedge \text{BAD} \right] \\ &\leq \left(1 - \frac{\mu}{2\lambda} \right)^\lambda = \text{negl}(\lambda) \end{aligned}$$

where the last inequality holds since when BAD occurs, we have $V_1(\text{st}'_V, \pi^*|_{Q'}) = 1$ only when all the rejecting sets of queries are picked for Q when partitioning \hat{Q} to Q and Q' .

By combining what we show in the above two paragraphs, we obtain Equation (21). This concludes the proof of Claim 1. \square

Claim 2 (No-signaling property). \tilde{P}^* is $(\kappa_{\max} - \kappa_V)$ -wise no-signaling.

Proof. We need to show that for any ppt distinguisher \mathcal{D}_{NS} , there exists a negligible function negl such that for every $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, every W, W' such that $W' \subset W$ and $|W| \leq \kappa_{\max}(\lambda)$, and every $z \in \{0, 1\}^{\text{poly}(\lambda)}$,

$$\left| \Pr \left[\mathcal{D}_{\text{NS}}(C_\lambda, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*|_{W'}, z) = 1 \mid (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, W) \right] - \Pr \left[\mathcal{D}_{\text{NS}}(C_\lambda, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*, z) = 1 \mid (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, W') \right] \right| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) .$$

From the construction of \tilde{P}^* , toward this end it suffices to show that for any PPT distinguisher \mathcal{D} , there exists a negligible function negl such that for every $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, every W, W' such that $W' \subset W$ and $|W| \leq \kappa_{\max}(\lambda)$, and every $z \in \{0, 1\}^{\text{poly}(\lambda)}$,

$$\left| \Pr \left[\mathcal{D}(v) = 1 \mid \begin{array}{l} (Q_i, \text{st}_{V,i}) \leftarrow V_0(1^\lambda, C_\lambda) \text{ for } \forall i \in [\lambda^{c+1}] \\ (\mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{y}_i, \pi_i^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, W_\lambda \cup Q_i) \text{ for } \forall i \in [\lambda^{c+1}] \end{array} \right] - \Pr \left[\mathcal{D}(v') = 1 \mid \begin{array}{l} (Q_i, \text{st}_{V,i}) \leftarrow V_0(1^\lambda, C_\lambda) \text{ for } \forall i \in [\lambda^{c+1}] \\ (\mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{y}_i, \pi_i^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, W'_\lambda \cup Q_i) \text{ for } \forall i \in [\lambda^{c+1}] \end{array} \right] \right| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) , \quad (24)$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} v &:= (C_\lambda, W_\lambda, W'_\lambda, \{Q_i, \text{st}_{V,i}, \mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{y}_i, (\pi_i^*)\}_{W'_\lambda \cup Q_i, i \in [\lambda^{c+1}]}, z) , \\ v' &:= (C_\lambda, W_\lambda, W'_\lambda, \{Q_i, \text{st}_{V,i}, \mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{y}_i, \pi_i^*\}_{i \in [\lambda^{c+1}]}, z) . \end{aligned}$$

(This is because given v or v' , the distinguisher \mathcal{D} can emulate the output of \tilde{P}^* .) Equation (24) can be shown easily by using a hybrid argument since the κ_{\max} -wise no-signaling property of P^* guarantees that for any PPT distinguisher \mathcal{D}_i , there exists a negligible function negl such that for every $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, every W, W' such that $W' \subset W$ and $|W| \leq \kappa_{\max}(\lambda)$, and every $z \in \{0, 1\}^{\text{poly}(\lambda)}$,

$$\left| \Pr \left[\mathcal{D}_i(v_i) = 1 \mid \begin{array}{l} (Q_i, \text{st}_{V,i}) \leftarrow V_0(1^\lambda, C_\lambda) \\ (\mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{y}_i, \pi_i^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, W_\lambda \cup Q_i) \end{array} \right] - \Pr \left[\mathcal{D}_i(v'_i) = 1 \mid \begin{array}{l} (Q_i, \text{st}_{V,i}) \leftarrow V_0(1^\lambda, C_\lambda) \\ (\mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{y}_i, \pi_i^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, W'_\lambda \cup Q_i) \end{array} \right] \right| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) ,$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} v_i &:= (C_\lambda, W_\lambda, W'_\lambda, Q_i, \text{st}_{V,i}, \mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{y}_i, (\pi_i^*)\}_{W'_\lambda \cup Q_i}, z) , \\ v'_i &:= (C_\lambda, W_\lambda, W'_\lambda, Q_i, \text{st}_{V,i}, \mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{y}_i, \pi_i^*, z) . \end{aligned}$$

This concludes the proof of [Claim 2](#). □

From [Claim 1](#) and [Claim 2](#), [Lemma 1](#) follows. □

7 Analysis of Our PCP: Step 2 (Self-Corrected Proof)

In this section, we introduce a “self-correction” procedure with the following property: given any successful no-signaling cheating prover against the relaxed verifier, the self-correction procedure outputs a no-signaling proof that satisfies several important properties that the correct proof satisfies, such as the ability to pass Linearity Test on any points.

7.1 Self-Correction Procedure Self-Correct

For every security parameter $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, circuit C , cheating prover P^* , and queries $Q \subset \mathbb{F}^N \cup \mathbb{F}^{N^2}$, we consider the following self-correction procedure.

Algorithm Self-Correct^{P*}(1^λ, C, Q).

1. For each $\mathbf{v} \in Q$, choose λ random points $\mathbf{r}_{\mathbf{v},1}, \dots, \mathbf{r}_{\mathbf{v},\lambda}$ from \mathbb{F}^N if $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{F}^N$ and choose them from \mathbb{F}^{N^2} if $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{F}^{N^2}$.
2. Run $(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C, Q')$, where $Q' = \{\mathbf{r}_{\mathbf{v},i}, \mathbf{v} + \mathbf{r}_{\mathbf{v},i}\}_{\mathbf{v} \in Q, i \in [\lambda]}$.
3. For each $i \in [\lambda]$, define a function $\tilde{\pi}^{(i)} : Q \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$ by

$$\tilde{\pi}^{(i)}(\mathbf{v}) := \pi^*(\mathbf{v} + \mathbf{r}_{\mathbf{v},i}) - \pi^*(\mathbf{r}_{\mathbf{v},i}) \text{ for } \forall \mathbf{v} \in Q .$$

4. Define a function $\tilde{\pi} : Q \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$ by

$$\tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{v}) := \text{majority}(\tilde{\pi}^{(1)}(\mathbf{v}), \dots, \tilde{\pi}^{(\lambda)}(\mathbf{v})) \text{ for } \forall \mathbf{v} \in Q .$$

Let $\tilde{\pi}_f$ be the function that is obtained by restricting the domain of $\tilde{\pi}$ to $Q \cap \mathbb{F}^N$, and $\tilde{\pi}_g$ be the function that is obtained by restricting the domain of $\tilde{\pi}$ to $Q \cap \mathbb{F}^{N^2}$.

5. Output $(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \tilde{\pi})$.

7.2 Basic Properties of Self-Correct

In this subsection, we observe two basic properties of Self-Correct. First, we observe that Self-Correct is no-signaling in the following sense.

Lemma 2 (No-signaling property of Self-Correct). *Let κ_{\max} be any polynomial, $\{C_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ be any circuit family, and P^* be any κ'_{\max} -wise no-signaling cheating prover, where $\kappa'_{\max}(\lambda) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} 2\lambda \cdot \kappa_{\max}(\lambda)$.*

Then, for any PPT Turing machine \mathcal{D} , there exists a negligible function negl such that for every $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, every Q, Q' such that $Q' \subset Q$ and $|Q| \leq \kappa_{\max}(\lambda)$, and every $z \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$,

$$\left| \Pr \left[\mathcal{D}(C_\lambda, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^* |_{Q'}, z) = 1 \mid (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{P^*}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q) \right] - \Pr \left[\mathcal{D}(C_\lambda, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*, z) = 1 \mid (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{P^*}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q') \right] \right| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) .$$

Proof. Since Self-Correct, on input Q , makes only $2\lambda|Q|$ queries to P^* , this lemma follows directly from the construction of Self-Correct and the κ'_{\max} -wise no-signaling property of P^* . \square

Next, we observe that Self-Correct outputs a statement that is indistinguishable from the one by P^* .

Lemma 3 (Statement Indistinguishability of Self-Correct). *Let κ_{\max} be any polynomial, $\{C_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ be any circuit family, and P^* be any κ_{\max} -wise no-signaling cheating prover. Then, two distributions,*

$$\{(C_\lambda, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) \mid (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \emptyset)\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$$

and

$$\{(C_\lambda, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) \mid (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \tilde{\pi}) \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{P^*}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \emptyset)\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}} ,$$

are computationally indistinguishable (where \emptyset is the empty set).

Proof. This lemma follows directly from the construction of Self-Correct since the output of Self-Correct is identical with that of P^* when $Q = \emptyset$. \square

7.3 Key Properties of Self-Correct

In this subsection, we give three key lemmas on Self-Correct, which roughly say that when Self-Correct is applied on a cheating prover that convinces the relaxed verifier with overwhelming probability, it produces a proof that passes Linearity Test, Tensor-Product Test, SAT Test *on any points* with overwhelming probability.

Lemma 4 (Linearity of Self-Corrected Proof). *Let $\tilde{V} = (V_0, \tilde{V}_1)$ be the relaxed PCP verifier in Section 6, $\{C_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ be any circuit family, and κ_{\max} be any polynomial such that $\kappa_{\max}(\lambda) \geq \kappa_V(\lambda) = 2\lambda(5\lambda + 3)$, where κ_V is the query complexity of (P, V) .*

Then, for any κ_{\max} -wise no-signaling cheating prover P^ , if it holds*

$$\Pr \left[\tilde{V}_1(\text{st}_V, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) = 1 \mid \begin{array}{l} (Q, \text{st}_V) \leftarrow V_0(1^\lambda, C_\lambda) \\ (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q) \end{array} \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) \quad (25)$$

for infinitely many $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ (let Λ be the set of those λ 's), there exists a negligible function negl such that for every sufficiently large $\lambda \in \Lambda$ and every $\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{F}^N$ (resp. $\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{F}^{N^2}$), it holds

$$\Pr \left[\tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{u}) + \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{v}) = \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{u} + \mathbf{v}) \mid (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \tilde{\pi}) \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{P^*}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \{\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{u} + \mathbf{v}\}) \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) . \quad (26)$$

Lemma 5 (Tensor-Product Consistency of Self-Corrected Proof). *Let $\tilde{V} = (V_0, \tilde{V}_1)$ be the relaxed PCP verifier in Section 6, $\{C_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ be any circuit family, and κ_{\max} be any polynomial such that $\kappa_{\max}(\lambda) \geq 2\lambda(8\lambda + 3)$.*

Then, for any κ_{\max} -wise no-signaling cheating prover P^ , if it holds*

$$\Pr \left[\tilde{V}_1(\text{st}_V, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) = 1 \mid \begin{array}{l} (Q, \text{st}_V) \leftarrow V_0(1^\lambda, C_\lambda) \\ (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q) \end{array} \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) \quad (27)$$

for infinitely many $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ (let Λ be the set of those λ 's), there exists a negligible function negl such that for every sufficiently large $\lambda \in \Lambda$ and every $\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{F}^N$, it holds

$$\Pr \left[\tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{u})\tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{v}) = \tilde{\pi}_g(\mathbf{u} \otimes \mathbf{v}) \mid (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \tilde{\pi}) \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{P^*}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \{\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{u} \otimes \mathbf{v}\}) \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) . \quad (28)$$

Lemma 6 (SAT Consistency of Self-Corrected Proof). *Let $\tilde{V} = (V_0, \tilde{V}_1)$ be the relaxed PCP verifier in Section 6, $\{C_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ be any circuit family, and κ_{\max} be any polynomial such that $\kappa_{\max}(\lambda) \geq \kappa_V(\lambda) = 2\lambda(5\lambda + 3)$, where κ_V is the query complexity of (P, V) .*

Then, for any κ_{\max} -wise no-signaling cheating prover P^ , if it holds*

$$\Pr \left[\tilde{V}_1(\text{st}_V, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) = 1 \mid \begin{array}{l} (Q, \text{st}_V) \leftarrow V_0(1^\lambda, C_\lambda) \\ (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q) \end{array} \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) \quad (29)$$

for infinitely many $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ (let Λ be the set of those λ 's), there exists a negligible function negl such that for every sufficiently large $\lambda \in \Lambda$ and every $\sigma \in \mathbb{F}^M$, it holds

$$\Pr \left[\tilde{\pi}_f(\psi_\sigma) + \tilde{\pi}_g(\psi'_\sigma) = c_\sigma \mid (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \tilde{\pi}) \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{P^*}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \{\psi_\sigma, \psi'_\sigma\}) \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) , \quad (30)$$

where $c_\sigma, \psi_\sigma, \psi'_\sigma$ are defined as follows: let $\Psi = \{\Psi_i(\mathbf{z}) = c_i\}_{i \in [M]}$ be the system of equations that is obtained from the circuit C_λ as described in [Section 5](#), and let

$$\Psi_\sigma(\mathbf{z}) := \sum_{i \in [M]} \sigma_i \Psi_i(\mathbf{z}) \quad \text{and} \quad c_\sigma := \sum_{i \in [M]} \sigma_i c_i ;$$

then, $\psi_\sigma, \psi'_\sigma$ are the coefficient of $\Psi_\sigma(\mathbf{z})$ such that

$$\Psi_\sigma(\mathbf{z}) = \langle \psi_\sigma, \mathbf{z} \rangle + \langle \psi'_\sigma, \mathbf{z} \otimes \mathbf{z} \rangle .$$

We prove these lemmas in [Sections 7.6, 7.7, and 7.8](#).

7.4 Corollaries of [Lemma 4](#)

Before proving the three key lemmas in the previous subsection, we observe that we can obtain several useful corollaries from the linearity of the self-corrected proof ([Lemma 4](#)).

First, we obtain the following basic lemma from [Lemma 4](#).

Lemma 7. *Let $\tilde{V} = (V_0, \tilde{V}_1)$ be the relaxed PCP verifier in [Section 6](#), $\{C_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ be any circuit family, and κ_{\max} be any polynomial such that $\kappa_{\max}(\lambda) \geq \kappa_V(\lambda) = 2\lambda(5\lambda + 3)$, where κ_V is the query complexity of (P, V) .*

Then, for any κ_{\max} -wise no-signaling cheating prover P^ , if it holds*

$$\Pr \left[\tilde{V}_1(\text{st}_V, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) = 1 \mid \begin{array}{l} (Q, \text{st}_V) \leftarrow V_0(1^\lambda, C_\lambda) \\ (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q) \end{array} \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) \quad (31)$$

for infinitely many $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ (let Λ be the set of those λ 's), there exists a negligible function negl such that for every sufficiently large $\lambda \in \Lambda$ and every $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{F}^N$ (resp. $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{F}^{N^2}$), it hold

$$\Pr \left[\tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{0}) = 0 \mid (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \tilde{\pi}) \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{P^*}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \{\mathbf{0}\}) \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) \quad (32)$$

and

$$\Pr \left[\tilde{\pi}(-\mathbf{v}) = -\tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{v}) \mid (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \tilde{\pi}) \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{P^*}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \{\mathbf{v}, -\mathbf{v}\}) \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) , \quad (33)$$

where $\mathbf{0} = (0, \dots, 0) \in \mathbb{F}^N$ (resp. $\mathbf{0} = (0, \dots, 0) \in \mathbb{F}^{N^2}$).

Proof. Fix any $\{C_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$, κ_{\max} , and P^* , and assume that Equation (31) holds for infinitely many $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$. Let Λ be the set of those λ 's, and fix any sufficiently large $\lambda \in \Lambda$. Our goal is to show Equations (32) and (33).

First, we obtain Equation (32) by first obtaining

$$\Pr \left[\tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{v} + \mathbf{0}) = \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{v}) + \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{0}) \mid (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \tilde{\pi}) \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{P^*}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \{\mathbf{v}, \mathbf{0}\}) \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

for any $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{F}^N$ (resp. $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{F}^{N^2}$) from [Lemma 4](#) and then use the no-singling property of Self-Correct ([Lemma 2](#)).

Next, we obtain Equation (33) by first obtaining

$$\Pr \left[\tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{v}) + \tilde{\pi}(-\mathbf{v}) = \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{0}) \mid (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \tilde{\pi}) \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{P^*}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \{\mathbf{v}, -\mathbf{v}, \mathbf{0}\}) \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

from [Lemma 4](#) and then use Equation (32) and the no-signaling property of Self-Correct ([Lemma 2](#)). \square

Next, we observe that [Lemma 4](#) can be generalized as follows.

Lemma 8 (Linearity of Self-Corrected Proof, scalar multiplication). *Let $\tilde{V} = (V_0, \tilde{V}_1)$ be the relaxed PCP verifier in [Section 6](#), $\{C_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ be any circuit family, and κ_{\max} be any polynomial such that $\kappa_{\max}(\lambda) \geq \kappa_V(\lambda) = 2\lambda(5\lambda + 3)$, where κ_V is the query complexity of (P, V) .*

Then, for any κ_{\max} -wise no-signaling cheating prover P^ , if it holds*

$$\Pr \left[\tilde{V}_1(\text{st}_V, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) = 1 \mid \begin{array}{l} (Q, \text{st}_V) \leftarrow V_0(1^\lambda, C_\lambda) \\ (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q) \end{array} \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) \quad (34)$$

for infinitely many $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ (let Λ be the set of those λ 's), there exists a negligible function negl such that for every sufficiently large $\lambda \in \Lambda$, every $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{F}^N$ (resp. $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{F}^{N^2}$), and every $k \in \{3, \dots, |\mathbb{F}| - 1\}$, it holds

$$\Pr \left[k\tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{v}) = \tilde{\pi}(k\mathbf{v}) \mid (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \tilde{\pi}) \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{P^*}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \{\mathbf{v}, k\mathbf{v}\}) \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) . \quad (35)$$

Proof. Fix any $\{C_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$, κ_{\max} , and P^* , and assume that Equation (34) for infinitely many $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$. Let Λ be the set of those λ 's, and fix any sufficiently large $\lambda \in \Lambda$. Our goal is to show Equation (35).

Fix any $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{F}^N$ (resp. $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{F}^{N^2}$), and let

$$p(k) := \Pr \left[k\tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{v}) = \tilde{\pi}(k\mathbf{v}) \mid (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \tilde{\pi}) \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{P^*}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \{\mathbf{v}, k\mathbf{v}\}) \right]$$

for $k \in \{2, \dots, k_{\max}\}$, where $k_{\max} := |\mathbb{F}| - 1$. (Note that we have $\log k_{\max} \leq \text{poly}(\lambda)$.) In this notation, our goal is to show $p(k) \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$ for every $k \in \{3, \dots, k_{\max}\}$. Assume, for simplicity, that k is an odd number (the case that k is an even number can be handled similarly). Then, observe that if we have

$$\tilde{\pi}(k\mathbf{v}) = \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{v}) + \tilde{\pi}((k-1)\mathbf{v}) \bigwedge \tilde{\pi}((k-1)\mathbf{v}) = 2\tilde{\pi}\left(\frac{k-1}{2}\mathbf{v}\right) \bigwedge \tilde{\pi}\left(\frac{k-1}{2}\mathbf{v}\right) = \frac{k-1}{2}\tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{v}) ,$$

then we have $k\tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{v}) = \tilde{\pi}(k\mathbf{v})$. In addition, observe that from the linearity of the self-corrected proof ([Lemma 4](#)), we have

$$\Pr \left[\tilde{\pi}(k\mathbf{v}) = \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{v}) + \tilde{\pi}((k-1)\mathbf{v}) \mid (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \tilde{\pi}) \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{P^*}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \{\mathbf{v}, (k-1)\mathbf{v}, k\mathbf{v}\}) \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

and

$$\Pr \left[\tilde{\pi}((k-1)\mathbf{v}) = 2\tilde{\pi}\left(\frac{k-1}{2}\mathbf{v}\right) \mid (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \tilde{\pi}) \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{P^*}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \{\frac{k-1}{2}\mathbf{v}, (k-1)\mathbf{v}\}) \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) .$$

By combining the above observations and the no-signaling property of [Self-Correct](#) ([Lemma 2](#)), we obtain

$$p(k) \geq p\left(\frac{k-1}{2}\right) - \text{negl}(\lambda) .$$

Now, since we have $p(2) \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$ from the linearity of the self-corrected proof ([Lemma 4](#)), we have

$$p(k) \geq 1 - \log k \cdot \text{negl}(\lambda) \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

as desired. This concludes the proof of [Lemma 8](#). \square

Finally, we notice that [Lemma 4](#) can also be generalized as follows.

Lemma 9 (Linearity of Self-Corrected Proof, more than two points). *Let $\tilde{V} = (V_0, \tilde{V}_1)$ be the relaxed PCP verifier in [Section 6](#), $\{C_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ be any circuit family, and κ_{\max} be any polynomial such that $\kappa_{\max}(\lambda) \geq \kappa_V(\lambda) = 2\lambda(5\lambda + 3)$, where κ_V is the query complexity of (P, V) .*

Then, for any κ_{\max} -wise no-signaling cheating prover P^ , if it holds a*

$$\Pr \left[\tilde{V}_1(\text{st}_V, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) = 1 \mid \begin{array}{l} (Q, \text{st}_V) \leftarrow V_0(1^\lambda, C_\lambda) \\ (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q) \end{array} \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

for infinitely many $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ (let Λ be the set of those λ 's), there exists a negligible function negl such that for every sufficiently large $\lambda \in \Lambda$ and every $\mathbf{v}_1, \dots, \mathbf{v}_k \in \mathbb{F}^N$ (resp. $\mathbf{v}_1, \dots, \mathbf{v}_k \in \mathbb{F}^{N^2}$), where $k \in \{3, \dots, \kappa_{\max}/(2\lambda) - 2\}$, it holds

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{v}_1) + \dots + \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{v}_k) \\ = \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{v}_1 + \dots + \mathbf{v}_k) \end{array} \mid \begin{array}{l} (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \tilde{\pi}) \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{P^*}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q) \\ \text{where } Q = \{\mathbf{v}_1, \dots, \mathbf{v}_k, \mathbf{v}_1 + \dots + \mathbf{v}_k\} \end{array} \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) .$$

7.5 Preliminary Observation

The rest of this section is devoted for proving the three key lemmas in [Section 7.3](#). Since we only use the statements of these lemmas in the rest of this paper, the readers can skip the rest of this section if they believe that these lemmas hold.

In this subsection, we make a useful immediate observation about Self-Correct. Specifically, we observe that if Self-Correct is applied on a no-signaling cheating prover that convinces the relaxed verifier with overwhelming probability, it produces a proof that passes each of Linearity Test, Tensor-Product Test, and SAT Test on random points with overwhelming probability even when these tests are done individually. We remind the readers that the relaxed verifier accepts a PCP proof even when the proof fails to pass a small number of tests, which means that we can only hope for that the self-corrected proof passes Linearity Test etc. except for a small number of trials.

Observation 1. Let $\tilde{V} = (V_0, \tilde{V}_1)$ be the relaxed PCP verifier in [Section 6](#), $\{C_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ be any circuit family, and κ_{\max} be any polynomial such that $\kappa_{\max}(\lambda) \geq \kappa_V(\lambda) = 2\lambda(5\lambda + 3)$, where κ_V is the query complexity of (P, V) .

Then, for any κ_{\max} -wise no-signaling cheating prover P^* , if it holds

$$\Pr \left[\tilde{V}_1(\text{st}_V, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) = 1 \mid \begin{array}{l} (Q, \text{st}_V) \leftarrow V_0(1^\lambda, C_\lambda) \\ (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q) \end{array} \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

for infinitely many $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ (let Λ be the set of those λ 's), there exists a negligible function negl such that for every sufficiently large $\lambda \in \Lambda$, each of the following holds.

– Linearity Test.

$$\Pr \left[|I_{\text{linear}}| \geq \lambda - \mu \mid \begin{array}{l} \mathbf{r}_{i,1}, \mathbf{r}_{i,2} \leftarrow \mathbb{F}^N \text{ for } \forall i \in [\lambda] \\ (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q) \text{ where } Q = \{\mathbf{r}_{i,1}, \mathbf{r}_{i,2}, \mathbf{r}_{i,1} + \mathbf{r}_{i,2}\}_{i \in [\lambda]} \end{array} \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) ,$$

where

$$I_{\text{linear}} := \left\{ i \text{ s.t. } \pi_f^*(\mathbf{r}_{i,1}) + \pi_f^*(\mathbf{r}_{i,2}) = \pi_f^*(\mathbf{r}_{i,1} + \mathbf{r}_{i,2}) \right\} .$$

The same holds when π_f^* is replaced with π_g^* .

– **Tensor-Product Test.**

$$\Pr \left[|I_{\text{Tensor}}| \geq \lambda - \mu \left| \begin{array}{l} \mathbf{r}_{i,1}, \mathbf{r}_{i,2} \leftarrow \mathbb{F}^N \text{ for } \forall i \in [\lambda] \\ (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \tilde{\pi}) \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{P^*}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q) \\ \text{where } Q = \{\mathbf{r}_{i,1}, \mathbf{r}_{i,2}, \mathbf{r}_{i,1} \otimes \mathbf{r}_{i,2}\}_{i \in [\lambda]} \end{array} \right. \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) ,$$

where

$$I_{\text{Tensor}} := \left\{ i \text{ s.t. } \tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{r}_{i,1})\tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{r}_{i,2}) = \tilde{\pi}_g(\mathbf{r}_{i,1} \otimes \mathbf{r}_{i,2}) \right\} .$$

– **SAT Test.**

$$\Pr \left[|I_{\text{SAT}}| \geq \lambda - \mu \left| \begin{array}{l} \sigma_i \leftarrow \mathbb{F}^M \text{ for } \forall i \in [\lambda] \\ (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \tilde{\pi}) \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{P^*}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q) \\ \text{where } Q = \{\psi_{\sigma_i}, \psi'_{\sigma_i}\}_{i \in [\lambda]} \end{array} \right. \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) ,$$

where $\psi_{\sigma_i} \in \mathbb{F}^N, \psi'_{\sigma_i} \in \mathbb{F}^{N^2}$ are defined as in Equation (18), and

$$I_{\text{SAT}} := \left\{ i \text{ s.t. } \tilde{\pi}_f(\psi_{\sigma_i}) + \tilde{\pi}_g(\psi'_{\sigma_i}) = c_{\sigma_i} \right\} .$$

◇

It is easy to see that this observation follows from the definition of the relaxed verifier and the no-signaling property of P^* .

7.6 Proof of Lemma 4 (Linearity of Self-Corrected Proof)

In this subsection, we prove Lemma 4, which says that the self-corrected proof passes Linearity Test on any points. As mentioned in the technical overview (Section 3.3), our analysis is an extension of a previous analysis of Linearity Test in the standard PCP setting. (In particular, our analysis is based on the analysis that is described in a textbook by Goldreich [Gol17], which follows the idea of Blum, Luby, and Rubinfeld [BLR93].)

Proof (of Lemma 4). Fix any $\{C_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}, \kappa_{\max}$, and P^* , and assume that Equation (25) holds for infinitely many $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$. Let Λ be the set of those λ 's, and fix any sufficiently large $\lambda \in \Lambda$. Our goal is to show Equation (26). In the following, we only consider the case of $\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{F}^N$. (The case of $\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{F}^{N^2}$ can be proven identically.)

At a high level, the proof proceeds as follows. From the construction, $\text{Self-Correct}^{P^*}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \{\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{u} + \mathbf{v}\})$ defines the self-corrected values $\tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{u}), \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{v}), \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{u} + \mathbf{v})$ by using three independent sets of randomness (where each set consists of λ random points in \mathbb{F}^N). First, we introduce a mental experiment where, in addition to $\tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{u}), \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{v}), \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{u} + \mathbf{v})$, alternative self-corrected values $\tilde{\rho}(\mathbf{u}), \tilde{\rho}(\mathbf{v}), \tilde{\rho}(\mathbf{u} + \mathbf{v})$ are defined by Self-Correct , where those alternative self-corrected values are defined by using three mutually dependent sets of randomness. Then, we proceed in the following two steps.

1. First, we show that the self-correction procedure is “consistent” in the sense that we have $\tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{t}) = \tilde{\rho}(\mathbf{t})$ for every $\mathbf{t} \in \{\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{u} + \mathbf{v}\}$. Roughly, we show this consistency by using the fact that, although the three sets of randomness that are used for $\tilde{\rho}(\mathbf{u}), \tilde{\rho}(\mathbf{v}), \tilde{\rho}(\mathbf{u} + \mathbf{v})$ are mutually dependent, each of these three sets is, when viewed individually, uniformly distributed.

2. Second, we show that the alternative self-corrected values satisfy linearity, i.e., they satisfy $\tilde{\rho}(\mathbf{u}) + \tilde{\rho}(\mathbf{v}) = \tilde{\rho}(\mathbf{u} + \mathbf{v})$. Roughly, we show this linearity by using the fact that the alternative self-corrected values are generated with mutually dependent sets of randomness.

By combining these two steps, we can obtain $\tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{u}) + \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{v}) = \tilde{\rho}(\mathbf{u}) + \tilde{\rho}(\mathbf{v}) = \tilde{\rho}(\mathbf{u} + \mathbf{v}) = \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{u} + \mathbf{v})$ as desired.

Formally, we first observe that the no-signaling property of P^* and the construction of Self-Correct guarantees that, to prove this lemma, it suffices to show that Equation (26) holds when $\tilde{\pi}$ are sampled in the following way. (A notable difference from $\text{Self-Correct}^{P^*}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \{\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{u} + \mathbf{v}\})$ is highlighted by red.)

1. Choose 4λ random points

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{r}_{\mathbf{u},1}, \dots, \mathbf{r}_{\mathbf{u},\lambda}, \mathbf{r}_{\mathbf{v},1}, \dots, \mathbf{r}_{\mathbf{v},\lambda}, \mathbf{r}_{\mathbf{u}+\mathbf{v},1}, \dots, \mathbf{r}_{\mathbf{u}+\mathbf{v},\lambda} &\in \mathbb{F}^N, \text{ and} \\ \mathbf{s}_1, \dots, \mathbf{s}_\lambda &\in \mathbb{F}^N \end{aligned}$$

2. Run $(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q \cup Q')$, where

$$\begin{aligned} Q &= \{\mathbf{r}_{\mathbf{u},i}, \mathbf{u} + \mathbf{r}_{\mathbf{u},i}, \mathbf{r}_{\mathbf{v},i}, \mathbf{v} + \mathbf{r}_{\mathbf{v},i}, \mathbf{r}_{\mathbf{u}+\mathbf{v},i}, \mathbf{u} + \mathbf{v} + \mathbf{r}_{\mathbf{u}+\mathbf{v},i}\}_{i \in [\lambda]} , \\ Q' &= \{\mathbf{s}_i, \mathbf{u} + \mathbf{s}_i, \mathbf{s}_i - \mathbf{v}\}_{i \in [\lambda]} . \end{aligned}$$

3. For each $i \in [\lambda]$, define a function $\tilde{\pi}^{(i)} : \{\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{u} + \mathbf{v}\} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$ by

$$\tilde{\pi}^{(i)}(\mathbf{t}) := \pi^*(\mathbf{t} + \mathbf{r}_{\mathbf{t},i}) - \pi^*(\mathbf{r}_{\mathbf{t},i}) \text{ for } \forall \mathbf{t} \in \{\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{u} + \mathbf{v}\}$$

and a function $\tilde{\rho}^{(i)} : \{\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{u} + \mathbf{v}\} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$ by

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{\rho}^{(i)}(\mathbf{u}) &:= \pi_f^*(\mathbf{u} + \mathbf{s}_i) - \pi_f^*(\mathbf{s}_i) \\ \tilde{\rho}^{(i)}(\mathbf{v}) &:= \pi_f^*(\mathbf{s}_i) - \pi_f^*(\mathbf{s}_i - \mathbf{v}) \\ \tilde{\rho}^{(i)}(\mathbf{u} + \mathbf{v}) &:= \pi_f^*(\mathbf{u} + \mathbf{s}_i) - \pi_f^*(\mathbf{s}_i - \mathbf{v}) . \end{aligned}$$

4. Define a function $\tilde{\pi} : \{\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{u} + \mathbf{v}\} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$ by

$$\tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{t}) := \text{majority}(\tilde{\pi}^{(1)}(\mathbf{t}), \dots, \tilde{\pi}^{(\lambda)}(\mathbf{t})) \text{ for } \forall \mathbf{t} \in \{\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{u} + \mathbf{v}\}$$

and a function $\tilde{\rho} : \{\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{u} + \mathbf{v}\} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$ by

$$\tilde{\rho}(\mathbf{t}) := \text{majority}(\tilde{\rho}^{(1)}(\mathbf{t}), \dots, \tilde{\rho}^{(\lambda)}(\mathbf{t})) \text{ for } \forall \mathbf{t} \in \{\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{u} + \mathbf{v}\} .$$

5. Output $(\tilde{\pi}, \tilde{\rho})$.

Therefore, we can obtain Equation (26) by showing

$$\Pr_{\tilde{\pi}, \tilde{\rho}} [\tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{u}) + \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{v}) = \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{u} + \mathbf{v})] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) , \quad (36)$$

where for any event E , we use

$$\Pr_{\tilde{\pi}, \tilde{\rho}} [E]$$

as a shorthand for the probability that the event E occurs when $\tilde{\pi}, \tilde{\rho}$ are chosen as above (along with \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}).

Now, we show Equation (36) by using the following two claims.

Claim 3 (Consistency of Self Correction). For every $t \in \{\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{u} + \mathbf{v}\}$,

$$\Pr_{\tilde{\pi}, \tilde{\rho}} [\tilde{\pi}(t) = \tilde{\rho}(t)] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) . \quad (37)$$

Claim 4 (Existence of Strong Majority). For every $t \in \{\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{u} + \mathbf{v}\}$,

$$\Pr_{\tilde{\pi}, \tilde{\rho}} \left[\left| \{i \text{ s.t. } \tilde{\rho}^{(i)}(t) = \tilde{\rho}(t)\} \right| \geq \lambda - 20\mu \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) .$$

Before proving Claim 3 and Claim 4, we show that Equation (36) indeed follows from these two claims. From Claim 3 and the union bound, we can show Equation (36) by showing

$$\Pr_{\tilde{\pi}, \tilde{\rho}} [\tilde{\rho}(\mathbf{u}) + \tilde{\rho}(\mathbf{v}) = \tilde{\rho}(\mathbf{u} + \mathbf{v})] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) . \quad (38)$$

Thus, we focus on showing Equation (38). First, from Claim 4 and the union bound, we have

$$\Pr_{\tilde{\pi}, \tilde{\rho}} \left[\begin{array}{l} \left| \{i \text{ s.t. } \tilde{\rho}^{(i)}(\mathbf{u}) = \tilde{\rho}(\mathbf{u})\} \right| \geq \lambda - 20\mu \\ \wedge \left| \{i \text{ s.t. } \tilde{\rho}^{(i)}(\mathbf{v}) = \tilde{\rho}(\mathbf{v})\} \right| \geq \lambda - 20\mu \\ \wedge \left| \{i \text{ s.t. } \tilde{\rho}^{(i)}(\mathbf{u} + \mathbf{v}) = \tilde{\rho}(\mathbf{u} + \mathbf{v})\} \right| \geq \lambda - 20\mu \end{array} \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) . \quad (39)$$

Then, since we have $3 \cdot 20\mu < \lambda$ for every sufficiently large λ , from Equation (39) and the pigeonhole principle we have

$$\Pr_{\tilde{\pi}, \tilde{\rho}} \left[\begin{array}{l} \exists i^* \in [\lambda] \text{ s.t. } \tilde{\rho}^{(i^*)}(\mathbf{u}) = \tilde{\rho}(\mathbf{u}) \\ \wedge \tilde{\rho}^{(i^*)}(\mathbf{v}) = \tilde{\rho}(\mathbf{v}) \\ \wedge \tilde{\rho}^{(i^*)}(\mathbf{u} + \mathbf{v}) = \tilde{\rho}(\mathbf{u} + \mathbf{v}) \end{array} \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) . \quad (40)$$

Then, observe that for every $i^* \in [\lambda]$ such that

$$\tilde{\rho}^{(i^*)}(\mathbf{u}) = \tilde{\rho}(\mathbf{u}) \quad \wedge \quad \tilde{\rho}^{(i^*)}(\mathbf{v}) = \tilde{\rho}(\mathbf{v}) \quad \wedge \quad \tilde{\rho}^{(i^*)}(\mathbf{u} + \mathbf{v}) = \tilde{\rho}(\mathbf{u} + \mathbf{v}) ,$$

we have

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{\rho}(\mathbf{u}) &= \pi_f^*(\mathbf{u} + \mathbf{s}_{i^*}) - \pi_f^*(\mathbf{s}_{i^*}) , \\ \tilde{\rho}(\mathbf{v}) &= \pi_f^*(\mathbf{s}_{i^*}) - \pi_f^*(\mathbf{s}_{i^*} - \mathbf{v}) , \\ \tilde{\rho}(\mathbf{u} + \mathbf{v}) &= \pi_f^*(\mathbf{u} + \mathbf{s}_{i^*}) - \pi_f^*(\mathbf{s}_{i^*} - \mathbf{v}) , \end{aligned}$$

from the definition of $\tilde{\rho}^{(i^*)}$, and therefore have $\tilde{\rho}(\mathbf{u}) + \tilde{\rho}(\mathbf{v}) = \tilde{\rho}(\mathbf{u} + \mathbf{v})$. By combining this observation with Equation (40), we obtain Equation (38).

Finally, to conclude the proof of Lemma 4, we prove Claim 3 and Claim 4. We prove these two claims by proving the following claim, which implies both of Claim 3 and Claim 4.

Claim 5. For every $t \in \{\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{u} + \mathbf{v}\}$,

$$\Pr_{\tilde{\pi}, \tilde{\rho}} [\text{Strong-Majority}_t] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) ,$$

where Strong-Majority_t is the event that there exists $a_t \in \mathbb{F}$ such that

$$\left| \{i \text{ s.t. } \tilde{\pi}^{(i)}(t) = \tilde{\rho}^{(i)}(t) = a_t\} \right| \geq \lambda - 20\mu .$$

(To see that [Claim 5](#) indeed implies [Claim 3](#) and [Claim 4](#), observe that when Strong-Majority_t occurs, we have $\tilde{\pi}(t) = \tilde{\rho}(t) = a_t$ since we have $\lambda - 20\mu > \lambda/2$ for every sufficiently large λ .) Hence, to prove [Claim 3](#) and [Claim 4](#), it remains to prove [Claim 5](#).

Proof (of [Claim 5](#)). An important observation is that, during the sampling of $\tilde{\pi}, \tilde{\rho}$ (as per the description at the beginning of the proof of [Lemma 4](#)), each of

- $\mathbf{r}_{u,\lambda}, \dots, \mathbf{r}_{u,\lambda}, \mathbf{s}_1, \dots, \mathbf{s}_\lambda$
- $\mathbf{r}_{v,1}, \dots, \mathbf{r}_{v,\lambda}, \mathbf{s}_1 - \mathbf{v}, \dots, \mathbf{s}_\lambda - \mathbf{v}$
- $\mathbf{r}_{u+v,1}, \dots, \mathbf{r}_{u+v,\lambda}, \mathbf{s}_1 - \mathbf{v}, \dots, \mathbf{s}_\lambda - \mathbf{v}$

is a set of 2λ random points. This observation, combined with the no-signaling property of P^* and the definition of $\tilde{\rho}^{(i)}$, implies that, to prove [Claim 5](#), it suffices to show the following simpler claim.

Claim 6. For any $t \in \{\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{u} + t\}$, we have

$$\Pr_{\tilde{\pi}_t, \tilde{\rho}_t} [\text{Strong-Majority}] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) , \quad (41)$$

where the probability is taken over the following sampling of $\tilde{\pi}_t, \tilde{\rho}_t$.

1. Choose 2λ random points $\mathbf{r}_1, \dots, \mathbf{r}_\lambda, \mathbf{s}_1, \dots, \mathbf{s}_\lambda \in \mathbb{F}^N$.
2. Run $(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q \cup Q')$, where $Q = \{\mathbf{r}_i, \mathbf{t} + \mathbf{r}_i\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$ and $Q' = \{\mathbf{s}_i, \mathbf{t} + \mathbf{s}_i\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$.
3. For each $i \in [\lambda]$, define $\tilde{\pi}_t^{(i)} := \pi^*(\mathbf{t} + \mathbf{r}_i) - \pi^*(\mathbf{r}_i)$ and $\tilde{\rho}_t^{(i)} := \pi^*(\mathbf{t} + \mathbf{s}_i) - \pi^*(\mathbf{s}_i)$.
4. Output $\tilde{\pi}_t \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{majority}(\tilde{\pi}_t^{(1)}, \dots, \tilde{\pi}_t^{(\lambda)})$ and $\tilde{\rho}_t \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{majority}(\tilde{\rho}_t^{(1)}, \dots, \tilde{\rho}_t^{(\lambda)})$.

and Strong-Majority is the event that there exists $a_t \in \mathbb{F}$ such that

$$\left| \{i \text{ s.t. } \tilde{\pi}_t^{(i)} = \tilde{\rho}_t^{(i)} = a_t\} \right| \geq \lambda - 20\mu .$$

Remark 5. To see that [Claim 6](#) indeed implies [Claim 5](#), observe the following. Consider, for example, the case of $t = \mathbf{v}$. Then, if we simplify the sampling of $\tilde{\pi}, \tilde{\rho}$ in [Claim 5](#) by removing all the queries that are not used for defining $\tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{v}), \tilde{\rho}(\mathbf{v})$, we obtain the following sampling (note that this simplification does not non-negligibly increase the probability of Strong-Majority_v occurring because of the no-signaling property of P^*).

1. Choose 2λ random points $\mathbf{r}_{v,1}, \dots, \mathbf{r}_{v,\lambda}, \mathbf{s}_1, \dots, \mathbf{s}_\lambda \in \mathbb{F}^N$.
2. Run $(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q \cup Q')$, where $Q = \{\mathbf{r}_{v,i}, \mathbf{v} + \mathbf{r}_{v,i}\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$ and $Q' = \{\mathbf{s}_i, \mathbf{s}_i - \mathbf{v}\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$.
3. For each $i \in [\lambda]$, define $\tilde{\pi}^{(i)}(\mathbf{v}) := \pi^*(\mathbf{v} + \mathbf{r}_{v,i}) - \pi^*(\mathbf{r}_{v,i})$ and $\tilde{\rho}^{(i)}(\mathbf{v}) := \pi^*(\mathbf{s}_i) - \pi^*(\mathbf{s}_i - \mathbf{v})$.
4. Output $\tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{v}) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{majority}(\tilde{\pi}^{(1)}(\mathbf{v}), \dots, \tilde{\pi}^{(\lambda)}(\mathbf{v}))$ and $\tilde{\rho}(\mathbf{v}) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{majority}(\tilde{\rho}^{(1)}(\mathbf{v}), \dots, \tilde{\rho}^{(\lambda)}(\mathbf{v}))$.

Now, since in this sampling, we have $\tilde{\rho}^{(i)}(\mathbf{v}) = \pi^*(\mathbf{v} + (\mathbf{s}_i - \mathbf{v})) - \pi^*(\mathbf{s}_i - \mathbf{v})$ and that the set $\{\mathbf{r}_{v,1}, \dots, \mathbf{r}_{v,\lambda}, \mathbf{s}_1 - \mathbf{v}, \dots, \mathbf{s}_\lambda - \mathbf{v}\}$ is a set of 2λ random points, this sampling is equivalent to the sampling of $\tilde{\pi}, \tilde{\rho}$ in [Claim 6](#). \diamond

Thus, what remains to do is to prove [Claim 6](#).

Proof (of [Claim 6](#)). To show Equation (41), we use the following two sub-claims.

Sub-Claim 1. We have

$$\Pr_{\tilde{\pi}_t, \tilde{\rho}_t} \left[|I_{\text{Good-pair}}| \geq \lambda - 2\mu \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) , \quad (42)$$

where $I_{\text{Good-pair}} := \{i \text{ s.t. } \tilde{\pi}_t^{(i)} = \tilde{\rho}_t^{(i)}\}$.

Sub-Claim 2. *We have*

$$\Pr_{\tilde{\pi}_t, \tilde{\rho}_t} \left[I_{\text{Good-pair}} \geq \lambda - 2\mu \mid \neg \text{Strong-Majority} \right] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) ,$$

where $I_{\text{Good-pair}}$ is defined as in [Sub-Claim 1](#).

First, Equation (41) follows from these two sub-claims since we have

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr_{\tilde{\pi}_t, \tilde{\rho}_t} [\text{Strong-Majority}] \\ & \geq \Pr_{\tilde{\pi}_t, \tilde{\rho}_t} \left[\text{Strong-Majority} \wedge I_{\text{Good-pair}} \geq \lambda - 2\mu \right] \\ & = \Pr_{\tilde{\pi}_t, \tilde{\rho}_t} \left[I_{\text{Good-pair}} \geq \lambda - 2\mu \right] - \Pr_{\tilde{\pi}_t, \tilde{\rho}_t} \left[\neg \text{Strong-Majority} \wedge I_{\text{Good-pair}} \geq \lambda - 2\mu \right] \\ & \geq \Pr_{\tilde{\pi}_t, \tilde{\rho}_t} \left[I_{\text{Good-pair}} \geq \lambda - 2\mu \right] - \Pr_{\tilde{\pi}_t, \tilde{\rho}_t} \left[I_{\text{Good-pair}} \geq \lambda - 2\mu \mid \neg \text{Strong-Majority} \right] \\ & = 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) , \end{aligned}$$

where we use the two sub-claims in the last equation. Thus, what remains to do is to prove the two sub-claims.

Proof (of Sub-Claim 1). At a high level, the proof proceeds as follows. Observe that for every $i \in [\lambda]$, since we have

$$\tilde{\pi}_t^{(i)} = \pi^*(\mathbf{t} + \mathbf{r}_i) - \pi^*(\mathbf{r}_i) \quad \text{and} \quad \tilde{\rho}_t^{(i)} = \pi^*(\mathbf{t} + \mathbf{s}_i) - \pi^*(\mathbf{s}_i)$$

from the definitions of $\tilde{\pi}_t^{(i)}$ and $\tilde{\rho}_t^{(i)}$, we have $\tilde{\pi}_t^{(i)} = \tilde{\rho}_t^{(i)}$ if we have

$$\pi^*(\mathbf{t} + \mathbf{r}_i) - \pi^*(\mathbf{t} + \mathbf{s}_i) = \pi^*(\mathbf{r}_i) - \pi^*(\mathbf{s}_i) .$$

Now, a key observation is that each of $\{\mathbf{t} + \mathbf{r}_i, \mathbf{t} + \mathbf{s}_i\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$ and $\{\mathbf{r}_i, \mathbf{s}_i\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$ is λ pairs of two random points, so we can use [Observation 1](#) to show that linearity holds on at least $\lambda - \mu$ pairs in each of $\{\mathbf{t} + \mathbf{r}_i, \mathbf{t} + \mathbf{s}_i\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$ and $\{\mathbf{r}_i, \mathbf{s}_i\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$, and therefore can conclude that the number of i 's such that we have

$$\pi^*(\mathbf{t} + \mathbf{r}_i) - \pi^*(\mathbf{t} + \mathbf{s}_i) = \pi^*(\mathbf{r}_i - \mathbf{s}_i) = \pi^*(\mathbf{r}_i) - \pi^*(\mathbf{s}_i)$$

is at least $\lambda - 2\mu$ as desired.

Formally, we first observe that, from the no-signaling property of P^* , it suffices to show that Equation (42) holds when $\tilde{\pi}_t, \tilde{\rho}_t$ are sampled in the following way. (A notable difference from the original sampling (the one in [Claim 6](#)) is highlighted by red.)

1. Choose 2λ random points $\mathbf{r}_1, \dots, \mathbf{r}_\lambda, \mathbf{s}_1, \dots, \mathbf{s}_\lambda \in \mathbb{R}^N$.
2. Run $(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q \cup Q' \cup Q'')$, where $Q = \{\mathbf{r}_i, \mathbf{t} + \mathbf{r}_i\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$, $Q' = \{\mathbf{s}_i, \mathbf{t} + \mathbf{s}_i\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$, and $Q'' = \{\mathbf{r}_i - \mathbf{s}_i\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$.
3. For each $i \in [\lambda]$, define $\tilde{\pi}_t^{(i)} := \pi^*(\mathbf{t} + \mathbf{r}_i) - \pi^*(\mathbf{r}_i)$ and $\tilde{\rho}_t^{(i)} := \pi^*(\mathbf{t} + \mathbf{s}_i) - \pi^*(\mathbf{s}_i)$.
4. Output $\tilde{\pi}_t \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{majority}(\tilde{\pi}_t^{(1)}, \dots, \tilde{\pi}_t^{(\lambda)})$ and $\tilde{\rho}_t \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{majority}(\tilde{\rho}_t^{(1)}, \dots, \tilde{\rho}_t^{(\lambda)})$.

Now, let

$$\begin{aligned} I_1 & := \{i \text{ s.t. } \pi^*(\mathbf{s}_i) + \pi^*(\mathbf{r}_i - \mathbf{s}_i) = \pi^*(\mathbf{r}_i)\} , \\ I_2 & := \{i \text{ s.t. } \pi^*(\mathbf{t} + \mathbf{s}_i) + \pi^*(\mathbf{r}_i - \mathbf{s}_i) = \pi^*(\mathbf{t} + \mathbf{r}_i)\} . \end{aligned}$$

Observe that for any $i^* \in I_1 \cap I_2$, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
\tilde{\pi}_t^{(i^*)} &= \pi^*(\mathbf{t} + \mathbf{r}_{i^*}) - \pi^*(\mathbf{r}_{i^*}) && \text{(from the definition)} \\
&= (\pi^*(\mathbf{t} + \mathbf{s}_{i^*}) + \pi^*(\mathbf{r}_{i^*} - \mathbf{s}_{i^*})) - (\pi^*(\mathbf{s}_{i^*}) + \pi^*(\mathbf{r}_{i^*} - \mathbf{s}_{i^*})) && \text{(since } i^* \in I_1 \cap I_2) \\
&= \pi^*(\mathbf{t} + \mathbf{s}_{i^*}) - \pi^*(\mathbf{s}_{i^*}) \\
&= \tilde{\rho}_t^{(i^*)} . && \text{(from the definition)}
\end{aligned}$$

Thus, to prove this sub-claim it suffices to show

$$\Pr_{\tilde{\pi}_t, \tilde{\rho}_t} [|I_1 \cap I_2| \geq \lambda - 2\mu] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) , \quad (43)$$

where $\tilde{\pi}_t, \tilde{\rho}_t$ are sampled as above. Now, since $\{\mathbf{s}_i, \mathbf{r}_i - \mathbf{s}_i\}_{i \in [2\lambda]}$ (resp., $\{\mathbf{t} + \mathbf{s}_i, \mathbf{r}_i - \mathbf{s}_i\}_{i \in [2\lambda]}$) are 2λ random points, [Observation 1](#) and the no-signaling property of P^* imply that we have

$$\Pr_{\tilde{\pi}_t, \tilde{\rho}_t} [|I_1| \geq \lambda - \mu] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) \quad \text{and} \quad \Pr_{\tilde{\pi}_t, \tilde{\rho}_t} [|I_2| \geq \lambda - \mu] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) .$$

Thus, from the union bound, we have

$$\Pr_{\tilde{\pi}_t, \tilde{\rho}_t} [|I_1| \geq \lambda - \mu \wedge |I_2| \geq \lambda - \mu] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

and therefore have Equation (43). \square

Proof (of Sub-Claim 2). For editorial simplicity, we think that $\tilde{\pi}_t, \tilde{\rho}_t$ are sampled by the following sampling algorithm, which differs from the original one (the one in [Claim 6](#)) only syntactically.

1. Choose 2λ random points $\mathbf{r}_1, \dots, \mathbf{r}_{2\lambda} \in \mathbb{F}^N$.
2. Run $(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q')$, where $Q' = \{\mathbf{r}_i, \mathbf{t} + \mathbf{r}_i\}_{i \in [2\lambda]}$.
3. Randomly partition $\{\pi^*(\mathbf{t} + \mathbf{r}_i) - \pi^*(\mathbf{r}_i)\}_{i \in [2\lambda]}$ into $(\tilde{\pi}_t^{(1)}, \dots, \tilde{\pi}_t^{(\lambda)})$ and $(\tilde{\rho}_t^{(1)}, \dots, \tilde{\rho}_t^{(\lambda)})$.
4. Output $\tilde{\pi}_t \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{majority}(\tilde{\pi}_t^{(1)}, \dots, \tilde{\pi}_t^{(\lambda)})$ and $\tilde{\rho}_t \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{majority}(\tilde{\rho}_t^{(1)}, \dots, \tilde{\rho}_t^{(\lambda)})$.

Note that in this sampling algorithm, the event Strong-Majority is implied by the event that there exists $a_t \in \mathbb{F}$ such that

$$|\{i \in [2\lambda] \text{ s.t. } \pi^*(\mathbf{t} + \mathbf{r}_i) - \pi^*(\mathbf{r}_i) = a_t\}| \geq 2\lambda - 20\mu .$$

Let

$$\begin{aligned}
I_w &:= \{i \in [2\lambda] \text{ s.t. } \pi^*(\mathbf{t} + \mathbf{r}_i) - \pi^*(\mathbf{r}_i) = w\} \text{ for each } w \in \mathbb{F} . \\
I_{\max} &:= I_{w^*}, \text{ where } w^* := \underset{w \in \mathbb{F}}{\text{argmax}}(|I_w|) . \\
I_{\text{others}} &:= [2\lambda] \setminus I_{\max} .
\end{aligned}$$

When Strong-Majority does not occur, we have

$$|I_{\max}| < 2\lambda - 20\mu \quad \text{and} \quad |I_{\text{others}}| \geq 20\mu . \quad (44)$$

Now, observe that having $|I_{\text{Good-pair}}| \geq \lambda - 2\mu$ in the above sampling algorithm is equivalent to having at least $\lambda - 2\mu$ ‘‘good’’ pairs when partitioning $[2\lambda]$ into λ pairs of indices randomly, where we say a pair of indices is good if the two indices in the pair belong to the same set I_w for $w \in \mathbb{F}$. We show that when we have Equation (44), we create at least $\lambda - 2\mu$ good pairs only with negligible probability. Toward showing this fact, we consider partitioning $[2\lambda]$ into λ pairs of indices as follows.

1. Choose random 10μ indices $(i_1, \dots, i_{10\mu})$ from I_{others} .
2. Create 10μ pairs by, for each index in $(i_1, \dots, i_{10\mu})$, choosing an index from the remaining indices of $[2\lambda]$ (without replacement).
3. Create the remaining $\lambda - 10\mu$ pairs by randomly partitioning the remaining indices of $[2\lambda]$ into $\lambda - 10\mu$ pairs.

When partitioning $[2\lambda]$ into λ pairs of indices in this way, we create at least $\lambda - 2\mu$ good pairs in total only when we create at least $10\mu - 2\mu = 8\mu$ good pairs in Step 2. Since each pair that is created in Step 2 is good with probability at most

$$\frac{\lambda}{2\lambda - 10\mu} \leq 0.51 \quad (\text{since we have } |I_w| \leq \lambda \text{ for } \forall I_w \neq I_{\max})$$

(where the inequality holds for every sufficiently large λ), the probability that we create at least 8μ good pairs in Step 2 of the above procedure is bounded by

$$\binom{10\mu}{2\mu} \times (0.51)^{8\mu} \leq \left(\frac{10\mu \cdot e}{2\mu}\right)^{2\mu} \times (0.51)^{8\mu} = \left((5e)^2 \times (0.51)^8\right)^\mu \leq (0.9)^\mu = \text{negl}(\lambda) ,$$

where we use the standard inequality $\binom{n}{k} \leq \left(\frac{ne}{k}\right)^k$ in the first inequality. Thus, we create at least 8μ good pairs in Step 2 of the above procedure only with negligible probability, so we create at least $\lambda - 2\mu$ good pairs in total only with negligible probability. This concludes the proof of [Sub-Claim 2](#). \square

Remark 6. The proof of [Sub-Claim 2](#) is based on the idea that is used in the analysis of previous no-signaling PCPs, e.g., [\[BHK16, Claim 22\]](#). \diamond

As noted above, Equation (41) follows from [Sub-Claim 1](#) and [Sub-Claim 2](#). This concludes the proof of [Claim 6](#). \square

As noted above, [Claim 6](#) implies [Claim 5](#). This concludes the proof of [Claim 5](#). \square

As noted above, [Claim 5](#) implies [Claim 3](#) and [Claim 4](#), with which we can prove [Lemma 4](#). This concludes the proof of [Lemma 4](#). (By inspection, one can verify that our analysis indeed works if $\kappa_{\max}(\lambda) \geq \kappa_V(\lambda) = 2\lambda(5\lambda + 3)$ since we make at most 9λ queries to P^* in all the mental experiments.) \square

7.7 Proof of [Lemma 5](#) (Tensor-Product Consistency of Self-Corrected Proof)

In this subsection, we prove [Lemma 5](#), which says that the self-corrected proof passes the tensor-product test on any points.

Proof (of [Lemma 5](#)). Fix any $\{C_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$, κ_{\max} , and P^* , and assume that Equation (27) holds for infinitely many $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$. Let Λ be the set of those λ 's, and fix any sufficiently large $\lambda \in \Lambda$. Our goal is to show Equation (28).

Roughly speaking, we obtain Equation (28) by using [Observation 1](#) and [Lemma 4](#). Recall that [Observation 1](#) guarantees that the self-corrected proof has Tensor-Product consistency on random points. Our strategy is to use the linearity of the self-corrected proof ([Lemma 4](#)) to show that if the self-corrected proof has Tensor-Product consistency on random points, it actually has Tensor-Product consistency on any points $\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{F}^N$. At a high level, we implement this strategy in two steps.

1. First, we split \mathbf{u} into $\mathbf{u} + \mathbf{s}$ and \mathbf{s} for random $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{F}^N$ and split \mathbf{v} into $\mathbf{v} + \mathbf{t}$ and \mathbf{t} for random $\mathbf{t} \in \mathbb{F}^N$, and then observe that we can reduce the problem of showing Tensor-Product consistency on \mathbf{u}, \mathbf{v} to the problem of showing Tensor-Product consistency on four pairs of points, where at least one of the points in each pair is taken from $\{\mathbf{u} + \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{v} + \mathbf{t}, \mathbf{t}\}$.
2. Next, we show Tensor-Product consistency on the four pairs of points by relying on the fact each point in $\{\mathbf{u} + \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{v} + \mathbf{t}, \mathbf{t}\}$ is, when viewed individually, a random point. Specifically, we show this Tensor-Product consistency by using a strengthened version of [Observation 1](#), namely the version that guarantees that Tensor-Product consistency holds on any pair of a single fixed point and a single random point.

The formal argument is given below.

We first prove the following strengthened version of [Observation 1](#).

Claim 7. *For any $\mathbf{t} \in \{\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{v}\}$, we have*

$$\Pr \left[\left| I'_{\text{Tensor}} \right| \geq \lambda - 2\mu \left| \begin{array}{l} \mathbf{r}_i \leftarrow \mathbb{F}^N \text{ for } \forall i \in [\lambda] \\ (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \tilde{\pi}) \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{P^*}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \{\mathbf{t}\} \cup Q \cup Q') \\ \text{where } Q = \{\mathbf{r}_i\}_{i \in [\lambda]} \text{ and } Q' = \{\mathbf{t} \otimes \mathbf{r}_i\}_{i \in [\lambda]} \end{array} \right. \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

where

$$I'_{\text{Tensor}} := \left\{ i \text{ s.t. } \tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{t})\tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{r}_i) = \tilde{\pi}_g(\mathbf{t} \otimes \mathbf{r}_i) \right\} .$$

Proof. For concreteness, we consider the case of $\mathbf{t} = \mathbf{u}$. (The case of $\mathbf{t} = \mathbf{v}$ can be handled similarly.)

From the no-signaling property of Self-Correct ([Lemma 2](#)), it suffice to show

$$\Pr \left[\left| I'_{\text{Tensor}} \right| \geq \lambda - 2\mu \left| \begin{array}{l} \mathbf{r}_i, \mathbf{s}_i \leftarrow \mathbb{F}^N \text{ for } \forall i \in [\lambda] \\ (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \tilde{\pi}) \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{P^*}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \{\mathbf{u}\} \cup Q \cup Q') \\ \text{where } Q = \{\mathbf{r}_i, \mathbf{s}_i, \mathbf{u} + \mathbf{s}_i\}_{i \in [\lambda]} \text{ and} \\ Q' = \{\mathbf{u} \otimes \mathbf{r}_i, (\mathbf{u} + \mathbf{s}_i) \otimes \mathbf{r}_i, \mathbf{s}_i \otimes \mathbf{r}_i\}_{i \in [\lambda]} \end{array} \right. \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) . \quad (45)$$

In the remaining of this proof, for any event E , we use

$$\Pr_{\tilde{\pi}} [E]$$

to denote the probability of E occurring when $\tilde{\pi}$ (and others) is sampled as in Equation (45). Let

$$\begin{aligned} I_1 &:= \left\{ i \text{ s.t. } \tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{u} + \mathbf{s}_i) = \tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{u}) + \tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{s}_i) \right\} \\ I_2 &:= \left\{ i \text{ s.t. } \tilde{\pi}_g((\mathbf{u} + \mathbf{s}_i) \otimes \mathbf{r}_i) = \tilde{\pi}_g(\mathbf{u} \otimes \mathbf{r}_i) + \tilde{\pi}_g(\mathbf{s}_i \otimes \mathbf{r}_i) \right\} \\ I_3 &:= \left\{ i \text{ s.t. } \tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{u} + \mathbf{s}_i)\tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{r}_i) = \tilde{\pi}_g((\mathbf{u} + \mathbf{s}_i) \otimes \mathbf{r}_i) \right\} \\ I_4 &:= \left\{ i \text{ s.t. } \tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{s}_i)\tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{r}_i) = \tilde{\pi}_g(\mathbf{s}_i \otimes \mathbf{r}_i) \right\} \end{aligned}$$

Observe that for every i such that $i \in I_1 \cap I_2 \cap I_3 \cap I_4$, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{u})\tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{r}_i) &= \tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{u} + \mathbf{s}_i)\tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{r}_i) - \tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{s}_i)\tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{r}_i) && \text{(since } i \in I_1) \\ &= \tilde{\pi}_g((\mathbf{u} + \mathbf{s}_i) \otimes \mathbf{r}_i) - \tilde{\pi}_g(\mathbf{s}_i \otimes \mathbf{r}_i) && \text{(since } i \in I_3 \cap I_4) \\ &= \tilde{\pi}_g(\mathbf{u} \otimes \mathbf{r}_i) && \text{(since } i \in I_2) . \end{aligned}$$

Thus, to show Equation (45), it suffices to show

$$\Pr_{\tilde{\pi}}[|I_1 \cap I_2 \cap I_3 \cap I_4| \geq \lambda - 2\mu] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) . \quad (46)$$

First, we have

$$\Pr_{\tilde{\pi}}[|I_1| = \lambda] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) \quad \text{and} \quad \Pr_{\tilde{\pi}}[|I_2| = \lambda] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

since the linearity of the self-corrected proof (Lemma 4) and the no-signaling property of Self-Correct (Lemma 2) guarantee that we have

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr_{\tilde{\pi}} \left[\tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{u} + \mathbf{s}_i) = \tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{u}) + \tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{s}_i) \right] &\geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) , \\ \Pr_{\tilde{\pi}} \left[\tilde{\pi}_g(\mathbf{u} \otimes \mathbf{r}_i + \mathbf{s}_i \otimes \mathbf{r}_i) = \tilde{\pi}_g(\mathbf{u} \otimes \mathbf{r}_i) + \tilde{\pi}_g(\mathbf{s}_i \otimes \mathbf{r}_i) \right] &\geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) \end{aligned}$$

for every $i \in [\lambda]$. Next, we have

$$\Pr_{\tilde{\pi}}[|I_3| \geq \lambda - \mu] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) \quad \text{and} \quad \Pr_{\tilde{\pi}}[|I_4| \geq \lambda - \mu] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

from Observation 1 since each of $(\mathbf{u} + \mathbf{s}_1, \mathbf{r}_1), \dots, (\mathbf{u} + \mathbf{s}_\lambda, \mathbf{r}_\lambda)$ and $(\mathbf{s}_1, \mathbf{r}_1), \dots, (\mathbf{s}_\lambda, \mathbf{r}_\lambda)$ are λ pairs of two random points. Thus, from the union bound, we have

$$\Pr_{\tilde{\pi}}[|I_1| = |I_2| = \lambda \wedge |I_3| \geq \lambda - \mu \wedge |I_4| \geq \lambda - \mu] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

and thus have Equation (46) as desired. Therefore, we have Equation (45). \square

Now, we are ready to prove Lemma 5. From the no-signaling property of Self-Correct (Lemma 2), it suffice to show

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} \tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{u})\tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{v}) \\ = \tilde{\pi}_g(\mathbf{u} \otimes \mathbf{v}) \end{array} \left| \begin{array}{l} \mathbf{s}_i, \mathbf{t}_i \leftarrow \mathbb{F}^N \text{ for } \forall i \in [\lambda] \\ (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \tilde{\pi}) \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{P^*}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \{\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{u} \otimes \mathbf{v}\} \cup Q \cup Q') \\ \text{where } Q = \{\mathbf{s}_i, \mathbf{t}_i, \mathbf{u} + \mathbf{s}_i, \mathbf{v} + \mathbf{t}_i\}_{i \in [\lambda]} \text{ and} \\ Q' = \{(\mathbf{u} + \mathbf{s}_i) \otimes (\mathbf{v} + \mathbf{t}_i), \mathbf{u} \otimes \mathbf{t}_i, \mathbf{s}_i \otimes \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{s}_i \otimes \mathbf{v}\}_{i \in [\lambda]} \end{array} \right. \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) . \quad (47)$$

In the remaining of this proof, for any event E , we use

$$\Pr_{\tilde{\pi}}[E]$$

to denote the probability of E occurring when $\tilde{\pi}$ (and others) is sampled as in Equation (47). Let

$$\begin{aligned} I_1 &:= \left\{ i \text{ s.t. } \tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{u} + \mathbf{s}_i) = \tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{u}) + \tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{s}_i) \right\} \\ I'_1 &:= \left\{ i \text{ s.t. } \tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{v} + \mathbf{t}_i) = \tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{v}) + \tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{t}_i) \right\} \\ I_2 &:= \left\{ i \text{ s.t. } \begin{array}{l} \tilde{\pi}_g((\mathbf{u} + \mathbf{s}_i) \otimes (\mathbf{v} + \mathbf{t}_i)) \\ = \tilde{\pi}_g(\mathbf{u} \otimes \mathbf{v}) + \tilde{\pi}_g(\mathbf{u} \otimes \mathbf{t}_i) + \tilde{\pi}_g(\mathbf{s}_i \otimes \mathbf{v}) + \tilde{\pi}_g(\mathbf{s}_i \otimes \mathbf{t}_i) \end{array} \right\} \\ I_3 &:= \left\{ i \text{ s.t. } \tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{u} + \mathbf{s}_i)\tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{v} + \mathbf{t}_i) = \tilde{\pi}_g((\mathbf{u} + \mathbf{s}_i) \otimes (\mathbf{v} + \mathbf{t}_i)) \right\} \\ I_4 &:= \left\{ i \text{ s.t. } \tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{s}_i)\tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{t}_i) = \tilde{\pi}_g(\mathbf{s}_i \otimes \mathbf{t}_i) \right\} \\ I_5 &:= \left\{ i \text{ s.t. } \tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{u})\tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{t}_i) = \tilde{\pi}_g(\mathbf{u} \otimes \mathbf{t}_i) \right\} \\ I_6 &:= \left\{ i \text{ s.t. } \tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{s}_i)\tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{v}) = \tilde{\pi}_g(\mathbf{s}_i \otimes \mathbf{v}) \right\} \end{aligned}$$

Observe that for every i such that $i \in I_1 \cap I'_1 \cap I_2 \cap I_3 \cap I_4 \cap I_5 \cap I_6$, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
& \tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{u})\tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{v}) \\
&= \tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{u} + \mathbf{s}_i)\tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{v} + \mathbf{t}_i) - \tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{u})\tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{t}_i) - \tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{s}_i)\tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{v}) - \tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{s}_i)\tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{t}_i) \quad (\text{since } i \in I_1 \cap I'_1) \\
&= \tilde{\pi}_g((\mathbf{u} + \mathbf{s}_i) \otimes (\mathbf{v} + \mathbf{t}_i)) - \tilde{\pi}_g(\mathbf{u} \otimes \mathbf{t}_i) - \tilde{\pi}_g(\mathbf{s}_i \otimes \mathbf{v}) - \tilde{\pi}_g(\mathbf{s}_i \otimes \mathbf{t}_i) \quad (\text{since } i \in I_3 \cap I_4 \cap I_5 \cap I_6) \\
&= \tilde{\pi}_g(\mathbf{u} \otimes \mathbf{v}) \quad (\text{since } i \in I_2) .
\end{aligned}$$

Thus, to show Equation (47), it suffices to show

$$\Pr_{\tilde{\pi}} [I_1 \cap I_2 \cap I_3 \cap I_4 \neq \emptyset] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) . \quad (48)$$

First, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
\Pr_{\tilde{\pi}} [|I_1| = \lambda] &\geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) \\
\Pr_{\tilde{\pi}} [|I'_1| = \lambda] &\geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) \\
\Pr_{\tilde{\pi}} [|I_2| = \lambda] &\geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)
\end{aligned}$$

since the linearity of the self-corrected proof (Lemma 4 and Lemma 9) and the no-signaling property of Self-Correct (Lemma 2) guarantees that we have

$$\begin{aligned}
\Pr_{\tilde{\pi}} [\tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{u} + \mathbf{s}_i) = \tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{u}) + \tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{s}_i)] &\geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) , \\
\Pr_{\tilde{\pi}} [\tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{v} + \mathbf{t}_i) = \tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{v}) + \tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{t}_i)] &\geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) , \\
\Pr_{\tilde{\pi}} [\tilde{\pi}_g(\mathbf{u} \otimes \mathbf{v} + \mathbf{u} \otimes \mathbf{t}_i + \mathbf{s}_i \otimes \mathbf{v} + \mathbf{s}_i \otimes \mathbf{t}_i) \\
&= \tilde{\pi}_g(\mathbf{u} \otimes \mathbf{v}) + \tilde{\pi}_g(\mathbf{u} \otimes \mathbf{t}_i) + \tilde{\pi}_g(\mathbf{s}_i \otimes \mathbf{v}) + \tilde{\pi}_g(\mathbf{s}_i \otimes \mathbf{t}_i)] &\geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)
\end{aligned}$$

for every $i \in [\lambda]$. Next, we have

$$\Pr_{\tilde{\pi}} [|I_3| \geq \lambda - \mu] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) \quad \text{and} \quad \Pr_{\tilde{\pi}} [|I_4| \geq \lambda - \mu] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

from Observation 1 since each of $(\mathbf{u} + \mathbf{s}_1, \mathbf{v} + \mathbf{t}_1), \dots, (\mathbf{u} + \mathbf{s}_\lambda, \mathbf{v} + \mathbf{t}_\lambda)$ and $(\mathbf{s}_1, \mathbf{t}_1), \dots, (\mathbf{s}_\lambda, \mathbf{t}_\lambda)$ are λ pairs of two random points, and we have

$$\Pr_{\tilde{\pi}} [|I_5| \geq \lambda - 2\mu] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) \quad \text{and} \quad \Pr_{\tilde{\pi}} [|I_6| \geq \lambda - 2\mu] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

from Claim 7 and the no-signaling property of Self-Correct (Lemma 2). Thus, from the union bound, we have

$$\Pr_{\tilde{\pi}} [|I_1| = |I'_1| = |I_2| = \lambda \wedge |I_3 \cap I_4| \geq \lambda - 2\mu \wedge |I_5 \cap I_6| \geq \lambda - 4\mu] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

and thus have Equation (48) from $\lambda - 6\mu > 0$. Therefore, we have Equation (47). This concludes the proof of Lemma 5. \square

Remark 7. By inspection, one can verify that the proof of Lemma 5 indeed works if $\kappa_{\max}(\lambda) \geq 2\lambda(8\lambda + 3)$ since we make at most $8\lambda + 3$ queries to Self-Correct in all the mental experiments and we can use Lemma 4 as long as $\kappa_{\max}(\lambda) \geq \kappa_V(\lambda) = 2\lambda(5\lambda + 3)$. \diamond

7.8 Proof of Lemma 6 (SAT Consistency of Self-Corrected Proof)

In this subsection, we prove Lemma 6, which says that the self-corrected proof passes the SAT-product test on any points.

Proof (of Lemma 6). The high-level strategy of the proof of this lemma is the same as that of the proof of Lemma 5, namely we prove this lemma by using Observation 1 and Lemma 4. (In other words, we use the linearity of the self-corrected proof (Lemma 4) to show that if the self-corrected proof has SAT consistency on random points (Observation 1), it also has SAT consistency on any points.) The formal argument is given below.

Fix any $\{C_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$, κ_{\max} , and P^* , and assume that Equation (29) holds for infinitely many $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$. Let Λ be the set of those λ 's, and fix any sufficiently large $\lambda \in \Lambda$. Our goal is to show Equation (30).

From the no-signaling property of Self-Correct (Lemma 2), to show Equation (30) it suffices to show

$$\Pr \left[\tilde{\pi}_f(\psi_\sigma) + \tilde{\pi}_g(\psi'_\sigma) = c_\sigma \left| \begin{array}{l} \sigma_i \leftarrow \mathbb{F}^M \text{ for } \forall j \in [\lambda] \\ (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \tilde{\pi}) \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{P^*}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \{\psi_\sigma, \psi'_\sigma\} \cup Q) \\ \text{where } Q = \{\psi_{\sigma_i}, \psi_{\sigma+\sigma_i}, \psi'_{\sigma_i}, \psi'_{\sigma+\sigma_i}\}_{i \in [\lambda]} \end{array} \right. \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) , \quad (49)$$

where for any $\tau = (\tau_1, \dots, \tau_M) \in \mathbb{F}^M$, we use ψ_τ, ψ'_τ to denote the coefficient vectors such that

$$\langle \psi_\tau, \mathbf{z} \rangle + \langle \psi'_\tau, \mathbf{z} \otimes \mathbf{z} \rangle = \Psi_\tau(\mathbf{z}) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \sum_{i \in [M]} \tau_i \Psi_i(\mathbf{z}) .$$

In the remaining of this proof, for any event E , we use

$$\Pr_{\tilde{\pi}} [E]$$

to denote the probability of E occurring when $\tilde{\pi}$ is sampled as in Equation (49). Let

$$\begin{aligned} I_1 &:= \left\{ i \text{ s.t. } \tilde{\pi}_f(\psi_{\sigma_i}) + \tilde{\pi}_g(\psi'_{\sigma_i}) = c_{\sigma_i} \right\} \\ I_2 &:= \left\{ i \text{ s.t. } \tilde{\pi}_f(\psi_{\sigma+\sigma_i}) + \tilde{\pi}_g(\psi'_{\sigma+\sigma_i}) = c_{\sigma+\sigma_i} \right\} \\ I_3 &:= \left\{ i \text{ s.t. } \tilde{\pi}_f(\psi_{\sigma+\sigma_i}) - \tilde{\pi}_f(\psi_{\sigma_i}) = \tilde{\pi}_f(\psi_\sigma) \right\} \\ I_4 &:= \left\{ i \text{ s.t. } \tilde{\pi}_g(\psi'_{\sigma+\sigma_i}) - \tilde{\pi}_g(\psi'_{\sigma_i}) = \tilde{\pi}_g(\psi'_\sigma) \right\} \end{aligned}$$

Observe that for every i such that $i \in I_1 \cap I_2 \cap I_3 \cap I_4$, we have

$$\begin{aligned} &\tilde{\pi}_f(\psi_\sigma) + \tilde{\pi}_g(\psi'_\sigma) \\ &= \tilde{\pi}_f(\psi_{\sigma+\sigma_i}) - \tilde{\pi}_f(\psi_{\sigma_i}) + \tilde{\pi}_g(\psi'_{\sigma+\sigma_i}) - \tilde{\pi}_g(\psi'_{\sigma_i}) \quad (\text{since } i \in I_3 \cap I_4) \\ &= c_{\sigma+\sigma_i} - c_{\sigma_i} \quad (\text{since } i \in I_1 \cap I_2) \\ &= c_\sigma . \quad (\text{from the definitions of } c_{\sigma+\sigma_i}, c_{\sigma_i}) \end{aligned}$$

Thus, to show Equation (49), it suffices to show

$$\Pr_{\tilde{\pi}} [I_1 \cap I_2 \cap I_3 \cap I_4 \neq \emptyset] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) . \quad (50)$$

First, we have

$$\Pr_{\tilde{\pi}} [|I_1| \geq \lambda - \mu] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) \quad \text{and} \quad \Pr_{\tilde{\pi}} [|I_2| \geq \lambda - \mu] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

from [Observation 1](#) and the no-signaling property of Self-Correct ([Lemma 2](#)) since each of σ_i and $\sigma + \sigma_i$ is a random point in \mathbb{F}^M . Next, we have

$$\Pr_{\tilde{\pi}} [|I_3| = \lambda] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) \quad \text{and} \quad \Pr_{\tilde{\pi}} [|I_4| = \lambda] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

since the linearity of the self-corrected proof ([Lemma 4](#)) and the no-signaling property of Self-Correct ([Lemma 2](#)) guarantee that we have

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr_{\tilde{\pi}} \left[\tilde{\pi}_f(\psi_{\sigma_i}) + \tilde{\pi}_f(\psi_{\sigma}) = \tilde{\pi}_f(\psi_{\sigma+\sigma_i}) \right] &\geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) \\ \Pr_{\tilde{\pi}} \left[\tilde{\pi}_g(\psi'_{\sigma_i}) + \tilde{\pi}_g(\psi'_{\sigma}) = \tilde{\pi}_g(\psi'_{\sigma+\sigma_i}) \right] &\geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) \end{aligned}$$

for every $i \in [\lambda]$. Thus, from the union bound, we have

$$\Pr_{\tilde{\pi}} [|I_1| \geq \lambda - \mu \wedge |I_2| \geq \lambda - \mu \wedge |I_3| = |I_4| = \lambda] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

and thus have Equation (50) as desired. Therefore, we have Equation (49). This concludes the proof of [Lemma 6](#). \square

Remark 8. By inspection, one can verify that the proof of [Lemma 6](#) indeed works if $\kappa_{\max}(\lambda) \geq \kappa_V(\lambda) = 2\lambda(5\lambda + 3)$ since we make at most $4\lambda + 2$ queries to Self-Correct in the mental experiment and we can use [Lemma 4](#) as long as $\kappa_{\max}(\lambda) \geq \kappa_V(\lambda)$. \diamond

8 Analysis of Our PCP: Step 3 (Consistency with Claimed Computation)

In this section, we show that if a no-signaling cheating prover convinces the relaxed verifier with overwhelming probability, the self-corrected proof is “locally consistent” with the system of equations $\Psi = \{\Psi_i(\mathbf{z}) = c_i\}_{i \in [M]}$. That is, we show that (1) if we recover the wire value of an input gate from the self-corrected proof, the recovered wire value is consistent with the input \mathbf{x} , (2) if we recover the wire values of the input and output wires of a gate from the self-corrected proof, the recovered wire values are consistent with the computation of the gate, and (3) if we recover the wire value of an output gate from the self-corrected proof, the recovered wire value is consistent with the claimed output \mathbf{y} .

Lemma 10 (Consistency with Claimed Computation). *Let $\tilde{V} = (V_0, \tilde{V}_1)$ be the relaxed PCP verifier in [Section 6](#), $\{C_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ be any circuit family, and κ_{\max} be any polynomial such that $\kappa_{\max}(\lambda) \geq 2\lambda(8\lambda + 3)$.*

Then, for any κ_{\max} -wise no-signaling cheating prover P^ , if it holds*

$$\Pr \left[\tilde{V}_1(\text{st}_V, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) = 1 \mid \begin{array}{l} (Q, \text{st}_V) \leftarrow V_0(1^\lambda, C_\lambda) \\ (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q) \end{array} \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) \quad (51)$$

for infinitely many $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ (let Λ be the set of those λ 's), there exists a negligible function negl such that for every sufficiently large $\lambda \in \Lambda$ and every $i^ \in [M]$, it holds*

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr \left[\text{Consist}_{i^*}(C_\lambda, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \tilde{\pi}) \mid (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \tilde{\pi}) \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{P^*}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \{\mathbf{e}_\alpha, \mathbf{e}_\beta, \mathbf{e}_\gamma\}) \right] \\ \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) \quad , \quad (52) \end{aligned}$$

where (1) $\alpha, \beta, \gamma \in [N]$ ($\alpha < \beta < \gamma$) are any wires of C_λ such that there exist $d_j \in \{-1, 0, 1\}$ ($j \in \{\alpha, \beta, \gamma\}$) and $d_{j,k} \in \{-1, 0, 1\}$ ($j, k \in \{\alpha, \beta, \gamma\}$) such that the i^* -th equation of $\Psi = \{\Psi_i(\mathbf{z}) = c_i\}_{i \in [M]}$ can be written as

$$\sum_{j \in \{\alpha, \beta, \gamma\}} d_j z_j + \sum_{j, k \in \{\alpha, \beta, \gamma\}} d_{j,k} z_j z_k = c_{i^*} \quad , \quad (53)$$

(2) for any $j \in \{\alpha, \beta, \gamma\}$, $\mathbf{e}_j = (0, \dots, 0, 1, 0, \dots, 0) \in \mathbb{F}^N$ is the vector such that only the j -th element is 1, and (3) $\text{Consist}_{i^*}(C_\lambda, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \tilde{\pi})$ is the event that $\tilde{\pi}$ is consistent with i^* -th equation of Ψ , i.e., it holds

$$\sum_{j \in \{\alpha, \beta, \gamma\}} d_j \tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{e}_j) + \sum_{j, k \in \{\alpha, \beta, \gamma\}} d_{j,k} \tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{e}_j) \tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{e}_k) = c_{i^*} \quad .$$

Proof. Fix any $\{C_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$, κ_{\max} , and P^* , and assume that Equation (51) for infinitely many $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$. Let Λ be the set of those λ 's, and fix any sufficiently large $\lambda \in \Lambda$ and any $i^* \in [M]$. Our goal is to show Equation (52).

Since the high-level idea is already explained in the technical overview (Section 3), we directly go to the formal argument. First, from SAT consistency of the self-corrected proof (Lemma 6), we obtain

$$\Pr \left[\tilde{\pi}_f(\boldsymbol{\psi}_{\mathbf{e}_{i^*}}) + \tilde{\pi}_g(\boldsymbol{\psi}'_{\mathbf{e}_{i^*}}) = c_{\mathbf{e}_{i^*}} \mid (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \tilde{\pi}) \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{P^*}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \{\boldsymbol{\psi}_{\mathbf{e}_{i^*}}, \boldsymbol{\psi}'_{\mathbf{e}_{i^*}}\}) \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) \quad . \quad (54)$$

Second, for any α, β, γ such that the i^* -th equation of Ψ can be written as Equation (53), we have

$$\boldsymbol{\psi}_{\mathbf{e}_{i^*}} = \sum_{j \in \{\alpha, \beta, \gamma\}} d_j \mathbf{e}_j \quad \text{and} \quad \boldsymbol{\psi}'_{\mathbf{e}_{i^*}} = \sum_{j, k \in \{\alpha, \beta, \gamma\}} d_{j,k} \mathbf{e}_j \otimes \mathbf{e}_k$$

from the definition of $\boldsymbol{\psi}_{\mathbf{e}_{i^*}}, \boldsymbol{\psi}'_{\mathbf{e}_{i^*}}$ (cf. Lemma 6), so we have

$$\Pr \left[\tilde{\pi}_f(\boldsymbol{\psi}_{\mathbf{e}_{i^*}}) = \sum_{j \in \{\alpha, \beta, \gamma\}} d_j \tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{e}_j) \mid (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \tilde{\pi}) \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{P^*}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q) \right. \\ \left. \text{where } Q = \{\boldsymbol{\psi}_{\mathbf{e}_{i^*}}\} \cup \{\mathbf{e}_j\}_{j \in \{\alpha, \beta, \gamma\}} \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

and

$$\Pr \left[\tilde{\pi}_g(\boldsymbol{\psi}'_{\mathbf{e}_{i^*}}) = \sum_{j, k \in \{\alpha, \beta, \gamma\}} d_{j,k} \tilde{\pi}_g(\mathbf{e}_j \otimes \mathbf{e}_k) \mid (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \tilde{\pi}) \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{P^*}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q) \right. \\ \left. \text{where } Q = \{\boldsymbol{\psi}_{\mathbf{e}_{i^*}}\} \cup \{\mathbf{e}_j \otimes \mathbf{e}_k\}_{j, k \in \{\alpha, \beta, \gamma\}} \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

from the linearity of the self-corrected proof (Lemma 4, Lemma 7, Lemma 9), the no-signaling property of Self-Correct (Lemma 2), and the union bound. Third, from the Tensor-Product consistency of the self-corrected proof (Lemma 5), we have

$$\Pr \left[\tilde{\pi}_g(\mathbf{e}_j \otimes \mathbf{e}_k) = \tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{e}_j) \tilde{\pi}_f(\mathbf{e}_k) \mid (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \tilde{\pi}) \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{P^*}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \{\mathbf{e}_j, \mathbf{e}_k, \mathbf{e}_j \otimes \mathbf{e}_k\}) \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

for every $j, k \in \{\alpha, \beta, \gamma\}$. Now, we obtain Equation (52) from all the above by using the no-signaling property of Self-Correct (Lemma 2) and the union bound. \square

9 Analysis of Our PCP: Step 4 (Consistency with Correct Computation)

In this section, we show that if a no-signaling cheating prover convinces the relaxed verifier with overwhelming probability, the self-corrected proof is consistent with the correct computation of $C(\mathbf{x})$. That is, we show that if we recover the wire value of an output gate from the self-corrected proof, the recovered wire value is consistent with the output $C(\mathbf{x})$.

Lemma 11. *Let $\tilde{V} = (V_0, \tilde{V}_1)$ be the relaxed PCP verifier in Section 6, $\{C_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ be any circuit family, and κ_{\max} be any polynomial such that $\kappa_{\max}(\lambda) \geq 2\lambda(8\lambda + 3)$.*

Then, for any κ_{\max} -wise no-signaling cheating prover P^ , if it holds*

$$\Pr \left[\tilde{V}_1(\text{st}_V, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) = 1 \mid \begin{array}{l} (Q, \text{st}_V) \leftarrow V_0(1^\lambda, C_\lambda) \\ (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q) \end{array} \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) \quad (55)$$

for infinitely many $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ (let Λ be the set of those λ 's), there exists a negligible function negl such that for every sufficiently large $\lambda \in \Lambda$ and every $i^* \in [m]$ (recall that m is the output length of C_λ), it holds

$$\Pr \left[\tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{e}_{N-m+i^*}) = C_{i^*}(\mathbf{x}) \mid (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \tilde{\pi}) \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{P^*}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \{\mathbf{e}_{N-m+i^*}\}) \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda), \quad (56)$$

where $\mathbf{e}_{N-m+i^*} = (0, \dots, 0, 1, 0, \dots, 0) \in \mathbb{F}^N$ is the vector such that only the $(N - m + i^*)$ -th element is 1, and $C_{i^*}(\mathbf{x})$ denote the i^* -th bit of $C_\lambda(\mathbf{x})$.

Proof. Fix any $\{C_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$, κ_{\max} , and P^* , and assume that Equation (55) holds for infinitely many $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$. Let Λ be the set of those λ 's. Now, our goal is to show Equation (56) for every sufficiently large $\lambda \in \Lambda$. The high-level idea of this proof is explained in the technical overview in Section 3.

For any C_λ , we use the following notation. Recall that we assume that arithmetic circuits are “layered” in such a way that (1) the first layer consists of the input gates and the last layer consists of the output gates, and (2) each gate in the i -th layer has children in the $(i - 1)$ -th layer. Let (ℓ, i) denote the i -th wire in the ℓ -th layer. Let ℓ_{\max} be the number of the layers, and N_i be the number of the wires in the i -th layer (i.e., those from the gates in the i -th layer); thus, we have $\sum_{i \in [\ell_{\max}]} N_i = N$, $N_1 = n$, and $N_{\ell_{\max}} = m$. For every $\ell \in [\ell_{\max}]$, let

$$D_\ell := \{ \mathbf{v} = (v_1, \dots, v_N) \in \mathbb{F}^N \mid v_i = 0 \text{ for } \forall i \notin \{N_{\leq \ell-1} + 1, \dots, N_{\leq \ell-1} + N_\ell\} \},$$

where $N_{\leq \ell-1} := \sum_{i \in [\ell-1]} N_i$.

For any $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, we also use the following notations. For any $\ell \in [\ell_{\max}]$ and event E , we use

$$\Pr_{U_\ell, \tilde{\pi}} [E]$$

to denote the probability of E occurring when U_ℓ and $\tilde{\pi}$ are sampled as follows (along with \mathbf{x} and \mathbf{y}).

1. Sample $\mathbf{u}_{\ell, i} \leftarrow D_\ell$ for each $i \in [\lambda]$, and let $U_\ell := \{\mathbf{u}_{\ell, i}\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$.
2. Run $(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \tilde{\pi}) \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{P^*}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, U_\ell)$.

Similarly, for any $\ell \in [\ell_{\max}]$ and event E , we use

$$\Pr_{U_\ell, U_{\ell+1}, \tilde{\pi}} [E]$$

to denote the probability of E occurring when U_ℓ , $U_{\ell+1}$ and $\tilde{\pi}$ are sampled as follows.

1. Sample $\mathbf{u}_{\ell,i} \leftarrow D_\ell$ and $\mathbf{u}_{\ell+1,i} \leftarrow D_{\ell+1}$ for each $i \in [\lambda]$, and let $U_\ell := \{\mathbf{u}_{\ell,i}\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$ and $U_{\ell+1} := \{\mathbf{u}_{\ell+1,i}\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$.
2. Run $(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \tilde{\pi}) \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{P^*}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, U_\ell \cup U_{\ell+1})$.

Given these notations, we prove [Lemma 11](#) by using the following claims.

Claim 8. *There exists a negligible function negl such that for every sufficiently large $\lambda \in \Lambda$, we have*

$$\Pr_{U_1, \tilde{\pi}} \left[\bigwedge_{\mathbf{u} \in U_1} \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{u}) = \pi(\mathbf{u}) \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) ,$$

where $\pi := P(C, \mathbf{x})$ is the honestly generated proof on input (C, \mathbf{x}) .

Claim 9. *There exists a negligible function negl such that for every sufficiently large $\lambda \in \Lambda$ and for every $\ell \in [\ell_{\max}]$, if we have*

$$\Pr_{U_\ell, \tilde{\pi}} \left[\bigwedge_{\mathbf{u} \in U_\ell} \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{u}) = \pi(\mathbf{u}) \right] \geq 0.9, \quad (57)$$

then for every $\mathbf{v} \in D_\ell$, we have

$$\Pr_{\mathbf{v}, U_\ell, \tilde{\pi}} \left[\tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{v}) = \pi(\mathbf{v}) \mid \bigwedge_{\mathbf{u} \in U_\ell} \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{u}) = \pi(\mathbf{u}) \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda), \quad (58)$$

where π is defined as in [Claim 8](#), and for any event E the notation $\Pr_{\mathbf{v}, U_\ell, \tilde{\pi}} [E]$ is to denote the probability of E occurring when U_ℓ and $\tilde{\pi}$ are sampled as follows.

1. Sample $\mathbf{u}_{\ell,i} \leftarrow D_\ell$ for each $i \in [\lambda]$, and let $U_\ell := \{\mathbf{u}_{\ell,i}\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$.
2. Run $(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \tilde{\pi}) \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{P^*}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \{\mathbf{v}\} \cup U_\ell)$.

Claim 10. *There exists a negligible function negl such that for every sufficiently large $\lambda \in \Lambda$ and for every $\ell \in [\ell_{\max} - 1]$, if we have*

$$\Pr_{U_\ell, \tilde{\pi}} \left[\bigwedge_{\mathbf{u} \in U_\ell} \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{u}) = \pi(\mathbf{u}) \right] \geq 0.9, \quad (59)$$

then we have

$$\Pr_{U_\ell, U_{\ell+1}, \tilde{\pi}} \left[\bigwedge_{\mathbf{u} \in U_{\ell+1}} \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{u}) = \pi(\mathbf{u}) \mid \bigwedge_{\mathbf{u} \in U_\ell} \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{u}) = \pi(\mathbf{u}) \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda), \quad (60)$$

where π is defined as in [Claim 8](#).

Before proving these claims, we finish the proof of [Lemma 11](#) by using them.

First, we show that there exists a negligible function negl such that for every sufficiently large $\lambda \in \Lambda$ and every $\ell \in [\ell_{\max} - 1]$, if we have

$$\Pr_{U_\ell, \tilde{\pi}} \left[\bigwedge_{\mathbf{u} \in U_\ell} \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{u}) = \pi(\mathbf{u}) \right] \geq 0.9,$$

then we have

$$\Pr_{U_{\ell+1}, \tilde{\pi}} \left[\bigwedge_{\mathbf{u} \in U_{\ell+1}} \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{u}) = \pi(\mathbf{u}) \right] \geq \Pr_{U_{\ell}, \tilde{\pi}} \left[\bigwedge_{\mathbf{u} \in U_{\ell}} \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{u}) = \pi(\mathbf{u}) \right] - \text{negl}(\lambda) . \quad (61)$$

Fix any sufficiently large $\lambda \in \Lambda$. Toward showing Equation (61), we observe that from the no-signaling property of Self-Correct (Lemma 2), we have

$$\Pr_{U_{\ell+1}, \tilde{\pi}} \left[\bigwedge_{\mathbf{u} \in U_{\ell+1}} \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{u}) = \pi(\mathbf{u}) \right] \geq \Pr_{U_{\ell}, U_{\ell+1}, \tilde{\pi}} \left[\bigwedge_{\mathbf{u} \in U_{\ell+1}} \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{u}) = \pi(\mathbf{u}) \right] - \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

and

$$\Pr_{U_{\ell}, \tilde{\pi}} \left[\bigwedge_{\mathbf{u} \in U_{\ell}} \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{u}) = \pi(\mathbf{u}) \right] \leq \Pr_{U_{\ell}, U_{\ell+1}, \tilde{\pi}} \left[\bigwedge_{\mathbf{u} \in U_{\ell}} \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{u}) = \pi(\mathbf{u}) \right] + \text{negl}(\lambda) ,$$

and thus, for any $\ell \in [\ell_{\max}]$, we can show Equation (61) by showing

$$\Pr_{U_{\ell}, U_{\ell+1}, \tilde{\pi}} \left[\bigwedge_{\mathbf{u} \in U_{\ell+1}} \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{u}) = \pi(\mathbf{u}) \right] \geq \Pr_{U_{\ell}, U_{\ell+1}, \tilde{\pi}} \left[\bigwedge_{\mathbf{u} \in U_{\ell}} \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{u}) = \pi(\mathbf{u}) \right] - \text{negl}(\lambda) .$$

Now, we observe that this inequality indeed holds.

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr_{U_{\ell}, U_{\ell+1}, \tilde{\pi}} \left[\bigwedge_{\mathbf{u} \in U_{\ell+1}} \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{u}) = \pi(\mathbf{u}) \right] \\ & \geq \Pr_{U_{\ell}, U_{\ell+1}, \tilde{\pi}} \left[\bigwedge_{\mathbf{u} \in U_{\ell+1}} \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{u}) = \pi(\mathbf{u}) \mid \bigwedge_{\mathbf{u} \in U_{\ell}} \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{u}) = \pi(\mathbf{u}) \right] \Pr_{U_{\ell}, U_{\ell+1}, \tilde{\pi}} \left[\bigwedge_{\mathbf{u} \in U_{\ell}} \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{u}) = \pi(\mathbf{u}) \right] \\ & \geq (1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)) \times \Pr_{U_{\ell}, U_{\ell+1}, \tilde{\pi}} \left[\bigwedge_{\mathbf{u} \in U_{\ell}} \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{u}) = \pi(\mathbf{u}) \right] \quad (\text{from Claim 10}) \\ & \geq \Pr_{U_{\ell}, U_{\ell+1}, \tilde{\pi}} \left[\bigwedge_{\mathbf{u} \in U_{\ell}} \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{u}) = \pi(\mathbf{u}) \right] - \text{negl}(\lambda) . \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, we have Equation (61) for any $\ell \in [\ell_{\max} - 1]$ as desired.

Now, we are ready to show Equation (56). From Claim 8 and Equation (61), we have

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr_{U_{\ell_{\max}}, \tilde{\pi}} \left[\bigwedge_{\mathbf{u} \in U_{\ell_{\max}}} \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{u}) = \pi(\mathbf{u}) \right] & \geq \Pr_{U_1, \tilde{\pi}} \left[\bigwedge_{\mathbf{u} \in U_1} \tilde{\pi}_1(\mathbf{u}) = \pi_1(\mathbf{u}) \right] - (\ell_{\max} - 1) \cdot \text{negl}(\lambda) \\ & \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) . \end{aligned}$$

By combining this inequality with Claim 9 and the no-signaling property of Self-Correct (Lemma 2), we obtain Equation (56). (Notice that from the construction of our PCP, we have $\mathbf{e}_{N-m+i^*} \in D_{\ell_{\max}}$ and $\pi(\mathbf{e}_{N-m+i^*}) = C_{i^*}(\mathbf{x})$ for every $i^* \in [m]$.)

This concludes the proof of Lemma 11 except for proving Claim 8, Claim 9, and Claim 10. Those claims are proven in the subsequent subsections. \square

9.1 Proof of Claim 8

From the no-signaling property of Self-Correct (Lemma 2) and the union bound, it suffices to show the following claim.

Claim 11. *There exists a negligible function negl such that for every sufficiently large $\lambda \in \Lambda$ and every $\mathbf{v} \in D_1$, we have*

$$\Pr \left[\tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{v}) = \pi(\mathbf{v}) \mid (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \tilde{\pi}) \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{P^*}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \{\mathbf{v}\}) \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) .$$

Furthermore, since for any $\mathbf{v} \in D_1$ there exist $d_1, \dots, d_{N_1} \in \{0, \dots, |\mathbb{F}| - 1\}$ such that

$$\mathbf{v} = \sum_{i \in [N_1]} d_i \mathbf{e}_{1,i}$$

(where each $\mathbf{e}_{1,i} := (0, \dots, 0, 1, 0, \dots, 0) \in \mathbb{F}^N$ is the vector such that only the i -th element is 1), Claim 11 is equivalent with the following claim.

Claim 12. *There exists a negligible function negl such that for every sufficiently large $\lambda \in \Lambda$ and every $d_1, \dots, d_{N_1} \in \{0, \dots, |\mathbb{F}| - 1\}$, we have*

$$\Pr \left[\tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{v}) = \pi(\mathbf{v}) \mid (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \tilde{\pi}) \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{P^*}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \{\mathbf{v}\}) \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) , \quad (62)$$

where $\mathbf{v} := \sum_{i \in [N_1]} d_i \mathbf{e}_{1,i}$.

Therefore, we focus on proving Claim 12 below.

Proof (of Claim 12). Before showing Equation (62), we first show that there exists a negligible function negl such that for every sufficiently large $\lambda \in \Lambda$, every $i \in N_1$, and every $d_i \in \{0, \dots, |\mathbb{F}| - 1\}$, we have

$$\Pr \left[\tilde{\pi}(d_i \mathbf{e}_{1,i}) = \pi(d_i \mathbf{e}_{1,i}) \mid (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \tilde{\pi}) \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{P^*}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \{d_i \mathbf{e}_{1,i}\}) \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) .$$

Fix any sufficiently large $\lambda \in \Lambda$, any $i \in N_1$, and any $d_i \in \{0, \dots, |\mathbb{F}| - 1\}$. From the consistency with the claimed computation of the self-corrected proof (Lemma 11), we have

$$\Pr \left[\tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{e}_{1,i}) = x_i \mid (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \tilde{\pi}) \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{P^*}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \{\mathbf{e}_{1,i}\}) \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) ,$$

and from the linearity of the self-corrected proof (Lemma 7, Lemma 8), we have

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr \left[\tilde{\pi}(d_i \mathbf{e}_{1,i}) = d_i \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{e}_{1,i}) \mid (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \tilde{\pi}) \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{P^*}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \{\mathbf{e}_{1,i}, d_i \mathbf{e}_{1,i}\}) \right] \\ \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) . \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, from the above inequalities, the no-signaling property of Self-Correct (Lemma 2), and the union bound, we have

$$\Pr \left[\tilde{\pi}(d_i \mathbf{e}_{1,i}) = d_i x_i \mid (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \tilde{\pi}) \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{P^*}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \{d_i \mathbf{e}_{1,i}\}) \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) .$$

Since we have $\pi(d_i \mathbf{e}_{1,i}) = d_i x_i$ from the construction of our PCP, we have

$$\Pr \left[\tilde{\pi}(d_i \mathbf{e}_{1,i}) = \pi(d_i \mathbf{e}_{1,i}) \mid (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \tilde{\pi}) \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{P^*}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \{d_i \mathbf{e}_{1,i}\}) \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

as desired.

Now, we show Equation (62). Fix any sufficiently large $\lambda \in \Lambda$ and any $d_1, \dots, d_{N_1} \in \{0, \dots, |\mathbb{F}| - 1\}$. For any $k \in [N_1]$, let

$$p(k) := \Pr \left[\tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{v}_{\leq k}) = \pi(\mathbf{v}_{\leq k}) \mid (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \tilde{\pi}) \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{P^*}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \{\mathbf{v}_{\leq k}\}) \right] ,$$

where $\mathbf{v}_{\leq k} := \sum_{i \in [k]} d_i \mathbf{e}_{1,i}$. In this notation, our goal is to show $p(N_1) \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$. Since we have $p(1) \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$ from what we show in the previous paragraph, it suffices to show that we have $p(k) \geq p(k-1) - \text{negl}(\lambda)$ for every $k \in \{2, \dots, N\}$. Now, observe that for any $k \in \{2, \dots, N\}$, if we have

$$\tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{v}_{\leq k}) = \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{v}_{\leq k-1}) + \tilde{\pi}(d_k \mathbf{e}_{1,k}) \bigwedge \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{v}_{\leq k-1}) = \pi(\mathbf{v}_{\leq k-1}) \bigwedge \tilde{\pi}(d_k \mathbf{e}_{1,k}) = \pi(d_k \mathbf{e}_{1,k}) ,$$

then we have $\tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{v}_{\leq k}) = \pi(\mathbf{v}_{\leq k})$ (this is because we have $\pi(\mathbf{v}_{\leq k}) = \pi(\mathbf{v}_{\leq k-1}) + \pi(d_k \mathbf{e}_{1,k})$ from the construction of our PCP). In addition, observe that from the linearity of the self-corrected proof (Lemma 4), we have

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr \left[\tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{v}_{\leq k}) = \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{v}_{\leq k-1}) + \tilde{\pi}(d_k \mathbf{e}_{1,k}) \mid (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \tilde{\pi}) \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{P^*}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \{\mathbf{v}_{\leq k-1}, d_k \mathbf{e}_{1,k}, \mathbf{v}_{\leq k}\}) \right] \\ \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) , \end{aligned}$$

and from what we show in the previous paragraph, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr \left[\tilde{\pi}(d_k \mathbf{e}_{1,k}) = \pi(d_k \mathbf{e}_{1,k}) \mid (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \tilde{\pi}) \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{P^*}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \{d_k \mathbf{e}_{1,k}\}) \right] \\ \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) . \end{aligned}$$

Thus, from the no-signaling property of Self-Correct (Lemma 2) and the union bound, for randomly chosen $k \in \{2, \dots, N\}$ we have $p(k) \geq p(k-1) - \text{negl}(\lambda)$ as desired. This concludes the proof of Claim 12. \square

As noted above, Claim 12 is equivalent with Claim 11, with which we can prove Claim 8. This concludes the proof of Claim 8.

9.2 Proof of Claim 9

Fix any sufficiently large $\lambda \in \Lambda$. Fix any $\ell \in [\ell_{\max}]$, and assume that Equation (57) holds. Our goal is to show Equation (58) for any $\mathbf{v} \in D_\ell$.

We first note that, to show Equation (58), it suffices to show

$$\Pr_{\mathbf{v}, U_\ell, \tilde{\pi}} \left[\tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{v}) \neq \pi(\mathbf{v}) \wedge \left(\bigwedge_{\mathbf{u} \in U_\ell} \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{u}) = \pi(\mathbf{u}) \right) \right] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) . \quad (63)$$

This is because if we have Equation (63) and Equation (57), we have

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr_{\mathbf{v}, U_\ell, \tilde{\pi}} \left[\tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{v}) = \pi(\mathbf{v}) \mid \bigwedge_{\mathbf{u} \in U_\ell} \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{u}) = \pi(\mathbf{u}) \right] &\geq 1 - \frac{\Pr_{\mathbf{v}, U_\ell, \tilde{\pi}} \left[\tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{v}) \neq \pi(\mathbf{v}) \wedge \left(\bigwedge_{\mathbf{u} \in U_\ell} \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{u}) = \pi(\mathbf{u}) \right) \right]}{\Pr_{\mathbf{v}, U_\ell, \tilde{\pi}} \left[\bigwedge_{\mathbf{u} \in U_\ell} \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{u}) = \pi(\mathbf{u}) \right]} \\ &\geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) . \end{aligned}$$

Thus, we focus on showing Equation (63). First, from the no-signaling property of Self-Correct (Lemma 2), it suffices to show that Equation (63) holds when U_ℓ and $\tilde{\pi}$ are sampled as follows.

1. Define $U_\ell = \{\mathbf{u}_{\ell,i} | i \in [\lambda]\}$ by defining each $\mathbf{u}_{\ell,i}$ as follows. Sample $\mathbf{r}_i \in D_\ell$ and $b_i \in \{0, 1\}$ for each $i \in [\lambda]$; then let $\mathbf{u}_{\ell,i} := \mathbf{r}_i$ if $b_i = 0$, and let $\mathbf{u}_{\ell,i} := \mathbf{v} + \mathbf{r}_i$ otherwise. Additionally, let $U'_\ell := \{\mathbf{r}_i, \mathbf{v} + \mathbf{r}_i | i \in [\lambda]\} \setminus U_\ell$
2. Run $(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \tilde{\pi}) \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{P^*}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \{\mathbf{v}\} \cup U_\ell \cup U'_\ell)$.

In other words, we can obtain Equation (63) by showing

$$\Pr_{\mathbf{v}, \{\mathbf{r}_i\}, U_\ell, \tilde{\pi}} \left[\tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{v}) \neq \pi(\mathbf{v}) \wedge \left(\bigwedge_{\mathbf{u} \in U_\ell} \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{u}) = \pi(\mathbf{u}) \right) \right] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) , \quad (64)$$

where for an event E , we use

$$\Pr_{\mathbf{v}, \{\mathbf{r}_i\}, U_\ell, \tilde{\pi}} [E]$$

to denote the probability of E occurring when U_ℓ and $\tilde{\pi}$ are sampled as above.

From the linearity of the self-corrected proof (Lemma 4), the no-signaling property of Self-Correct (Lemma 2), and the union bound, we have

$$\Pr_{\mathbf{v}, \{\mathbf{r}_i\}, U_\ell, \tilde{\pi}} \left[\bigwedge_{i \in [\lambda]} \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{v} + \mathbf{r}_i) - \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{r}_i) = \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{v}) \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) .$$

Hence,

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr_{\mathbf{v}, \{\mathbf{r}_i\}, U_\ell, \tilde{\pi}} \left[\tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{v}) \neq \pi(\mathbf{v}) \wedge \left(\bigwedge_{\mathbf{u} \in U_\ell} \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{u}) = \pi(\mathbf{u}) \right) \right] \\ & \leq \Pr_{\mathbf{v}, \{\mathbf{r}_i\}, U_\ell, \tilde{\pi}} \left[\tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{v}) \neq \pi(\mathbf{v}) \wedge \left(\bigwedge_{\mathbf{u} \in U_\ell} \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{u}) = \pi(\mathbf{u}) \right) \wedge \left(\bigwedge_{i \in [\lambda]} \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{v} + \mathbf{r}_i) - \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{r}_i) = \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{v}) \right) \right] + \text{negl}(\lambda) \\ & \leq \Pr_{\mathbf{v}, \{\mathbf{r}_i\}, U_\ell, \tilde{\pi}} \left[\left(\bigwedge_{\mathbf{u} \in U_\ell} \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{u}) = \pi(\mathbf{u}) \right) \wedge \left(\tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{v}) \neq \pi(\mathbf{v}) \wedge \left(\bigwedge_{i \in [\lambda]} \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{v} + \mathbf{r}_i) - \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{r}_i) = \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{v}) \right) \right) \right] + \text{negl}(\lambda) . \end{aligned} \quad (65)$$

Now, observe that when

$$\tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{v}) \neq \pi(\mathbf{v}) \wedge \left(\bigwedge_{i \in [\lambda]} \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{v} + \mathbf{r}_i) - \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{r}_i) = \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{v}) \right)$$

occurs, we have either $\tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{v} + \mathbf{r}_i) \neq \pi(\mathbf{v} + \mathbf{r}_i)$ or $\tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{r}_i) \neq \pi(\mathbf{r}_i)$ for every $i \in [\lambda]$ since we have $\pi(\mathbf{v} + \mathbf{r}_i) - \pi(\mathbf{r}_i) = \pi(\mathbf{v})$ for every $i \in [\lambda]$ from the construction of our PCP. Then, since each $\mathbf{u}_{\ell,i}$ is defined by taking either \mathbf{r}_i or $\mathbf{v} + \mathbf{r}_i$ randomly, we have

$$\Pr_{\mathbf{v}, \{\mathbf{r}_i\}, U_\ell, \tilde{\pi}} \left[\left(\bigwedge_{\mathbf{u} \in U_\ell} \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{u}) = \pi(\mathbf{u}) \right) \wedge \left(\tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{v}) \neq \pi(\mathbf{v}) \wedge \left(\bigwedge_{i \in [\lambda]} \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{v} + \mathbf{r}_i) - \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{r}_i) = \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{v}) \right) \right) \right] \leq 2^{-\lambda} . \quad (66)$$

Thus, by combining Equations (65) and (66), we obtain Equation (64) as desired. This concludes the proof of Claim 9.

9.3 Proof of Claim 10

Fix any sufficiently large $\lambda \in \Lambda$. Fix any $\ell \in [\ell_{\max} - 1]$ and assume that Equation (59) holds. Our goal is to show Equation (60).

In this proof, we use

$$\Pr[E]_{U_\ell}$$

as the shorthand of

$$\Pr \left[E \mid \bigwedge_{\mathbf{u} \in U_\ell} \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{u}) = \pi(\mathbf{u}) \right] .$$

First, we notice that, to prove Claim 10, it suffices to show that for any $i^* \in [N_{\ell+1}]$, we have

$$\Pr \left[\tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{e}_{\ell+1, i^*}) = \pi(\mathbf{e}_{\ell+1, i^*}) \mid \begin{array}{l} U_\ell \leftarrow D_\ell^\lambda \\ (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \tilde{\pi}) \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{P^*}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \{\mathbf{e}_{\ell+1, i^*}\} \cup U_\ell) \end{array} \right]_{U_\ell} \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) , \quad (67)$$

where $\mathbf{e}_{\ell+1, i^*} := (0, \dots, 0, 1, 0, \dots, 0) \in \mathbb{F}^N$ is the vector such that only the $(N_{\leq \ell} + i^*)$ -th element is 1 (recall that $N_{\leq \ell} := \sum_{i \in [\ell]} N_i$). Indeed, if we have Equation (67), we can argue as in the proof of Claim 8 that for any $\mathbf{v} = \sum_{i \in [N_{\ell+1}]} d_i \mathbf{e}_{\ell+1, i}$ (where $d_1, \dots, d_{N_{\ell+1}} \in \{0, \dots, |\mathbb{F}| - 1\}$), we have

$$\Pr \left[\tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{v}) = \pi(\mathbf{v}) \mid \begin{array}{l} U_\ell \leftarrow D_\ell^\lambda \\ (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \tilde{\pi}) \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{P^*}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \{\mathbf{v}\} \cup U_\ell) \end{array} \right]_{U_\ell} \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) ,$$

and thus we can obtain Equation (60) from the no-signaling property of Self-Correct (Lemma 2) and the union bound.

Thus, our goal is to show Equation (67). To simplify the exposition, we only consider the case that $i^* \in [N_{\ell+1}]$ is such that the wire $(\ell + 1, i^*)$ is the output wire of an addition gate (other cases can be handled similarly), and denote the input wires of this addition gate by (ℓ, j^*) and (ℓ, k^*) . Now, from the consistency with the claimed computation of the self-corrected proof (Lemma 11) and Equation (59), we have

$$\Pr \left[\tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{e}_{\ell+1, i^*}) = \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{e}_{\ell, j^*}) + \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{e}_{\ell, k^*}) \mid \begin{array}{l} U_\ell \leftarrow D_\ell^\lambda \\ (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \tilde{\pi}) \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{P^*}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q \cup U_\ell) \\ \text{where } Q = \{\mathbf{e}_{\ell+1, i^*}, \mathbf{e}_{\ell, j^*}, \mathbf{e}_{\ell, k^*}\} \end{array} \right]_{U_\ell} \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) .$$

Then, since we have $\pi(\mathbf{e}_{\ell+1, i^*}) = \pi(\mathbf{e}_{\ell, j^*}) + \pi(\mathbf{e}_{\ell, k^*})$ from the construction of our PCP (Section 5), to show Equation (67) it suffices to show that

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{e}_{\ell, j^*}) = \pi(\mathbf{e}_{\ell, j^*}) \\ \wedge \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{e}_{\ell, k^*}) = \pi(\mathbf{e}_{\ell, k^*}) \end{array} \mid \begin{array}{l} U_\ell \leftarrow D_\ell^\lambda \\ (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \tilde{\pi}) \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{P^*}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q \cup U_\ell) \\ \text{where } Q = \{\mathbf{e}_{\ell+1, i^*}, \mathbf{e}_{\ell, j^*}, \mathbf{e}_{\ell, k^*}\} \end{array} \right]_{U_\ell} \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) . \quad (68)$$

Now, we notice that Equation (68) follows immediately from Equation (59), Claim 9, the no-signaling property of Self-Correct (Lemma 2), and the union bound.

This concludes the proof of Claim 10.

10 Analysis of Our PCP: Step 5 (Concluding Proof of No-signaling Soundness)

Finally, we conclude the proof of [Theorem 1](#). Recall that our goal is to show that for any circuit family $\{C_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$, any polynomial κ_{\max} such that $\kappa_{\max}(\lambda) \geq 2\lambda \cdot \max(8\lambda + 3, m_\lambda) + \kappa_V(\lambda)$, and any κ_{\max} -no-signaling cheating prover P^* , there exists a negligible function negl such that for every $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, we have

$$\Pr \left[V_1(\text{st}_V, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) = 1 \wedge C_\lambda(\mathbf{x}) \neq \mathbf{y} \mid \begin{array}{l} (Q, \text{st}_V) \leftarrow V(1^\lambda, C_\lambda) \\ (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) \leftarrow P^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q) \end{array} \right] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) .$$

(Recall that m_λ is the output length of C_λ and κ_V is the query complexity of (P, V) .) From [Lemma 1](#), it follows that toward this goal, it suffices to show that for any $\tilde{\kappa}_{\max}$ -wise no-signaling cheating prover \tilde{P}^* and negligible function negl , we have

$$\Pr \left[\tilde{V}_1(\text{st}_V, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) = 1 \wedge C_\lambda(\mathbf{x}) \neq \mathbf{y} \mid \begin{array}{l} (Q, \text{st}_V) \leftarrow V_0(1^\lambda, C_\lambda) \\ (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) \leftarrow \tilde{P}^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q) \end{array} \right] \leq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda), \quad (69)$$

for every sufficiently large $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, where $\tilde{\kappa}_{\max} := \kappa_{\max} - \kappa_V$. Furthermore, it is easy to see that to show Equation (69), it suffices to show that if there exists a negligible function negl such that we have

$$\Pr \left[\tilde{V}_1(\text{st}_V, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) = 1 \mid \begin{array}{l} (Q, \text{st}_V) \leftarrow V_0(1^\lambda, C_\lambda) \\ (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) \leftarrow \tilde{P}^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q) \end{array} \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) \quad (70)$$

for infinitely many $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ (let Λ be the set of those λ 's), then there exists another negligible function negl such that we have

$$\Pr \left[C_\lambda(\mathbf{x}) \neq \mathbf{y} \mid \begin{array}{l} (Q, \text{st}_V) \leftarrow V_0(1^\lambda, C_\lambda) \\ (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) \leftarrow \tilde{P}^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q) \end{array} \right] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) \quad (71)$$

for every sufficiently large $\lambda \in \Lambda$. Thus, we focus on showing Equation (71). Fix any P^* , and assume that we have Equation (70). Fix any sufficiently large $\lambda \in \Lambda$. (Note that we have

$$\tilde{\kappa}_{\max}(\lambda) = \kappa_{\max}(\lambda) - \kappa_V(\lambda) \geq 2\lambda \cdot \max(8\lambda + 3, m_\lambda) ,$$

so in particular [Self-Correct](#) is m -wise no-signaling.) First, from the consistency with the claimed computation of the self-corrected proof ([Lemma 10](#)) and the union bound, we have

$$\Pr \left[\bigwedge_{i \in [m]} \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{e}_{N-m+i}) = y_i \mid (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \tilde{\pi}) \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{P^*}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \{\mathbf{e}_{N-m+i}\}_{i \in [m]}) \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) .$$

On the other hand, from the consistency with the correct computation of the self-corrected proof ([Lemma 11](#)) and the union bound, we have

$$\Pr \left[\bigwedge_{i \in [m]} \tilde{\pi}(\mathbf{e}_{N-m+i}) = C_i(\mathbf{x}) \mid (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \tilde{\pi}) \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{P^*}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \{\mathbf{e}_{N-m+i}\}_{i \in [m]}) \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) .$$

From these two inequalities and the union bound, we obtain

$$\Pr \left[C_\lambda(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{y} \mid (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \tilde{\pi}) \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{P^*}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \{e_{N-m+i}\}_{i \in [m]}) \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) .$$

Then, we use the no-signaling property of Self-Correct (Lemma 2) to obtain

$$\Pr \left[C_\lambda(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{y} \mid (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \tilde{\pi}) \leftarrow \text{Self-Correct}^{P^*}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \emptyset) \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) ,$$

and use the statement indistinguishability of self-corrected proof (Lemma 3) to obtain

$$\Pr \left[C_\lambda(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{y} \mid (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) \leftarrow \tilde{P}^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \emptyset) \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) .$$

Now, we use the no-signaling property of \tilde{P}^* to obtain Equation (71). This concludes the proof of the no-signaling soundness of our PCP.

11 Application: Delegating Computation in Preprocessing Model

In this section, we give an application of our no-signaling linear PCP system to a 2-message delegation scheme for \mathcal{P} in the preprocessing model. As mentioned in Introduction, we obtain our delegation scheme by applying the transformation of Kalai et al. [KRR13, KRR14] on our no-signaling linear PCP system.

We remark that our delegation scheme is actually non-interactive in the sense that, after the verifier's message is computed and published in the (expensive) offline phase, anyone can prove a statement to the verifier in the online phase by sending a single message, and the same offline verifier message can be used for proving multiple statements in the online phase. Formally, this property is guaranteed due to the adaptive soundness of our delegation scheme, which guarantees that the soundness holds even when the statement to be proven is chosen after the verifier's message.

11.1 Technical Overview

In this subsection, we give an overview of our delegation scheme. Those who are familiar with the transformation of Kalai et al. [KRR13, KRR14] can skip this subsection.

Recall that in the setting of delegating computation, a computationally weak client asks a powerful server to perform a heavy computation, and the server returns the computation result to the client with a proof that the result is correct. Our focus is delegation schemes for arithmetic-circuit computation, so the statement to be proven by the server is of the form $(C, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})$, which states that an arithmetic circuit C outputs \mathbf{y} on input \mathbf{x} . For simplicity, in this overview, we consider a static soundness setting where the statement is fixed before the verifier's message is generated.

In our delegation scheme, we use the following two building blocks.

- Our no-signaling linear PCP system for deterministic arithmetic-circuit computation (Section 5).
- An additive homomorphic encryption scheme HE, which is an encryption scheme such that the message space is a finite group and that anyone can efficiently compute a ciphertext of $m_0 + m_1$ from ciphertexts of any two messages m_0, m_1 .

We assume that the message space of HE is a finite field \mathbb{F} of prime order, and consider delegation scheme for arithmetic circuits over this finite field \mathbb{F} .

The high-level structure of our delegation scheme is quite simple. When the statement is $(C, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})$, our scheme roughly proceeds as follows.

1. In the offline phase, the client firsts samples PCP queries Q of our PCP system, where $Q = \{q_i\}_{i \in [\kappa_V]}$ and $q_i = (q_{i,1}, \dots, q_{i,N'}) \in \mathbb{F}^{N'}$, where $N' := N + N^2$. Next, the client encrypts those queries by HE, where each query q_i is encrypted under a fresh key. (That is, for each $i \in [\kappa_V]$, the client samples a key pair (pk_i, sk_i) of HE and encrypts each $q_{i,j} \in \mathbb{F}$ ($j \in [N']$) under the public-key pk_i .) Finally, the verifier sends the resultant ciphertexts $\{\{ct_{i,1}, \dots, ct_{i,N'}\}_{i \in [\kappa_V]}\}$ to the server.
2. Given the ciphertexts of the PCP queries $\{\{ct_{i,1}, \dots, ct_{i,N'}\}_{i \in [\kappa_V]}\}$, the server obtain ciphertexts of the PCP answers by homomorphically evaluate the PCP oracle $\pi : \mathbb{F}^{N'} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$ under the ciphertexts (since π is a linear function, additive homomorphism of HE suffices for evaluating π ¹³), and then returns the resultant ciphertexts $\{\tilde{ct}_i\}_{i \in [\kappa_V]}$ to the client.
3. Given the ciphertexts of the PCP answers $\{\tilde{ct}_i\}_{i \in [\kappa_V]}$, the client obtains the PCP answers by decrypting $\{\tilde{ct}_i\}_{i \in [\kappa_V]}$ and then verifies the PCP answers by using the PCP decision algorithm.

The offline phase of our delegation scheme is expensive since the verifier query algorithm of our PCP system runs in time $\text{poly}(\lambda + |C|)$, while the online phase is efficient since the verifier decision algorithm of our PCP system runs in time $\text{poly}(\lambda + |x| + |y|)$. Very roughly speaking, the soundness of our scheme holds since, somewhat surprisingly, the semantic security of HE directly guarantees that the server can answer to the PCP queries under the ciphertexts of HE only in a no-signaling way. (Formally, in order to guarantee that the server is κ_{\max} -wise no-signaling for sufficiently large κ_{\max} , we need to change the above delegation scheme and add “dummy” queries to the PCP queries.)

Using multiplicative homomorphic encryption rather than additive one. We can replace the additive homomorphic encryption scheme in the above scheme with a multiplicative one over prime-order bilinear group as follows: we replace the scheme so that, instead of encrypting the PCP queries $\{(q_{i,1}, \dots, q_{i,N})\}_{i \in [\kappa_V]}$ directly, the client encrypts $\{g^{q_{i,1}}, \dots, g^{q_{i,N}}\}$, where g is a generator of the bilinear group, and the server homomorphically evaluates the PCP oracle in the exponent of g using the multiplicative homomorphic property of HE. Since the PCP verification algorithm only involves quadratic tests on the PCP answers, the client can verify the PCP answers even when the PCP answers are encoded in the exponent of g . (Unfortunately, the security analysis cannot be straightforwardly modified to work for this modified scheme.)

11.2 Preliminaries

In this subsection, we first give the definition of delegation scheme and next give the definition of homomorphic encryption schemes.

Preprocessing non-interactive delegation scheme. For concreteness, we focus our attention on 2-message delegation schemes with adaptive soundness, or in other words, non-interactive delegation schemes in the preprocessing model where the preprocess consists of a single message from the verifier. We remark that the following definition is essentially identical with the definition of preprocessing SNARGs (e.g., [BCI⁺13]) as well as the definition of adaptively sound 2-message delegation schemes of [BHK17, BKK⁺17]. The difference is that the following definition is tailored for deterministic arithmetic circuit computation.

A *preprocessing non-interactive delegation scheme* consists of three polynomial-time algorithms (Gen, Prove, Verify) with the following syntax.

¹³ Since \mathbb{F} is of prime order, it is possible to compute $\text{Enc}(pk, v \cdot m)$ from $\text{Enc}(pk, m)$ for any $v, m \in \mathbb{F}$.

- **Gen** is a probabilistic algorithm such that on input the security parameter 1^λ and an arithmetic circuit C , it outputs a public-key pk and a secret key sk .
- **Prove** is a deterministic algorithm such that on input the public-key pk , the circuit C , and an input \mathbf{x} of C , it outputs a proof pr .
- **Verify** is a deterministic algorithm such that on input the secret key sk , the input \mathbf{x} , the output \mathbf{y} , and the proof pr , it outputs a bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$.

The execution of preprocessing non-interactive delegation schemes is separated into two phases, the *offline phase* and the *online phase*.

- **Offline phase:** First, the verifier obtains an arithmetic circuit C that it wants to let the prover compute. Next, the verifier obtains (pk, sk) by running **Gen** on C and sends pk to the prover. After executing **Gen**, the prover can erase the circuit C .
- **Online phase:** The prover, on input \mathbf{x} (which is obtained either from the verifier or from any other process), computes the output $\mathbf{y} = C(\mathbf{x})$ and the proof $\text{pr} = \text{Prove}(\text{pk}, C, \mathbf{x})$ and then sends $(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \text{pr})$ to the verifier. Given $(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \text{pr})$, the verifier verifies the proof by running $\text{Verify}(\text{sk}, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \text{pr})$. The online phase can be repeated multiple times on the same public key and secret key (see [Remark 9](#) below).

Note that delegation scheme is meaningful only when the running time of **Verify** is much smaller than the time that is needed for computing $C(\mathbf{x})$.

The security requirements of preprocessing non-interactive delegation schemes are the following.

Correctness. For every security parameter $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, arithmetic circuit C , and input \mathbf{x} of C ,

$$\Pr \left[\text{Verify}(\text{sk}, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \text{pr}) = 1 \mid \begin{array}{l} (\text{pk}, \text{sk}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\lambda, C) \\ \mathbf{y} := C(\mathbf{x}) \\ \text{pr} := \text{Prove}(\text{pk}, C, \mathbf{x}) \end{array} \right] = 1 .$$

Soundness. For every circuit family $\{C_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ and PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , there exists a negligible function negl such that for every $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$,

$$\Pr \left[\text{Verify}(\text{sk}, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \text{pr}) = 1 \wedge C_\lambda(\mathbf{x}) \neq \mathbf{y} \mid \begin{array}{l} (\text{pk}, \text{sk}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda) \\ (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \text{pr}) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \text{pk}) \end{array} \right] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) .$$

Remark 9. It is easy to see that if a delegation scheme is sound w.r.t. the above definition, it remains sound even when the same (pk, sk) is used for generating multiple proofs as long as the results of the verification are kept secret against the cheating provers (or, equivalently, as long as a new public-key–secret-key pair is generated when the verification of a proof is rejected).¹⁴ \diamond

Homomorphic encryption. A *public-key encryption scheme* consists of three polynomial-time algorithms (**Gen**, **Enc**, **Dec**) with the following syntax.

- **Gen** is a probabilistic algorithm such that on input the security parameter 1^λ , it outputs a public-key pk and a secret key sk .

¹⁴ Previous designated-verifier delegation schemes (such as the schemes of [BHK17] and subsequent works) also have this restriction.

- Enc is a probabilistic algorithm such that on input the public-key pk and a message $m \in \mathbb{F}$, it outputs a ciphertext ct . (It is assumed that pk contains the information of a finite field \mathbb{F} , which works as the message space.)
- Dec is a deterministic algorithm such that on input the secret-key sk and the ciphertext ct , it outputs the plaintext m .

For any vector \mathbf{v} , we denote by $\text{Enc}(\mathbf{v})$ the element-wise encryption of \mathbf{v} .

The following security notion of public-key encryption schemes is used in this paper (it is easy to see that the following security notion is implied by the standard CPA-security through a simple hybrid argument).

Definition 5 ((multi-key multi-message) CPA-security). For every polynomial p and PPT adversary $\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{A}_0, \mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2)$, there exists a negligible function negl such that for every security parameter $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ and every $z \in \{0, 1\}^{\text{poly}(\lambda)}$,

$$\Pr \left[b = \tilde{b} \left| \begin{array}{l} (\ell, \text{st}_0) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_0(1^\lambda, z), \text{ where } \ell \leq p(\lambda) \\ (\text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\lambda) \text{ for every } i \in [\ell] \\ ((m_{0,1}, \dots, m_{0,\ell}), (m_{1,1}, \dots, m_{1,\ell}), \text{st}_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1(\text{st}_0, \text{pk}_1, \dots, \text{pk}_\ell) \\ b \leftarrow \{0, 1\} \\ \text{ct}_i^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{pk}_i, m_{b,i}) \text{ for every } i \in [\ell] \\ \tilde{b} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_2(\text{st}_1, \text{ct}_1^*, \dots, \text{ct}_\ell^*) \end{array} \right. \right] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}(\lambda) .$$

◇

A public-key encryption scheme $(\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ is *additive homomorphic* if it has an additional PPT algorithm Eval^+ such that, on input $\text{ct}_0 \leftarrow \text{Enc}(m_0)$ and $\text{ct}_1 \leftarrow \text{Enc}(m_1)$ for any $m_0, m_1 \in \mathbb{F}$, it outputs $\text{Enc}(m_0 + m_1)$. Formally, Eval^+ is required to satisfy the following property.

Homomorphic Evaluation. For every PPT adversary \mathcal{A} and every $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$,

$$\Pr \left[\tilde{m} = m_0 + m_1 \left| \begin{array}{l} (\text{pk}, \text{sk}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\lambda) \\ (m_0, m_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{pk}, \text{sk}), \text{ where } m_0, m_1 \in \mathbb{F} \\ \text{ct}_b \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{pk}, m_b) \text{ for every } b \in \{0, 1\} \\ \text{ct} \leftarrow \text{Eval}^+(\text{pk}, \text{ct}_0, \text{ct}_1) \\ \tilde{m} := \text{Dec}(\text{sk}, \text{ct}) \end{array} \right. \right] = 1 .$$

To simplify the exposition, for any two ciphertext ct_0, ct_1 under a public-key pk , we use $\text{ct}_0 + \text{ct}_1$ as a shorthand of $\text{Eval}^+(\text{pk}, \text{ct}_0, \text{ct}_1)$. Similarly, for any ciphertext ct and a scalar $k \in \mathbb{N}$, we use $k \cdot \text{ct}$ as a shorthand of $\underbrace{\text{ct} + \dots + \text{ct}}_k$.

A public-key encryption scheme is *multiplicative homomorphic* if it has a PPT algorithm Eval^* that satisfies the above property w.r.t. multiplication over \mathbb{F} .

11.3 Our Result

Theorem 2. Assume the existence of an additive homomorphic encryption scheme over fields of prime order (i.e., over the additive group of the fields) or a multiplicative homomorphic encryption scheme over bilinear groups with prime order. Then, there exists a preprocessing non-interactive delegation scheme for polynomial-time arithmetic-circuit computation with the following efficiency.

- The running time of Gen is $\text{poly}(\lambda + |C|)$.
- The running time of Prove is $\text{poly}(\lambda + |C|)$.
- The running time of Verify is $\text{poly}(\lambda + |x| + |y|)$.

Proof. We focus on the case of additive homomorphic encryption schemes over fields of prime orders. (The case of multiplicative homomorphic encryption schemes over bilinear groups is discussed in Appendix A.) Let (HE.Gen, HE.Enc, HE.Dec) be the additive homomorphic encryption scheme and (PCP.P, PCP.V) be the PCP prover and verifiers of our PCP system (Section 5). Recall that our PCP system satisfies the following properties.

- It can handle arithmetic circuits over any prime-order fields. Furthermore, there exists a polynomial κ_{\max} such that the soundness holds against any κ_{\max} -wise no-signaling adversaries.¹⁵
- For an arithmetic circuit C over a finite field \mathbb{F} , PCP.P outputs a linear function $\pi : \mathbb{F}^{N+N^2} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$ as the PCP proof, where N is the number of wires in C . (To simplify the notations, we let $N' := N+N^2$ in what follows.) Since π is linear, there exists $d_1, \dots, d_{N'} \in \mathbb{F}$ such that $\pi(\mathbf{z}) = \sum_{i \in [N']} d_i z_i$.
- For an arithmetic circuit C over a finite field \mathbb{F} , PCP.V₀ outputs a set of queries $Q = \{q_i\}_{i \in [\kappa_V(\lambda)]} \subset \mathbb{F}^{N'}$ and a state $\text{st}_V \in \mathbb{F}^{n+m}$, where κ_V is a polynomial (which is independent of C) and n, m are the input and output length of C .

We assume that for every security parameter λ , the arithmetic circuit C to be delegated is defined over a finite field \mathbb{F} that is also the message space of HE.

Construction. The three algorithms (Gen, Prove, Verify) are defined as follows.

– **Algorithm Gen**($1^\lambda, C$)

1. Run $(Q, \text{st}_V) \leftarrow \text{PCP.V}_0(1^\lambda, C)$.
Then, parse Q as $\{\mathbf{q}_i\}_{i \in [\kappa_V(\lambda)]}$, where $\mathbf{q}_i = (q_{i,1}, \dots, q_{i,N'}) \in \mathbb{F}^{N'}$.
2. Define $\text{ct}_1, \dots, \text{ct}_{\kappa_{\max}(\lambda)}$ as follows.
 - (a) Choose a random injective function $\tau : [\kappa_V(\lambda)] \rightarrow [\kappa_{\max}(\lambda)]$.
 - (b) Define ct_i for each $i \in [\kappa_{\max}(\lambda)]$ by

$$\text{ct}_i \leftarrow \begin{cases} \text{HE.Enc}(\text{HE.pk}_i, \mathbf{q}_{\tau^{-1}(i)}) & (\text{if } \exists i' \in [\kappa_V(\lambda)] \text{ s.t. } \tau(i') = i) \\ \text{HE.Enc}(\text{HE.pk}_i, \mathbf{0}) & (\text{otherwise}) \end{cases},$$

where $(\text{HE.pk}_i, \text{HE.sk}_i) \leftarrow \text{HE.Gen}(1^\lambda)$ and $\mathbf{0} := (0, \dots, 0) \in \mathbb{F}^{N'}$.

3. Output $\text{pk} := (\text{ct}_1, \dots, \text{ct}_{\kappa_{\max}(\lambda)})$ and $\text{sk} := (\text{st}_V, \tau, \{\text{HE.sk}_i\}_{i \in [\kappa_{\max}(\lambda)]})$.

– **Algorithm Prove**(pk, C, \mathbf{x})

1. Run $\pi \leftarrow \text{PCP.P}(C, \mathbf{x})$.
Let $d_1, \dots, d_{N'} \in \mathbb{F}$ be such that $\pi(\mathbf{z}) = \sum_{i \in [N']} d_i z_i$.
2. Parse pk as $(\text{ct}_1, \dots, \text{ct}_{\kappa_{\max}(\lambda)})$, where $\text{ct}_i = (\text{ct}_{i,1}, \dots, \text{ct}_{i,N'})$.
Then, perform homomorphic operation to obtain

$$\tilde{\text{ct}}_i := \pi(\text{ct}_i) = \sum_{j \in [N']} d_j \text{ct}_{i,j}$$

for every $i \in [\kappa_{\max}(\lambda)]$.

3. Output $\text{pr} := (\tilde{\text{ct}}_1, \dots, \tilde{\text{ct}}_{\kappa_{\max}(\lambda)})$.

– **Algorithm Verify**($\text{sk}, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \text{pr}$)

1. Parse sk as $(\text{st}_V, \tau, \{\text{HE.sk}_i\}_{i \in [\kappa_{\max}(\lambda)]})$, and pr as $(\tilde{\text{ct}}_1, \dots, \tilde{\text{ct}}_{\kappa_{\max}(\lambda)})$.
Then, run $a_i := \text{HE.Dec}(\text{HE.sk}_{\tau(i)}, \tilde{\text{ct}}_{\tau(i)})$ for every $i \in [\kappa_V(\lambda)]$.
2. Output $b := \text{PCP.V}_1(\text{st}_V, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \{a_i\}_{i \in [\kappa_V(\lambda)]})$.

¹⁵ Formally, κ_{\max} depends on m , which is an upper bound of the output length of the circuits to be considered.

Security Analysis. Correctness can be verified by inspection, so we focus on the proof of soundness.

Fix any circuit family $\{C_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ and a PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , and assume for contradiction that we have

$$\Pr \left[\text{Verify}(\text{sk}, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \text{pr}) = 1 \wedge C_\lambda(\mathbf{x}) \neq \mathbf{y} \mid \begin{array}{l} (\text{pk}, \text{sk}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda) \\ (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \text{pr}) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \text{pk}) \end{array} \right] \geq \frac{1}{\text{poly}(\lambda)} \quad (72)$$

for infinitely many $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$. Our goal is to obtain, by using \mathcal{A} , a successful κ_{\max} -wise no-signaling cheating prover against our PCP system. That is, our goal is to obtain a κ_{\max} -wise no-signaling cheating prover PCP.P^* such that

$$\Pr \left[\text{PCP.V}_1(\text{st}_V, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) = 1 \wedge C_\lambda(\mathbf{x}) \neq \mathbf{y} \mid \begin{array}{l} (Q, \text{st}_V) \leftarrow \text{PCP.V}_0(1^\lambda, C_\lambda) \\ (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) \leftarrow \text{PCP.P}^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q) \end{array} \right] \geq \frac{1}{\text{poly}(\lambda)} \quad (73)$$

holds for infinitely many $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$.

Consider the following PPT κ_{\max} -wise cheating prover PCP.P^* against our PCP system. (Essentially, PCP.P^* internally executes \mathcal{A} while emulating Gen and Verify for \mathcal{A} .)

– **Adversary $\text{PCP.P}^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q)$**

1. Parse Q as $\{\mathbf{q}_i\}_{i \in [\kappa]}$, where $\mathbf{q}_i = (q_{i,1}, \dots, q_{i,N'}) \in \mathbb{F}^{N'}$ and $\kappa := |Q|$.
2. Define $\text{ct}_1, \dots, \text{ct}_{\kappa_{\max}(\lambda)}$ as follows.
 - (a) Choose a random injective function $\tau : [\kappa] \rightarrow [\kappa_{\max}(\lambda)]$.
 - (b) Define ct_i for each $i \in [\kappa_{\max}(\lambda)]$ by

$$\text{ct}_i \leftarrow \begin{cases} \text{HE.Enc}(\text{HE.pk}_i, \mathbf{q}_{\tau^{-1}(i)}) & (\text{if } \exists i' \in [\kappa] \text{ s.t. } \tau(i') = i) \\ \mathbf{0} & (\text{otherwise}) \end{cases},$$

where $(\text{HE.pk}_i, \text{HE.sk}_i) \leftarrow \text{HE.Gen}(1^\lambda)$ and $\mathbf{0} := (0, \dots, 0) \in \mathbb{F}^{N'}$.

3. Run $(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \text{pr}) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \text{pk})$, where $\text{pk} := (\text{ct}_1, \dots, \text{ct}_{\kappa_{\max}(\lambda)})$.
4. Parse pr as $(\tilde{\text{ct}}_1, \dots, \tilde{\text{ct}}_{\kappa_{\max}(\lambda)})$
Then, run $a_i := \text{HE.Dec}(\text{HE.sk}_{\tau(i)}, \tilde{\text{ct}}_{\tau(i)})$ for every $i \in [\kappa]$.
5. Output $(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*)$, where $\pi^* : Q \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$ is a function such that $\pi^*(\mathbf{q}_i) = a_i$ for every $\mathbf{q}_i \in Q$.

From the construction of PCP.P^* , we directly obtain Equation (73) from (72). (Observe that PCP.P^* perfectly emulates Gen and Verify for \mathcal{A} .)

Thus, it remains to show that PCP.P^* is κ_{\max} -wise no-signaling. That is, it remains to show that for every PPT distinguisher \mathcal{D}_{NS} , there exists a negligible function negl such that for every $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, every Q, Q' such that $Q' \subset Q$ and $|Q| \leq \kappa_{\max}(\lambda)$, and every $z \in \{0, 1\}^{\text{poly}(\lambda)}$,

$$\left| \Pr \left[\mathcal{D}_{\text{NS}}(C_\lambda, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*|_{Q'}, z) = 1 \mid (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) \leftarrow \text{PCP.P}^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q) \right] - \Pr \left[\mathcal{D}_{\text{NS}}(C_\lambda, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*, z) = 1 \mid (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) \leftarrow \text{PCP.P}^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q') \right] \right| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) . \quad (74)$$

We show this indistinguishability by relying on the the multi-key multi-message CPA-security of HE ([Definition 5](#)). Fix any \mathcal{D}_{NS} , $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, Q and Q' such that $Q' \subset Q$ and $|Q| \leq \kappa_{\max}(\lambda)$, and z . Let $z' := (z, C_\lambda, Q, Q')$. Then, consider the following adversary $\mathcal{A}^{\text{HE}} = (\mathcal{A}_0^{\text{HE}}, \mathcal{A}_1^{\text{HE}}, \mathcal{A}_2^{\text{HE}})$ against HE. (Essentially, \mathcal{A}^{HE} internally executes \mathcal{A}_{NS} and \mathcal{D}_{NS} while emulating PCP.P^* for them.)

– **Adversary $\mathcal{A}_0^{\text{HE}}(1^\lambda, z')$.**

1. Parse z' as (z, C_λ, Q, Q') .

2. Output (ℓ, st_0) , where $\ell := |Q \setminus Q'|$ and $\text{st}_0 := z'$.
- **Adversary** $\mathcal{A}_1^{\text{HE}}(\text{st}_0, \text{HE.pk}_1, \dots, \text{HE.pk}_\ell)$.
 1. Parse st_0 as (z, C_λ, Q, Q') , and parse Q as $\{\mathbf{q}_i\}_{i \in [\kappa]}$, where $\kappa := |Q|$. Let i_1, \dots, i_ℓ be such that $Q \setminus Q' = \{\mathbf{q}_{i_k}\}_{k \in [\ell]}$.
 2. Output $((\mathbf{q}_{i_1}, \dots, \mathbf{q}_{i_\ell}), (\mathbf{0}, \dots, \mathbf{0}))$ and $\text{st}_1 := \text{st}_0$.
 - **Adversary** $\mathcal{A}_2^{\text{HE}}(\text{st}_1, \text{ct}_1^*, \dots, \text{ct}_\ell^*)$.
 1. Parse st_1 as (z, C_λ, Q, Q') , and parse Q as $\{\mathbf{q}_i\}_{i \in [\ell]}$. Let i_1, \dots, i_ℓ be defined as above.
 2. Define $\text{ct}_1, \dots, \text{ct}_{\kappa_{\max}(\lambda)}$ as follows.
 - (a) Choose a random injective function $\tau : [\kappa] \rightarrow [\kappa_{\max}(\lambda)]$.
 - (b) Define $\text{ct}_{\tau(i_1)}, \dots, \text{ct}_{\tau(i_\ell)}$ by renaming $\text{ct}_1^*, \dots, \text{ct}_\ell^*$ as $\text{ct}_{\tau(i_1)}, \dots, \text{ct}_{\tau(i_\ell)}$.
 - (c) Define ct_i for each $i \in [\kappa_{\max}(\lambda)] \setminus \{\tau(i_k)\}_{k \in [\ell]}$ by
$$\text{ct}_i \leftarrow \begin{cases} \text{HE.Enc}(\text{HE.pk}_i, \mathbf{q}_{\tau^{-1}(i)}) & (\text{if } \exists i' \in [\kappa] \setminus \{i_k\}_{k \in [\ell]} \text{ s.t. } \tau(i') = i) \\ \text{HE.Enc}(\text{HE.pk}_i, \mathbf{0}) & (\text{otherwise}) \end{cases},$$
- where $(\text{HE.pk}_i, \text{HE.sk}_i) \leftarrow \text{HE.Gen}(1^\lambda)$ and $\mathbf{0} := (0, \dots, 0) \in \mathbb{F}^{N'}$.
3. Run $(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \text{pr}) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, \text{pk})$, where $\text{pk} := (\text{ct}_1, \dots, \text{ct}_{\kappa_{\max}(\lambda)})$.
 4. Parse pr as $(\tilde{\text{ct}}_1, \dots, \tilde{\text{ct}}_{\kappa_{\max}(\lambda)})$
Then, run $a_i := \text{HE.Dec}(\text{HE.sk}_{\tau(i)}, \tilde{\text{ct}}_{\tau(i)})$ for every $i \in [\kappa] \setminus \{i_k\}_{k \in [\ell]}$.
 5. Output $\tilde{b} \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\text{NS}}(C_\lambda, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*, z)$, where $\pi^* : Q' \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$ is a function such that $\pi^*(\mathbf{q}_i) = a_i$ for every $\mathbf{q}_i \in Q'$. (Observe that $Q' = \{\mathbf{q}_i\}_{i \in [\kappa] \setminus \{i_k\}_{k \in [\ell]}}$ holds since $Q' \subset Q$.)

From the construction of \mathcal{A}^{HE} , we have

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr \left[\mathcal{A}_2^{\text{HE}}(\text{st}_1, \text{ct}_1^*, \dots, \text{ct}_\ell^*) = 1 \mid \begin{array}{l} (\ell, \text{st}_0) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_0(1^\lambda, z'), \text{ where } \ell \leq \kappa_{\max}(\lambda) \\ (\text{HE.pk}_i, \text{HE.sk}_i) \leftarrow \text{HE.Gen}(1^\lambda) \text{ for every } i \in [\ell] \\ ((\mathbf{m}_1, \dots, \mathbf{m}_\ell), (\mathbf{0}, \dots, \mathbf{0}), \text{st}_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1^{\text{HE}}(\text{st}_0, \text{HE.pk}_1, \dots, \text{HE.pk}_\ell) \\ \text{ct}_i^* \leftarrow \text{HE.Enc}(\text{HE.pk}_i, \mathbf{m}_i) \text{ for every } i \in [\ell] \end{array} \right] \\ = \Pr \left[\mathcal{D}_{\text{NS}}(C_\lambda, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^* |_{Q'}, z) = 1 \mid (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) \leftarrow \text{PCP.P}^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q) \right] \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr \left[\mathcal{A}_2^{\text{HE}}(\text{st}_1, \text{ct}_1^*, \dots, \text{ct}_\ell^*) = 1 \mid \begin{array}{l} (\ell, \text{st}_0) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_0(1^\lambda, z'), \text{ where } \ell \leq \kappa_{\max}(\lambda) \\ (\text{HE.pk}_i, \text{HE.sk}_i) \leftarrow \text{HE.Gen}(1^\lambda) \text{ for every } i \in [\ell] \\ ((\mathbf{m}_1, \dots, \mathbf{m}_\ell), (\mathbf{0}, \dots, \mathbf{0}), \text{st}_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1^{\text{HE}}(\text{st}_0, \text{HE.pk}_1, \dots, \text{HE.pk}_\ell) \\ \text{ct}_i^* \leftarrow \text{HE.Enc}(\text{HE.pk}_i, \mathbf{0}_i) \text{ for every } i \in [\ell] \end{array} \right] \\ = \Pr \left[\mathcal{D}_{\text{NS}}(C_\lambda, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*, z) = 1 \mid (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \pi^*) \leftarrow \text{PCP.P}^*(1^\lambda, C_\lambda, Q') \right]. \end{aligned}$$

(Observe that \mathcal{A}^{HE} perfectly emulates PCP.P^* for \mathcal{A}_{NS} and \mathcal{D}_{NS} in both cases.) Thus, from the (multi-key multi-message) CPA-security of HE, we obtain Equation (74).

Efficiency. By inspection, it can be verified that our delegation scheme indeed has the following efficiency.

- The running time of Gen is $\text{poly}(\lambda + |C|)$.
- The running time of Prove is $\text{poly}(\lambda + |C|)$.
- The running time of Verify is $\text{poly}(\lambda + |\mathbf{x}| + |\mathbf{y}|)$.

This concludes the proof of [Theorem 2](#). □

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A Delegation Scheme based on Multiplicative Homomorphic Encryption

In this section, we explain how we prove [Theorem 2](#) in the case of using multiplicative homomorphic encryption schemes over prime-order bilinear groups.

Construction. The construction is based on the one that we give in [Section 11.3](#) for the case of additive homomorphic encryption schemes. In the following, the differences are highlighted by red.

– Algorithm Gen($1^\lambda, C$)

1. Run $(Q, \text{st}_V) \leftarrow \text{PCP.V}_0(1^\lambda, C)$.
Then, parse Q as $\{\mathbf{q}_i\}_{i \in [\kappa_V(\lambda)]}$, where $\mathbf{q}_i = (q_{i,1}, \dots, q_{i,N'}) \in \mathbb{F}^{N'}$.
2. Choose a bilinear group (G, G_T, e) with order $|\mathbb{F}|$ and its generator g , and define $\text{ct}_1, \dots, \text{ct}_{\kappa_{\max}(\lambda)}$ as follows.
 - (a) Choose a random injective function $\tau : [\kappa_V(\lambda)] \rightarrow [\kappa_{\max}(\lambda)]$.
 - (b) Define ct_i for each $i \in [\kappa_{\max}(\lambda)]$ by

$$\text{ct}_i \leftarrow \begin{cases} \text{HE.Enc}(\text{HE.pk}_i, g^{q_{\tau^{-1}(i)}}) & (\text{if } \exists i' \in [\kappa_V(\lambda)] \text{ s.t. } \tau(i') = i) \\ \text{HE.Enc}(\text{HE.pk}_i, \mathbf{1}) & (\text{otherwise}) \end{cases},$$

where $(\text{HE.pk}_i, \text{HE.sk}_i) \leftarrow \text{HE.Gen}(1^\lambda, g^{q_{\tau^{-1}(i)}} := (g^{q_{\tau^{-1}(i),1}}, \dots, g^{q_{\tau^{-1}(i),N'}})$, and $\mathbf{1} := (1, \dots, 1) \in G^{N'}$.

3. Output $\text{pk} := (\text{ct}_1, \dots, \text{ct}_{\kappa_{\max}(\lambda)})$ and $\text{sk} := (\text{st}_V, \tau, \{\text{HE.sk}_i\}_{i \in [\kappa_{\max}(\lambda)]}, (G, G_T, e), g)$.

– Algorithm Prove($\text{pk}, C, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}$)

1. Run $\pi \leftarrow \text{PCP.P}(C, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})$.
Let $d_1, \dots, d_{N'} \in \mathbb{F}$ be such that $\pi(z) = \sum_{i \in [N']} d_i z_i$.
2. Parse pk as $(\text{ct}_1, \dots, \text{ct}_{\kappa_{\max}(\lambda)})$, where $\text{ct}_i = (\text{ct}_{i,1}, \dots, \text{ct}_{i,N'})$.
Then, perform homomorphic operation to obtain

$$\tilde{\text{ct}}_i := \prod_{j \in [N']} \text{ct}_{i,j}^{d_j}$$

for every $i \in [\kappa_{\max}(\lambda)]$.

3. Output $\text{pr} := (\tilde{\text{ct}}_1, \dots, \tilde{\text{ct}}_{\kappa_{\max}(\lambda)})$.
- **Algorithm Verify**($\text{sk}, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \text{pr}$)
1. Parse sk as $(\text{st}_V, \tau, \{\text{HE.sk}_i\}_{i \in [\kappa_{\max}(\lambda)]}, (G, G_T, e), g)$, and pr as $(\tilde{\text{ct}}_1, \dots, \tilde{\text{ct}}_{\kappa_{\max}(\lambda)})$.
Then, run $a_i := \text{HE.Dec}(\text{HE.sk}_{\tau(i)}, \tilde{\text{ct}}_{\tau(i)})$ for every $i \in [\kappa_V(\lambda)]$.
 2. Output $b := \text{PCP.V}'_1(\text{st}_V, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \{a_i\}_{i \in [\kappa_V(\lambda)]})$, where $\text{PCP.V}'_1$ is an algorithm that runs PCP.V_1 in the exponent of g by using the bilinear map e .

A.1 Security Analysis.

The analysis is also based on the one that we give in [Section 11.3](#) for the case of additive homomorphic encryption schemes. That is, given any successful cheating PPT adversary against the above scheme, we obtain a cheating PCP prover PCP.P^* , and show that it successfully fools the PCP verifier as well as that it is κ_{\max} -wise no-signaling.

The problem is that if we obtain the PCP prover PCP.P^* in the same way as in [Section 11.3](#), PCP.P^* runs in super-polynomial time since the PCP answers in the delegation scheme are now encoded in the exponent of g and PCP.P^* need to solve the discrete-logarithm problem to obtain the PCP answers. This is problematic since, if PCP.P^* runs in super-polynomial time, we can no longer show the no-signaling property of PCP.P^* under the semantic security of HE, which holds only against PPT adversaries.

To overcome this problem, we modify our PCP system so that the prover returns the PCP answers in the exponent of a generator of a bilinear group (which is chosen by the verifier as a public parameter), and the verifier runs the verification algorithm in the exponent by using the bilinear map (recall that the verification algorithm of our (original) PCP system only checks quadratic equations on the PCP answers). It is easy to see that if this modified PCP system is sound against κ_{\max} -wise no-signaling cheating provers, we can prove the soundness of the above delegating scheme as in [Section 11.3](#). Furthermore, it can be verified by inspection that the analysis of our original PCP system ([Section 6](#) to [Section 10](#)) can be straightforwardly modified so that it works for the above modified PCP system. (A key point is every event that we consider in the analysis can be efficiently checked by quadratic tests on PCP answers.)